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Dear Attorney-General 
It is with pleasure that I submit to you the Administrative Review Council’s report 
Federal Judicial Review in Australia. 
Judicial review provides an important avenue of appeal for those affected by government 
decision making.  It is a central feature of the administrative law system as a means of 
ensuring the accountability of officials for the legality of their actions.   
The Council considers the judicial review system in light of recent jurisprudence 
interpreting the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, as well as the Australian 
Constitution and the Judiciary Act 1903.  The Council revisits—and in some cases, revises—
many of its previous recommendations in relation to judicial review.  Recent 
developments, in the migration jurisdiction in particular, have significantly shaped the 
judicial review landscape in Australia. 
We look forward to your consideration of this body of work. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION 
The Administrative Review Council has examined in detail the various aspects of the federal 
judicial review system in Australia.  The current system is a product of its constitutional context 
and the history of reforms in this area. There are several different mechanisms for seeking 
judicial review of Australian Government decisions and actions, and the Council makes 
recommendations for better integration of the review mechanisms and access to judicial review 
in federal courts. 
The Council’s recommendations build from the constitutional basis of judicial review, 
recognising that, while section 75(v) of the Australian Constitution provides an important 
minimum standard of review, it may not provide the most effective model for review.  Ultimately 
the Council considers that a judicial review statute such as the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) allows the legislature to: affirm the importance of the legal 
accountability of administrative decision makers, identify potential grounds upon which their 
decisions can be challenged; provide for the right to request reasons; and offer clear guidance on 
standing and remedies.  The Council’s recommendations therefore focus on restoring the 
ADJR Act to a central place in the federal judicial review system. 
CONTEXT—A FRAGMENTED SYSTEM 
In the Australian federal system, the starting point for any discussion of judicial review is s 75(v) 
of the Constitution.  Section 75(v) confers original jurisdiction on the High Court of Australia ‘in 
all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an 
officer of the Commonwealth’. 
Before 1980, s 75(v) was the primary means of seeking judicial review of Commonwealth 
Government decisions and actions, as federal judicial review jurisdiction was not fully conferred 
on State Supreme Courts.  Due to the operation of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (Judiciary Act), the 
High Court had exclusive jurisdiction to grant mandamus and prohibition. This meant that an 
individual needed to seek judicial review from the High Court, by way of a prerogative writ, and 
without the benefit of identified grounds for seeking review.  The Council considers that this is 
neither an easily accessible way for an individual to seek review of the actions of government 
officials, nor a good use of the resources of the High Court. 
In contrast, State Supreme Courts have inherent power to conduct judicial review as a matter of 
common law.  While the High Court’s decision in Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW)1 has given the 
inherent judicial review powers of State Supreme Courts a basis in the Constitution, there are 
important differences between judicial review in the States and Territories and at the federal 
level.  State Supreme Courts have a general review power, and assess the availability of remedies 
in particular cases.  In the case of federal courts, the jurisdiction to conduct review is granted by 
                                                          
1  (2010) 239 CLR 531. 
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the Constitution or by specific legislation, and is subject to jurisdictional limits on the grant of 
power in those instruments. 
In 1971, the Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee chaired by Sir John Kerr (Kerr 
Committee) recommended significant changes to the federal system for review of government 
decisions.  The Kerr Committee’s recommendations included codifying the grounds of judicial 
review and simplifying procedures for review applications, as well as establishing a superior 
federal court with jurisdiction to hear judicial review applications. Following these 
recommendations, the Committee of Review of Prerogative Writ Procedures, chaired by 
RJ Ellicott QC (Ellicott Committee) examined the Kerr Committee’s proposals for a reformed 
system of judicial review.  In 1973, the Ellicott Committee endorsed the view that the state of 
the law relating to judicial review of administrative action was technical and complex and in need 
of reform, simplification and legislative statement. 
The ADJR Act passed through Parliament in 1977 and came into force in 1980, introducing a 
simplified procedure for applying for review, a list of grounds and flexible remedies expressed in 
plain language.  Establishing the Federal Court of Australia also meant that the High Court was 
no longer the primary forum for judicial review. 
The aim of the ADJR Act was to codify the common law of judicial review and to be the primary 
means of seeking review of government decisions.  The ADJR Act was not, however, intended 
to cover all administrative decisions.  For example, it cannot be relied upon for seeking review of 
non-statutory administrative decisions.  In addition, Australian Government policy has 
determined that a number of areas of statutory decision making should be excluded from the 
ADJR Act.  While some exclusions were included in the ADJR Act from its inception, others 
were carved out of the ambit of the Act at a later stage—most notably migration decisions. 
The restrictions on the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to conduct review under the ADJR Act 
resulted in a number of applications being made to the High Court under s 75(v) of the 
Constitution.  Although the High Court had the power to remit matters back to the Federal Court 
under s 44 of the Judiciary Act, this placed an administrative burden on the High Court.  To 
address this issue, s 39B(1) was inserted into the Judiciary Act, granting the Federal Court the 
same jurisdiction as the High Court under s 75(v). 
Further developments in the judicial review landscape included the establishment of the Federal 
Magistrates Court, which also assumed equivalent jurisdiction to the High Court under s 75(v) to 
review decisions made under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act). 
Since the enactment of the ADJR Act, jurisprudence on s 75(v) has developed significantly.  
Because the High Court’s jurisdiction under s 75(v) is defined by the constitutional writs of 
mandamus and prohibition, ‘jurisdictional error’ has become the unifying principle for review 
under s 75(v).  The constitutional separation of powers has played an important role in the 
development of constitutional judicial review.  The High Court has held that review for 
jurisdictional error cannot be excluded or reduced by legislation in the form of privative clauses 
(clauses which purport to exclude judicial review of particular decisions).  However, because it is 
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in the authority of Parliament to define the jurisdiction of decision makers, Parliament can affect 
the question of what will amount to a jurisdictional error. 
In addition to the ‘constitutional review’ mechanisms in s 75(v) of the Constitution, s 39B of the 
Judiciary Act and in the Migration Act, an increasing number of legislative schemes have set up 
alternative statutory appeals mechanisms, most notably the statutory appeals mechanisms in the 
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) and in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) 
(AAT Act). 
THE INQUIRY 
It is the fragmentation of the federal judicial review landscape that prompted the Council to 
conduct an assessment of the current system, and to consider whether the Council could 
recommend changes to improve the accessibility and efficiency of federal judicial review.  The 
Council had as its starting point the entrenched provision for judicial review in s 75(v) of the 
Constitution, and its recommendations flow from the fact that review in the High Court for 
jurisdictional error cannot be excluded by legislation.   
The Council consulted widely with the federal courts, tribunals, government agencies, the legal 
profession and academics.  The Council received 24 submissions, including from government 
agencies who address particular issues relating to Schedule 1 and 2 exemptions (discussed in 
Chapter 5 and 9 and Appendices B and C). Submissions are listed in Appendix E and are 
available at www.ag.gov.au/arc. 
KEY CONCLUSIONS 
The Council has two important conclusions about the current state of federal judicial review in 
Australia: 
 It is undesirable that there is a different ambit for ‘constitutional review’ 
under the Constitution and the Judiciary Act and ‘statutory judicial review’ 
under the ADJR Act. 
 The ADJR Act continues to play an important role by improving the 
accessibility of judicial review, as a clear statement of the Parliament’s 
commitment to be legally accountable for its decisions and by guiding 
administrative decision makers. 
Submissions to the Council strongly support the continuing utility of the ADJR Act.  
Acknowledging dissenting views on this subject, the Council agrees that the ADJR Act has 
benefits that flow from: 
 a list of grounds; 
 flexible remedies, all of which are available where a ground of review is 
established; 
 the right to request a written statement of reasons; and 
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 clear standing rules to initiate judicial review proceedings. 
The Council’s view is that the advantages of the remedial and standing provisions of the 
ADJR Act should, in most cases, also be available in relation to decisions currently only 
reviewable in the Federal Court under s 39B of the Judiciary Act.  The federal judicial review 
system would be more accessible to individuals, and the legal requirements for decision makers 
clearer, if constitutional review and statutory review were more closely aligned.  If the current 
system of judicial review continues without modification, the ADJR Act may become further 
marginalised and judicial review less accessible. 
RECOMMENDED MODEL FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The Council considers that the scope of the ADJR Act should be expanded to encompass the 
jurisdiction of the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution.  The Council recommends a new 
section be added to the ADJR Act to allow an application to be made under the ADJR Act where 
a person would otherwise be able to initiate proceedings in in the High Court under s 75(v) of 
the Constitution (Recommendation 1).  This amendment should allow applicants who would 
otherwise have had standing under the ADJR Act to make a judicial review application under 
that Act without needing to make an application in the alternative under s 39B of the 
Judiciary Act.  Applicants who would otherwise only have been able to make an application under 
s 39B would be able instead to apply for an order of review under the ADJR Act. 
The Council also recommends other amendments to the ambit of the ADJR Act.  Currently, a 
report or recommendation that is made in the exercise of a power conferred by an enactment, 
prior to the making of a decision under that enactment, is included in the definition of a decision 
to which the Act applies in s 3.  The Council recommends that there should be another schedule 
added to the Act, which can be amended by regulation, which should list other reports and 
recommendations that are decisions to which the Act applies (Recommendation 2).  While 
many of these decisions may be reviewable in any case (where a person would otherwise have 
standing to make an application under s 75(v) of the Constitution or an amended ADJR Act), this 
recommendation would ensure that the judicial review jurisdiction of the courts under the 
ADJR Act is clearly stated in relation to particular reports and recommendations.  The 
recommendation would also extend to reports and recommendations by non-Commonwealth 
officers which could be subject to review where appropriate.  The Council would produce 
guidelines to enable the Council, agencies and parliamentary committees to decide, on a case by 
case basis, whether specific reports and recommendations should be included in the schedule, 
and to provide for clear review rights. 
The Council also recommends some amendments to the current exemptions from the 
ADJR Act.  Decisions to commence civil penalty proceedings should be exempt from the 
ADJR Act on the basis that judicial review could fragment legal proceedings 
(Recommendation 3).  The general exemption from the ADJR Act of decisions of the 
Governor-General should be removed and replaced with particular exemptions of certain 
statutory decisions relating to defence (Recommendation 4).  The Council has also made 
particular recommendations with regard to the existing exemptions in Schedule 1, summarised 
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and discussed at Appendix B, on the basis of principles outlined in Chapter 5 that may justify 
the restriction of judicial review to its constitutional minimum. 
Some decisions for which constitutional judicial review is currently available should also be 
excluded from an amended ADJR Act.  For example, the Council considers that decisions made 
under the Scheme for Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration and 
certain vice-regal decisions relating to defence could be excluded from the ambit of a 
revised Act.   
The Council does not recommend expanding judicial review beyond the current ambits of the 
ADJR Act and constitutional review.  The Council considers a model of review based on a 
‘public power’ or ‘public function’ test to be indeterminate and likely to create uncertainty about 
the coverage of judicial review standards (Chapter 4). 
The Council does not recommend the piecemeal expansion of the jurisdiction of the ADJR Act 
to particular areas of non-statutory government decision making.  This is a change from previous 
recommendations of the Council, in particular, in its 1989 Report No 32, Review of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The ambit of the Act.  The Council prefers to extend the 
ambit of the Act to align more closely with constitutional judicial review, while maintaining 
specific exemptions. 
The Council’s preferred model incorporates the ‘officer of the Commonwealth’ test of 
constitutional judicial review and the current ADJR Act test of ‘a decision of an administrative 
character made … under an enactment’.  By providing for the court to have jurisdiction to make 
an order of review under the ADJR Act in relation to both of these jurisdiction tests, the 
following decisions remain subject to judicial review:  
 decisions of officers of the Commonwealth, regardless of the source of 
power being exercised or the nature of the action performed; 
 decisions made ‘under an enactment’, whether or not a jurisdictional error 
has occurred; and 
 decisions by persons other than officers of the Commonwealth, if made 
‘under an enactment’. 
SEPARATE STATUTORY REVIEW SCHEMES 
Where a well-established mechanism provides for review of administrative decisions and is as 
accessible and efficient as under the ADJR Act, the Council considers that these separate 
statutory review mechanisms should remain.  The Council’s view is that changing the system of 
judicial review in these cases would inhibit rather than increase access to review.  Accordingly, 
the Council recommends that the separate statutory review scheme for taxation under Part IVC 
of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 and the mechanism for statutory appeals to the Federal 
Court on questions of law from decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be maintained 
(Recommendations 5 and 6).   
14     
Federal Judicial Review in Australia 
14 
Ultimately, the Council would prefer migration decisions to be reviewed under the general 
statutory scheme, if the Council’s recommendation is accepted to extend the ambit of the 
ADJR Act to embrace constitutional judicial review.   However, acknowledging that return to 
this structure would have resourcing implications for the courts and the Government, because of 
the likelihood that any change in the law in this area would lead to a temporary increase in 
litigation, the Council has not made a specific recommendation with regard to judicial review of 
migration decisions. 
A new avenue for judicial review that operates alongside or in place of the ADJR Act should not 
be established unless there are compelling reasons, and only after consultation with the 
Attorney-General and the Council (Recommendation 7). 
GROUNDS OF REVIEW 
The Council has recommended that the current list of grounds in ss 5 and 6 of the ADJR Act be 
retained (Recommendation 8).  The Council recommends one amendment to the current 
grounds of review—an amendment to the ‘no evidence’ ground.  Currently ss 5(3) and 6(3) set 
out the requirements which must be met to make out the ‘no evidence’ ground in ss 5(1)(h) and 
6(1)(h) respectively.  The Council recommends that ss 5(3) and 6(3) be amended to clarify these 
requirements (Recommendation 8). 
The Council has also considered the usefulness of statutory codes of procedure to accompany 
the ADJR Act grounds of review.  The Council considers that procedural guidance in legislation 
may be useful, but that codes of procedure risk becoming overly prescriptive.  The Council will 
develop clear guidance for policy makers on when statutory codes of procedure or procedural 
steps in legislation are appropriate, and what form they should take (Recommendation 9). 
STANDING 
The Council considers that minor changes to the standing rules in the ADJR Act could improve 
access to judicial review.  The Council considers that the standing of representative organisations 
is unclear, and that this may prevent organisations from challenging government decisions in 
which they have an interest.  The Council recommends the addition of a provision in the 
ADJR Act—modelled on s 27(2) of the AAT Act—to allow applications for review ‘if the 
decision relates to a matter included in the objects or purposes of the organisation or association’  
(Recommendation 10). 
REASONS 
The Council affirms the importance of the right to reasons in the ADJR Act.  The Council 
recognises that, subject to limited exceptions, individuals should generally be able to request 
reasons for a decision for which judicial review is available.  Reasons are valuable because they 
assist a person to understand why a decision was made, which may prevent further disputes or 
review applications. Good communication with people affected by decisions can therefore 
improve trust in government decision making and prevent disputes arising.  Having reasons also 
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assists courts conducting judicial review to assess whether a decision was made according to law.  
The Council proposes to update its guidelines on reasons to provide clearer guidance on issues 
such as the kind of advice that should be sought from legal practitioners regarding reasons and 
to deal with situations where decision makers may not be able to prepare a statement of reasons 
(Recommendation 12). 
Currently, reasons provided under s 13 of the ADJR Act do not need to be drafted at the time 
the decision to which they relate is made.  However, contemporaneous recording of reasons for 
decisions improves the quality of decision making, ensures that the reasons recorded are the 
actual reasons for the decision and prevents information being lost with staff changeovers.  The 
Council recommends that all agencies endeavour to implement the recording of reasons when 
making decisions where this is not currently the practice (Recommendation 11).  The Council 
recognises that in some cases this may be impracticable, but considers that in the majority of 
cases contemporaneous recording of reasons—to assist the later provision of reasons to affected 
parties—should be possible. 
The Council recognises that, in some cases, the failure of an agency to fulfil its duty to provide 
reasons under the ADJR Act may result in a situation where proceedings under the ADJR Act 
could have been averted or conducted more simply had an adequate statement of reasons been 
prepared by the decision maker.  The Council recommends that the failure of an agency to 
provide a statement of reasons that complies with the requirements of s 13 of the ADJR Act 
should be a factor that is taken into account by a court in making a costs order at the conclusion 
of proceedings under the Act (Recommendation 13). 
The Council notes that ss 13A and 14 of the ADJR Act were enacted prior to the Freedom of 
Information Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act), and are not aligned with the exemptions from the 
requirements to provide information under that Act.  The Council recommends that ss 13A and 
14 of the ADJR Act be amended to provide that a statement of reasons does not have to 
disclose:  
 any matter that is of such a nature that its inclusion in a document would 
cause that document to be an exempt document under the FOI Act; or 
 the notice or statement of reasons for a decision that is required by an 
enactment to be laid before either House of the Parliament, prior to the 
date on which that notice or statement of reasons is laid before a House of 
the Parliament (Recommendation 14).   
This will reduce the need for Schedule 2 exemptions, some of which are justified on the basis of 
protecting certain types of information, and will align the ADJR Act and the FOI Act. 
COURT PROCEDURES 
The Council considers that the federal courts’ current powers are sufficiently flexible to allow for 
efficient and effective hearing of judicial review cases, and has not recommended any changes to 
court procedures.  The recommended changes to standing should improve access for 
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representative organisations.  In relation to costs, the Council has recommended that, unless the 
court orders otherwise, parties to a proceeding under the ADJR Act should bear their own costs 
(Recommendation 15).  The Council proposes to provide educative materials on its website 
about judicial review, which may assist applications navigating the various forums for review. 
THE FUTURE WORK OF THE COUNCIL 
The Council proposes to provide new policy guidance and educative materials on a number of 
aspects of the judicial review system, building on the current Council materials available to 
government and the public.  
The Council also supports the development of a Charter of Good Administration for the 
Australian Government, and considers this should be developed through cooperation between a 
range of policy and decision making agencies. 
SUMMARY 
The Council recommends altering the scope of the ADJR Act, without, however, altering the 
current ambit of judicial review.  The Council would more closely align the two current generalist 
judicial review jurisdictions, encouraging consistency between constitutional and statutory 
judicial review.  The Council considers that the two review mechanisms should be equally 
accessible.  The Council recommends legislative changes to improve accessibility and encourage 
best practice in government decision making, including to the standing rules in the ADJR Act 
and procedural aspects of the right to request reasons.  The Council also acknowledges the 
effectiveness of guidance material for policy and decision makers, and proposes to update and 
add to its existing guidelines.   
The Council’s Report provides a snapshot of federal judicial review in Australia in 2012.  The 
Council aims to provide a vision of federal judicial review into the future. 
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1. OVERVIEW OF THE INQUIRY 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Council considers it timely to conduct a comprehensive review of the judicial 
review landscape in Australia.  Since the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) 
(ADJR Act) commenced in 1980, many aspects of the federal judicial review system have 
changed, as have the nature and functions of government.  The Council considers this issue 
on its own motion under s 51 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act).   
1.2 Monitoring the effectiveness of the judicial review system is one of the Council’s key 
functions.  In producing this Report, the Council considers the system in light of the 
development through case law of the judicial review principles under the Australian Constitution 
and the ADJR Act.  The 1971 Report of the Commonwealth Administrative Review 
Committee on the federal administrative law system, chaired by Sir John Kerr (the Kerr 
Committee), described the existing legal grounds for judicial review as ‘limited’ and the 
remedies ‘complicated’.2  Since that time, despite the availability of new statutory review 
grounds, the writs in s 75(v) of the Australian Constitution have come to represent a guarantee 
of legal oversight of exercises of executive power.  The concept of jurisdictional error has 
assumed central importance.  In addition, significant areas of government decision making are 
now subject to separate judicial review systems, outside of the ambit of the ADJR Act.  
BACKGROUND 
Previous reports by the Council 
1.3 The Council has produced a number of reports relating to judicial review of 
administrative action.  In this Report, the Council revisits—and in some cases, revises—many 
of its previous recommendations in light of subsequent developments in Australian 
administrative law. 
1.4 In its first report in 1978 (Report No 1),3 the Council identified classes of decisions 
for exclusion from the ADJR Act.  Given the broad operation of the ADJR Act, the Council 
considered that ‘cogent reasons are required to justify excluding a class of decisions from the 
beneficial operation of the Act’.4 
1.5 Many of the Council’s recommendations from Report No 1 were incorporated into 
the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Amendment Bill 1980.  After accepting an 
invitation from the Attorney-General to comment on the Bill, in Report No 9 the Council 
noted that some exclusions were inconsistent with the Council’s previous recommendations 
                                                          
2  Commonwealth Administrative Review Council, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, Parl 
Paper No 144 (1971) 9. 
3  Administrative Review Council, Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977—Exclusions under Section 19, 
Report No 1 (1978). 
4  Ibid 19. 
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in Report No 1.5  The Council made a number of recommendations in that Report 
concerning regulations to delete classes of decisions from the schedules to the ADJR Act and 
about information that should not be included in a statement of reasons, which were not 
taken up in the Bill. 
1.6 The Council’s response to the Act was presented in three Reports—in 1986 (Report 
No 26); 1989 (Report No 32) and 1991 (Report No 33).  In Report No 26 the Council 
considered whether the ADJR Act had left public authorities open to unwarranted litigation.  
The Council found little evidence of the ADJR Act being used to delay or frustrate 
Commonwealth administration merely to gain a tactical advantage, rather than to establish a 
genuine legal right or interest.  The Council did not consider an increase in the number of 
judicial review cases, or the mere fact of applications for an order of review being refused, as 
evidence of such abuse.  The Council recommended amendments to the ADJR Act to extend 
the Federal Court’s powers and to enable that Court to stay or to refuse to grant applications 
for review in appropriate cases. 
1.7 In Report No 32 the Council recommended widening the scope of judicial review 
under the ADJR Act to equate it with review available under s 75(v) of the Constitution under 
the writs of mandamus, prohibition or injunction.  The Council reiterated that the Federal 
Court’s discretion to refuse relief or grant an application under the ADJR Act should be 
strengthened.  The Council recommended that review under the ADJR Act should extend to 
include a decision of an administrative character made, or proposed to be made, by an officer 
under a non-statutory scheme or program, the funds for which are authorised by an 
appropriation made by the Parliament.  The Council considers recommendations from 
Reports 26 and 32 in more detail in Chapter 5 of this Report. 
1.8 In Report No 33 the Council recommended the repeal of Schedule 2 of the 
ADJR Act, which exempts specified classes of decisions from the requirement to give 
reasons.  The Council made recommendations to strengthen the provisions of s 13A of 
the Act, acknowledging the need to prevent the disclosure of information in statements of 
reasons for decisions that should not, in the public interest, be disclosed.  These 
recommendations are considered in Chapter 9 of this Report. 
1.9 In 1995, Report No 38 considered government business enterprises and 
administrative law.6  In 1998, Report No 42 considered the contracting out of government 
services.7  In both of these Reports, the Council again recommended that ADJR Act review 
extend to a decision of an administrative character made by an officer under a non-statutory 
scheme or program, the funds for which are authorised by an appropriation made by the 
Parliament.8 
                                                          
5  Administrative Review Council, Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Amendment Bill 1980, Report No 9 
(1980).  This report followed an invitation from the Attorney-General to comment on the Bill. 
6  Administrative Review Council, Government Business Enterprises and Commonwealth Administrative Law, Report 
No 38 (1995) 48. 
7  Administrative Review Council, The Contracting out of Government Services, Report No 42 (1998). 
8  Ibid (Recommendation 22); Administrative Review Council, Government Business Enterprises and Commonwealth 
Administrative Law, Report No 38 (1995) 48.   
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1.10 In 1999, Report No 41 recommended that the scope of review by the Federal Court 
should remain unchanged, after considering the need for a specific statutory right of appeal 
from decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).9  However, the Council also 
recommended that the Federal Court’s powers be expanded to give it discretion to receive 
evidence and to make findings of fact where there has been an error of law, provided the 
Court’s findings are not inconsistent with those of the AAT.   
1.11 The Council has also addressed constitutional and policy considerations relevant to 
the scope of judicial review.  In 2003, Report No 47 provided guidance in the form of 
indicative principles to assist in determining when limitations to judicial review are acceptable 
in the context of particular policy and legislative proposals.10  
SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY 
1.12 In this Report, the Council considers the federal system of judicial review.  The 
functions and powers of the Council relevant to this Report are: 
 keeping the Commonwealth administrative law system under review, 
monitoring developments in administrative law and recommending to the 
Minister improvements that might be made to the system;11 
 keeping under review the classes of administrative decisions that are not the 
subject of review by a court, tribunal or other body and to make 
recommendations to the Minister as to whether any of those classes of 
decisions should be the subject of review by a court, tribunal or other body 
and, if so, the appropriate body to make that review;12 and 
 inquiring into the adequacy of the law and practice relative to the review by 
courts of administrative decisions and recommending to the Minister any 
improvements that might be made in that law or practice.13 
1.13 The Council’s aim in this inquiry was to assess the different mechanisms for seeking 
review of Australian Government actions and to make recommendations for changes to the 
system where necessary or desirable.  The Council has considered both legislative and non-
legislative responses in making recommendations to government.  The scope of the Council’s 
inquiry therefore included consideration of: 
 the ADJR Act as a whole; 
 the application of s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (Judiciary Act); 
 other statutory schemes for reviewing government decisions and actions; 
and 
                                                          
9  Administrative Review Council, Appeals from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to the Federal Court, Report 
No 41 (1997). 
10  Administrative Review Council, The Scope of Judicial Review, Report No 47 (2003). 
11  Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 51(1)(aa). 
12  Ibid s 51(1)(a)–(b). 
13  Ibid s 51(1)(c). 
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 non-statutory materials that support judicial review applications. 
RELATED REPORTS 
1.14 In preparing this Report the Council has had regard to a number of related reports.  
Two reports of relevance to the Australian federal civil justice system were released in 2009: 
the Report of the Access to Justice Taskforce, A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the 
Federal Civil Justice System, and the Report of the National Human Rights Consultation.  In 
2010, the Law Commission for England and Wales released the Report Administrative Redress: 
Public Bodies and the Citizen, which discussed proposals relating to the reform of judicial review 
remedies.  In early 2011, the Australian Information Commissioner, Emeritus Professor 
John McMillan AO, conducted an inquiry into judicial review of refugee status assessments of 
irregular maritime arrivals at the request of the Government.  In March 2011, the NSW 
Department of Justice and Attorney-General released a Discussion Paper, Reform of Judicial 
Review in NSW.  This section provides a brief summary of these reports, and how they relate 
to the Council’s current inquiry.   
A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice 
1.15 The Access to Justice Taskforce was established in the Australian Government 
Attorney-General’s Department in January 2009 to develop a more strategic approach to, and 
make recommendations on ways of, improving access to justice for all Australians.  The 
Report of the Access to Justice Taskforce was released on 23 September 2009.14  The central 
recommendation, which has been adopted by the Government, was a ‘Strategic Framework 
for Access to Justice’.15 
1.16 The Australian Government’s Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil 
Justice System16 sets out key principles to guide justice system reforms and initiatives, as well as 
resource allocation decisions, in order to facilitate better access to justice.  These ‘access to 
justice principles’ are: accessibility, appropriateness, equity, efficiency and effectiveness.  In 
November 2009, the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General17 adopted these principles to 
guide future decisions affecting civil justice.18  The principles will be applied by policy makers 
in any implementation of recommendations resulting from this inquiry. 
                                                          
14  Access to Justice Taskforce, A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil Justice System 
(September 2009) Australian Government Attorney General’s Department <www.ag.gov.au/a2j>. 
15  A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil Justice System (24 September 2011) Australian 
Government Attorney-General’s Department <www.ag.gov.au/a2j>. 
16  Access to Justice Taskforce, A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil Justice System 
(September 2009) Australian Government Attorney General’s Department <www.ag.gov.au/a2j>. 
17  The Standing Committee of Attorneys-General is now the Standing Council on Law and Justice. 
18  Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (now the Standing Council on Law and Justice), Communiqué 
November 2009 (2009) 2. 
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National Human Rights Consultation 
1.17 The National Human Rights Consultation was conducted by an independent 
Committee—the National Human Rights Consultation Committee—established by the 
Australian Government.19  It aimed to seek a range of views from across Australia about the 
protection and promotion of human rights.  The Committee provided its Report to the 
Australian Government on 30 September 2009.20 
1.18 The most significant recommendations for administrative law were: that the 
ADJR Act be amended in such a way as to make the definitive list of Australia’s international 
human rights obligations a relevant consideration in government decision making; and that 
the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) President be included as a statutory 
member of the Council.  At the date of this Report, the Australian Government has 
implemented the second of these recommendations, but not the first.  The Human Rights 
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2011(Cth) amended the AAT Act to include 
the AHRC President as one of the ex officio members.21  The Australian Government has 
also produced guidance on human rights for public servants developing legislation, policy or 
programs.22 
1.19 The Council considers that the existence of an effective and accessible system of 
judicial review is essential to maintaining the rule of law and ensuring respect for fundamental 
human rights.  However, the Council does not propose to address the issue of whether 
human rights should be specifically listed as relevant considerations in the ADJR Act.  The 
focus of this inquiry is the framework for judicial review. 
Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen 
1.20 On 25 May 2010, the Law Commission of England and Wales (Law Commission) 
published its Report, Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen.23  This followed 
publication of a discussion paper (October 2004),24 a scoping paper (October 2006)25 and a 
consultation paper (3 July 2008),26 as part of the Law Commission’s review of redress from 
public bodies for substandard administrative action. 
1.21 In its consultation paper, the Law Commission proposed reforms to the court-based 
common law mechanisms for redress against public bodies in judicial review and private law 
                                                          
19  National Human Rights Consultation Committee, National Human Rights Consultation Report 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) 3. 
20  Ibid. 
21  This received royal assent on 4 December 2011.  Since then, the President of the Human Rights 
Commission has served on the Council. 
22  Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, Human Rights Guidance Sheets (November 2011) 
<www.ag.gov.au/Humanrightsandantidiscrimination/Humanrightsandthepublicsector/>. 
23  Law Commission (UK) Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen, Report No 322 (2010).  The report 
and the papers which preceded it can be downloaded from <www.lawcom.gov.uk/remedies.htm>. 
24  Law Commission (UK) Monetary Remedies in Public Law: A Discussion Paper (2004). 
25  Law Commission (UK) Remedies Against Public Bodies: A Scoping Report (2006). 
26  Law Commission (UK) Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen, A Consultation Paper, Consultation 
Paper No 187 (2008). 
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claims.27  The proposed reforms involved the creation of a statutory discretion of the court to 
award damages against a public body for ‘serious fault’ in making a decision that was 
objectively intended to confer a benefit on a class of individuals.28  In the final report, the Law 
Commission decided not to pursue these proposals due to opposition raised in consultations 
and the lack of data available to refute or support those criticisms.29  However, 
recommendations were made concerning the collation and publication of data about the costs 
of compensation paid by government.30  The Law Commission’s recommendations are 
considered in more detail in Chapter 10.  
1.22 Other proposed reforms in the consultation paper were directed at improving access 
to, and powers of, public sector ombudsmen to aid them in undertaking their role in the 
redress system for administrative injustice.31  No recommendations were made about these 
proposals in the Report.  However, the Law Commission will be undertaking a process of 
further review and consultation in this area.32 
Professor McMillan’s paper on immigration processes 
1.23 On 7 January 2011, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, 
the Hon Chris Bowen MP, announced that the Government had asked Emeritus 
Professor John McMillan AO to advise the Government on possible options for improving 
the efficiency and minimising the duration of the judicial review process for irregular maritime 
arrivals.33 
1.24 The report, Regulating Migration Litigation after Plaintiff M61,34 was released in 
November, 2011.  The Report: 
 did not recommend that Parliament enact a direction to the courts to 
resolve offshore entry person refugee status determination matters as 
expeditiously as is reasonable (as a direction of the kind would be ineffective 
and unnecessary); 
 did not recommend removal of the right of appeal from the Federal 
Magistrates Court to the Federal Court in offshore entry refugee status 
determination matters; and 
                                                          
27  Law Commission (UK) Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen, A Consultation Paper, Consultation 
Paper No 187 (2008). 
28  Ibid 75. 
29  Law Commission (UK) Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen, Report No 322 (2010) 21–22. 
30  Ibid 69. 
31  Law Commission (UK) Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen, A Consultation Paper, Consultation 
Paper No 187 (2008) 104–116. 
32  Law Commission (UK) Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen, Report No 322 (2010) 70. 
33  John McMillan, ‘Regulating Migration Litigation after Plaintiff M61’ (Report to the Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, November 2011) <www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/>. 
34  Ibid. 
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 recommended that the Department of Immigration and Citizenship should 
implement two measures to provide guidance and assistance to offshore 
entry persons concerning the initiation of judicial review proceedings: 
o prepare an information sheet on judicial review process and rights; 
and 
o consider adopting a provisional scheme for reimbursing all or part 
of the legal costs of an offshore entry person in test case litigation 
that raises a significant legal issue about the Protection Obligations 
Determination process, or judicial review of actions taken under 
that process.35 
1.25 The Government issued a response to Professor McMillan’s Report in November 
2011, accepting the key recommendations, but stating that it would not pursue the suggestion 
to consider a provisional test case scheme modelled on the Australian Taxation Office’s Test 
Case Litigation Program.36   
1.26 However, from 24 March 2012, the Government has implemented a single 
processing system for both irregular maritime arrivals and air arrivals.37  Irregular maritime 
arrivals will now make protection visa applications under the same process as onshore 
applicants, and protection visa decisions will be subject to review by the Refugee Review 
Tribunal.38 
Reform of Judicial Review in NSW  
1.27 In March 2011, the NSW Department of Justice and Attorney General released the 
discussion paper Reform of Judicial Review in NSW for public consultation.39  As NSW does not 
have a statutory judicial review right,  the discussion paper sought views on whether a 
statutory review jurisdiction should be established and, if so, which of a number of options 
for reform of common law judicial review in NSW should be adopted.   
INQUIRY PROCESS 
1.28 In May 2011, the Council released a Consultation Paper providing a survey of the 
current system of judicial review in Australia and seeking views from key stakeholders on 
various aspects of the judicial review system. In response, the Council received 24 
submissions from a wide range of people and organisations, including government agencies, 
                                                          
35  John McMillan, ‘Regulating Migration Litigation after Plaintiff M61’ (Report to the Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, November 2011) 3. 
36  Australian Government, ‘Government Response to McMillan Report’ (Government release, November 
2011) <www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/pdf/2011/government-response-mcmillan-review-
111124.pdf>. 
37  Australian Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Implementation of a single process for 
Irregular Maritime Arrivals (Questions and Answers) <www.immi.gov.au/visas/humanitarian/onshore/>. 
38  Ibid. 
39  NSW Department of Justice and Attorney General, Discussion Paper: Reform of Judicial Review in NSW (March 
2011) <www.lpclrd.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lpclrd/lpclrd_consultation/lpclrd_discussion.html>. 
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legal representative groups, tribunals and academics.  A list of submissions can be found at 
Appendix E.   
1.29  The Council also conducted four days of consultations in Sydney, Melbourne and 
Canberra with a variety of stakeholders across government and the legal community.  A list of 
consultations carried out is at Appendix F.   
1.30 After receiving submissions on the Consultation Paper, the Council also sought 
further views from Australian Government agencies on specific exemptions from the 
ADJR Act. 
1.31 In this Report, the Council relies upon statistical information about the judicial 
review system.  The Federal Court has assisted the Council greatly in making statistical 
information available.  The Council was able to obtain some limited data from Australian 
Government agencies about numbers and type of judicial review applications, in addition to 
information available publicly in agency annual reports. 
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2. CONTEXT 
2.1 In the Council’s view, any consideration of judicial review must be placed in the 
context of the administrative law system in Australia as a whole.  As submitted by the Law 
Society of New South Wales, ‘any possible reform of judicial review should be considered 
keeping in mind the proper roles played respectively by the courts, merit review bodies and 
decision makers’.40  This chapter places judicial review in its context.  The chapter provides an 
overview of the historical development of the administrative law system in Australia, the 
changes to the nature and functions of government since the adoption of the Australian 
administrative law framework, the current administrative law system and the principles that 
should guide the development of the system into the future. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SYSTEM 
2.2 In considering the best model for judicial review in Australia, the Council considers 
that it is essential to understand the rationale for the development of the current system of 
administrative review. 
Review of administrative decisions in Australia until the 1970s 
2.3 State Supreme Courts in Australia have inherent power as superior courts to conduct 
judicial review by granting ‘prerogative writs’ or certain equitable remedies—orders quashing 
or setting aside a decision, directing or preventing action, or declaring the rights of parties.41  
Section 75(v) of the Australian Constitution gave jurisdiction to the High Court to issue 
remedies against an officer of the Commonwealth ‘in all matters in which a writ of Mandamus 
or prohibition or an injunction is sought’.  Section 75(v) therefore retained the focus on 
remedies or writs that is a feature of judicial review under the common law.  
2.4 In 1971, the Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee, in a review chaired 
by Sir John Kerr (the Kerr Committee), commented that ‘there is a complex relationship 
between the principles of review and the remedies available and technical limitations diminish 
the effectiveness of remedies which at first sight appear to [be] fairly comprehensive’.42  In 
addition, until the Federal Court was established in 1980,43 the High Court was the sole forum 
for federal judicial review matters.  
                                                          
40  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission 24 (23 June 2011) 1. 
41  The High Court decision in Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW (2010) 239 CLR 531 marked a 
significant change in the way that State Supreme Courts conduct judicial review.  This decision is discussed 
in Chapter 3. 
42  Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, 
Parl Paper No 144 (1971) 9–10.  For a retrospective analysis of the main themes, see Robin Creyke and 
John McMillan (eds) The Kerr Vision of Australian Administrative Law—At the Twenty-Five Year Mark 
(Australian National University, 1998). 
43  Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). 
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2.5 By the early 1970s, a number of administrative review tribunals and other 
administrative review schemes in specific jurisdictions had been introduced.44  However, the 
Kerr Committee identified ‘a need for the establishment of machinery which provides for a 
more comprehensive review of administrative decisions’.45 
Reforms in other jurisdictions 
2.6 The Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report (Kerr Committee Report) 
discussed administrative law reform in various jurisdictions during the 1960s and 1970s.  At 
this time, the United Kingdom was developing a framework of administrative law comprising 
the courts, tribunals, a Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and a Council on 
Tribunals.46  Likewise, New Zealand created the Administrative Division of the Supreme 
Court in 1968, and appointed an Ombudsman in 1962.47 The United States had enacted the 
Administrative Procedures Act in 1946 after ‘a fervent and sustained debate at the highest levels 
sparked by the Great Depression’.48 
The beginning of an integrated system of review in Australia 
2.7 Australian States and Territories began to implement similar reforms in the early 
1970s.  Between 1971 and 1974, five of the Australian States established Ombudsmen or 
Parliamentary Commissioners.49  Reform proposals of a different kind had also been made in 
Victoria.  Two reports in 1968, from the Victorian Statute Law Revision Committee and the 
Chief Justice’s Law Reform Committee, proposed the creation of a general administrative 
tribunal, an Ombudsman and a reformed system of judicial review.50 Academic and judicial 
commentators in Australia had also spoken in favour of administrative law reform.51 
2.8 The present Commonwealth system of administrative review can be traced to the 
report in 1971 of the Kerr Committee.  The major features of the present system—the 
statutory framework for judicial review, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman and, indeed, the establishment of the Administrative Review 
Council—stem largely from the recommendations of that Committee.  In its landmark report 
in 1971, the Kerr Committee drew attention to the steady development of a vast range of 
                                                          
44  Appendix E of the following report provides a list of tribunals and jurisdictions: Committee on 
Administrative Discretions, Final Report of the Committee on Administrative Discretions, Parl Paper No 316 
(1973). 
45  Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, 
Parl Paper No 144 (1971) 3. 
46  Ibid ch 6. 
47  Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman) Act 1962 (NZ).  See Commonwealth Administrative Review 
Council, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, Parl Paper No 144 (1971) ch 7. 
48  Mark Aronson, ‘The Great Depression, this Depression, and Administrative Law’ (2009) 37 Federal Law 
Review 165, 173. 
49  Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (Qld); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA); 
Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA). 
50  See Commonwealth Administrative Review Council, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, 
Parl Paper No 144 (1971) ch 5.  Note also the subsequent Report of the NSW Law Reform Commission, 
Appeals in Administration, Report No 16 (1973). 
51  See, eg, articles in R A Woodman (ed) Record of the Third Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference (Law Book 
Co, 1966). 
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administrative discretions that could be exercised in a way that detrimentally affected the life, 
liberty, property, livelihood or other interests of a person.52 The Committee concluded that 
established mechanisms were unable adequately to correct administrative errors and to ensure 
justice for the individual.   
2.9 The major theme underlying the Kerr Committee Report was the need to develop a 
comprehensive, coherent and integrated system of administrative review.53  The main 
recommendations of the Kerr Committee were: 
 the establishment of a general merits review tribunal; 
 codification of the grounds of judicial review, including clarification of the 
grounds and simplification of procedures; 
 creation of a new superior federal court to have jurisdiction to hear judicial 
review applications; 
 the introduction of an obligation for decision makers to provide a statement 
of findings of fact and reasons at the request of a person affected by the 
decision; 
 the introduction of an obligation to disclose relevant documents; 
 the establishment of a Counsel for Grievances; and 
 the establishment of the Administrative Review Council with a continuing 
role overseeing and monitoring the new system.54 
2.10 These recommendations form the basis for the major elements of the administrative 
law system today. 
2.11 In this system, courts, tribunals and the ‘General Counsel for Grievances’ (which 
became the Ombudsman), would all play separate but overlapping roles.  As Professors 
Robin Creyke and John McMillan have noted, the Kerr Committee considered the integration 
of the whole system to be a key means of creating a unified review system.  However, 
generally speaking, this integration and harmonisation has not occurred.55  This is because a 
number of the Kerr Committee recommendations directed towards the integration of the 
system were never implemented, for example the recommendations that the Ombudsman 
                                                          
52  Commonwealth Administrative Review Council, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, Parl 
Paper No 144 (1971) 1, 3–4, 6. 
53  Robin Creyke and John McMillan, ‘Administrative Law Assumptions ...  Then and Now’ in Robin Creyke 
and John McMillan (eds) The Kerr Vision of Australian Administrative Law (Australian National University, 
1998) 1. 
54  Commonwealth Administrative Review Council, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, Parl 
Paper No 144 (1971) 112–116. 
55  Robin Creyke and John McMillan, ‘Administrative Law Assumptions ...  Then and Now’ in Robin Creyke 
and John McMillan (eds) The Kerr Vision of Australian Administrative Law (Australian National University, 
1998) 10–11. 
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have an advocacy role in courts and tribunals, and that departmental representatives be 
appointed to tribunals.56 
2.12 The second key feature of the Kerr Committee’s recommendations was the central 
role that administrative tribunals should play in review of executive action.  The Committee 
downplayed the importance of the role of the courts, seeing judicial review as complementary 
to merits review, rather than the central feature of the system.57 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Ombudsman and a statutory system of 
judicial review 
2.13 The Committee on Administrative Discretions, chaired by Sir Henry Bland (Bland 
Committee), was established to advance the Kerr Committee’s recommendations, in 
particular to consider the variety of discretions exercised by the Australian Government and 
to identify those that should be subject to merits review.  The final report of the Bland 
Committee drew attention to the lack of consistent administrative review, the diversity of 
tribunal procedures and functions, and the lack of external review in many jurisdictions.  The 
Bland Committee supported the establishment of a general merits review tribunal and a 
Counsel for Grievances, or Ombudsman.58 
2.14 The inquiry by the Committee of Review of Prerogative Writ Procedures, chaired by 
Robert Ellicott QC (Ellicott Committee), examined the Kerr Committee’s proposals for a 
reformed system of judicial review.59  This Committee was established to review the 
prerogative writ procedures available in the courts and was primarily concerned with judicial 
review.  The Ellicott Committee endorsed the Kerr Committee’s view that the state of the law 
relating to judicial review of administrative action was technical and complex and in need of 
reform, simplification and legislative statement.60  The Ellicott Committee also endorsed the 
Kerr Committee’s recommendation that a Counsel for Grievances be established. 
2.15 The recommendations of the Kerr, Bland and Ellicott Committees led to the 
establishment of the AAT (and the Administrative Review Council) under the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) and the Ombudsman under the 
Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) (Ombudsman Act), as well as the implementation of a statutory 
judicial review scheme under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) 
(ADJR Act). 
                                                          
56  Robin Creyke and John McMillan, ‘Administrative Law Assumptions ...  Then and Now’ in Robin Creyke 
and John McMillan (eds) The Kerr Vision of Australian Administrative Law (Australian National University, 
1998) 10–11. 
57  Commonwealth Administrative Review Council, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, Parl 
Paper No 144 (1971) 67. 
58  Committee on Administrative Discretions, Final Report of the Committee on Administrative Discretions, Parl 
Paper No 316 (1973). 
59  Committee of Review of Prerogative Writ Procedure, Report of the Committee of Review of Prerogative Writ 
Procedure, Parl Paper No 56 (1973). 
60  Ibid. 
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Freedom of information and privacy laws 
2.16 Two interdepartmental committees in 197461 and 197662 considered the 
implementation of freedom of information laws in Australia, based on the US Freedom of 
Information Act 1966.  The report of the 1976 committee became the basis for the Freedom of 
Information Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act).63 
2.17 The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act) was passed by the Federal Parliament at the 
end of 1988.  The Act gave effect to Australia’s agreement to implement guidelines adopted 
in 1980 by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, as well as its obligations 
under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT SINCE THE 1970S 
2.18 This section considers a number of changes in government since the 1970s that have 
altered the context in which the administrative law system operates and raised new issues for 
judicial review. 
Increase in legislation 
2.19 From 1990 to 2006, the Australian Parliament passed more pages of legislation than 
were passed during the first 90 years of federation.64  This increase, of itself, does not 
necessarily mean that government regulation has grown,65 but this increase in the amount of 
legislation is one of the factors contributing to the increase in the volume of discretionary 
decisions made by public officials.  For example, in 2009–10, Centrelink alone had 
7.02 million customers and administered 11.4 million individual entitlements.66  In his study of 
the growth of the regulatory state, Chris Berg argues, however, that ‘technical changes in the 
manner in which legislation is drafted cannot explain modern legislative and regulatory 
excess’.67  Rather, Berg suggests that ‘there has been a fundamental shift in the relationship 
between government and society; in the mechanisms by which policy is conducted; and the 
institutions where political power resides’.68 
                                                          
61  Interdepartmental Committee on Proposed Freedom of Information Legislation, Proposed Freedom of 
Information legislation: Report of Inter-Departmental Committee (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1974). 
62  Interdepartmental Committee on Proposed Freedom of Information Legislation, Policy proposals for freedom of 
information legislation: Report of Interdepartmental Committee, (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976). 
63  Australian Law Reform Commission, Open Government: A review of the federal Freedom of Information Act 1982, 
Report No 77 (1995) 12; Administrative Review Council, Open Government: A review of the federal Freedom of 
Information Act 1982, Report No 40 (1995) 12. 
64  Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens, Australian Government, Rethinking Regulation: Report of the 
Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business (January 2006) 5. 
65  For example, there have been changes to the formatting of legislation and increased detail in legislation.  
Increased detail may make the intended operation of the statute clearer and more certain, with less room 
for variety in judicial interpretation, despite increasing the length of legislation. 
66  Centrelink, Annual Report 2009–10 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). 
67  Chris Berg, The Growth of Australia’s Regulatory State (Institute of Public Affairs, 2008) 17. 
68  Ibid 7. 
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2.20 There has also been a considerable increase in the number and complexity of 
legislative instruments—made by the executive government under the authority of an 
enactment—each year.69  This increase has seen the development of a new phenomenon—
hybrid mechanisms that are part-legislative and part-administrative in nature, blurring the 
distinction between legislative and administrative actions of the executive government. 
2.21 Regulation through ‘soft law’ has also increased since the introduction of the 
ADJR Act.  Soft law encompasses rules, guidelines, practices and policies that guide the 
executive government in its administrative decision making, but do not have the force of law.  
Greg Weeks submitted to the Council that soft law applies asymmetrically, as ‘it operates as de 
facto hard law on those who are being regulated but is decidedly soft in its effect on the 
regulators’.70 
Privatisation of government functions 
2.22 While legislation has grown, a contrasting trend is the move during the 1980s and 
1990s towards the privatisation of many functions traditionally carried out by government.  
As Michael Taggart explains: 
the privatization movement was said to be a response to budget deficits and 
mounting public debt, perceived inefficiencies in government operations, and a 
loss of faith in the ability of governments in the developed world to meet the 
expectations of their citizenry of an ever-increasing standard of living.71   
2.23 The theory was that the market, through competition between service providers, 
could provide higher quality services more efficiently than government and many government 
services were outsourced to private providers.  However, a consequence of such privatisation 
was to put private providers outside administrative review.  Outsourcing was therefore seen 
by many commentators as a threat to government accountability.72  While some elements of 
the federal administrative law system, in particular the Commonwealth Ombudsman, now 
apply to Australian Government contractors, the reach of judicial review has not extended 
into the private sector.73 
2.24 Other jurisdictions deal with this trend in different ways.  English courts have been 
prepared to find that private and domestic bodies that do not exercise statutory powers may 
                                                          
69  Chris Berg, The Growth of Australia’s Regulatory State (Institute of Public Affairs, 2008) 10–16. 
70  Greg Weeks, Submission 8 (1 July 2011) 5. 
71  Michael Taggart, ‘The Changing Nature of the Administrative State’ in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet (eds) 
The Oxford Companion to Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, 2003) 101. 
72  See, eg, Rachel Livingston, ‘Contracting out of employment services in Australia and administrative law’ 
(2003) 10 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 77; Hannes Schoombee, ‘Judicial Review of Contractual 
Powers’, in Linda Pearson (ed) Administrative Law: Setting the Pace or Being Left Behind? (Australian Institute of 
Administrative Law, 1997) 433; David De Carvalho, ‘Social contract renegotiated: Protecting public law 
values in the age of contracting’ (2001) 28 AIAL Forum 1; Margaret Allars, ‘Private law but public power: 
Removing administrative law review from government business enterprises’ (1995) 6 Public Law Review 44. 
73  See, eg, NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 277. 
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nevertheless be amenable to judicial review.74  The focus of the English courts is on 
government power, although it has been admitted this can be as much a matter of ‘feel’ as 
deciding whether criteria are met.75  In South Africa, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
2001 applies to ‘a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision, which 
adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect’.76  The 
South African courts therefore focus on whether the body or person made the decision while 
exercising public power or performing a public function.   
Increase in the number and powers of regulatory bodies 
2.25 Berg notes that Australia has seen an increase in the number and powers of 
government regulatory bodies, such as the Australian Securities and Investment Commission, 
the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission, the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority, the Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia and the Australian Energy 
Regulator.77  This is significant to administrative law in that those affected by regulatory 
decisions will usually be corporations, rather than individuals, and more likely to challenge 
government decisions in the courts. 
Technological developments 
2.26 Technology now plays a significant role in government decision making.  This has 
assisted governments to deal with the increase in the volume of decisions being made, but has 
also changed the manner in which decisions are made.   
2.27 The development of computer systems that can make decisions or guide decision 
makers has raised new issues for administrative law.  ‘Automated decision making’ has the 
potential to lead to greater accuracy and consistency in decision making—for example 
through limiting the potential for irrelevant factors to be taken into account.  However, 
automated decision making also has a number of potential pitfalls—for example, narrowing 
the discretion granted by a statute or the possibility of discrepancies arising over time between 
the computer system and the legislation.   
2.28 The Council considered the issues associated with automated decision making in 
2004.78  The Australian Government developed a best practice guide based on the Council’s 
report.79 
                                                          
74  R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers; Ex parte Datafin [1987] QB 815, 824–825.  The Court of Appeal found 
that the Take-overs Panel—which was part of a system of self-regulation ‘without visible means of legal 
support’, which had ‘no statutory, prerogative or common law powers’ and was ‘not in contractual 
relationship with the financial market or with those who deal in that market’—could be subject to judicial 
review. 
75  R (Tucker) v Director General of the National Crime Squad [2003] ICR 599, [13] (Scott Baker LJ). 
76  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2001 (South Africa) s 1. 
77  Chris Berg, The Growth of Australia’s Regulatory State (Institute of Public Affairs, 2008) 20.   
78  Administrative Review Council, Automated Assistance in Administrative Decision Making, Report No 46 (2004). 
79  Australian Government Information Management Office, Automated Assistance in Administrative Decision 
Making: Best Practice Guide (Commonwealth of Australia, 2007). 
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THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 
2.29 This section describes the current administrative law system in Australia as well as 
other mechanisms for improving government decision making.  This is followed by a 
consideration of how different elements of the administrative law system accord with the 
underlying principles of the system.  The Australian administrative law system consists of 
mechanisms for reviewing Australian Government decisions and for improving the future 
conduct of Australian Government officers and agencies. 
2.30 There are also a number of other mechanisms available for individuals seeking 
redress from government, in particular discretionary compensation mechanisms and private 
legal actions.  All fulfil different and complementary roles in the administrative law system.  
To provide a comprehensive consideration of judicial review, these are also considered, 
recognising that there are a range of mechanisms for review of government decisions and 
actions. 
Review of government decisions 
2.31 In the federal administrative law system, there are four main mechanisms for review 
and oversight of administrative government decision making:  
 internal merits review;  
 external merits review (including tribunals and the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner);  
 administrative investigation (for example the Ombudsman); and 
 judicial review.   
Merits review 
2.32 Merits review is the process by which a person or body, other than the primary 
decision maker, reconsiders the facts, law and policy aspects of the original decision and 
determines the correct or preferable decision.80  In merits review, a new decision can be made 
after review of the facts.  This is different from judicial review, where only the legality of the 
decision making process is considered. 
2.33 In Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Bowen CJ and Deane J held that 
‘the question for the determination of [a] Tribunal is whether that decision was the correct or 
preferable one on the material before the Tribunal.81  Kiefel J summarised the task of a merits 
review body in Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority as ‘reach[ing] its conclusion, as to 
what is the correct decision, by conducting its own, independent assessment and 
                                                          
80  See the discussion in Administrative Review Council, What decisions should be subject to merits review 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1999) 1. 
81  Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577, 589. Approved by the High Court in 
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286, 307 (Kirby J) 314–15 (Heydon and 
Hayne JJ) 327 (Kiefel J).  
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determination of the matters necessary to be addressed’.82 In the Council’s guide, What 
Decisions should be Subject to Merits Review, the Council explained that a decision is ‘correct’ in the 
sense of being made according to law and preferable in the sense that it is the best decision 
that could have been made on the basis of the relevant facts.83  It is directed to ensuring fair 
treatment of all persons affected by a decision, and improving the quality and consistency of 
primary decision making.84   
2.34 Internal review occurs when a decision made by an officer of an agency is reviewed by 
another person in the agency.  Many agencies have some formal system of internal review; 
others have more ad hoc systems.  Internal review can be sought by requesting 
reconsideration of a decision or by following set procedures where more formal mechanisms 
exist.  Internal review may be stipulated in legislation or may be available through 
administrative processes in an agency.  For example, Division 2 of the Social Security 
Administration Act 1999 (Cth) grants the Secretary a delegable power to review most decisions 
made ‘under the social security law’,85 and to affirm, vary or set aside a decision.  Section 129 
sets out the procedure for making an application. 
2.35 External review involves a fresh consideration of a case by an external body.  This 
body is often a tribunal, but may also be a regulator reviewing the decision of a private body 
given decision-making power by legislation, or an independent officer from another agency.  
External merits review has to be provided for by legislation; it is not available without specific 
prescription.  For example, the Social Security Administration Act 1999 (Cth), Division 3, grants 
the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT) the jurisdiction to review most decisions made 
under social security law.  Division 3 also sets out the powers of the SSAT, the procedures for 
making an application and the effect of SSAT decisions.   The Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (AAT) was established by the AAT Act, setting out the AAT’s powers and 
functions. However, jurisdiction is also conferred on the AAT by particular statutes, for 
example, Division 5 of the Social Security Administration Act 1999 (Cth). 
Administrative investigation 
2.36 The Commonwealth Ombudsman has wide powers to investigate complaints about 
the administrative actions and decisions of most Australian Government agencies to consider 
if they are unreasonable, unjust, wrong, unlawful or discriminatory.86  Under the 
Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman can also investigate complaints about government 
contractors providing goods and services to the public under a contract with a government 
agency.  Ombudsman investigation and review is available for all administrative and decision-
making processes of agencies within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.87 The Ombudsman has 
                                                          
82  Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286, 327. 
83  Administrative Review Council, What decisions should be subject to merits review? (Commonwealth of Australia, 
1999) 1. 
84  Ibid.   
85  The Social Security Administration Act 1999 (Cth) s 3, defines ‘the social security law’ as including the Social 
Security Administration Act 1999 (Cth) the Social Security Act 1991 and any other act expressed to be part of 
the social security law. 
86  Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) s 15. 
87  Ibid s 5. 
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the discretion not to investigate a complaint.88  The Ombudsman can also conduct ‘own 
motion’ investigations.89  The remedies offered by the Ombudsman are: recommendations to 
departments; specific reports to the Government; or broader reports making 
recommendations to the Government about systemic problems.90   
2.37 Other Australian Government agencies may have an investigative function that is 
comparable to that of the Ombudsman.  For example, the Australian Human Rights 
Commission (AHRC) may investigate whether Commonwealth administrative activity 
complies with human rights or anti-discrimination standards.  Section 11 of the Australian 
Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (AHRC Act) gives the AHRC the following relevant 
functions:  
 to inquire into, and attempt to conciliate, complaints of unlawful 
discrimination; 
 to inquire into any act or practice, including any systematic practice, that 
may constitute ‘discrimination’ in employment or occupation; and  
 to inquire into any act or practice that may be inconsistent with or contrary 
to any human right.  
2.38 Section 8(6) of the AHRC Act requires that the function of the AHRC under each 
of these provisions be performed by the President.   The President may not delegate his or 
her powers with respect to: unlawful discrimination;91 and acts or practices that may be 
inconsistent with or contrary to human rights, or that relate to equal opportunity in 
employment.92 
2.39 The AHRC resolves many complaints through conciliation,93 but reports to the 
relevant Minister or body may recommend specific action, including the payment of 
compensation.94  After the President has terminated a complaint and given notice of the 
termination, any person who was an affected person in relation to the complaint may apply to 
the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court, alleging unlawful discrimination by one or 
more of the respondents to the terminated complaint.95  The Federal Court can make a variety 
of orders including a declaration that the respondent has committed unlawful discrimination, 
orders requiring the respondent to perform an action and orders for damages.96  
                                                          
88  Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) s 6. 
89  Ibid s 5. 
90  Ibid s 15. 
91  Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 19(2A). 
92  Ibid s 19(2B)—except to the Human Rights Commissioner. 
93  Australian Human Rights Commission, Conciliation – How it works 
<www.hreoc.gov.au/complaints_information/conciliation.html>. 
94  Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 29, 35. 
95  Ibid s 46PO. 
96  Ibid. 
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Judicial review 
2.40 Judicial review is a review by a court of a decision to determine whether it was made 
within the lawful limits of the decision maker’s authority including, where necessary, in 
compliance with the requirement of procedural fairness.  It is not a re-hearing of the merits of 
a particular case.  Judicial review in Australia is discussed in Chapter 3. 
Accessing and protecting information 
2.41 The administrative law system includes a number of mechanisms relating to the 
maintenance, publication and access to government information, including:  
 the FOI Act;  
 the Archives Act 1983 (Cth);  
 the Privacy Act; and  
 the right to request reasons in the ADJR Act or in relation to decisions 
subject to review in the AAT. 
2.42 Major reforms to the FOI Act97 in 2010 implemented recommendations of the 
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and the Council in the joint report, Open 
Government: A review of the federal Freedom of Information Act 1982.98  The 2010 reforms established 
a new statutory office of the Australian Information Commissioner.99   
2.43 Currently, there are Information Privacy Principles which set out how the 
Government is to treat personal information and the circumstances in which agencies can 
pass the information to someone else.100  In 2008 the ALRC in its report, For Your Information: 
Australian Privacy Law and Practice,101 recommended major reforms to Australian privacy law.  
The Australian Government has released a first stage response to 197 of the ALRC’s 
recommendations.102   On 24 June 2010, the Australian Government released an exposure 
draft of legislation containing the proposed Australian Privacy Principles, unifying the 
Information Privacy Principles and the National Privacy Principles.103  The exposure draft was 
referred to the Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee, which reported on 
                                                          
97  Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010 (Cth); Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth). 
98  Australian Law Reform Commission, Open Government: A review of the federal Freedom of Information Act 1982, 
Report No 77 (1995); Administrative Review Council, Open Government: A review of the federal Freedom of 
Information Act 1982, Report No 40 (1995). 
99  Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth). 
100  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 14. 
101  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108 
(2008). 
102  Australian Government, Enhancing National Privacy Protection: Australian Government first stage response to the 
Australian Law Reform Commission Report 108, October 2009. 
103  Australian Government, Australian Privacy Principles—Exposure Draft, Australian Privacy Principles—
Companion Guide.  Available at Senate Finance and Administration Committees, Exposure Drafts of 
Australian Privacy Amendment Legislation Senate of the Parliament of Australia 
<www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=fapa_ctte/priv_exp_dra
fts/index.htm>. 
36     
Federal Judicial Review in Australia 
36 
15 June 2011, broadly supporting the principles, with some recommendations for changes.104 
On 31 January 2011, the Government also referred the Credit Reporting provisions to the 
Committee to consider.105  The Committee released its report on 6 October 2011.106  On 
23 May 2012, the Attorney-General introduced the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy 
Protection) Bill 2012 into Parliament, incorporating the Australian Privacy Principles and 
credit reporting provisions, as well as other key aspects of the Government’s first stage 
response to the ALRC report. On 1 November 2010, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
was integrated into the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC).107 
2.44 Under the Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth), the Australian 
Information Commissioner has significant merits review and investigation powers, as well as a 
role in developing information policy in the Australian Government.108   In addition, the 
Australian Information Commissioner’s statutory function, supported by the Freedom of 
Information Commissioner, includes promoting awareness and understanding of the 
Freedom of Information legislation among both agencies and the public.109  An example of 
the merits review powers of the Australian Information Commissioner is the review of 
decisions concerning applications for access to Government information or records under the 
Freedom of Information Act.110  Such decisions may also be reviewed by the AAT, either 
following a decision by the Australian Information Commissioner, or on referral by the 
Information Commissioner.111  A person may complain to OAIC if he or she is concerned 
about how the Government collects and handles personal information.112  
Other accountability mechanisms 
2.45 There are a variety of other agencies, policies and legal remedies that are not part of 
the administrative law system, but which also serve to keep the Government accountable for 
its conduct and decision making.  The Council does not propose to recommend reforms to 
these broader elements of the system, but considers it important to recognise the role these 
mechanisms play when considering what judicial review can—and should—achieve in relation 
to ensuring government accountability.  These include: agencies that provide accountability 
for executive conduct; mechanisms that provide accountability for legislative frameworks; 
other compensation mechanisms; and private legal action.  Each is considered briefly here. 
                                                          
104  Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Exposure Drafts of 
Australian Privacy Amendment Legislation: Part 1 – Australian Privacy Principles (2011). 
105  Credit Reporting—Exposure Draft, Credit Reporting—Companion Guide (2010). Available at Senate 
Finance and Administration Committees, Exposure Drafts of Australian Privacy Amendment Legislation 
Senate of the Parliament of Australia 
<www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=fapa_ctte/priv_exp_dra
fts/index.htm>. 
106  Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Exposure Drafts of 
Australian Privacy Amendment Legislation: Part 2—Credit Reporting (2011). 
107  Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth) ss 6, 7, 9, 12, 14. 
108  Ibid s 7. 
109  Ibid s 8. 
110  Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) Part VII. 
111  Ibid Part VIII.  Section 57A gives the AAT the power to review either decisions made by the Information 
Commissioner or agency decisions which the Information Commissioner declares inappropriate for review 
by the Information Commissioner. 
112  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 36. 
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Accountability for executive conduct 
2.46 There are a number of agencies, which seek to improve government decision 
making, that are not considered a part of the administrative law system but rather form a part 
of the broader ‘administrative justice’ system.  The Auditor-General, for example, conducts 
independent assessments of selected areas of public administration for Parliament.113  The 
Auditor-General also provides government agencies with objective assessments of areas 
where improvements can be made in public administration and service delivery.114  These 
reports are made public, and agencies report progress in annual reports. 
Accountability for executive rule making 
2.47 The Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) (Legislative Instruments Act) is designed to 
introduce a consistent system for the registration, tabling, scrutiny and sunsetting of all 
Commonwealth legislative instruments.115  The Legislative Instruments Act requires: 
 consultation during the making of instruments;116 
 public accessibility through registration on the Federal Register of 
Legislative Instruments;117  
 parliamentary scrutiny through the disallowance process;118  and 
 ‘sunsetting’—a process by which all legislative instruments automatically 
cease after 10 years.119  
2.48 The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2012 (Cth) introduced a requirement for 
all Bills and disallowable legislative instruments to be accompanied by a Statement of 
Compatibility.  The Statement of Compatibility contains an assessment of whether the Bill or 
legislative instrument is compatible with the rights and freedoms recognised in the seven core 
international human rights treaties which Australia has ratified. 
2.49 Parliamentary committees also play an important role in scrutinising legislation that 
is before Parliament.  Both the Senate Standing Committee on the Scrutiny of Bills and the 
Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances scrutinise all bills and 
instruments that Parliament is considering but have not yet passed into law in accordance 
with relevant standing orders, and report back to the Senate.   
                                                          
113  For example, beginning in 2007–08, an annual program was established in conjunction with the Defence 
Materiel Organisation (DMO) to enable the Australian National Audit Office to review and report to the 
Parliament on the status of major Defence acquisition projects: 
<www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Assurance-Activities>. 
114  See for example Australian National Audit Office, Centrelink’s Role in the Process of Appeal to the Social Security 
Appeals Tribunal and to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Report No 16 (2010); Australian National Audit 
Office, Northern Territory Night Patrols, Report No 32 (2011). 
115  Explanatory Memorandum, Legislative Instruments Bill 2003, 2. 
116  Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) Part 3. 
117  Ibid Part 4. 
118  Ibid Part 5.  Parliament has 15 sitting days to consider a legislative instrument and members can move to 
have the instrument ‘disallowed’ during this period, invalidating the instrument: s 42.  
119  Ibid Part 6. 
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2.50 The Senate Standing Committee on the Scrutiny of Bills assesses whether bills 
before the parliament: 
 trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties; 
 make rights, liberties or obligations unduly dependent upon insufficiently 
defined administrative powers; 
 make rights, liberties or obligations unduly dependent upon non-reviewable 
decisions; 
 inappropriately delegate legislative powers; or 
 insufficiently subject the exercise of legislative power to parliamentary 
scrutiny.120 
2.51 The Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances assesses legislative 
instruments tabled in Parliament against principles set out in Standing Order 23 and considers 
whether delegated legislation: 
 is in accordance with the statute; 
 trespasses unduly on personal rights and liberties; 
 makes rights unduly dependent on administrative decisions which are not 
subject to independent review of their merits; or 
 contains matters more appropriate for parliamentary enactment. 
2.52 The Joint Committee on Human Rights established on 13 March 2012 also examines 
Bills and legislative instruments for compatibility with human rights.  
Other compensation mechanisms 
2.53 There are also discretionary compensation mechanisms that the Government can 
use to provide compensation when a person suffers some loss or detriment because of 
government administration.  Judicial review remedies do not include an award of damages, 
and these schemes may provide compensation to individuals where no appropriate legal 
remedy is available and an individual has suffered loss or damage.  There are three main 
schemes for providing discretionary compensation:  the Scheme for Compensation for 
Detriment caused by Defective Administration (CDDA); ‘act of grace payments’; and ‘ex 
gratia payments’.121  The Finance Minister, or delegate, also has the power to waive an amount 
owing to the Commonwealth.122  
2.54 The Department of Finance and Deregulation states that ‘the authority to make 
CDDA payments comes from the executive power of the Commonwealth under s 61 of the 
                                                          
120  Senate Standing Order 24, Parliament of Australia. 
121  Department of Finance, Discretionary Compensation and Waiver of Debt Mechanisms, Finance Circular 2009/09 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009).  
122  Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) s 34(1)(a). 
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Constitution’.123  Under the CDDA, ministers and other authorised officials in agencies 
governed by the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) (FMA Act) may 
‘compensate individuals or other bodies that have experienced losses caused by an agency’s 
defective administration’.124   
2.55 ‘Act of grace’ payments may be made under s 33 of the FMA Act.  Section 33 allows 
the Finance Minister or delegate to authorise one-off and periodic payments to individuals if 
considered appropriate because of special circumstances, such as where government 
legislation or policy has had unintended and unacceptable consequences in a particular 
person’s circumstances.125  As the Department of Finance explains, act of grace payments are 
generally available when the Government has a moral, rather than a legal, obligation to 
provide compensation for some harm caused by government administration.126 For example, 
act of grace payments may be appropriate where the application of Commonwealth legislation 
or policy has resulted in an ‘unintended, anomalous, inequitable or otherwise unacceptable 
result in the applicant’s circumstances’,127 and those circumstances were specific to the 
applicant, outside the applicant’s control and consistent with the broad purpose of the 
legislation.128 
2.56 ‘Ex gratia’ payments may be made by the Prime Minister and/or the Cabinet under 
the authority of s 61 of the Constitution.  Such payments are typically used to deliver financial 
assistance at short notice, often to groups of people rather than individuals.129  The Australian 
National Audit Office gives the example of payments made by the Commonwealth to 
persons affected by the Bali bombing in October 2002.130 
2.57 On 6 December 2010 the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References 
Committee published a review of Australian Government compensation payments.131  The 
review recommended that the Department of Finance should investigate the extension, in 
appropriate circumstances, of the CDDA to agencies governed by the Commonwealth 
Authorities and Corporations Act 1997 (Cth) and to third parties performing functions or 
providing services on behalf of the Australian Government.132 
Private legal action 
2.58 Private law remedies are usually directed at compensating an individual for loss 
suffered as a result of a particular wrong.  In some cases a private legal action against 
                                                          
123  Department of Finance, Discretionary Compensation and Waiver of Debt Mechanisms, Finance Circular 2009/09 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) 2. 
124  Ibid. 
125  Ibid 23–24. 
126  Ibid 3. 
127  Ibid 24. 
128  Ibid. 
129  Ibid 4. 
130  Australian National Audit Office, Compensation Payments and Debt Relief in Special Circumstances, Audit Report 
No 35 (2004). 
131  Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Review of Government 
Compensation Payments (2010). 
132  Ibid 53. 
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Government may be an alternative to a judicial review application.  Remedies may be 
available in contract where a person has a contractual relationship with the Government.  
Public officials may be held accountable in damages under the torts of negligence, breach of 
statutory duty or misfeasance in public office.   
2.59 Emeritus Professor Carol Harlow observed that tort law has ‘an ancient lineage’ of 
complaints of abuse of power.133 Damages are available for negligence on the part of public 
authorities if a plaintiff can show that the authority owed the plaintiff a duty of care, breached 
that duty and caused the plaintiff damage.  Professor John CP Goldberg states that ‘the 
possibility of liability will hinge on the nature of the activity in question’.134  For example, 
discretionary questions of policy are unlikely to give rise to liability, whereas the careless 
application of a policy may give rise to liability.135  To show a breach of statutory duty, the 
claimant must show that Parliament intended a private action to be available for breach of the 
duty.  The High Court considered the tort of misfeasance in public office in Northern Territory 
of Australia v Mengel.136 Deane J identified the requisite elements of the offence as an 
unauthorised act by a public official, done maliciously in the exercise of his or her public 
duties, which causes loss or harm to the plaintiff.137  The majority noted that the act can be 
performed either with knowledge, or where the official ‘recklessly disregards the means of 
ascertaining the extent of his or her power’.138   
PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSE 
2.60 Any reform to judicial review must be considered in the context of the principles of 
the administrative law system as a whole, and the aims of the system.  The Council has, on 
previous occasions, identified a number of general principles underlying the administrative 
law system.  The Council relies on these to provide a context for the principles and purpose 
of judicial review, acknowledging that judicial review alone cannot support all of the 
principles of the administrative law system. 
Administrative law system principles 
2.61 As Professors Robin Creyke and John McMillan observe, the original purpose of the 
administrative law system as envisaged by the Kerr and Bland Committees was to protect 
citizens against government at a time when the Australian Government was growing in size 
                                                          
133  Carol Harlow, ‘A Punitive Role for Tort Law?’ in Michael Taggart, Linda Pearson and Carol Harlow (eds) 
Administrative Law in a Changing State (Hart Publishing, 2008) 247, 248. 
134  John C P Goldberg, ‘Tort’ in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies 
(Oxford University Press, 2003) 21, 37.  For a general discussion and critique of the current legal tests—
common law and legislative—for determining whether government entities owe a duty of care see Mark 
Aronson, ‘Government Liability in Negligence’ (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law Review 44. 
135  Ibid.  
136  (1995) 185 CLR 307. 
137  Northern Territory of Australia v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 370 (Deane J); Commonwealth of Australia v 
Fernando [2012] FCAFC 18. 
138  Northern Territory of Australia v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 347 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and 
McHugh JJ). 
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and exercising more administrative authority and discretionary power.139  The administrative 
law system is also superimposed upon a constitutional framework for judicial review that has 
regard to public law values such as the rule of law, the safeguarding of individual rights and 
executive accountability.   
2.62 In a number of previous reports, the Council identified the general principles 
underlying the administrative law system as: ‘lawfulness, fairness, rationality, openness and 
efficiency’.140   
2.63 Drawing on these principles, the Council has previously identified the two primary 
goals of the administrative law system as: 
 improving the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of government decision 
making generally; and  
 enabling people to test the legality and the merits of decisions that affect 
them.141 
2.64 These two goals are based on the principles underlying the system.  By improving 
the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of government decision making, the administrative 
law system assists the Government to make lawful, fair and rational decisions, to interact 
openly with the public and to follow efficient processes.  By enabling the legality and merits 
of decisions to be tested, the administrative law system provides mechanisms for individuals 
to test whether decisions that affect them were lawful, fair and rational.  Each element of the 
system, discussed above, works to achieve one or both of these goals. 
2.65 The Council also considers that the accessibility of the administrative law system is 
an important principle which should be added to this list.  This section outlines how different 
elements of the administrative law system support different principles. 
Lawfulness 
2.66 Judicial review is generally concerned with the lawfulness of an administrative 
decision.  As Brennan J stated in Church of Scientology v Woodward:  
Judicial review is neither more nor less than the enforcement of the rule of law 
over executive action; it is the means by which executive action is prevented from 
exceeding the powers and functions assigned to the executive by law and the 
interests of the individual are protected accordingly.142 
                                                          
139  Robin Creyke and John McMillan, ‘Administrative Law Assumptions ...  Then and Now’ in Robin Creyke 
and John McMillan (eds) The Kerr Vision of Australian Administrative Law (Australian National University, 
1998) 1. 
140  See Administrative Review Council, Automated Assistance in Administrative Decision Making, Report to the 
Attorney-General, Report No 46 (November 2004) 3; Administrative Review Council, The Coercive Information-
Gathering Powers of Government Agencies, Report No 48 (2008) 2; Administrative Review Council, Administrative 
Review Council Thirty-Third Annual Report 2008-09 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009). 
141  Administrative Review Council, Overview of the Commonwealth System of Administrative Review (2011) 
<http://www.arc.ag.gov.au/Aboutus/Pages/OverviewoftheCommonwealthSystemofAdminReview.aspx>. 
142  (1982) 154 CLR 25, 70. 
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2.67   Through judicial review, courts can ensure that public officials do not exceed their 
powers, and can provide remedies when officials overstep those bounds.  Specialist external 
review bodies, such as the AAT, also have significant legal expertise, contributing to lawful 
government decision making. 
Fairness and rationality  
2.68 Fair and rational decision making is achieved through a number of elements of the 
administrative law system, including: legal standards being applied to decision-making 
procedures through judicial review; finding the ‘correct or preferable decision’ through 
external merits review; and investigations conducted by various accountability agencies. 
2.69 Judicial review principles themselves illustrate what ‘fairness’ and ‘rationality’ require 
in terms of an administrator’s actions.  For example, the rules of natural justice or procedural 
fairness set out certain procedures which must be followed in order to afford a person a fair 
hearing in particular cases.  Other grounds of judicial review require a decision maker to take 
into account relevant considerations, ascertained by reference to the Commonwealth law in 
question, and not take into account irrelevant considerations when making a decision.  While, 
as Creyke and McMillan point out, there have been limited studies of the normative effect 
achieved by judicial review,143 it has also been observed that the grounds of judicial review, 
and interpretation of statutory powers by the courts, have had a profound effect on 
government decision-making processes over the years and on what fairness and rationality 
mean in particular cases.144 
Openness 
2.70 Freedom of information legislation supports the principle of openness in 
government decision making.  Public reporting of the decisions of merits review tribunals and 
courts also contributes to openness. 
Access and efficiency 
2.71 The range of review mechanisms available contributes to the efficiency and 
accessibility of the administrative law system, by providing avenues for people to hold 
government accountable for its conduct.  In particular, complaints can be made to the 
Ombudsman free of charge, and applications for merits review can be made to the 
Information Commissioner without any cost.  Internal review usually involves no cost and 
provides an accessible means of having a decision reviewed. 
2.72 In order to uphold the rule of law effectively, judicial review must be open and 
accessible to individuals. However, access to justice is a nuanced idea, and closely related to 
the principle of ‘efficiency’.  In order for individuals to have access to judicial review, the 
Council considers that the system cannot be overwhelmed with cases more appropriately 
                                                          
143  Robin Creyke and John McMillan, ‘Judicial review outcomes: an empirical study’ (2004) 11 Australian 
Journal of Administrative Law 82. 
144  Andrew Metcalfe, ‘Administrative law evolution: an administrator’s point of view’ (2010) Admin Review 42. 
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dealt with elsewhere.  The Australian Government Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the 
Federal Civil Justice System sets out a number of principles to guide justice system reforms and 
initiatives, as well as resource allocation decisions, in order best to achieve access to justice.   
2.73 These principles are accessibility, appropriateness, equity, efficiency and 
effectiveness: 
 Accessibility refers to the creation of mechanisms to allow people to 
understand and exercise their rights, and includes the idea that justice 
initiatives should reduce the complexity of the system to make this task 
easier; 
 Appropriateness refers to the structure of the justice system: the system 
should be structured to create incentives to encourage people to resolve 
disputes at the most appropriate level and in the most appropriate way (for 
example not using a legal mechanism to try to solve what is fundamentally 
not a legal problem); 
 Equity refers to making the system accessible to all and not dependent on 
private legal representation; 
 Efficiency refers to the fact that fair outcomes should be achieved in the most 
efficient way possible, usually without resort to formal dispute resolution 
processes; and 
 Effectiveness refers to the interaction of elements in the justice system and 
ensuring that all elements of the system working together achieve the best 
outcome for users.145    
2.74 Judicial review may not be the most appropriate forum for resolving a dispute 
between the government and the individual, at least at the first instance.  Internal and external 
merits review may be more effective and efficient means of disputing government decisions, 
because agencies are best placed to explain directly to the individual the reasons for decisions.  
Tribunals also will often have in place dispute management systems to resolve issues in a less 
formal way.  Ultimately, agencies and tribunals can remake the decision on the merits of the 
case. 
Principles for judicial review 
2.75 In the broader context of the administrative law system, the Council considers it 
appropriate to restate the core principles to which judicial review gives effect.  The Council 
utilises these principles to assess issues such as the best models for review, the 
appropriateness of exclusions from review, the appropriateness of separate statutory schemes 
and the ambit of review.  The constitutional basis for judicial review in Australia means that 
principles such as the separation of powers and the rule of law are guiding principles for the 
                                                          
145  Australian Government, A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil Justice System: A guide for 
future action, September 2009, 7–8. 
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courts considering judicial review applications.  The principles below are policy principles to 
guide the design of the system. 
2.76 The Council considers that the principles underlying judicial review are: 
 Reviewability—that the lawfulness of government executive action should be 
subject to review by the courts; 
 Certainty—that the standards of lawfulness set out in judicial review 
legislation and by the courts should provide guidance to government 
officials as to the proper limits of their power, and therefore should be as 
clear as possible to officials exercising powers; 
 Accessibility—that judicial review should be accessible to those whose 
interests are directly affected by government decisions, in the context of the 
whole administrative review system, noting that different aspects of the 
administrative review system are appropriate for different purposes and at 
different stages in the review process; and 
 Efficiency—that judicial review mechanisms should operate as efficiently as 
possible. 
2.77 The Council has used these principles in developing recommendations for the future 
direction of federal judicial review.  The principles underlie the Council’s analysis and 
conclusions in the following chapters. 
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3. FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVIEW IN 
AUSTRALIA 
INTRODUCTION 
3.1 This chapter examines the various sources of judicial review in the Australian federal 
jurisdiction.  These are: 
 constitutional judicial review in the High Court under s 75(v) of the 
Australian Constitution;  
 the statutory equivalent of  s 75(v) of the Constitution, conferred on the 
Federal Court by s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (Judiciary Act);  
 the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act);  
 alternative sources of judicial review under s 75(iii) of the Constitution and 
s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act; and 
 other specific statutory appeal or review mechanisms.   
3.2 These mechanisms share common law origins, both in terms of the grounds of 
review and remedies, and the underlying principles of judicial review such as the rule of law 
and the principle of legality.  This Chapter discusses the scope of each jurisdiction, and the 
different grounds of review, standing to seek review, and the remedies that are available. 
3.3 In this Report, the Council uses the term ‘constitutional judicial review’ to refer to 
judicial review under s 75(v) of the Constitution and s 39B of the Judiciary Act.  This recognises 
that despite the origins of constitutional judicial review in the inherent powers of superior 
courts to grant prerogative remedies, in the Australian federal context the source of the High 
Court’s jurisdiction is granted by s 75(v) of the Constitution, and the Federal Court’s 
jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act mirrors the constitutional provision.  In this 
Report, the term ‘statutory judicial review’ refers to review powers otherwise granted to the 
courts by statute—primarily the ADJR Act but including other statutory judicial review 
mechanisms.   
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW 
3.4 This section outlines constitutional judicial review under s 75(v) of the Constitution 
and its statutory equivalent in s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act.  The scope and grounds of 
constitutional judicial review can only be understood in the context of the remedies which 
define the jurisdiction in s 75(v) of the Constitution and s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act.   
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Source 
3.5 Section 75(v) of the Constitution confers on the High Court original jurisdiction in all 
matters ‘in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an 
officer of the Commonwealth’.146  Section 75(v) uses the language of the ‘prerogative writs’ 
that were inherent in the jurisdiction of all superior courts of record, but, as 
Professor Peter Cane and Associate Professor Leighton McDonald explain, ‘the High Court 
has rebadged the s 75(v) remedies by replacing the language of “prerogative writs” with that 
of the “constitutional writs” and “constitutional injunction”’.147  As this jurisdiction is in the 
Constitution, it cannot be excluded by legislation. 
3.6 Section 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act confers on the Federal Court an equivalent 
jurisdiction to s 75(v).  Section 39B(1A) also confers broad additional jurisdiction on the 
Federal Court in any matter:148 
(a) in which the Commonwealth is seeking an injunction or a declaration; or 
(b) arising under the Constitution, or involving its interpretation; or 
(c) arising under any laws made by the Parliament, other than a matter in 
respect of which a criminal prosecution is instituted or any other criminal 
matter. 
3.7 Section 44 of the Judiciary Act allows the High Court to remit matters to the Federal 
Court, where the Federal Court has jurisdiction with respect to the subject matter and the 
parties.  In most cases, s 75(v) matters can be remitted to the Federal Court;149 ss 39B(1) 
and (1A) also allow applications for judicial review to be lodged directly in the Federal Court.   
Scope 
3.8 The scope of constitutional judicial review is related to the identity of the decision 
maker who must be ‘an officer of the Commonwealth’,150 which includes: public servants;151 
Ministers152 and their delegates; and federal judges153 (though not High Court judges).154  It 
                                                          
146  Mandamus—a writ compelling the exercise of a public power in accordance with a duty; prohibition—an 
order preventing particular conduct; injunction—an order restraining particular conduct.   
147  Peter Cane and Leighton McDonald, Principles of Administrative Law: Legal regulation of governance (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 70. 
148  Section 2 of the Judiciary Act defines ‘matter’ to include ‘any proceeding in a Court, whether between 
parties or not, and also any incidental proceeding in a cause or matter’ and defines ‘cause’ to include ‘any 
suit, and also includes criminal proceedings’. 
149  Section 44 allows the High Court to remit any matter that is pending in the High Court to any federal court 
or court of any State or Territory that has jurisdiction in the matters.  Therefore in matters where the 
Federal Court does not have jurisdiction, for example in relation to most decisions under the 
Migration Act 1958 (s 476A) the High Court cannot remit those matters to the Federal Court. 
150  Australian Constitution, s 75(v). 
151  R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Brisbane Tramways Company Limited [No 1] 
(1914) 18 CLR 54, 66; Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25, 65. 
152  Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25, 65. 
153  R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Brisbane Tramways Company Limited [No 1] 
(1914) 18 CLR 54, 66; Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25. 
154  Re Carmody; Ex parte Glennan (2003) 198 ALR 259, [6]. 
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does not include a State court or judge exercising federal jurisdiction.155 The scope of review 
is also related to the availability of the constitutional remedies, discussed in more detail below.  
More significantly, as noted by Stephen Gageler SC: 
judicial review of administrative action has come to be seen to be anchored not in 
the developing common law but in the fairly rigid Australian constitutional 
structure: its existence mandated and its scope constrained by the separation of 
judicial power.156 
3.9 As discussed in Chapter 2, judicial review is generally concerned with the lawfulness 
of an administrative decision.  Gageler has observed that the source of judicial review of both 
legislation and administrative action ‘can legitimately be labelled “the rule of law” [but] is 
more precisely identified as the constitutional separation of judicial power from legislative and 
executive power’.157 Essentially, as explained by Cane and McDonald, the separation of 
powers is based on the idea ‘that power should not become too concentrated in the hands of 
any one branch of government; and ‘that those who exercise power should be subject to 
some form of external check’.158   
3.10 Cane and McDonald identified that the traditional role of administrative law in 
maintaining the separation of powers ‘is primarily concerned with providing an external check 
on the exercise of power by the executive branch of government’.159  This external check is 
solely of the legality of exercises of executive power.  Gageler explained that ‘it is the province 
and duty of the judicial power to declare and enforce the law that constrains and limits the 
powers of other branches of government’, and this function ‘is not only exclusively the 
function of the judicial power.  It is the sole function of the judicial power’.160  In 
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin, Brennan J stated that: 
The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go 
beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and 
governs the exercise of the repository’s power.  If, in so doing, the court avoids 
administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply 
to cure administrative injustice or error ...  [T]he merits of administrative action, 
to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of 
the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone ... The 
consequence is that the scope of judicial review must be defined not in terms of 
the protection of individual interests but in terms of the extent of power and the 
legality of its exercise.161 
                                                          
155  R v Murray and Cormie; Ex parte Commonwealth (1916) 22 CLR 437.  See Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer and 
Matthew Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Thomson Reuters, 4th ed, 2009) 36–39. 
156  See Stephen Gageler, ‘Impact of migration law on the development of Australian administrative law’ (2010) 
17 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92, 104. 
157  Stephen Gageler, ‘The underpinnings of judicial review of administrative action: Common law or 
Constitution?’ (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 303, 309. 
158  Peter Cane and Leighton McDonald, Principles of Administrative Law: Legal regulation of governance (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 2. 
159  Ibid. 
160  Stephen Gageler, ‘The underpinnings of judicial review of administrative action: Common law or 
Constitution?’ (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 303, 309. 
161  (1990) 170 CLR 1, 35–36 (Brennan J). 
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3.11 The separation of powers therefore becomes the basis for the distinction between 
‘legality’ and ‘merits’ in judicial review matters, and the reason why judicial review looks only 
at the legality of the decision.162  The distinction is significant because it limits the power of 
the courts to supervise executive action, ensuring that the courts do not usurp the proper role 
of the executive.  It is also possible that the wide availability of merits review by a specialist 
tribunal—the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT)—has contributed to the emphasis on 
the importance of the legality/merits distinction in Australia. 
3.12 Gageler pointed out that ‘there is in Australian legal theory a bright line between 
judicial review and merits review’,163 but that while in principle the distinction is easy to make, 
‘the practice is somewhat blurred’.164 For example in relation to the application of particular 
principles of judicial review such as ‘unreasonableness’, the application of legal limits may 
appear to require some assessment of the merits of a decision.  The content of ‘legality’ in 
particular cases is usually defined by reference to the statutory grant of power from which, in 
most cases, executive authority to make decisions affecting individuals, derives:   
While the legitimate scope of judicial review of administrative action in Australia 
is fixed its content is ultimately determinable by the legislature in formulating the 
law, which sets the limits and governs the exercise of the administrator’s 
powers.165 
3.13 Thus, the legislature plays a significant role in defining the content of legality in a 
particular case within the limits on legislative power set by the Constitution.  Judicial review 
under s 75(v) is about ‘keeping administrative decision makers within the express or implied 
limits of the power conferred on them by statute’.166 
Remedies 
3.14 Section 75(v) of the Constitution gives the High Court jurisdiction in any matter in 
which a person is seeking mandamus, prohibition or an injunction against an officer of the 
Commonwealth.  Certiorari is available as an ancillary remedy where it is necessary for one of 
these constitutional writs to operate.167  The court also has an inherent power to grant 
declarations.168  
3.15 A writ of prohibition is a discretionary remedy that is available to prevent a court or 
tribunal from acting in excess of its jurisdiction.  A writ of mandamus orders a person to 
perform a public duty.  A writ of certiorari quashes a decision, or deprives the decision of 
                                                          
162  Sir Anthony Mason has suggested that such an approach reflects ‘the limited Australian conception of the 
content of judicial power’ that may be traced to the influence of Dixon CJ: Sir Anthony Mason, 
‘Procedural Fairness: Its Development and Continuing Role of the Legitimate Expectation’ (2005) 12 
Australian Journal of Administrative Law 103, 109. 
163  Stephen Gageler, ‘The Legitimate Scope of Judicial Review’ (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 279, 279. 
164  Ibid 280. 
165  Ibid 281.   
166  Stephen Gageler, ‘Impact of migration law on the development of Australian administrative law’ (2010) 17 
Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92, 104. 
167  Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651, 673. 
168  Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564, 581–82. 
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legal effect.  Declarations and injunctions are equitable remedies.  An injunction may either 
restrain action or, less commonly, require that action be taken; it may be prescriptive or 
proscriptive in operation.  A declaration is a statement by the court of existing rights or 
obligations as at law.  The court may declare that a decision is invalid, that a proposed 
decision would be invalid, or that a particular action or duty should be performed—it is not a 
coercive remedy. 
3.16 At common law, to obtain the writs of prohibition and mandamus it was necessary 
to show ‘jurisdictional error’.  The same rule applies to the constitutional writs—which are 
only available where the decision maker has made a jurisdictional error or has failed to 
exercise jurisdiction when required to do so by law.169  The concept of ‘jurisdictional error’ is 
discussed in more detail below.  At common law, certiorari is available for a jurisdictional 
error or for an ‘error on the face of the record’. 170  However, as noted by a number of Justices 
in Re McBain; Ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference, in the constitutional jurisdiction 
certiorari is only available for an error on the face of the record where the error is also a 
jurisdictional error.  This is because certiorari is only available as an ancillary remedy, and the 
remedies to which it is ancillary are only available for a jurisdictional error.171  In its 2010 
decision in Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (Kirk),172 the High Court held that what constitutes 
‘the record’ for these purposes now includes the reasons for judgment of an inferior court. 
3.17 In 2003 the High Court commented in obiter that injunctive relief may be available 
for a wider range of grounds than the constitutional writs, including for non-jurisdictional 
errors.173  Cane and McDonald suggest that this may mean an injunction can be obtained 
under s 75(v) for a non-jurisdictional error, but only to have prospective operation.174  
Jurisdictional error 
3.18 Hayne J explained in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala that ‘there is a 
jurisdictional error if the decision maker makes a decision outside the limits of the functions 
and powers conferred on him or her, or does something which he or she lacks power to 
do’.175  In the United Kingdom and New Zealand the distinction between jurisdictional and 
non-jurisdictional errors has been rejected.176  Chief Justice Spigelman of the New South 
Wales Supreme Court argued that ‘the distinction is necessitated in Australian law by our 
separation of powers doctrine’.177  As Gageler pointed out, the term has become increasingly 
significant in Australia due to the High Court’s identification of jurisdictional error as the 
                                                          
169  Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 
CLR 476, 508. 
170  An error ‘on the face of the record’ is an error that is identifiable from the written record of the decision. 
171  (2002) 209 CLR 372, 393–4 (Gleeson CJ) 403 (Gummow and Gaudron JJ) 440–1 (Kirby J).  See also Re 
Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 90–91 (Gaudron and Gummow JJ). 
172  (2010) 239 CLR 531, 577–78. 
173  Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 508. 
174  Peter Cane and Leighton McDonald, Principles of Administrative Law: Legal regulation of governance (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 114. 
175  (2000) 204 CLR 82, 141 
176  Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147; R v Lord President of the Privy Council, Ex parte 
Page [1993] AC 682. 
177  James Spigelman, ‘The centrality of jurisdictional error’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 77, 83. 
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unifying principle upon which constitutional judicial review is based.178  In Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS, Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J suggested that jurisdictional 
error does not play the same central role in identification of legal error in ‘systems of review 
of administrative decisions which are established by laws of the Commonwealth and under 
which the grounds of review are not limited to those involving jurisdictional error’.179  
Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J pointed to the availability of review under the ADJR Act on the 
grounds ‘that the decision “involved an error of law” (s 5(1)(f)) and that there was no 
evidence or other material to justify the decision (s 5(1)(h) and (3))’.180  
3.19 The High Court has linked the concept of jurisdictional error to the separation of 
powers in the Constitution.181  As Gageler explains, this has ‘anchored’ judicial review in the 
constitutional structure, ‘its existence mandated and its scope constrained by the separation of 
judicial power’.182  Thus, in the constitutional context, the concept of jurisdictional error is 
linked to the broader principle of legality, discussed above.   
3.20 The significance of review for jurisdictional error under s 75(v) emerged in 2001 in a 
High Court challenge to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act), s 474 of which purported 
to exclude decisions made under the Migration Act from judicial review by any court (a 
‘privative clause’). 183  In Plaintiff S157 v Commonwealth (Plaintiff S157), the High Court held that 
the clause did not apply to decisions affected by jurisdictional error, because those decisions 
were not made ‘under the Act’.184  Hence, the power of the High Court to grant judicial 
review remedies for jurisdictional errors was not excluded by s 474.  The High Court stated 
that s 75(v) ‘introduces into the Constitution of the Commonwealth an entrenched minimum 
provision of judicial review’.185  The Australian Parliament could not, therefore, restrict 
judicial review for jurisdictional error through the use of privative clauses. 
3.21 In 2010, the High Court in Kirk considered the position of State courts in the 
Australian constitutional system, and held that State parliaments similarly could not restrict 
the power of State Supreme Courts to review administrative decisions on the basis of 
jurisdictional error.186  As explained by Spigelman CJ: 
The effect of Kirk is that there is, by force of s 73, an ‘entrenched minimum 
provision of judicial review’ applicable to State decision makers of a similar, 
probably the same, character as the High Court determined in Plaintiff 
S157/2002 v Commonwealth ...  to exist in the case of Commonwealth decision 
makers by force of s 75(v) of the Constitution.187 
                                                          
178  Stephen Gageler, ‘Impact of migration law on the development of Australian administrative law’ (2010) 17 
Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92, 93. 
179  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, 616 (Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J). 
180  Ibid. 
181  Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1, 23–24. 
182  Stephen Gageler, ‘Impact of migration law on the development of Australian administrative law’ (2010) 17 
Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92, 104. 
183  A privative clause is a clause which purports to exclude the availability of judicial review. 
184  Plaintiff S157 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 506. 
185  Ibid 513. 
186  Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531. 
187  James Spigelman, ‘The centrality of jurisdictional error’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 77, 81. 
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3.22 How can jurisdictional error be defined?  In Craig v South Australia (Craig),188 the High 
Court drew a distinction between the extent of jurisdictional error in the context of an 
inferior court—which has power authoritatively to determine questions of fact and law—and 
administrative decision makers.  This distinction was confirmed by the High Court in Kirk.189  
In Craig, the High Court stated that an inferior court would fall into jurisdictional error if it 
‘mistakenly asserts or denies the existence of jurisdiction or if it misapprehends or disregards 
the nature or limits of its functions or powers in a case where it correctly recognises that 
jurisdiction does exist’.190  The court stated that this includes: 
 entertaining a matter that lies outside the limits of the court’s powers; 
 acting in the absence of a jurisdictional fact; 191 
 failing to consider a matter that the relevant statute requires to be taken into 
account as a condition of jurisdiction, or considering an irrelevant matter; 
and 
 misconstruing the relevant statute in a way that leads to the decision maker 
misconceiving the extent of its powers.192 
3.23 Following Plaintiff S157, the statement by Brennan J in Kioa v West regarding the 
implication of procedural fairness from the statutory context has become increasingly 
significant: 
At base, the jurisdiction of a court judicially to review a decision made in the 
exercise of a statutory power on the ground that the decision-maker has not 
observed the principles of natural justice depends upon the legislature’s intention 
that observance of the principles of natural justice is a condition of the valid 
exercise of the power ... The statute is construed, as all statutes are construed, 
against a background of common law notions of justice and fairness and, when 
the statute does not expressly require that the principles of natural justice be 
observed, the court construes the statute on the footing that ‘the justice of the 
common law will supply the omission of the legislature’: Cooper v. Wandsworth 
Board of Works ((1863) 14 CB NS 180, 194).  The true intention of the legislature is 
thus ascertained.  When the legislature creates certain powers, the courts presume 
that the legislature intends the principles of natural justice to be observed in their 
exercise in the absence of a clear contrary intention.193 
                                                          
188  (1995) 184 CLR 163. 
189  Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531. 
190  Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163, 177. 
191  A jurisdictional fact is a factual or legal precondition which must be fulfilled before a power can be 
exercised under a statute.  For example, a statute might grant an executive power to grant a licence if the 
relevant fee has been paid.  The payment of the fee is a jurisdictional fact.  In Parisienne Basket Shoes v Whyte 
(1938) 59 CLR 369 the High Court held that an inferior court had jurisdiction to determine, rightly or 
wrongly, any jurisdictional fact—and was not subject to administrative law review for a wrong decision in 
that regard.  However, the bright line distinction between inferior courts and administrative bodies in 
respect of jurisdictional facts is now less clear—see Public Service Association of South Australia Inc v Industrial 
Relations Commission of South Australia [2012] HCA 25. 
192  Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163, 177–78. 
193  Kioa v West 159 CLR 550, 609. 
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3.24 Thus, in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala the High Court concluded that a 
failure to afford procedural fairness may result in a jurisdictional error in respect of which the 
High Court may issue constitutional writs.194    Applying Brennan J’s approach, in Project Blue 
Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (Project Blue Sky),195 the High Court held that whether 
or not an error was jurisdictional was a matter to be determined through a process of 
statutory interpretation—did the Parliament intend that the failure to comply with the express 
or implied requirement would result in invalidity?  However, the High Court made clear that 
the scope of jurisdictional error may continue to expand when it stated in Kirk that it was 
‘neither necessary, nor possible, to attempt to mark the metes and bounds of jurisdictional 
error’.196 
Constitutional review and the common law grounds 
Grounds and jurisdictional error 
3.25 Section 75(v) makes no reference to the grounds of review.  The grounds of review 
are therefore linked to the statutory grant of power, and the question of whether the decision 
maker has acted outside jurisdiction.  According to the High Court:  
the authority conferred on the repository of a general power cannot be exercised 
in conflict with a provision which governs the manner of its exercise; the 
constraint on the exercise of the power defines the ambit of the power granted.  
A purported exercise of a power in breach of the provision which governs the 
manner of its exercise is invalid, since there is no power to support it.197 
3.26  Thus, as a general proposition, the grounds of judicial review which are available in 
relation to any decision will depend on the construction of the statute governing the decision 
maker’s power.  However, the traditional grounds of review are reflected in the concept of 
jurisdiction, so that in practice the concept of ‘jurisdictional error’ still leads to decisions 
based on the traditional grounds.  As Gageler explains:  
The legal rules giving rise to the traditional grounds of judicial review are ... not 
discrete or freestanding.  They are all aspects of jurisdiction.  They serve to 
identify the scope of a decision maker’s power and the conditions of its valid 
exercise.  But ultimately it is for the legislature to set the limits of any jurisdiction 
it confers.  The scope of a decision maker’s power and the conditions of its valid 
exercise can always be defined differently.198 
An issue that has not been further explored by the High Court is the implication of the 
observation in the joint judgment in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth199  that s 75(v) 
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‘introduces into the Constitution of the Commonwealth an entrenched minimum provision 
of judicial review’. 
3.27 In practice, as Gageler contends, the traditional grounds play a significant role in 
constitutional judicial review because they amount to the ‘default position’ in the absence of a 
contrary legislative definition.200  
Common law grounds 
3.28 As Emeritus Professor Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer and Associate Professor 
Matthew Groves explain, ‘the overall ground of judicial review is that the repository of public 
power has breached the limits placed upon the grant of that power’.201  The grounds of 
judicial review, according to Cane and McDonald, ‘flesh out this basic principle’ of legality.202  
The grounds of review are a shorthand description of a number of ways in which an officer 
of the Commonwealth may breach a grant of power.  They include: 
 failing to comply with the legislation; 
 acting irrationally or unreasonably; and 
 failing to follow proper procedures.203   
3.29 A decision maker may fail to comply with legislative requirements in a number of 
ways—for example: making an error of law; misinterpreting the statute conferring decision-
making power; and acting without jurisdiction. 
3.30 A further ground, referred to as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’, derives from the case 
of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation.204  A decision that is ‘so 
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it’, 205 is an example of a 
ground of review that developed as a safety net to catch cases not demonstrating error on one 
of the more specific grounds of judicial review falling within this category.206  In the UK, 
Wednesbury unreasonableness developed in the 1990s to mean that, as explained by Michael 
Taggart, the graver the impact of the decision on the affected person, the more substantial the 
justification that will be required to uphold it.207  However, these developments toward 
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‘variable intensity unreasonableness review’ have not been accepted by the Federal Court, 
because it may involve consideration of the merits of the decision.208   
3.31 Closely related to Wednesbury unreasonableness, irrationality or illogicality in the 
reasoning for an administrative decision has been accepted as a common law ground of 
review in Australia, at least for jurisdictional facts.209  The critical question is whether the 
determination was ‘irrational, illogical and not based on findings or inferences of fact 
supported by logical grounds’.210 
3.32 Decision makers can also breach the limits of a grant of power by failing to follow 
proper procedures when making a decision—failing to apply the rules of ‘natural justice’ or 
‘procedural fairness’.211 Relevant requirements include: providing a person affected by the 
decision with notice; providing them the opportunity to be heard and respond to the case; 
and the impartiality of the decision maker.  Natural justice is more often described as 
‘procedural fairness’ in the Australian administrative law context.212  Procedural fairness has 
two limbs—the rule against bias and the fair hearing rule.213 
3.33 The rule against bias covers both actual and apprehended bias—the decision maker 
must not only be free from bias but also appear to be free from bias.214  The right to a fair 
hearing applies where a person has a legitimate expectation that he or she will be afforded 
procedural fairness in the making of a decision that affects him or her.215  The right is subject 
to any clear contrary statutory intention and the individual’s rights, interest or legitimate 
expectations must be affected in a direct and immediate way.216  
3.34 The extent to which judicial review will protect ‘legitimate expectations’ is still the 
subject of some uncertainty.  In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (Teoh) the High 
Court held that the ratification by the Australian Government of an international treaty gave 
rise to a legitimate expectation that a decision maker would act in conformity with the treaty 
requirements.217  If the decision maker decided not to do so, it must inform the person 
affected and give him or her an opportunity to argue that the decision maker should comply 
with the treaty.218 However, in Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (Lam), 
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members of the High Court, in obiter, expressed doubt about the High Court’s decision in 
Teoh that the ratification of a treaty by the executive raised a legitimate expectation that that 
treaty would be taken into account by the decision maker.219  McHugh and Gummow JJ 
stated that: 
If Teoh is to have continued significance at a general level for the principles which 
inform the relationship between international obligations and the domestic 
constitutional structure, then further attention will be required to the basis upon 
which Teoh rests.220 
3.35 In Lam, Gleeson J also suggested that there needed to be some ‘practical injustice’ 
resulting from the disappointment of a legitimate expectation for the court to issue judicial 
review remedies.221  In the 2009 decision in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO, the 
High Court held that breach of a procedural obligation was not a jurisdictional error because 
no injustice or unfairness resulted from the breach of a ‘facilitative provision’—a provision 
that ‘impose[s] obligations which facilitate the conduct of a procedurally fair hearing’.222  
These decisions indicate that, while procedural fairness still focuses on process rather than 
outcomes, the court will inquire into whether the process was actually unfair rather than 
applying strict procedural requirements. 
3.36 The common law grounds of review are largely codified in the ADJR Act ss 5 and 6, 
considered further below. 
Standing 
3.37 A person has standing to apply for judicial review if the court considers that the 
person has a sufficient connection to the proceedings.  Standing is distinct from the merits of 
the proceeding, and does not necessarily relate to the subject matter of the application.  As 
explained by Mason J, agreeing with Gibbs J, in Australian Conservation 
Foundation v Commonwealth: 
a private citizen or a corporation, who has no special interest in the subject matter 
of the action over and above that enjoyed by the public generally, has no locus 
standi to seek a declaration or injunction to prevent the violation of a public right 
or to enforce the performance of a public duty.223  
3.38 Gibbs J discussed the nature of the interest required for a person to have standing: 
A person is not interested within the meaning of the rule, unless he is likely to 
gain some advantage, other than the satisfaction of righting a wrong, upholding a 
principle or winning a contest, if his action succeeds or to suffer some 
disadvantage, other than a sense of grievance or a debt for costs, if his action fails.  
A belief, however strongly felt, that the law generally, or a particular law, should 
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be observed, or that conduct of a particular kind should be prevented, does not 
suffice to give its possessor locus standi.224 
3.39 Therefore, a person will generally have standing to seek any of the constitutional 
remedies if he or she is adversely affected by executive action in the sense that the person has 
a special interest in the subject of the decision or would be adversely affected by the outcome. 
Alternative sources of judicial review  
3.40 There are other sources of judicial review, both in the Constitution and the 
Judiciary Act, which can also be used to seek judicial review.  In the Constitution, s 75(iii) has the 
widest application, although s 75(i) could also potentially be used.  Section 39B(1A)(c) of the 
Judiciary Act is an additional source of review for the Federal Court.  These sources, in 
particular s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act, do not appear to be as widely used as the more 
traditional sources in s 75(v) and s 39B(1).  This section discusses the availability of review 
and remedies under these sections. 
Section 75(iii) of the Constitution 
3.41 Section 75(iii) confers upon the High Court original jurisdiction in all matters ‘in 
which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, 
is a party’.  This section is an alternative means of engaging the High Court’s power to grant 
remedies, and is not subject to the same restrictions on the grant of remedies as under s 75(v).   
3.42 Under s 75(iii) available remedies include the constitutional writs, declaration and 
certiorari for jurisdictional error and non-jurisdictional error on the face of the record.  In 
Project Blue Sky the High Court distinguished between decisions that are invalid because of a 
jurisdictional error where retrospective remedies would issue, and decisions which are 
affected by a non-jurisdictional breach of the statute or some other legal requirement where 
prospective remedies may issue.225 
3.43 The High Court’s jurisdiction under s 75(iii) is also engaged even where a party is 
not ‘an officer of the Commonwealth’, as long as the Commonwealth is one of the parties.  
This may be significant in cases involving government contractors.  In Plaintiff 
M61 v Commonwealth (Plaintiff M61) in 2010, the High Court stated that it clearly had 
jurisdiction over decisions of government contractors because the Court had jurisdiction 
under ss 75(v), 75(iii) and possibly 75(i).226 In Plaintiff M61, a declaration was granted as a 
remedy, even though none of the constitutional writs were available. 
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Section 75(i) of the Constitution 
3.44 Section 75(i) gives the High Court jurisdiction in all matters ‘arising under any 
treaty’.  The potential to use this provision in judicial review applications was recognised by 
the High Court in Plaintiff M61.227 
Section 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 
3.45 The jurisdiction of the Federal Court to undertake judicial review under s 39B(1A)(c) 
is very broad and may address many of the restrictions on s 75(v) review.  Aronson, Dyer and 
Groves note that: 
Provided that at least part of a matter “arises under” a Commonwealth statute, 
the Federal Court has judicial review jurisdiction, even though ADJR is excluded, 
and even though no respondent answers s 39B’s description of “officer of the 
Commonwealth”.228 
3.46 Remedies under s 39B(1A)(c) are as the Court considers appropriate.  229  
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS (JUDICIAL REVIEW) ACT 1977 
3.47 The reforms to the judicial review system, implemented by the ADJR Act, were 
intended to overcome many of the technical issues associated with obtaining writs under 
s 75(v).230  The ADJR Act sought to codify the principles of judicial review and reform 
relevant procedures, in order to provide a simple alternative to the traditional, complex 
judicial review processes under the Constitution.  It also introduced an obligation for decision 
makers to provide a written statement of reasons on request—an important reform, giving 
people access to information that could provide evidence to ground a judicial review 
application.  Cane and McDonald suggest that the ADJR Act focuses less on the availability of 
remedies and shifts attention to whether a legal error could be established (a breach of a 
ground of review).231 
Scope 
3.48 The ADJR Act provides an automatic right to judicial review of the exercise of a 
statutory discretion, unless legislation specifically excludes decisions of that kind from 
ADJR Act review.  Particular decisions that are exempt from the Act are listed in Schedule 1, 
in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Regulations 1985 and occasionally in the specific 
legislation under which a decision will be made. 
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3.49 The ADJR Act specifies in s 3 that it applies to all decisions:  
of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be 
made (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not and whether before or after 
the commencement of this definition): 
(a) under an enactment referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) of the 
definition of enactment; or 
(b) by a Commonwealth authority or an officer of the Commonwealth under an 
enactment referred to in paragraph (ca) or (cb) of the definition of enactment; 
other than: 
(c) a decision by the Governor-General; or 
(d) a decision included in any of the classes of decisions set out in Schedule 1.232   
3.50 Paragraph (b) of the s 3 definition covers State and Territory legislation 
implementing national schemes, where Commonwealth authorities or officers are given 
powers under it. 
3.51  The phrase ‘administrative character’ is not defined in the ADJR Act.  The courts 
have taken a broad view of what is administrative as being that which is neither legislative nor 
judicial.233  However, the distinction can be difficult, as Professors Robin Creyke and 
John McMillan observe, ‘courts have frequently acknowledged the categories overlap and that 
the characterisation of any function takes colour from the context in which it is exercised’.234  
In Federal Airports Corporation v Aerolineas Argentinas, Lehane J stated that ‘general tests 
frequently provide no clear answer’ and emphasised ‘the need to examine closely the 
particular provisions and the particular circumstances’.235 
3.52 The ADJR Act applies to decisions and conduct engaged in for the purpose of 
making a decision.236  The courts have held that decisions to which the ADJR Act applies 
must be final and operative, and that ‘conduct’ refers to activity preceding a decision that 
reveals a flawed administrative process (rather than ‘decisions made along the way with a view 
to making the final determination).237  Further cases on the meaning of conduct are few, partly 
due to the prevailing view that ‘conduct overtaken by a subsequent decision is not 
independently reviewable but should be considered in the context of the review of the 
decision itself’.238 
                                                          
232  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 3. 
233  Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 123.  In ACT Health Authority v Berkeley (1985) 60 ALR 284, 
286; the Federal Court indicated that the word ‘administrative’ is not, in the context of the Act, to be 
distinguished from ‘executive’. 
234  Robin Creyke and John McMillan, Control of Government Action: Text, Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis, 
2nd ed, 2009) 109.   
235  (1997) 147 ALR 649, 657 ( Beaumont and Whitlam JJ concurring). 
236  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 3(1). 
237  Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, 337–339, 341–342 (Mason CJ). 
238  Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ozamanian (1996) 71 FCR 1, 20.   
          59
Chapter 3: Federal Judicial Review in Australia 
59 
3.53 The ADJR Act also requires the decision to be made ‘under an enactment’.239  This 
excludes review of non-statutory decisions—for example, those made under executive or 
prerogative power.  It may include an administrative instrument where it is made pursuant to 
statute.240  The courts have interpreted the need for a decision to be made ‘under an 
enactment’ restrictively, requiring a link between the decision to be reviewed and a power 
conferred by an enactment to make that decision.241  The test has been expressed in many 
ways in a number of Federal Court decisions.242  In Griffith University v Tang the High Court 
held that a decision will only be made ‘under an enactment’, for ADJR Act purposes, if it 
‘derives from the enactment the capacity to affect legal rights and obligations’243 or ‘took its 
legal force or effect from statute’.244   
Grounds of review 
3.54 A person aggrieved by a decision may apply for judicial review under ADJR Act 
s 5(1) on the following grounds:  
(a) that a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the 
making of the decision;  
(b) that procedures that were required by law to be observed in connection 
with the making of the decision were not observed;  
(c) that the person who purported to make the decision did not have 
jurisdiction to make the decision;  
(d) that the decision was not authorized by the enactment in pursuance of 
which it was purported to be made;  
(e) that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power 
conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be 
made;  
(f) that the decision involved an error of law, whether or not the error appears 
on the record of the decision;  
(g) that the decision was induced or affected by fraud;  
(h) that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the 
decision;  
(i) that the decision was otherwise contrary to law.   
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3.55 Subsection 5(2) of the ADJR Act specifies that the reference to ‘an improper 
exercise of a power’ in s 5(1)(e) is to be construed as including a reference to: 
(a) taking an irrelevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power;  
(b) failing to take a relevant consideration into account in the exercise of a 
power;  
(c) an exercise of a power for a purpose other than a purpose for which the 
power is conferred;  
(d) an exercise of a discretionary power in bad faith;  
(e) an exercise of a personal discretionary power at the direction or behest of 
another person;  
(f) an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy 
without regard to the merits of the particular case;  
(g) an exercise of a power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person 
could have so exercised the power;  
(h) an exercise of a power in such a way that the result of the exercise of the 
power is uncertain; and  
(i) any other exercise of a power in a way that constitutes abuse of the power.   
3.56 Section 6 of the ADJR Act applies similarly to review of conduct relating to the 
making of decisions. 
3.57 Review under the ADJR Act extends beyond the  requirement in the constitutional 
judicial review jurisdiction for a jurisdictional error in three respects.  First, review under the 
ADJR Act is available for any error of law, whether or not that error is jurisdictional and 
whether or not the error appears on the face of the record.245  Secondly, review is available 
where the decision maker has based the decision on a particular fact, and that fact did not 
exist—the ‘no evidence’ ground.246  As explained by Aronson, Dyer and Groves, this ground 
‘probably exceeds the common law’s notion of error of law’.247  Thirdly, review is available 
where the procedures required by law were not observed.248  Aronson, Dyer and Groves 
suggest that this ground appears not to be confined to jurisdictional errors, unlike in the 
constitutional judicial review jurisdiction.249  
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Standing 
3.58 To apply for review under the ADJR Act a person must be aggrieved by a decision, 
conduct or failure to make a decision.250  In Australian Institute of Marine and Power 
Engineers v Secretary, Department of Transport, Gummow J commented that this was no narrower 
than standing rules applying for constitutional judicial review.251 
Remedies 
3.59 One of the main features of the ADJR Act is that it removes some of the remedial 
complexities still associated with constitutional review.  The ADJR Act structure means that, 
if an applicant establishes that the court has jurisdiction and there has been some error in the 
decision making, the court can issue any of the remedies listed in s 16.   
3.60 Section 16 confers on the Federal Court and the Federal Magistrates Court wide 
powers to make orders for substantive relief.  Remedies are generally the same as those 
available for constitutional judicial review, regardless of the court handling the matter, without 
any restrictions relating to the nature of the error or whether it appears on the record or not.  
In particular, the court may grant an order: 
 quashing or setting aside the decision, or a part of the decision, with effect 
from the date of the order or from such earlier or later date as the court 
specifies; 
 referring the matter to which the decision relates to the person who made 
the decision for further consideration, subject to such directions as the 
court thinks fit; 
 declaring the rights of the parties in respect of any matter to which the 
decision relates, or in relation to the making of a decision; or 
 directing any of the parties to do, or to refrain from doing, any act or thing 
the doing, or the refraining from the doing, of which the court considers 
necessary to do justice between the parties. 
3.61 The courts also have power to make orders of such kinds as the court thinks 
appropriate in relation to matters in which they have jurisdiction, including interlocutory 
orders and the issue of writs.252 
The provision of reasons 
3.62 There is no common law obligation upon an administrative decision maker to 
provide reasons for an adverse administrative decision.253 However, s 13 of the ADJR Act 
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provides that, where there is a right of judicial review by the Federal Court and Federal 
Magistrates Court under the Act, there is also a right to request and obtain from a decision 
maker a written statement of reasons for a decision.  Schedule 2 sets out classes of exclusions 
from this right.   
OTHER STATUTORY APPEALS 
3.63 Some statutory and executive schemes for Commonwealth decision making, 
particularly those with large volumes of, or special environments for, decisions, have specific 
statutory appeal or review mechanisms that in many cases replace the need to rely on other 
general avenues of judicial review. 
Migration 
3.64 Part 8 of the Migration Act provides a separate scheme for judicial review of 
migration decisions, which mirrors the constitutional review jurisdiction.  Migration decisions 
are governed by this separate scheme as a result of government policy and court decisions 
particular to the migration jurisdiction.   
3.65 In 1992, in response to significant rises in the number of applications for review of 
migration decisions in the Federal Court, a separate judicial review scheme was enacted in 
Part 8 of the Migration Act for entry decisions and refugee claims, in substitution for the 
provisions of ADJR Act and the Judiciary Act.254  This constituted a restricted scheme, 
involving fewer grounds under which review could be sought, mandatory merits review 
before judicial review could be sought and stricter time limits for applications.  However, this 
led to cases being brought in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, significantly 
increasing its workload.255  Over time, the more restrictive scheme in Part 8 was broadened by 
the courts through statutory interpretation of its provisions.256 
3.66 Further changes were made to the scheme in 2001, most notably to introduce a 
‘privative clause’ to: 
provide decision-makers with wider lawful operation for their decisions such that, 
provided the decision-maker is acting in good faith, has been given the authority 
to make the decision concerned ... and does not exceed constitutional limits, the 
decision will be lawful.257  
3.67 As noted above, this attempt to limit judicial review was not successful, with the 
High Court in Plaintiff S 157 allowing judicial review in relation to decisions that involve 
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jurisdictional error.258  Other amendments in 2001 also introduced a bar on class actions in 
both the Federal and High Courts, following concerns that such actions were being used to 
encourage large numbers of people to litigate to prolong their stay in Australia while 
appealing against adverse visa decisions.259  Further amendments were made in 2002 to 
exclude the operation of common law rules in relation to procedural fairness and to codify 
the procedure for migration decision making.260  
3.68 In 2005, to ensure that the Federal Magistrates Court would deal with the majority 
of migration matters involving judicial review, Part 8 of the Migration Act was amended to 
provide that the ‘Federal Magistrates Court has the same original jurisdiction in relation to 
migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution’ (with 
some exceptions).261  The Federal Court still has some first instance jurisdiction over certain 
migration decisions listed specifically in Part 8.   
Taxation 
3.69 The Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (Taxation Administration Act) provides for 
several appeal or review processes, depending on the provision under which the decision is 
made.262  Under the provisions set out in Part IVC of the Taxation Administration Act, a 
taxpayer who is dissatisfied with a decision by the Commissioner of Taxation has a right to 
seek review of an assessment and recourse to the Federal Court against a decision on grounds 
such as that the taxation decision should not have been made or should have been made 
differently.263  Following review, the Commissioner has a statutory duty to take whatever 
action is necessary to give effect to a decision by the AAT or the Federal Court.   
3.70 In some cases, review can only be sought under Part IVC of the Taxation 
Administration Act.  The ADJR Act does not apply to tax assessment decisions,264 and only 
applies to a limited number of taxation decisions.  Review of some taxation decisions under 
s 39B of the Judiciary Act is restricted through the use of ‘no invalidity’ clauses—which state 
that a decision is not invalid because the provisions of the relevant Act have not been 
complied with.  For example, s 175 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (Income Tax 
Assessment Act) provides that ‘the validity of any assessment shall not be affected by reason 
that any of the provisions of this Act have not been complied with’.  In Commissioner of 
Taxation v Futuris Corporation, the High Court held that s 175 had the effect that a breach of 
the requirements of the Income Tax Assessment Act was not a jurisdictional error, and therefore 
not subject to review under s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act or s 75(v) of the Constitution. 
                                                          
258  Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476.  In Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651 the High Court held that it was unconstitutional to restrict the time 
in which an application under s 75(v) could be brought in the High Court.  The provision in that case 
imposed inflexible time limits which did not allow the court to extend to commence proceedings where the 
court concluded that circumstances might justify such an extension. 
259  Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2001 (Cth). 
260  Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 (Cth). 
261  Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 476. 
262  Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) part IVC. 
263  Ibid s 14ZZO. 
264  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) Schedule 1 paragraphs (e) (f) (ga) (gaa). 
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Appeal from the AAT 
3.71 Under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act), a party 
to a merits review proceeding may appeal to the Federal Court on a question of law from any 
decision of the AAT.  The Federal Court rules require that the ‘precise question’ of law be 
stated.265  The distinction between questions of law and errors of law is not clear, but there is 
significant overlap between the two.266   
3.72 While there is no clear prohibition upon applicants using both s 44 of the AAT Act 
and judicial review under the ADJR Act or s 39B of the Judiciary Act, it is likely that 
simultaneous applications of review and appeal might lead the Federal Court to exercise its 
inherent discretion to stay any judicial review application until an appeal under the AAT Act 
was determined.  The Federal Court has held that s 44 is the ordinary basis for appeal of 
decisions, with applications for judicial review under the ADJR Act or Judiciary Act generally 
concerning conduct falling outside the scope of the decision.267  AAT online information 
entitled ‘what do I do if I disagree with the Tribunal decision’, points to the ability to appeal 
under s 44 but not under the ADJR Act or the Judiciary Act. 268   
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE STATES AND TERRITORIES 
3.73 As noted above, State Supreme Courts have inherent power to conduct judicial 
review.  Until recently, judicial review by State Supreme Courts was considered to be of a 
different nature from federal judicial review by the High Court, based on the common law 
rather than the Constitution.  However, in 2010, in Kirk, the High Court held that State 
parliaments could not restrict the power of State Supreme Courts to review administrative 
decisions on the basis of jurisdictional error.269  This case may lead to closer alignment 
between State judicial review and federal judicial review. 
3.74 In addition to the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts, three Australian 
States, Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania, and the Australian Capital Territory, have 
introduced statutory judicial review.  The judicial review statutes in Queensland,270 
Tasmania271 and the Australian Capital Territory272 are modelled on the ADJR Act, with some 
modifications.  For example, Queensland’s Judicial Review Act 1991 applies to a slightly wider 
                                                          
265  Federal Court Rules 2011, r 33.12(2)(b).  Hartnett v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2004] FCA 50 
Marshall J sets out the general principles. 
266  See, eg, Administrative Review Council, Appeals from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to the Federal Court, 
Report No 41 (1997).  The High Court has also made clear that the scope of a right of appeal on the 
ground of error of law from a tribunal decision is a limited one that does not grant the court jurisdiction to 
review the entire matter argued in the tribunal.  The appellate jurisdiction covers only as much 
as is impugned for error of law: Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2010) 84 ALJR 528, [20] French 
CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ) [78] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ). 
267  Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2010) 84 ALJR 528 [21]. 
268  See <www.aat.gov.au>. 
269  Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531; see also Public Service Association of South Australia Inc v 
Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia [2012] HCA 25.   
270  Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld). 
271  Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas). 
272  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT). 
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range of executive action than the ADJR Act.  In addition to the ‘decision under an 
enactment’, it also applies to a decision: 
a decision of an administrative character made, or proposed to be made, by, or by 
an officer or employee of, the State or a State authority or local government 
authority under a non-statutory scheme or program involving funds that are 
provided or obtained (in whole or part)— 
(i) out of amounts appropriated by Parliament; or 
(ii) from a tax, charge, fee or levy authorised by or under an enactment.273  
3.75 The Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic) is significantly different from the ADJR Act 
and other statutory schemes.  The Administrative Law Act provides for procedures for seeking 
an ‘order for review’ of a ‘decision of a tribunal’.  ‘Tribunal’ is defined as ‘a person or body of 
persons (not a court or a tribunal constituted of or presided over by a Judge of the Supreme 
Court)’ required to observe ‘one or more of the rules of natural justice.’274  
3.76 The Western Australia Law Reform Commission recommended in 2002 that a 
statutory model similar to that of the ADJR Act should be adopted in that State.275  This 
recommendation has not yet been implemented. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW STATISTICS 
ADJR Act and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 
3.77 The Federal Court of Australia provided the Council with statistics on numbers of 
filings and finalisations by subject matter for the financial years 2002–03 to 2010–11 for all 
applications under the  ADJR Act and s 39B of the Judiciary Act in both the Federal Court and 
the Federal Magistrates Court.  Earlier statistical information on ADJR Act filings is available 
in annual reports.  The Court also provided information on the outcomes of matters finalised.  
These figures do not include applications under Part 8 of the Migration Act, or appeals under 
s 44 of the AAT Act, which are discussed separately below. 
3.78 In the eight year period covered by these statistics, 457 applications were filed in the 
Federal Court under the ADJR Act and 887 were filed under s 39B of the Judiciary Act, 
including  79 and 475 appeals276 under the respective Acts.  Figure 1 represents the 
proportion of initial filings under the ADJR Act (total 373) and s 39B (total 397) in each of 
these financial years.  These figures do not take into account applications made in the 
alternative.  The figures show that, with the exception of 2004–05 and 2005–06 (when the 
Federal Court still had jurisdiction over first instance migration matters), ADJR Act 
                                                          
273  Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) s 4. 
274  Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic) s 2. 
275  Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Report on Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions: Options for 
Reform, Project No 95 (2002).  
276  From the Federal Court to the Full Federal Court, and from the Federal Magistrates Court to the Federal 
Court.   
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applications exceeded or approximately equalled s 39B applications.277  These figures show 
that, despite comments made to the Council during the course of this inquiry, the ADJR Act 
is still utilised by applicants for judicial review in the Federal Court. 
 
Figure 1: First instance judicial review filings in the Federal Court of Australia (excluding 
appeals) 
 
 
3.79 In the Federal Magistrates Court, in the same period, there were 124 applications 
filed under the ADJR Act and 1,651 filed under s 39B of the Judiciary Act.  1,666 of 
applications filed under s 39B—the vast majority—were in the migration jurisdiction.  The 
Federal Court can remit s 39B matters to the Federal Magistrates Court.  Section 39B(1EA) of 
the Judiciary Act gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Magistrates Court in matters where:  
 a civil proceeding in relation to which the Attorney-General has given 
notice under s 5 of the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil 
Proceedings) Act 2004 is before the Federal Magistrates Court; and  
 ‘a person who is or was a party to the proceeding seeks a writ of mandamus 
or prohibition or an injunction against an officer or officers of the 
Commonwealth in relation to a related civil proceeding decision’. 
                                                          
277  Applications in the alternative are included in the figures only once and categorised, at initiation, as either 
ADJR Act or s 39B as appears most appropriate. 
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Figure 2: First instance judicial review filings in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia 
(excluding transfers from the Federal Court) 
 
3.80 As shown in Figure 2, the Federal Magistrates Court figures seem heavily skewed 
because of its central role in the review of migration decisions at that time.  The Federal 
Magistrates Court’s general administrative law workload is relatively low, as shown in 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3: First instance non-migration related judicial review filings in the Federal 
Magistrates Court of Australia—ADJR Act and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 
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Other statutory appeals mechanisms 
3.81 As discussed above, there are a number of other statutory avenues for review of 
administrative decision making, apart from s 39B and the ADJR Act.  The most significant of 
these are the statutory appeal rights under Part 8 of the Migration Act (which grant the Federal 
Magistrates Court a jurisdiction equivalent to review under s 75(v) of the Constitution), 
Division 5 of the Taxation Administration Act and s 44 of the AAT Act. 
3.82 A large proportion of applications are made under these statutory appeal provisions.  
In 2010–11, 959 migration matters were filed in the Federal Magistrates Court under Part 8 of 
the Migration Act, and 254 appeals were lodged in the Federal Court.  In the past, the number 
of migration applications lodged in the Federal Court or Federal Magistrates Court has been 
much higher.  For example, in 2003–04, 2,591 migration applications were filed in the Federal 
Court and 3,031 in the Federal Magistrates Court. 
Figure 4: Judicial review applications under Part 8 of the Migration Act in the Federal 
Magistrates Court of Australia compared to first instance applications under the ADJR Act 
and s 39B of the Judiciary Act in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia and Federal 
Court of Australia (excluding appeals) combined 
 
3.83 There were 235 taxation matters filed in the Federal Court in 2010–11.278 
3.84 Appeals on questions of law from the AAT are far more common than judicial 
review of Tribunal decisions.  There were 98 appeals from decisions of the AAT under s 44 
of the AAT Act in 2010–11 and 23 applications for judicial review under other statutes 
                                                          
278  Federal Court of Australia, Annual Report 2010–11 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) 143. 
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(including the ADJR Act, s 39B of the Judiciary Act and Part 8 of the Migration Act).279  In 
2009–10 there were 83 appeals from decisions of the AAT under s 44 of the AAT Act and 19 
applications for judicial review under other statutes.280  In 2008–09, there were 95 appeals 
across all jurisdictions under s 44 of the AAT Act, and 15 applications for judicial review 
under other statutes.281  In 2007–08, there were 121 appeals on questions of law and 21 
applications for judicial review.282  In 2006–07, there were 127 appeals on questions of law, 
and seven applications for judicial review.283  Figure 5 compares s 44 appeals to other judicial 
review applications in the Federal Court from 2007–2011. 
Figure 5: Appeals under s 44 of the AAT Act in the Federal Court of Australia and Federal 
Magistrates Court of Australia compared to judicial review applications under the ADJR Act 
and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 
 
3.85 In 2010–2011, 64 statutory appeals against decisions of the Social Security Appeals 
Tribunal (SSAT) were filed (58 in the Federal Magistrates Court and 6 in the Family Court of 
Western Australia). 
Other avenues of review  
3.86 Disputes and complaints about administrative decision making are usually resolved 
by means other than judicial review.  This includes agency resolution of complaints, merits 
                                                          
279  Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 2010–11 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). 
280  Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 2009–10 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). 
281  Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 2008–09 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009). 
282  Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 2007–08 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008). 
283  Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 2006–07 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2007). 
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review and administrative investigation.  The figures below show that the proportion of issues 
that go to judicial review for resolution is small in comparison with other methods of 
resolution. 
3.87 There were 5,437 applications for review lodged with the AAT in 2010–11.284 
3.88 The Commonwealth Ombudsman received 37,468 approaches and complaints in 
2009–10.  Of these, 18,313 were about agencies within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.285 The 
Ombudsman investigated 4,489 separate complaints and identified some agency error or 
deficiency in 10 per cent of complaints investigated.286   
3.89 At an agency level, in 2010–11, with 15.6 million tax returns lodged by taxpayers, the 
Australian Taxation Office internally dealt with 24,225 objections, disputes and reviews.287 
The AAT recorded 1,103 applications lodged for review of taxation decisions and 45 appeals 
lodged in the Federal Court under s 44 of the AAT Act.288 
3.90 Centrelink granted 3.7 million new claims in 2010-11 and had 7.1 million 
customers.289  Of the Centrelink decisions that were challenged in the reporting year, there 
were: 
 195,277 applications for internal review; 
 11,087 applications to the SSAT; 
 1,975 customer applications to the AAT;290 and 
 22 Secretary applications to the AAT.291 
3.91 The AAT recorded 16 appeals from social security decisions under s 44 of the 
AAT Act.292 
3.92 Figure 6 gives an overview of the proportion of decisions finalised in the AAT to 
decisions subject to judicial review. 
 
                                                          
284  Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 2009–10 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). 
285  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report 2009–2010 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). 
286  Ibid. 
287  Australian Taxation Office, 2010–11 Commissioner of Taxation Annual Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2011). 
288  Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 2010–11 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). 
289  Centrelink, Annual Report 2009–10 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). 
290  These are applications by customers for review of the SSAT’s decisions. 
291  These are applications by the Secretary of Centrelink for review of the SSAT’s decisions.   
292  Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 2010–11 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). 
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Figure 6: Applications finalised in the AAT subject to judicial review 
 
*Section 44 appeals are not available for certain migration decisions made by the AAT. 
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4. RECOMMENDED MODEL FOR 
REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION  
4.1 The primary issue facing the federal judicial review system is that in practice there 
are two systems of judicial review.  Statutory judicial review occurs under the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act), and is available in both the Federal 
Magistrates Court and the Federal Court.  Constitutional judicial review is available in the 
High Court under s 75(v) of the Australian Constitution, and in the Federal Court under 
s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (Judiciary Act).  Decisions made under the 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) are principally reviewable in the Federal Magistrates 
Court under provisions of that Act that courts have interpreted as a mirror of the 
constitutional review jurisdiction.  Review of migration decisions is analysed as a separate 
statutory review scheme in Chapter 6. 
4.2 The issue of concern to the Council is the divergence between the two avenues of 
judicial review available in the Federal Court (review under the ADJR Act and review under 
s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act).  This divergence, discussed in Chapter 3, stems from the limited 
nature of review under the ADJR Act, which resulted in litigants electing to commence 
judicial review proceedings in the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution in order to 
circumvent the limitations in the ADJR Act.  Section 39B(1) extended the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Court so that applicants could commence constitutional judicial review proceedings 
in the Federal Court in cases that did not contain issues warranting the consideration of the 
High Court.   
4.3 Since its conferral, the rationale behind the Federal Court’s constitutional judicial 
review jurisdiction has remained relevant, while the nature and frequency of its use has 
changed significantly.  As discussed in Chapter 3, in the period 2007–2011 nearly half the 
applications for judicial review in the Federal Court were commenced under s 39B(1).  In 
effect, a jurisdiction that was designed to supplement the ADJR Act is increasingly overtaking 
it in importance.  Indeed, the view was put to the Council in this inquiry by a number of 
commentators that the ADJR Act procedure is largely irrelevant, or becoming so.  Some 
suggested that the ADJR Act be repealed and that federal judicial review be based on the 
constitutional review jurisdiction. 
4.4 The Council’s view is that judicial review under the ADJR Act should be maintained 
as the principal avenue for federal judicial review.  The beneficial features of the ADJR Act 
include: 
 it prescribes a clear, straightforward and self-contained procedure for 
commencing judicial review proceedings in s 11 of the Act; 
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 the test for standing to commence proceedings under the Act is defined in 
ss 3(4), 5 and 6 of the Act, and a third party with an interest in the 
proceedings can be joined under s 12; 
 the Act defines the range of Commonwealth decisions that are reviewable 
under the Act but also those excluded from review; 
 the grounds on which administrative action can be set aside are listed in 
ss 5, 6 and 7, and provide clear guidance to decision makers as to the legal 
requirements for lawful decision making; 
 the relief that can be granted by a court when a breach of a ground of 
review is established is set out in s 16, which enables the court to make an 
order that is appropriate to the case; 
 a court can stay the operation of a decision being challenged under ss 15 
and 15A; and 
 a person may obtain a statement of reasons for a decision under s 13 before 
commencing judicial review proceedings. 
4.5 In the Council’s view, the ADJR Act has played a central role in improving the 
quality of Australian Government decision making since 1980 and elevating respect for the 
rule of law in government.  An important body of jurisprudence that lies at the core of 
Australian administrative law and that is generally understood within government has been 
developed under the ADJR Act.  The relative ease with which proceedings can be 
commenced under the Act means also that judicial review is more accessible to the Australian 
community and that proceedings can be commenced without professional legal assistance. 
4.6 Those benefits are at risk if the current trend continues and constitutional judicial 
review under s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act becomes the preferred or standard avenue for 
federal judicial review.  The Judiciary Act contains few of the features of the ADJR Act, such as 
the procedure for commencing judicial review proceedings, the test for standing, the range of 
reviewable decisions, the grounds for review, or the right to a statement of reasons.  Instead, 
s 39B(1) states only that a person can apply for a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an 
injunction against an officer of the Commonwealth.  The prevailing view is that relief can be 
granted (including certiorari or a declaration) if there was a jurisdictional error by an officer of 
the Commonwealth.  A frequent remark by courts and practitioners is that the scope of 
jurisdictional error cannot readily be defined.  Indeed, the concept is more a description of 
the conclusion reached by a court than a definition of the principles for lawful decision 
making expected of an officer of the Commonwealth. 
4.7 The unavoidable practical reality is that s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act must continue as 
an avenue for federal judicial review in the Federal Court.  If s 39B(1) was repealed, the likely 
result is that there would be an increase in the number of matters commenced in the original 
jurisdiction of the High Court, especially if there was doubt as to whether the matter could be 
commenced in the Federal Court under the ADJR Act.  This would require the High Court to 
deal with trial matters that should more appropriately be heard in another court and could 
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detract from the High Court’s appellate role.  That outcome would revive the very problems 
that required enactment of s 39B. 
4.8 This presents a difficulty: how can the pre-eminence of the ADJR Act in federal 
judicial review be maintained if the Federal Court also has a jurisdiction to hear proceedings 
commenced under s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act?  Unless some legislative adjustment is made 
to the Federal Court’s jurisdiction, the likely result in the Council’s view is that the ADJR Act 
will dwindle in importance and become marginalised.  The reasons are twofold.   
4.9 Firstly, it is a wise precautionary step for a person commencing judicial review 
proceedings to do so under s 39B(1), either in addition to ADJR Act proceedings or as an 
alternative.  There are fewer apparent limitations on the right to commence proceedings 
under s 39B(1) than under the ADJR Act.  Section 39B(1) requires only that the applicant for 
relief demonstrate an entitlement to an order of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction 
against an officer of the Commonwealth.  The ADJR Act requires that proceedings concern a 
‘decision’ or ‘conduct’ of an ‘administrative character’ made ‘under an enactment’,293 and that 
the decision not be excluded from review under Schedule 1 of the Act.  Stricter time limits 
also apply to proceedings commenced under the ADJR Act.   
4.10 Secondly, the large majority of federal judicial review proceedings concern decisions 
made under the Migration Act, where the principles of constitutional judicial review are applied 
by the High Court, Federal Court and Federal Magistrates Court.  Administrative law 
practitioners who regularly practice in the federal courts are therefore familiar with concepts 
such as ‘matter’ and ‘jurisdictional error’ and the nature of the constitutional remedies, and 
encounter little inhibition in commencing proceedings under s 39B(1).  However, in the view 
of the Council the framework and principles for federal judicial review must satisfy benefits 
beyond the convenience of experienced practitioners.   
THE COUNCIL’S PREFERRED MODEL—INCORPORATING 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW INTO THE ADJR ACT 
4.11 The Council sees only two viable options for satisfying the dual objectives of 
retaining the Federal Court’s jurisdiction under s 39B(1), while reinforcing the primacy of the 
Court’s jurisdiction under the ADJR Act.  The first option is to lessen the present 
jurisdictional limitations in the ADJR Act and allow actions to be commenced that at present 
can only be commenced under s 39B(1).  For example, as recommended by the Council in its 
report in 1989, the requirement that a decision be made ‘under an enactment’ could be 
removed so that the ADJR Act applies also to decisions made in the exercise of executive (or 
non-statutory) power.294  This may necessitate the revision of some grounds of review in s 5 
of the ADJR Act that are either explicitly tied to the exercise of statutory power, such as 
s 5(1)(d) (decision not authorised by the enactment) and s 5(1)(e) (improper exercise of the 
power conferred by the enactment), or have developed on that assumption, such as s 5(2)(e) 
                                                          
293  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 s 3. 
294  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The Ambit of the Act, 
Report No 32 (1989) 43. 
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(inflexible application of policy) and s 5(2)(h) (uncertainty).  Another approach, supported in 
some of the submissions to this inquiry, would be to broaden the scope of the ADJR Act to 
extend an exercise of ‘public power’ or the discharge of a ‘public function’. 
4.12 The Council does not support this option.  The chief difficulty, as explained in 
Chapter 5 of this report, is that it would replace ADJR Act jurisdictional tests that have been 
interpreted and applied for over 30 years and that have a relatively settled operation, with new 
tests of uncertain meaning and operation.  This change could usher in a new phase of 
adventurous re-thinking of the scope of judicial review, the grounds of review and the 
objectives of administrative law.  The Council does not believe that the resulting litigation 
would necessarily enhance adherence to the core values of administrative law, or that 
Parliament would support such a change. 
4.13 The second option is to add a new head of jurisdiction to the ADJR Act, based on 
s 75(v) of the Constitution.  This is the Council’s preferred option, and is taken up in 
Recommendation 1 below.  The Council recommends that the ADJR Act be amended to 
provide that a person who is otherwise able to initiate proceedings in the High Court under 
s 75(v) may apply for an order of review under the ADJR Act.   
4.14 An action that relied on this head of jurisdiction would be commenced under s 11 of 
the ADJR Act, using the same procedure that applies to other ADJR Act proceedings.  If a 
court was satisfied at the conclusion of proceedings that an order of review should be 
granted, this would be done under s 16 of the ADJR Act, rather than by the grant of a 
constitutional remedy such as mandamus, prohibition or injunction.  The constitutional 
remedies nevertheless have a role to play, as the concept of jurisdictional error that is applied 
in constitutional judicial review is tied to those remedies.  In essence, a court could make an 
order of review under this extended head of jurisdiction upon being satisfied that a 
jurisdictional error had occurred.  There would be no listed grounds on which relief could be 
granted, and ss 5, 6 and 7 of the ADJR Act would not directly apply to these proceedings.   
4.15 Consequential changes would be required to some other provisions of the 
ADJR Act.  We do not recommend that the right to obtain a statement of reasons under s 13 
should apply to proceedings that rely on this new head of jurisdiction.  The statement of 
reasons procedure is currently tied, at least in practice and in the jurisprudence that 
accompanies s 13, to decisions that are made under legislation.  There may be a case for 
extending the right to reasons to categories of decisions that presently fall beyond the scope 
of the ADJR Act, but that extension could be considered at a later stage.   
4.16 Another change recommended by the Council in other chapters of this report is that 
the ADJR Act (even as extended as recommended in this chapter) should not apply to special 
categories of decisions, such as criminal justice decisions, decisions made under the executive 
scheme for Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration (CDDA), and 
certain vice-regal decisions (see Chapter 5).  It would still be open to a person, as at present, 
to initiate proceedings for review of such a decision under s 75(v) of the Constitution.  
However, this lies at the periphery of constitutional judicial review and would not result in a 
further marked divergence between the ADJR Act and s 75(v).  It would also be necessary to 
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exclude decisions of federal judicial officers; they can be reviewed under s 75(v) but it would 
not be appropriate that they are reviewable under an ADJR Act procedure.   
4.17 The Council acknowledges that the model for federal judicial review recommended 
in this chapter is an unconventional way of creating a jurisdiction in a court to undertake 
judicial review.  However, the Council believes that this is the most suitable way of achieving 
the dual objective of retaining the Federal Court’s jurisdiction under s 39B(1), while 
reinforcing the primacy of the Court’s jurisdiction under the ADJR Act.   
4.18 The essence of this approach is that no change would be made to the established 
procedure for judicial review in the Federal Court under either the ADJR Act or s 39B(1) of 
the Judiciary Act.  There would be no change to the provisions of the ADJR Act that enable 
review of whether a decision of an administrative character made under an enactment 
complies with the criteria for legality specified in s 5 of the Act.  Similarly, an action could still 
be commenced under s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act for a writ of mandamus or prohibition or 
an injunction against an officer of the Commonwealth.  Equally, it would be open to a 
person, as at present, to commence a proceeding under s 39B(1) either in addition to or as an 
alternative to an action under the ADJR Act.   
4.19 However, the Council expects that reliance on s 39B(1) would be less common.  A 
proceeding akin to that under s 39B(1) could be commenced under the extended jurisdiction 
in the ADJR Act, but in a manner that is procedurally simpler.  The proceeding could be 
commenced under s 11 of the ADJR Act, rather than by an application for mandamus, 
prohibition or an injunction.  Relief could be granted by the court under s 16 of the 
ADJR Act, which is a more flexible and expanded remedial framework than the constitutional 
writs.  Other beneficial procedures in the ADJR Act (such as the court’s power to stay the 
operation of a decision that is being challenged) would also apply. 
4.20 The main source of uncertainty—and potential doctrinal untidiness—in the 
Council’s proposal is that the Federal Court would be applying two bodies of substantive law 
under the ADJR Act.  The requirements for lawful decision making include both the grounds 
of review in ss 5, 6 and 7 of the Act, concerning decisions of an administrative character 
made under an enactment, and the concept of jurisdictional error, concerning other actions 
by an officer of the Commonwealth.  This already occurs at present, according to whether a 
proceeding is commenced under the ADJR Act or s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act.   
4.21 It is possible, on the Council’s recommended approach, that courts would pay 
explicit regard to the criteria in s 5 of the ADJR Act in elaborating the concept of 
jurisdictional error.  A closer alignment of statutory judicial review and constitutional judicial 
review could lead to the development of a more coherent and integrated body of legal 
principle to guide decision makers on the requirements for lawful decision making.  This 
would also restore the pre-eminence of the ADJR Act in providing that administrative law 
guidance. 
          77
Chapter 4: Recommended Model for Review 
77 
Recommendation 1 
The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) should provide that, 
subject to limited exceptions, a person who otherwise would be able to initiate a proceeding 
in the High Court under s 75(v) of the Australian Constitution may apply for an order of review 
under the ADJR Act.  Sections 5, 6, 7 and 13 of the ADJR Act would not apply in those 
proceedings, but other provisions of the ADJR Act would apply subject to some 
modifications.   
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5. AMBIT OF REVIEW 
 
5.1 The model proposed by the Council does not resolve all the outstanding issues as to 
the ambit of review in Australia.  Questions still remain about the scope of constitutional 
judicial review in some areas, and whether the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) should be specifically amended to extend the ambit of 
the Act to particular classes of decisions to clarify the law.  Since the Council’s proposed 
model would retain s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (Judiciary Act), there would still be 
scope for exemptions from the operation of an amended ADJR Act.  Accordingly, this 
chapter considers:  
 the current operation of judicial review of non-statutory decisions, 
preliminary decisions—particularly reports and recommendations—and 
subordinate legislation; and 
 general limitations on review, current exclusions from the ADJR Act; and 
possible exclusions from the Council’s recommended model, which are 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
5.2 Many examinations of the extent of statutory review are based on very broad 
accounts of the types of decisions that are not reviewable—‘non-statutory’, ‘preliminary’ or 
‘legislative’ decisions.  The Council has taken the approach of looking at more specific 
examples of the kinds of decisions that fall into these categories, and considering: the kind of 
accountability mechanisms these decisions are currently subject to; how useful judicial review 
remedies would be in relation to these decisions; and the extent to which constitutional 
review currently applies to those decisions, including consideration of whether these decisions 
have been subject to constitutional judicial review. 
NON-STATUTORY DECISIONS 
Summary 
5.3 The requirement in the ADJR Act that a decision be made ‘under an enactment’295 
excludes review of non-statutory decisions—decisions not made ‘under an enactment’.  
Executive schemes, schemes to distribute funding which do not have a legislative basis and 
are an exercise of executive power, have been widely used296 for purposes such as emergency 
                                                          
295  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 s 3. 
296  The decision in Williams v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 23 found such a non-statutory funding 
scheme to be beyond the executive power of the Commonwealth, casting doubt on the legal basis for 
similar schemes.  Following this judgment, Parliament passed the Financial Framework Legislation 
Amendment Act (No 3) 2012 (Cth) which provides a legislative basis for such schemes.  The Act also amends 
Schedule 1 of the ADJR Act to exempt these schemes from judicial review. 
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financial aid, drought relief, health payments, industry incentives and administrative 
compensation.297 
5.4 Many submissions to the Council argued that non-statutory schemes should be 
subject to judicial review under the ADJR Act.  However, government agencies expressed 
concern in submissions about the extent of judicial review of non-statutory commercial 
decisions by government, as discussed below.  As the Council has previously discussed, 
judicial review of tender and contracting decisions has been a particularly contentious area as 
they lie at the fringe of administrative decision making and may be regarded as falling more 
readily into the private law areas, with private law remedies arguably more appropriate.298 
5.5 The precise boundaries of constitutional judicial review of non-statutory decisions 
are not clearly defined because, unlike statutory decisions, there is not a statutory source to 
define the limits of decision makers’ powers. 
5.6 The Council has concluded that these uncertainties are best resolved through the 
courts defining the application of constitutional judicial review to non-statutory decisions, 
rather than specific extension of the ADJR Act to particular non-statutory decisions. 
Judicial review of non-statutory decisions 
5.7 The non-statutory decisions of government fall into three main categories: decisions 
under executive schemes; commercial decisions of government; and other miscellaneous 
exercises of executive power under s 61 of the Australian Constitution.  Different considerations 
apply to these different types of decision in terms of the possible extension of the ADJR Act. 
5.8 Overall, it should be noted that the precise application of constitutional judicial 
review to exercises of non-statutory power remains unclear.  As Emeritus Professor 
Aronson, Bruce Dyer and Associate Professor Matthew Groves explain: 
whilst the High Court has not yet ruled on the issue, the indications are that 
Australia is following the English lead of extending judicial review into the realm 
of non-statutory executive power.  The fact that a power has a non-statutory 
source no longer guarantees its immunity from judicial review.  But that is not to 
say that all powers formerly immune from judicial review because they were not 
statutory but executive ... or common law powers are now reviewable.299 
5.9 It is therefore still unclear how review for jurisdictional error under constitutional 
judicial review would apply to a decision made in exercise of a power that does not derive 
from legislation and that may involve a broad discretionary choice.  This is discussed in detail 
                                                          
297  Professor John McMillan, ‘Can administrative law foster good administration’ (Speech delivered at The 
Whitmore Lecture, Sydney, 16 September 2009) 
<http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/files/16_September_2009_Can_administrative_law_foster_good_admi
nistration.pdf>.   
298  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The Ambit of the Act, 
Report No 32 (1989) 37. 
299  Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer and Matthew Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Thomson Reuters, 
4th ed, 2009) 103. 
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below with respect to each of the different categories of non-statutory decision.  Because the 
scope of constitutional judicial review in this area is unclear, the Council addresses two 
questions in relation to the powers discussed:  
 whether the ADJR Act should specifically allow for review of these 
decisions in addition to the Council’s proposed model; and  
 whether any decisions in that category should be excluded explicitly from 
statutory judicial review. 
5.10 The issue is also uncertain following the 2012 decision of the High Court in 
Williams v Commonwealth of Australia and Ors,300 and the Parliament’s response to that decision.  
The High Court found a non-statutory funding scheme (a school chaplaincy program) to be 
beyond the executive power of the Commonwealth.  Legislation was promptly enacted to 
provide that the Commonwealth has power to establish a large number of funding 
arrangements and grants listed in the Act.  The statutory description of each arrangement was 
brief, including only the title of the arrangement and its objective.  The legislation further 
provided that decisions made under those arrangements were not subject to review under the 
ADJR Act.301  Consequently, there is now a statutory basis or anchor for many executive 
schemes, but the rules and procedures of the schemes continue to be defined in executive 
guidelines.  Whether this will affect the scope of judicial review of decisions made under these 
schemes is uncertain.  
5.11 Submissions from government expressed concern at extending the ADJR Act to 
cover executive schemes and commercial decisions.302  Other stakeholders, including 
academics, public interest groups and the Commonwealth Ombudsman, argued that non-
statutory decisions should be subject to review under the ADJR Act.303 
Executive power 
5.12 The source of the executive power of the Commonwealth is s 61 of the Constitution.  
In Barton v Commonwealth of Australia Mason J stated that: 
By s 61 the executive power of the Commonwealth was vested in the Crown.  
It extends to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and of the laws of 
the Commonwealth.  It enables the Crown to undertake all executive action which 
is appropriate to the position of the Commonwealth under the Constitution and to 
the spheres of responsibility vested in it by the Constitution.  It includes the 
                                                          
300  [2012] HCA 23. 
301  Financial Framework Legislation Amendment Act (No 3) 2012 (Cth). 
302  Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, Submission No 3 (24 June 2011); 
Department of Finance and Deregulation, Submission No 19 (18 July 2011); Department of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry, Submission No 16 (1 July 2011); Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Submission 
No 21 (9 August 2011). 
303  Victoria Legal Aid, Submission No 14 (7 July 2011) 3; Public Interest Advocacy Centre Ltd, Submission 
No 18 (14 July 2011) 3; Law Society of New South Wales Young Lawyers, Submission No 7 (1 July 2011) 
6–7; Law Council of Australia, Submission No 23 (1 July 2011) [20]; Peter Billings and Anthony 
Cassimatis, Submission No 6 (27 June 2011) 4; Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission No 15 
(8 July 2011) 3. 
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prerogative powers of the Crown, that is, the powers accorded to the Crown by 
the common law.304 
5.13 The power to ‘execute and maintain’ the Constitution extends to the powers to 
summon, dissolve and prorogue the Parliament (s 5), the issue of writs for elections (ss 5 and 
32), the appointment and removal of civil servants (s 67) and the command in chief of the 
naval and military forces. 
5.14 There are varied interpretations regarding the ambit of the ‘prerogative powers of 
the Crown’ referred to by Mason J.  Professor Peter Cane and Associate Professor Leighton 
McDonald explain that:  
There are two basic schools of thought about the nature of ‘prerogative powers’ 
... On the broader view, prerogative powers encompass all non-statutory powers 
of the executive arm of the government, including ‘common law’ powers held by 
legal persons generally (for example, the power to enter into contracts or to 
conduct non-coercive inquiries).  The narrower view is that prerogative powers 
are those non-statutory powers of the executive arm which are thought to be 
unique to it ... Important examples of prerogative powers include powers to 
declare war, enter into treaties, conduct foreign diplomacy, award honours, grant 
pardons and to appoint judges.  On either interpretation, prerogative powers are 
creations of the common law.  As such, they are capable of being modified or 
abolished by statute.305 
5.15 The extent to which prerogative powers are subject to judicial review is still 
uncertain in Australia.  Professors Robin Creyke and John McMillan explain that: 
while the existence of a claimed prerogative power is always reviewable (Burmah 
Oil Co (Burmah Trading) Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75), some prerogative 
powers will be non-reviewable as to the manner of their exercise, while others are 
justiciable as a general rule.306 
5.16 In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (CSSU),307 the House of 
Lords held that prerogative powers were not immune from judicial review.  CSSU concerned 
a branch of the civil service known as Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ).  
GCHQ performed a number of communications functions vital to national security.  In 1983, 
the Minister gave an instruction under Order in Council that the GCHQ staff would no 
longer be permitted to belong to national trade unions.  The Order in Council was created 
under the prerogative power to regulate home civil service.   
5.17 In CCSU Lord Diplock stated that he could see ‘no reasons why simply because a 
decision-making power is derived from a common law and not a statutory source it should for 
that reason only be immune from judicial review’.308  However, as Lord Roskill observed, the 
                                                          
304  (1974) 131 CLR 477, 498. 
305  Peter Cane and Leighton McDonald, Principles of Administrative Law: Legal Regulation of Governance (Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 82. 
306  Robin Creyke and John McMillan, Control of Government Action.  Text, Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis, 2nd 
ed, 2009) 81. 
307  [1985] AC 374. 
308  Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410. 
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right of challenge to an exercise of prerogative power ‘must ... depend on the subject matter 
of the prerogative power which is exercised’.309  As the decision involved the consideration of 
national security, the court held that it was not justiciable.  As Lord Diplock explained, 
‘national security is the responsibility of the executive government; what action is needed to 
protect its interests is ... a matter on which those on whom the responsibility rests, and not 
the courts of justice, must have the last word’.310 
5.18 In Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (Peko-Wallsend) the 
Full Federal Court concluded that CCSU should be followed in Australia.311  Bowen CJ stated 
that, ‘subject to the exclusion of non-justiciable matters, the courts of this country should 
now accept responsibility for reviewing the decisions of Ministers or the Governor-General in 
Council notwithstanding the decision is carried out in pursuance of a power derived not from 
statute but from the common law or prerogative’.312   
5.19 Peko-Wallsend concerned the decision made by the Federal Cabinet, in the exercise of 
prerogative powers, to nominate Stage II of Kakadu National Park for UNESCO’s 
World Heritage listing.  Peko-Wallsend Ltd held mineral leases over land in Stage II and 
instituted proceedings claiming that, in making the decision, Cabinet was bound by the 
principles of natural justice to afford it a hearing but had failed to do so.  The Federal Court 
rejected this claim on the basis that the subject matter lay in the political arena,313 and was 
therefore inappropriate for judicial determination.  However, the Court maintained that it was 
no longer possible to exclude judicial review merely because a matter concerned a prerogative 
decision.  Wilcox J identified the ‘critical matter’ for consideration as ‘the nature and effect of 
the relevant decision’.314  He concluded that: 
[the] case did not relate essentially to the personal circumstances on any individual 
[and] concerned a substantial area of land which the Government regarded as 
being of national, indeed international, significance and in relation to which many 
people had concerns of various types.315 
5.20 Although the High Court has not ruled on the issue directly, the High Court in 
R v Toohey; ex parte Northern Land Council (Toohey) 316 demonstrated its willingness to review acts 
or decisions of the Crown, at least when referable to statutory authority.  In reaching this 
decision, the High Court rejected a number of arguments commonly raised for excluding 
review of prerogative and statutory discretions alike.317  
5.21 The scope of judicial review of the exercise of executive power is not, therefore, 
completely settled in Australia.  It is clear that judicial review extends to whether a decision 
                                                          
309  Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 418. 
310  Ibid 412. 
311  (1987) 75 ALR 218. 
312  Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 218, 278. 
313  Ibid 218. 
314  Ibid 304. 
315  Ibid 307. 
316  (1981) 151 CLR 170. 
317  Fiona Wheeler, ‘Judicial Review of Prerogative Powers in Australia: Issues and Prospects’ (1992) 14 Sydney 
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maker has the power to make a particular decision—that is, whether the executive power 
authorises the action taken.  Further, it appears likely that the High Court will extend the 
scope to other grounds of judicial review as long as the decision made pursuant to a 
prerogative power is of a subject matter suitable for judicial review.318 
5.22 The Council’s model would leave the development of this area of judicial review to 
the courts.  By giving an applicant standing under the ADJR Act where they can show an 
entitlement to the constitutional remedies, arguments about the scope of constitutional 
judicial review can occur under the auspices of the ADJR Act.  Given the range of prerogative 
powers, it is unnecessary specifically to extend judicial review in these areas.  However, certain 
powers of particular national significance, most appropriately dealt with by the High Court, 
could be excluded from the revised ADJR Act—in particular, decisions relating to war and 
the defence of the nation. 
Decisions under executive schemes 
5.23 Many Commonwealth executive schemes fall into two categories: schemes that allow 
the Government to provide discretionary compensation payments; and schemes that provide 
government grants.319  Judicial review is not available under the ADJR Act of decisions made 
under executive schemes, nor is review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.  The 
Commonwealth Ombudsman can investigate complaints about the administration of 
executive schemes.  The Ombudsman has described the lack of effective review as a 
fundamental problem, because ‘decisions made under these schemes are often just as 
important and can affect people’s rights and interests just as much as decisions made under 
legislative schemes’.320  
5.24 In Report No 32, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The Ambit of 
the Act (1989), the Council recommended that the ADJR Act should extend to certain 
non-statutory decisions made by officers of the Commonwealth.321  The Council 
recommended that the definition of a decision to which the ADJR Act applies should  be 
amended to include a: 
decision of an administrative character made, or proposed to be made, by an 
officer of the Commonwealth under a non-statutory scheme or program the 
funds for which are authorised by an appropriation made by the Parliament for 
the purpose of that scheme or program.322 
5.25 A provision of this type was adopted in the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld).  
Section 4(b) of that Act enables judicial review of decisions made by public officers or 
employees under a non-statutory ‘scheme or program’, which are supported by funds 
                                                          
318  For a detailed discussion of this point see Fiona Wheeler, ‘Judicial Review of Prerogative Powers in 
Australia: Issues and Prospects’ (1992) 14 Sydney Law Review 432. 
319  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Executive Schemes, Report 12/2009 (2009).  The report draws on the Office’s 
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320  Ibid.   
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appropriated by Parliament or taxes, charges, fees or levies collected by statute.323  The few 
applications that have sought to use the provision to support an application for judicial review 
suggest that there is uncertainty about what might constitute such a ‘scheme or program’.324   
5.26 In Report No 32, the Council identified two main reasons why such schemes should 
be subject to review under the ADJR Act.  First, executive schemes supported by executive 
action could, if the Government chose, be supported by legislation, and in many cases 
equivalent schemes are.  The Council was of the view that an ‘accident of birth’—whether the 
scheme was supported by legislative or statutory power—should not determine whether 
exercises of power under the scheme should or should not be subject to review.325  Second, 
funding for such schemes has usually been provided by an appropriation in legislation by 
Parliament, ‘giving them the same public interest character as they would have if they were 
the subject of other legislation enacted in the public interest’.326 
5.27 The Council’s view was that the link with Parliament—through appropriation of 
funding, the spending of public money and the parallel with many legislation schemes—
distinguished executive schemes from other non-statutory decisions, and therefore justified 
explicitly providing for ADJR Act review of these decisions, in addition to the available 
constitutional judicial review.327 
5.28 Associate Professor Matthew Groves suggests that the small number of cases that 
have used the provision in Queensland—and the lack of clear principles in those cases—
indicate that the provision has not amounted to a significant extension to the Queensland 
version of the ADJR Act.328  Drs Billings and Cassimatis submitted that: 
the potential utility of these provisions has not been realised in a number of cases 
where the provisions have not been raised in judicial review proceedings, in 
circumstances where one might have expected them to be relied upon by 
applicants.329   
5.29 They suggest that while ‘empirical analysis would need to be undertaken to assess 
why the provisions were not raised … initial indications suggest that legal advisors have not 
fully appreciated the potential of these provisions’.330  The Law Council of Australia, the 
Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) and the NSW Young Lawyers all supported review 
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of non-statutory decisions based on s 4(b) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), modelled on 
past recommendations of the Council.331 
5.30 The Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) 
noted the difficulties in framing the jurisdiction of a decision maker exercising power under 
an executive scheme.332  The Council had also noted this difficulty in Report No 32.333  The 
Council considers that the most relevant ground of review in relation to non-statutory 
schemes would be a failure to afford an applicant procedural fairness.  Given the broad ambit 
of the power to administer executive schemes, many other grounds would not be applicable.  
This lack of clear jurisdictional limits might make the operation of judicial review in this area 
less clear. 
5.31 What kinds of executive payment schemes would statutory judicial review apply to if 
extended as previously proposed by the Council?  As DEEWR submitted, when making the 
decision whether ‘to establish an executive scheme in order to address a particular area of 
policy or program concern’, the availability of a statutory right of review ‘may not be a 
consideration at all, or be only one of many considerations taken into account by the 
Australian government’.334  In other words, government does not implement schemes via the 
executive power in order to avoid judicial review, but for other reasons—in particular, the 
flexibility of such schemes arising from the absence of legislation and the promptness with 
which programs can be commenced.  It may be that agencies are concerned that some of this 
flexibility and promptness will be lost if too much emphasis is placed on judicial review 
standards for decision making.  While the Council noted that many of the non-statutory 
executive schemes could have been implemented through statute,335 the executive government 
may have reasons for not wishing to do so. 
5.32 Agencies were particularly concerned about the prospect of judicial review of 
decisions under the Compensation for Detriment Caused by Defective Administration 
(CDDA) Scheme.  The Department of Finance and Deregulation (Finance) submitted that 
the scheme: 
enables Government portfolio Ministers and authorised officials in FMA Act 
[Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997] departments/agencies to 
compensate individuals or other bodies who have experienced losses caused by a 
department’s/an agency’s defective administration … Under the CDDA Scheme, 
decisions are made at the discretion of the decision maker and payments are 
approved on the basis that there is a moral, rather than a legal, obligation to the 
person or body concerned.  Each case is determined on its own merits.  The 
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principles of procedural fairness are applied to CDDA matters and applicants 
must be treated equitably.336 
5.33 Finance goes on to state that it did not support the extension of ADJR Act review to 
decisions made under the CDDA Scheme, on the basis that ‘executive schemes provide the 
executive with flexibility in dealing with administrative challenges arising from the diversity of 
its activities’.337  
5.34 This statement highlights one of the key questions regarding the review of executive 
schemes—if constitutional judicial review is available in the Federal Court under s 39B of the 
Judiciary Act, what disadvantages would flow from also having the decisions reviewable under 
the ADJR Act?  If the Council’s model is adapted, allowing for judicial review under the 
ADJR Act of decisions already reviewable under constitutional judicial review, is there still a 
need to exempt some decisions from the operation of the amended ADJR Act?  Applicants 
would have access to broader grounds and more flexible remedies under the amended 
ADJR Act—should judicial review of some decisions be restricted to the constitutional 
minimum? 
5.35 In the 2009 Report, Putting things right: Compensating for defective administration,338  the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman considered that there were disadvantages to increasing external 
review of CDDA decisions, including:  
 concerns that if courts were to interpret CDDA criteria ‘more expansively’ 
than administrative decision makers and be ‘more generous in awarding 
compensation’ then ‘the cost of the CDDA Scheme to government would 
be both unpredictable and inflationary’;  
 the costs of defending proceedings in a court; 
 the possibility that the application of legal standards could ‘blur the current 
distinction between ‘moral’ and ‘legal’ obligation which is currently central 
to the CDDA; and 
 that the CDDA Scheme would become less flexible if agencies were 
involved in legal disputes and began to focus more on legal principle.339 
5.36 The Ombudsman concluded that ‘the survival of the CDDA Scheme probably 
depends upon it remaining an administrative scheme under which decisions are not routinely 
subject to court or tribunal review’.340  The Ombudsman’s Report recommended 
improvements to the scheme, including ensuring that adequate reasons accompany every 
decision.341 
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5.37 In its submission to the Council’s current inquiry, the Ombudsman noted its past 
concerns of ‘poor decision making practices as well as the lack of effective review rights for 
persons dissatisfied by decisions made under executive schemes’.342  In particular, the 
Ombudsman referred to its 2009 Executive Schemes report,343 which raised concerns about 
the lack of internal guidelines, poor recordkeeping and inadequate reasons given to claimants.  
In contrast to the position expressed in its 2009 CDDA report, the Ombudsman submitted 
that these concerns warranted an extension of the ADJR Act to CDDA decisions.344  
Victorian Legal Aid also expressed concern with the inconsistency of decisions made under 
the CDDA Scheme and argued that expanding judicial review under the ADJR Act to cover 
schemes would ‘tend to promote consistency in terms of process and principles applied’.345 
5.38 A number of discretionary compensation schemes which Finance administers are 
statutory schemes—‘act of grace’ payments and waivers of debts.  The Finance figures 
indicate that even where review is available under the ADJR Act rather than solely under 
s 39B, the numbers of applications for review of discretionary compensation decisions are not 
large: 
In relation to proceedings under the ADJR Act related to discretionary 
compensation, they have been rare: there have been 13 instances of litigation 
under the ADJR Act since 2001.  This represents 0.24% of claims.  During that 
period, Finance has received 5,401 claims for act of grace payments and/or 
waivers of debt, 99 requests for statements of reasons (1.83% of total claims), and 
46 investigations by the Ombudsman (0.85% of total claims). 
Of the 13 litigated claims, three are ongoing, one resulted in a decision being set 
aside and the remainder were either dismissed or discontinued—in no case has a 
claimant been successful in a subsequent claim for compensation following 
litigation.346   
5.39 In at least two cases, applications for review of CDDA decisions were made under 
the ADJR Act and were unsuccessful because the court held they were not decisions ‘under 
an enactment’ and therefore that statutory judicial review under the ADJR Act was not 
available.347  The Council received no submissions containing examples of review of CDDA 
decisions under s 39B, and could not find any examples of such cases. 
5.40 The Council acknowledges the concerns raised by the Ombudsman and Victorian 
Legal Aid, and agrees that the CDDA scheme involves rules-based decision making which 
could be amenable to judicial review.  While the grounds of review are likely to be limited, 
grounds such as procedural fairness, not taking into account a relevant consideration and 
taking into account an irrelevant consideration would still be arguable.   
                                                          
342  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission No 15, 8 July 2011, 3-4. 
343  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Executive Schemes, Report No 12 (2009). 
344  Ibid 4. 
345  Victoria Legal Aid, Submission No 14 (7 July 2011) 3. 
346  Department of Finance and Deregulation, Submission No 19 (18 July 2011) 2. 
347  Smith v Oakenfull (2004) 134 FCR 413; Barron v Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing (2003) 176 FLR 
192. 
88     
Federal Judicial Review in Australia 
88 
5.41 On the other hand, the Council accepts that CDDA payments are at the discretion 
of the executive, and largely issue as an alternative to legal remedies.  The Council also notes 
that significant improvements have been made to the implementation of the scheme since 
2009.  Finance Circular 2009/09 contains procedural guidance for decision makers, including 
strict requirements to provide adequate reasons for decisions.348 
5.42 On balance, the Council’s view is that decisions made under the CDDA Scheme 
would continue to be reviewable in the Federal Court under s 39B of the Judiciary Act but not 
under the ADJR Act.  As such, if the Council’s preferred model were implemented, CDDA 
decisions would be excluded from the ambit of the amended ADJR Act.  The Council bases 
this recommendation on its expectation that decision making under the CDDA scheme will 
be undertaken in accordance with the procedures in Finance Circular 2009/09, and that there 
will be active oversight of CDDA administration by the Commonwealth Ombudsman. 
5.43 The other area of concern in relation to executive schemes is in relation to payments 
by Government, such as grants and emergency payments.   
5.44 There are a wide variety of grants processes—some have guidelines and an 
application process, others may be purely at the discretion of the executive government.  
Typically grants programs involve the allocation of a limited amount of resources among a 
number of applicants.  Sometimes a large amount of money is distributed.  The group being 
considered for the grants may not be clearly defined if there is no application process. 
5.45 National Security Law and Policy Division of the Attorney-General’s Department 
(NSLPD) gave the example of the Building Community Resilience grants programs, and 
pointed out that these programs are governed by significant legislative and policy frameworks.  
NSLPD expressed concern at reviewing such a scheme ‘where the funding agreements are 
already in place and expenditure has occurred in reliance on those agreements’.349  Similarly, 
the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) submitted the executive grant 
and exceptional circumstances schemes, which it administers, should not be subject to review 
under the ADJR Act, as there are: 
sufficient review mechanisms available for executive schemes administered by the 
department and that adding a statutory right of review for these schemes would 
add an extra layer of red-tape without providing significant benefit to applicants 
or agencies.350 
5.46 The Council considers that the problem with providing for judicial review of grants 
decisions (which is theoretically available in the constitutional judicial review jurisdiction) is 
that the grounds of review would be limited, and remedies are likely to be ineffectual.  The 
latter point is particularly significant, because the available grant money is likely to have been 
legitimately distributed to other persons when a judicial review remedy issues and thus a 
finding that a particular decision not to give a grant to a person was invalid is unlikely to lead 
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to the money being granted to that person.  Making a judicial review application of a grant 
decision is therefore unlikely to have much practical utility. 
5.47 Some categories of emergency payments, for example large-scale programs 
responding to floods or fires, are likely to resemble more closely ordinary welfare payments.  
However, ordinary proof of identity requirements will often be less strict or removed 
altogether,351 and evidence is normally not required of the particular disadvantage claimed at 
the time of application and payment.  For people receiving payments, the time taken to 
process the claim is a critical factor, ensuring that they receive the payments they are entitled 
to, and are not overpaid.352 
5.48 The Council considers that judicial review remedies are unlikely to be particularly 
useful in relation to grants decisions.  Decisions regarding emergency payments tend to be 
time-critical and administered in such a way that few people miss out, and commercial 
decisions of government are likely to be subject to other legal remedies.  Specifically 
extending review to these decisions would not significantly increase accountability for 
government action.  The Council’s model would mean that judicial review for these decisions 
would be available under the ADJR Act if the matter was within the High Court’s jurisdiction 
under s 75(v) of the Constitution. 
5.49 Overall, the Council no longer considers the specific extension of review to 
non-statutory schemes funded by an appropriation by Parliament, as previously 
recommended by the Council and adopted in Queensland, to be the most appropriate 
approach.  Specifically to extend statutory review only to certain non-statutory decisions, 
where the application of judicial review principles is currently unclear, would place an 
unnecessary administrative burden on agencies administering those schemes.  The discussion 
above illustrates that executive schemes all have particular considerations—for example 
urgency, broad discretion as to payments or large numbers of potentially eligible recipients—
associated with their administration.  The Council’s model would provide for judicial review 
of executive schemes under the ADJR Act where it is also available under the Constitution.  
The Council’s model would, however, allow for limited exclusions of ADJR Act review, for 
example, of decisions under the CDDA scheme. 
Commercial decisions by government 
5.50 Commonwealth agencies expressed concerns in submissions about the extension of 
statutory judicial review to procurement, tender and contracting decisions.  Constitutional 
judicial review of tender and procurement decisions may be available, but there is no decisive 
authority for this in the constitutional judicial review jurisdiction.  There are some State and 
Territory cases that have held that administrative law remedies can issue in relation to tender 
processes where the body concerned is required to pay some attention to the ‘public 
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interest’.353   The Federal Court has commented that there may be some justification for 
judicial review where the legislature has set out procedures to be followed in a tender process 
and the question is whether those procedures have been followed.354  If review were available, 
the grounds of review would likely relate to procedural fairness.   
5.51 Private companies also carry out tendering processes.  Aronson, Dyer and Groves 
note that tendering processes may sometimes be treated by the courts as implied ‘process 
contracts’, which incorporate some public law principles ‘rebranded’ as implied contractual 
obligations of good faith and good dealing.355  
5.52 Procurement decisions are currently governed by various accountability frameworks, 
including the Financial Management Act 1997 (Cth), and are subject to supervision by Finance. 
5.53 In terms of contractual relationships, there are private law remedies available where 
those relationships break down.  It is unclear why a decision to enter into a contract should 
be subject to judicial review, given that this is a power which government exercises in 
common with all persons.  In Griffith University v Tang, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ 
confirmed that decisions made under contract did not fall within the jurisdictional formula of 
the ADJR Act.356  Australian courts are equally reluctant to allow common law judicial review 
to query the decisions of governments and their agencies about with whom and on what 
terms they enter contracts.357  
5.54 As the Department of Defence points out, there are many means other than judicial 
review for resolving commercial disputes, which are perhaps more appropriate.358  This may 
be why there have been few attempts to apply for judicial review of government commercial 
decisions, even though those decisions may be reviewable under constitutional judicial review.   
5.55 Finance submitted that expanding the ADJR Act to include procurement decisions, 
would increase the compliance costs of agencies and suppliers, reduce the flexibility of the 
current framework and cause unnecessary delays.359  The Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship (DIAC) argued that allowing review of an unsuccessful tender would have adverse 
consequences for all Commonwealth agencies and hamper the ability of the Commonwealth 
to obtain services in a timely and cost-effective manner.360 
5.56 Billings and Cassimatis, however, considered that there should not be a ‘blanket 
exclusion of commercial decisions from the scope of judicial review’.361  The Law Council of 
Australia argued that ‘the commercial impact of a decision is not an appropriate criterion for 
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excluding judicial review’,362 and submitted that the ADJR Act should align with the general 
law.   
5.57 As discussed above, the scope of judicial review of the commercial decisions of 
government in the constitutional judicial review jurisdiction is currently unresolved.  Probably 
some commercial decisions of government are subject to limited judicial review.  The Council 
considers that commercial actions where the Government is acting as a private individual—
such as contractual actions by government, procurement decisions and tendering decisions—
are subject to accountability mechanisms other than judicial review.  However, the Council 
considers that these issues could equally be argued under an amended ADJR Act as under 
s 39B of the Judiciary Act, and there is therefore no reason to specifically exclude these 
decisions. 
The Council’s model and non-statutory decisions  
5.58 There are a range of exercises of non-statutory powers currently not reviewable 
under the ADJR Act.  Many exercises of non-statutory powers are, at least in theory, 
reviewable under s 39B of the Judiciary Act and s 75(v) of the Constitution. 
5.59 When many of these powers are considered individually, there is not necessarily a 
compelling need for judicial review of those decisions.  However, the Council still considers 
there to be an underlying problem with the dual systems for applying for judicial review.  In 
relation to executive schemes and grants programs, the Council notes that s 39B review 
would be available—even if the grounds of review are likely to be limited—and therefore 
considers that many of the concerns expressed by agencies are unlikely to be realised.  The 
Council’s proposed model of drawing the constitutional review jurisdiction into the 
ADJR Act would therefore bring these decisions within the ambit of the ADJR Act, to the 
extent that constitutional judicial review already allows for their review. 
5.60 However, some non-statutory decisions could be excluded from the operation of the 
expanded ADJR Act.  The Council considers that limited exclusions would still be appropriate 
to address the concerns of government agencies about the expansion of review in certain 
areas.  Exemptions which the Council considers appropriate—on the basis that only very 
limited review would be available under s 39B—are: 
 CDDA decisions; and 
 actions relating to war and the defence of the nation. 
5.61 Such exemptions should be limited to decisions where there is a justification for 
limiting the availability of judicial review to its constitutional minimum.   
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PRELIMINARY DECISIONS 
Summary 
5.62 There has been some criticism of the ADJR Act requirement that a decision be ‘final 
and operative’ for the courts to have jurisdiction to review it under the Act, noting the ‘fine 
line’ between final decisions and preliminary steps or views.363  In particular, judicial review 
proceedings cannot normally be commenced until a final or operative decision has been 
made.364  By contrast, constitutional judicial review allows for review of some preliminary 
decisions, particularly reports or recommendations to final decision makers, as discussed 
below. 
5.63 The Council recommended in its Report No 32 that reports and recommendations 
to final decision makers be made subject to review under the ADJR Act.365  Submissions to 
this inquiry were divided on this issue.  The Council has concluded that in some cases judicial 
review of reports and recommendations should explicitly be provided for by means of a 
schedule to the ADJR Act. 
Review under the ADJR Act 
5.64 The ADJR Act allows for review of a ‘decision to which this Act applies’—but 
‘decision’ is not defined.  Aronson, Dyer and Groves note that ‘the Federal Court construed 
‘decision’ extremely widely for most of the 1980s, so as to include interim or non-final 
decisions’.366  This approach was overturned by the High Court in Australian Broadcasting 
Tribunal v Bond (Bond).367  Mason CJ concluded that: 
a reviewable “decision” is one for which provision is made by or under statute.  
That will generally, but not always, entail a decision which is final or operative and 
determinative, at least in a practical sense, of the issue of fact falling for 
consideration.368 
5.65 However, Mason CJ considered that an intermediate decision might be subject to 
review, where ‘the statute provided for the making of a finding or ruling on that point so that 
the decision ... might accurately be described as a decision under an enactment’.369  In 
addition, Mason CJ noted that ‘review of an ultimate or operative decision on permissible 
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grounds will expose for consideration the reasons which are given for the making of the 
decisions and the processes by which it is made’.370 
Constitutional judicial review  
5.66 While review of preliminary decisions has not been heavily litigated, they are 
reviewable under s 39B of the Judiciary Act and s 75(v) of the Constitution.  The only conditions 
of constitutional judicial review are the caveats that apply generally, namely that the 
constitutional writs are available and the preliminary decision is a ‘matter’.  Preliminary 
decisions that are reviewed are usually decisions made in reports or recommendations.371   
5.67 The grounds of constitutional judicial review are closely related to the available 
remedies.  The constitutional writs are available only for excess or denial of jurisdiction.  
Certiorari is an ancillary remedy available in the constitutional judicial review jurisdiction only 
where a jurisdictional error has occurred.  Under the inherent jurisdiction of the superior 
courts of the UK, certiorari was traditionally not available to preliminary decisions that have 
no discernible legal effect.  That is because certiorari quashes the ‘legal effect of an act or 
decision ... but, if an act or decision has no legal effect, then there is nothing to quash’.372  
Thus, in Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission,373 certiorari was not available because the 
recommendations to the Criminal Justice Commission had no legal effect or consequence 
attached to it.374  However, in Hot Holdings,375 certiorari was available for a preliminary 
decision in a non-binding recommendation as to whether a mining exploration licence should 
be granted.  This is because the final determination could not be made before the 
recommendation was considered.376  Consequently, as Cane and McDonald explain, the 
preliminary decision had a ‘discernible legal effect’377 upon the exercise of the final decision.378  
Therefore, for a court to issue a remedy in the constitutional judicial review jurisdiction there 
must be a jurisdictional error, and if certiorari is required then the preliminary decision in 
question must have a legal effect. 
5.68 Where a process resulting in a recommendation to a final decision maker is 
undertaken for the express purpose of making a decision, as opposed to a factor in making a 
decision, it is likely to be subject to constitutional judicial review.  In 
Plaintiff M61 v Commonwealth, the High Court held in relation to the decisions of independent 
merits reviewers, that: 
inquiries made after a decision to consider exercising the relevant powers [under 
the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)] and for the purposes of informing the Minister of 
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matters that were relevant to the decision whether to exercise one of those 
powers were subject to procedural fairness requirements because of their 
‘statutory foundation’.  … Once it is decided that the assessment and review 
processes were undertaken for the purpose of the Minister considering whether to 
exercise [his statutory powers], it follows from the consequences upon the 
claimant’s liberty that the assessment and review must be procedurally fair and 
must address the relevant legal question or questions.379 
5.69 Additionally, constitutional judicial review of a preliminary decision must involve a 
‘matter’.  A matter is ‘some immediate right, duty or liability to be established by the 
determination of the court’ and no ‘declaration of the law divorced from any attempt to 
administer that law’.380  Matters are only present where there is a justiciable controversy.381  
Therefore, while constitutional judicial review does not require the decision to be final, the 
case may be that the preliminary decision does not affect an ‘immediate right, duty or liability’, 
but the final decision does.  In such a scenario, constitutional judicial review does not offer an 
alternative avenue of review to the ADJR Act. 
Reports and recommendations to final decision makers 
5.70 In Report No 32, the Council made specific recommendations to make reports and 
recommendations by bodies other than the final decision makers judicially reviewable prior to 
the final decision being made.382  The Council noted that this was strongly criticised on the 
basis that it may frustrate the workings of government,383 but suggested that it would do no 
more than mirror the situation at common law (ie under constitutional judicial review).384  
Courts would still have the discretion not to hear a matter if they did not consider it to be 
appropriate.   
5.71 Currently, some reports are already reviewable under s 3(3) of the ADJR Act, which 
provides for review of ‘the making of a report or recommendation before a decision is made 
in the exercise of a power under that enactment or under another law’.  However, many 
reports are not themselves made under an enactment or law, but must be taken into account 
by the decision maker.  Medical reports are one such example. 
5.72 Many reports taken into account by decision makers are prepared by experts who are 
not officers of the Commonwealth, for example private medical examiners or language testing 
schools.  Potentially, where the report is made by a person who is not an officer of the 
Commonwealth, the decision would not be captured directly by constitutional judicial review.  
In these cases, the validity of the report or a decision by a private person or body could 
possibly be challenged on the basis that the report or decision was central to the validity of 
the decision by an officer of the Commonwealth, and was itself invalid.   
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5.73 In the Consultation Paper, the Council sought views as to whether reports and 
recommendations to final decision makers should be subject to judicial review under the 
ADJR Act.  The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) considered it would be 
counterproductive to allow for review of reports and recommendations, as in most cases it 
would be ‘more practicable to challenge the decision once made than to seek an anticipatory 
remedy’.385  However, NSW Young Lawyers, the Australian Network of Environmental 
Defenders Offices (ANEDO) and Victorian Legal Aid argued that judicial review under the 
ADJR Act should be extended to reports and recommendations made by bodies other than 
the final decision maker prior to the final decision being made, particularly where they have 
the capacity to affect a person’s rights or interests.386 
5.74 DIAC pointed out that ‘the Courts have, in limited circumstances, shown a 
willingness to scrutinise the decisions of independent experts’.387  An example following 
Plaintiff M61388 is the case of Maman v Minister for Immigration,389 in which Raphael FM held that 
an assessment by a social worker (acting as an independent expert) that Mr Maman had not 
suffered family violence was flawed, because the expert was required to provide the applicant 
with procedural fairness in the preparation of the report, and procedural fairness had not 
been afforded.  Raphael FM came to the conclusion that the independent expert’s decision 
was made ‘under’ the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) for the purposes of the privative 
clause in s 474, and was therefore reviewable by the Federal Magistrates Court, and subject to 
procedural fairness requirements.390  The Refugee Review Tribunal had regard to the expert's 
assessment.  Raphael FM came to the conclusion that the independent expert’s decision was 
made under the Migration Act for the purposes of the privative clause in s 474, and was 
therefore reviewable by the Federal Magistrates Court under s 476, and subject to procedural 
fairness requirements.391 On appeal the Full Federal Court (Flick, Foster and Katzmann JJ) 
upheld the decision of Raphael FM.392   
5.75 In SZQDZ v MIAC393 the Full Federal Court (Keane CJ, Rares and Perram JJ), in 
considering whether time limits applied to applications for judicial review of independent 
merits reviewers’ decisions, decided that these were not decisions but recommendations 
without any statutory force and merely a procedural step in the course of arriving at a 
substantive determination.   
5.76 At the time of writing, the High Court’s decision is reserved in Plaintiffs S10/2011, 
S49/2011 and S51/2011 v MIAC on whether procedural fairness must be followed in the 
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process leading to a recommendation to the Minister on whether to exercise the personal 
powers under ss 48B, 351 and 417 of the Migration Act.  Meanwhile Plaintiff M61 and Maman 
are examples of cases where the courts have been willing to apply judicial review standards to 
preliminary decisions that are made for the purpose of a final decision given effect by statute, 
where the statutory power ‘confers power to destroy, defeat or prejudice a person’s rights, 
interests or legitimate expectations’.394 
5.77 Victorian Legal Aid provided examples of reports conducted by bodies other than 
the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) in a visa application which are 
prerequisites to the grant of a visa, such as security risk assessments conducted by the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), criminal histories provided by the 
Australian Federal Police and health checks conducted by Health Services Australia.395  
However, DIAC submitted that if reports and recommendations were subject to judicial 
review, it would ‘significantly impede’ the efficient decision making capabilities of the 
Department and undermine administrative certainty which is required for an application to be 
processed.396  DIAC noted that many reports used in the migration decision making process 
could be captured in ‘preliminary decisions’, including reports from Medical Officers of the 
Commonwealth and reports on applicants’ English language capabilities.  DIAC argued that 
the courts’ past reluctance to decline to review reports or recommendations would not be 
sufficient to protect DIAC’s interests, as applications to the Court and interlocutory 
proceedings would still take time.397  DIAC expressed further concern with the costs and 
delays involved if reports and recommendations would be reviewable in addition to the final 
decision being subject to review.398   
5.78 Security assessments by ASIO are currently excluded from the ambit of the 
ADJR Act, and would be separately reviewable as decisions under an enactment if this 
exclusion were removed.  Security assessments are usually only subject to extremely limited 
judicial review, even where they are reviewable under constitutional judicial review because of 
limits on the information which can be given in reasons and in evidence.399  
5.79 It is unclear why providing a criminal history would raise administrative law issues, 
as a history is merely factual material, and does not require any discretionary decision to be 
made.  It may be that many reports provided to decision makers fall into this category, which 
may raise issues in terms of encouraging challenges to reports that are largely factual in 
nature—for example, reports that are the result of a database search rather than a 
discretionary decision-making process. 
5.80 DIAC indicated that health checks should not be subject to statutory judicial review, 
while Victorian Legal Aid considered that health checks should be subject to challenge on 
judicial review grounds.  In the migration jurisdiction, the opinions of medical examiners are 
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only subject to limited judicial review, for example review of whether the person making the 
medical report is properly appointed, not review of the decision-making process itself.400  
Importantly, however, a challenge to the validity of the medical report is usually made as an 
element of a challenge to the final decision by the Migration Review Tribunal–Refugee 
Review Tribunal (MRT-RRT), rather than as a separate action. 
5.81 The Law Council of Australia supported a broader amendment to the ADJR Act to 
overcome the requirement in Bond that a ‘decision to which this Act applies’ must be ‘final or 
ultimate or operative’.  The Law Council argued that this requirement is not supported by the 
text of the ADJR Act and has resulted in an ‘undesirable proliferation of litigation on a 
technical issue of justiciability’.401  They noted that the same requirement does not apply in 
relation to review under the Judiciary Act.  They argued that the Court can be given an 
additional basis for discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction under s 10(2)(b) of the 
ADJR Act in order to combat concerns about ‘abuse’ of the Act.402  The Council does not 
support this approach on the basis that the jurisdictional test in the ADJR Act is now 
relatively settled, and the Council’s preferred approach to expanding the jurisdiction of 
the Act would allow for review of preliminary decisions to the extent this is already available 
via constitutional judicial review. 
Providing for judicial review in particular cases 
5.82 There are a variety of reports and recommendations to original decision makers 
which have an essentially conclusive effect for the purposes of the final decision, while being 
preliminary decisions.  In some cases these preliminary decisions, because of their conclusive 
legal effect and the nature of the decision, should possibly be subject to judicial review.  In 
other cases, some expert reports may be unsuitable for judicial review, for example because 
the report is entirely factual in nature and review applications are only likely to delay the 
decision-making process, or because the decision relates to an investigation process.  It is also 
difficult to define at what point advice to the final decision maker becomes a ‘report or 
recommendation’, and this could lead to a lack of clarity concerning the point at which a 
person needs to be afforded procedural fairness in relation to preliminary recommendations 
or report. 
5.83 The Council therefore considers that agencies should, in relation both to existing 
and new decision-making structures, consider the accountability mechanisms which currently 
apply to bodies that make reports and recommendations, and consider whether those reports 
and recommendations should be subject to statutory judicial review.  This could be achieved 
by giving those decisions statutory status such that they were ‘decisions under an enactment’. 
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5.84 Factors which indicate that reports or recommendations should be subject to judicial 
review include that they: 
 are made by another officer of the Commonwealth (and are therefore 
already reviewable under s 39B); 
 are based on an assessment process where a person should be afforded 
procedural fairness; and 
 have a conclusive effect for the purposes of the final decision. 
5.85 However, there are also factors which indicate that a report or recommendation 
should not be subject to statutory judicial review, namely that the report or recommendation: 
 is of a completely factual nature; and 
 is an assessment of a professional nature and judicial review standards, such 
as procedural fairness, do not apply to the decision-making process. 
5.86 The Council acknowledges that an assessment of the appropriateness of judicial 
review in the circumstances may require balancing some of these factors against one another.  
For example, a report may be both conclusive and factual.  Where a report or 
recommendation is appropriate for review, it could be specifically listed in the ADJR Act as a 
decision subject to review. 
 
Recommendation 2 
The application of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) to reports and 
recommendations should be dealt with in the following way:  
(a) A report or recommendation that is made in the exercise of a power conferred by an 
enactment, prior to the making of a decision under that enactment, should be a 
decision to which the Act applies, as currently required by s 3(3) of the Act. 
(b) A schedule to the Act that can be amended by regulation should list other reports 
and recommendations that are decisions to which the Act applies. 
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION 
Summary 
5.87 The ADJR Act is restricted to decisions of an administrative character.403  A number 
of submissions to the inquiry supported the extension of the ADJR Act to allow for judicial 
review of subordinate legislation.  Most submissions argued that because judicial review of 
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subordinate legislation is available under constitutional judicial review, it should therefore also 
be available under the ADJR Act.   
5.88 The Council considers that it is important to distinguish between direct and indirect 
review of subordinate legislation.  Indirect review of the validity of a legislative instrument, by 
a challenge to the validity of a decision made under that instrument, is currently available 
under both the ADJR Act and constitutional judicial review.  The Council’s model of judicial 
review, discussed in Chapter 4, allows for direct review of subordinate legislation under the 
ADJR Act to the same extent as it is available under constitutional judicial review.  Therefore, 
the Council does not consider that a specific extension of the ADJR Act to allow for judicial 
review of subordinate legislation is necessary. 
Judicial review of subordinate legislation 
5.89 As Emeritus Professor Mark Aronson explains, the ADJR Act definition of 
‘decisions to which this Act applies’, which includes only ‘administrative decisions’,404 was 
based on concerns about courts reviewing policy decisions.405 Courts have defined 
‘administrative’ decisions as those that are not legislative or judicial.406  The ADJR Act does 
not cover the making of subordinate legislation, as this represents a decision that is legislative 
rather than administrative in character.407  Section 5 of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) 
(Legislative Instruments Act) defines a ‘legislative instrument’ as an instrument in writing of a 
legislative character that is or was made in the exercise of a power delegated by the 
Parliament.  Examples include instruments that determine the law and alter the content of the 
law, or affect a privilege or interest, impose an obligation, or create a right. 
5.90 The distinction between legislative and administrative action is not always clear, and 
there are many examples of executive action that are hybrids of the two.  In some cases, 
legislative action is preceded by consideration of criteria as a precondition for the exercise of a 
power.408  In other cases, an instrument may contain provisions of a legislative character as 
well as provisions of an administrative character.  The Legislative Instruments Act provides that 
such an instrument is a legislative instrument for the purposes of the Act.409 Although the 
ADJR Act does not allow judicial review of the actions of rule makers in making legislative 
instruments, these decisions may be reviewed under constitutional judicial review.410  An 
administrative decision can also be challenged under the ADJR Act on the ground that it has 
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no legislative support—including because the decision was made under an invalid 
instrument.411 
5.91 The main argument advanced in submissions for extending review to delegated 
legislation is that review is already available under s 39B of the Judiciary Act, and that there is 
no valid reason for excluding it under the ADJR Act.412  Billings and Cassimatis argued that 
there is no ‘principled justification’ for subordinate legislation being excluded from review 
under the ADJR Act, especially provided that judicial review of delegated legislation is 
available under constitutional judicial review.413  They noted that the requirement in the 
ADJR Act that a decision be of an ‘administrative character’ would need to be removed.   
5.92 However, the validity of delegated legislation is rarely challenged directly under 
constitutional judicial review, even though it is possible to do this on the basis that it is an 
action taken by an ‘officer of the Commonwealth’.  It is more usual that the validity of 
delegated legislation is challenged on the basis that an administrative decision is invalid 
because the delegated legislation supporting that decision is also invalid.  The validity of 
delegated legislation could be challenged therefore as an element of either a constitutional 
judicial review or an ADJR Act application.   
5.93 Questions of standing are less likely to arise when an indirect challenge of this kind 
is undertaken.  In relation to a direct challenge to a legislative instrument under constitutional 
judicial review, an applicant would need to show they have standing to challenge the 
instrument directly, and this may be difficult in cases where the instrument creates a general 
decision-making structure.  However, where an instrument applies a rule to a class of persons, 
any person in that class would be likely to have standing to challenge the instrument directly. 
5.94 Review of delegated legislation under constitutional judicial review is not necessarily 
available on the same grounds as review of administrative decisions, though there is 
considerable overlap.  As Professor Dennis Pearce and Stephen Argument have explained, 
the grounds upon which delegated legislation can be found to be invalid ‘are regarded as 
branches of the general doctrine of ultra vires’.414 Pearce and Argument identify the principal 
grounds of review under this banner as: non-compliance with formal requirements; dealing 
with a subject not within the scope of the power provided by the empowering Act; and 
inconsistency with the law.415  Procedural fairness requirements are unlikely to apply to the 
making of delegated legislation because of the fact that legislative instruments are likely to 
affect the community at large.  In Kioa v West, Brennan J stated that: 
[the] legislature is not likely to intend that a statutory power of a strictly legislative 
nature be conditioned on the observance of the principles of natural justice, for 
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the interests of all members of the public are affected in the same way by the 
exercise of such a power.416   
The remedy granted is typically a declaration of invalidity.   
5.95 Some submissions suggested that not all the s 5 grounds should be available for 
review of delegated legislation.417  However, High Court authority indicates that ADJR Act 
grounds will not be available in relation to a particular decision if they would not be available 
under constitutional judicial review.  In Kioa v West,418 it was argued that the effect of s 5(1)(a) 
was that all decisions are now subject to natural justice; but the court rejected that view and 
held that natural justice only applies where the common law (or constitutional judicial review) 
previously applied it.  The court may take the same view if the making of delegated legislation 
is reviewable under the ADJR Act.  Therefore this could be addressed by specifically listing—
and narrowing—the grounds that did apply; or by leaving it to the courts to resolve in the 
manner explained in Kioa by applying constitutional judicial review grounds developed at 
common law. 
5.96 NSW Young Lawyers submitted that subordinate legislation that can, at the least, be 
partially characterised as containing an administrative decision, should be reviewable under 
the ADJR Act.419  Currently the administrative aspects of an instrument may be subject to 
review under the ADJR Act, though the legislative aspects will not.420 However, item 21 of 
Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Legislative Instruments Regulations 2004 provides that an instrument is 
declared not to be a legislative instrument if it is an instrument the making or issue of which is 
a decision that is reviewable under the ADJR Act.  This could potentially create some 
confusion about the interaction between the two Acts.  The 2008 Review of the Legislative 
Instruments Act 2003 recommended that item 21 be removed from the Act, because the 
provision was ‘confusing and unhelpful’.421 
5.97 NSW Young Lawyers expressed concern with all subordinate legislation being 
subject to review, and noted that purely legislative instruments should not be reviewable, 
especially where they ‘affect the general populace’.422  Agencies also did not support the 
extension of the ADJR Act to subordinate instruments.423  Department of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) submitted that ‘any changes to the statutory judicial review 
process to include decisions about subordinate legislation in the decisions that can be 
reviewed under judicial review may have a significant impact on the department and/or 
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portfolio agencies and related industries’.424  DIAC argued that subjecting subordinate 
legislation to judicial review ‘is to then open public policy to the Courts’.425   
5.98 A number of government agencies argued that existing accountability mechanisms, 
including the scheme for review and disallowance in the Legislative Instruments Act and the 
scrutiny of legislation undertake by Senate Committee on Regulations and Ordinances 
provided sufficient accountability for legislative instruments.426  However, the Law Council of 
Australia asserted that it is important that subordinate legislation is reviewable under the 
ADJR Act, as scrutiny by the relevant parliamentary committee cannot be relied on to remove 
all cases of ultra vires instruments.427   
5.99 The Senate Committee on Regulations and Ordinances cannot make a binding 
statement as to the legality of an instrument.  Rather, the Committee assesses tabled 
instruments against a list of criteria set by the Committee.  The Senate Committee on 
Regulations and Ordinances criteria are whether the delegated legislation: 
 is in accordance with the statute; 
 trespasses unduly on personal rights and liberties; 
 makes rights unduly dependent on administrative decisions which are not 
subject to independent review of their merits; or 
 contains matters more appropriate for parliamentary enactment. 
5.100 These criteria all reflect important principles of administrative law, and the first 
reflects the kind of inquiry that a court would undertake in assessing the legality of an 
instrument.  The Committee’s ability to recommend that an instrument be subject to 
amendment or disallowance is also a powerful consequence of not complying with the 
criteria.  However, as explained by Creyke and McMillan, the Committee typically relies upon 
‘suggestion and persuasion to influence executive action’.428  Usually, agencies will amend an 
instrument upon receiving a notice of motion from the Committee.   
5.101 The existing accountability mechanisms for the exercise of a rule-making power 
recognise that legislative actions may have broad and enduring application.  The 
Legislative Instruments Act provides an accountability regime for legislative instruments through 
requirements for consultation, registration, disallowance and sunsetting (the automatic repeal 
of instruments after a set period of time).   
5.102 In the Council’s view, there are a number of reasons why delegated legislation 
should not be directly subject to review under the ADJR Act.  The making of delegated 
legislation is a different kind of action from other actions taken by members of the executive 
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government.  Delegated legislation is subject to Parliamentary scrutiny and disallowance, and 
is of general application, rather than applying to a particular person.  It is also subject to a 
comprehensive accountability scheme set out in the Legislative Instruments Act.  The validity of 
delegated legislation can already be challenged indirectly under the ADJR Act and both 
indirectly and directly under constitutional judicial review.  However, indirect challenge 
appears to be the usual means of challenging delegated legislation, and is less likely to raise 
issues of standing.  In addition, the grounds of review for delegated legislation are not the 
same as for review of administrative decisions, reflecting the different nature of the decision 
itself and the type of review. 
5.103 The Council considers that extending ADJR Act review to cover legislative 
instruments would move away from the original purpose of the Act, which was clearly 
focused on the administrative actions of the executive government.   
EXCLUSIONS FROM STATUTORY REVIEW 
Summary 
5.104 There are several ways in which review under the ADJR Act is excluded.  The first is 
the exclusion of decisions of the Governor-General from the definition of ‘decision’.  The 
second is the specific list of exemptions in Schedule 1.  The third is through general principles 
relating to the appropriateness of particular questions for judicial resolution, resolved by the 
courts. 
5.105 The Council has, based on its previous publications, developed general principles 
that may justify exclusions from the ADJR Act.  The Council has considered specific 
Schedule 1 exemptions, and these are discussed and the Council’s recommendations 
summarised in Appendix B.  The Council has also concluded that decisions of the 
Governor-General should no longer be excluded from the definition of a decision to which 
the Act applies in the ADJR Act, and that decisions by the Governor-General should instead 
be excluded on a case-by-case basis according to the general principles.  The Council has also 
considered the broader notion of ‘justiciability’ in relation to review and has concluded, 
contrary to previous recommendations of the Council, that an express reference to 
justiciability should not be included in the ADJR Act. 
5.106 Schedule 1 of the ADJR Act includes a long list of Acts and provisions, decisions 
made under which are exempt from the ADJR Act.  In the following section of the chapter, 
the Council outlines some general principles for exemptions from the ADJR Act, and 
considers each of the current exemptions with reference to those principles. 
Principles justifying the exemption of ADJR Act review  
5.107 Schedule 1 of the ADJR Act includes a long list of Acts and provisions, decisions 
made under which are exempt from the ADJR Act.  The Council has developed general 
principles for exemptions from the ADJR Act, and in Appendices B and C considers each of 
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the current exemptions with reference to those principles.  The Council also considers that a 
principles-based approach justifies the inclusion of one more general exclusion from the 
ambit of the ADJR Act—applications to commence civil penalty proceedings. 
5.108 Some of the exemptions were previously considered by the Council in 1989 in 
Report No 32, and the Council’s views at that time are noted in relation to particular 
decisions in Appendix B.429  The Council also considered exemptions from judicial review in 
its Report No 47, The Scope of Judicial Review (2006). 
5.109 A number of agencies responsible for Acts and provisions in Schedule 1 have argued 
for the maintenance of some of the exemptions.430  Billings and Cassimatis submitted that any 
exemptions should ‘complement the Constitutional jurisprudence on jurisdictional error’.431  
They also argued that the discretionary grounds for restricting judicial review ‘might be better 
articulated’.432  The Law Council of Australia also supported some principles-based 
exemptions.433 
Principles 
5.110 The Council considers that judicial review is not always the most appropriate means 
of dealing with a particular dispute, and that the Federal Court is not always the most 
appropriate forum for the resolution of disputes.  The Council has considered its previous 
views on the subject, and considers that the following principles justify exemption from the 
ADJR Act: 
 Review is also not available under s 39B.  Some decisions may be most 
appropriate to be heard in the High Court in the first instance.  In this case, 
an exemption from both the ADJR Act and s 39B of the Judiciary Act is 
appropriate. 
 A well-established alternative scheme already exists which is as accessible and effective as 
ADJR Act review.  In some cases, for example taxation decisions, there is a 
comprehensive review scheme, which will often provide for both merits and 
judicial review, which is accessible to applicants and achieves the same or 
better results in terms of remedies.  Where such a scheme already exists, 
removing the ADJR Act exemption may make the system less efficient and 
effective overall. 
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 Where review has the potential to fragment or frustrate another legal process which is 
already underway.  In Report No 47, the Council examined the possibility that 
judicial review can lead to the fragmentation of criminal justice proceedings: 
There is a strong argument that any determination of the lawfulness of 
government activity related to a substantive criminal proceeding should be 
a matter for the court adjudging that proceeding and not another court434 
This does not involve any limitation on the opportunity for judicial review, 
because there is still an avenue for judicial consideration of the relevant 
decisions.   
 Where ADJR Act review could pose a risk to personal safety.  This exemption 
applies in limited cases.  It may be that some interim orders made under 
statute are designed to protect people from security threats, and that such 
decisions are not appropriate for review.  The other case currently listed in 
Schedule 1 is the National Witness Protection Program, where the 
legislation as a whole provides for the protection of federal witnesses, and 
the protection of personal information is particularly important. 
 Where decisions relate to representatives of the diplomatic or consular community.  Issues 
related to such decisions are settled by the traditional diplomatic means of 
discussion, consultation and negotiation and not by resort to the formal 
mechanisms of Australian legislation.  This mode of proceeding is 
consistent with international practice in the conduct of diplomatic and 
consular relations.   
 Particular decisions relating to the management of the national economy, which do not 
directly affect the interests of individuals, and are likely to be most appropriately resolved 
in the High Court.  Exemptions such as this will be rare, and include, for 
example, decisions by the Treasurer to make payments out of the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund. 
 Decisions which have a strong link with other constitutional considerations, and as such 
are better dealt with via constitutional review.  The relevant example is electoral 
boundary decisions, and also decisions relating to appropriations. 
 Decisions relating to the deployment or discipline of defence force members.  These 
exemptions recognise the special status of decisions regarding the Defence 
Forces, in particular: the voluntary nature of military service, the importance 
of hierarchy and discipline, and the existence of alternative review 
mechanisms within the military context.  The Council agrees that there is a 
strong argument for deferring to the expertise of Defence in this area, 
however that would be subject to ensuring transparency and fairness of the 
processes adopted. 
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National security decisions 
5.111 The Council considers that national security may justify an exemption, but should 
not be used as a blanket justification.  The Council notes that constitutional judicial review of 
these decisions is still available. 
5.112 In 1989, the majority of the Council was of the view that these decisions should not 
be excluded from the ambit of the ADJR Act, but a minority of the Council disagreed.  The 
majority was of the view that: 
 the High Court had expressed the view that security agencies should not be 
free from judicial review (Church of Scientology v Woodward);435 
 the ADJR Act was not an additional review right, but a more satisfactory 
avenue for review; and 
 the availability of review in the Security Appeals Tribunals was relevant to 
the grant of a remedy, but not to the availability of review.436 
5.113 However, a minority view in 1989 was that if responsible government agencies 
considered that review of security decisions would compromise the operations of security 
agencies then those decisions should not be subject to ADJR Act review.437 
5.114 The exemption of these acts is justified with reference to national security 
considerations.  In submissions to the current inquiry, the Attorney-General’s Department 
(AGD) supported maintaining these exemptions for the following reasons: 
These are matters of national security, and the exclusions are based on the fact 
that decisions made under those Acts are likely to be made on the basis of 
sensitive classified information, and with regard to operational matters not 
appropriate for public dissemination.  Where appropriate, those Acts may contain 
mechanisms to provide appropriate review or notification requirements, which 
have been developed to balance the interests of national security with procedural 
fairness.438 
5.115 It seems that the main objection here is to the dissemination of information to the 
public.  This indicates that the main concern is reasons for decisions rather than judicial 
review proceedings themselves—discovery rules in an ADJR Act proceeding would be the 
same as for a constitutional judicial review application. 
5.116 The Council sought further information from the AGD as to how the removal of 
national security-related exemptions would affect the operation of national security agencies.  
The AGD was of the view that removal of the Schedule 1 exemptions would be likely to 
affect the operation of intelligence organisations, even where there could be an exemption 
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from the right to request reasons.  Largely this appears to be because of the potential for the 
numbers of judicial review applications to increase if review was available under the 
ADJR Act.  The Department considered that the Acts themselves balanced national security 
considerations with review rights and procedural fairness considerations.  The AGD 
submitted that providing for judicial review under the ADJR Act would risk an increase in 
applications for review and a resulting risk that information about national security agencies’ 
operations would emerge in a piecemeal fashion, eventually providing a picture of those 
operations. 
5.117 The Council raised the question of whether concerns about information could be 
dealt with through a Schedule 2 exemption from s 13 of the ADJR Act, as opposed to a 
Schedule 1 exemption.  The AGD commented that: 
Even if an exemption from the right to give reasons were provided for decisions 
under these Acts, the Department contends that in many instances the release of 
any amount of information could contribute to a ‘mosaic effect’.  That is, serious 
offenders or intelligence operatives of foreign powers could gain access to enough 
pieces of information to construct a picture of the covert investigation procedures 
employed by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies concerned, allowing 
persons of interest to modify their mode of operation to avoid investigation or 
prosecution. 
5.118 The Council considers that national security considerations may be a reason for 
excluding ADJR Act review, particularly where sensitive information is involved which 
increased litigation in the area may potentially expose.  However, the Council does not 
consider that ‘national security’ should be a blanket reason for an exemption.  Each national 
security exemption should therefore be considered on its own merits, with regard to whether 
review of the decisions could pose a risk to national security through the disseminated of 
information through judicial review proceedings. 
New general exemptions 
5.119 As noted above in Report No 47, the Council examined the possibility that judicial 
review can lead to the fragmentation of criminal justice proceedings.  Section 9A of the 
ADJR Act currently contains a provision limiting judicial review of decisions related to 
criminal justice process decisions once criminal proceedings have commenced. 
5.120 The Council also considered other kinds of legal proceedings where judicial review is 
inappropriate because the issues were already subject to judicial review in another proceeding: 
The same applies to judicial review of proceedings for civil penalties and for 
extradition: the court hearing the substantive proceeding is best placed to 
determine any collateral matters in relation to the lawfulness of associated 
government activity…  Although it might limit the scope of review available in 
particular courts, it does not in fact limit the opportunity for judicial review.439 
                                                          
439  Administrative Review Council, The Scope of Judicial Review, Report No 47 (2003) 39. 
108     
Federal Judicial Review in Australia 
108 
5.121 This conclusion is reflected in Report No 47’s ‘Framework of indicative principles’, 
which says that limits on judicial review are justified in decisions in relation to criminal, civil 
penalty or extradition proceedings.440  The Council’s view is that the ADJR Act should also 
not apply to decisions to commence civil penalty proceedings.   
Recommendation 3 
Review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should not apply to 
decisions to commence civil penalty proceedings. 
Decisions of the Governor-General 
5.122 Currently, statutory decisions of the Governor-General are excluded from review 
under the ADJR Act.  Under Commonwealth law, the Governor-General makes a variety of 
decisions, for example dismissal of statutory office holders who cannot be removed without 
cause.  In exercising power under statute, the Governor-General must act with the advice of 
the Executive Council and Ministers.441   
5.123 Decisions of Ministers under statute, on the other hand, are susceptible to review 
under the ADJR Act.  Courts have struggled to separate decisions taken by the Governor-
General from the ministerial and departmental advice that informs those vice-regal decisions.  
The cases do not reveal a coherent approach.  In Steiner v Attorney-General, the Federal Court 
held that ministerial advice to the Governor-General was outside the ADJR Act, otherwise 
the exclusion of the former from the ADJR Act would be defeated.442  But soon after in 
Squires v Attorney-General, the Federal Court held that ministerial advice to the Governor-
General was amenable to review under the ADJR Act, but actions within the minister’s 
department preceding this advice were not.443  
5.124 Vice-regal immunity has been removed from constitutional judicial review.444  
Decisions of the Governor are subject to statutory judicial review in Queensland445 and 
Tasmania.446 
5.125 While decisions made by the Governor-General exercising prerogative power may 
be non-justiciable—discussed above in relation to executive power and below in relation to 
justiciability—the Council recommended in Report No 32 that the ADJR Act apply to 
statutory decisions of the Governor-General.447  The Council suggested that the definition of 
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decision to which the ADJR Act applies be amended to remove the present exclusion of 
decisions of the Governor-General made under an enactment, and the Minister responsible 
for the advice tendered to the Governor-General be named as respondent.448   
5.126 In the Consultation Paper, this Council sought views on whether statutory decisions 
of the Governor-General should be subject to review under the ADJR Act.  Some 
submissions supported the removal of the exclusion.449  However, two specific concerns were 
raised regarding statutory decisions of the Governor-General in relation to defence, and also 
decisions of the Governor-General to make statutory appointments. 
5.127 The Department of Defence expressed strong concerns should the exclusion of the 
Governor-General’s decisions be removed.  The Department noted examples of decisions 
made by the Governor-General that are vitally important to the administration of the 
Department and the conduct of military operations, including powers under the 
Defence Act 1903 (Cth) to call out the Defence Force and the Reserves and decisions under 
Defence Regulations about the appointment and promotion of officers in the Defence Force.  
The Department argued that the exercise of these powers is not an appropriate subject for 
judicial review as it is an ‘essential duty of the Executive to take action to use the Defence 
Force to protect the nation and in this respect, has close parallels with other prerogatives of 
the Crown’.  Such decisions need finality and certainty from the moment they are made.450   
5.128 The Council considers that the most compelling reason for excluding these decisions 
from the operation of the ADJR Act would be the urgent nature of the decision and the fact 
that the power is unlikely to be used frequently, which would mean that an application to the 
High Court in the first instance would be the most appropriate form of review.  The Council 
therefore considers that, if the general exemption for statutory decisions of the Governor-
General were to be removed, these decisions could be exempt from review in schedule 1. 
5.129 The Department of Defence’s other concern was in relation to the promotion and 
appointment of officers within the Defence Force, arguing that: 
The discretion that is inherent in the exercise of those powers is essential to the 
operational effectiveness of the Defence Force.  It recognises the imperative of 
maintaining leadership and discipline in the Defence Force ... Enabling statutory 
avenues for judicial intervention into the appointment and promotion of officers 
who make up the command structure risks adversely affecting the ability of the 
Defence Force to command the loyalty and devotion to duty of subordinates, 
including in circumstances of extreme danger.451 
5.130 It is unlikely that a successful review application would be made under the 
ADJR Act in relation to these decisions.  The Council considers that the arguments above in 
relation to the need to avoid delay are not as significant here.  However, if the Department of 
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Defence is of the view that the availability of judicial review would disrupt the military 
hierarchy, the Council defers to their concerns in this area. 
5.131 The ACC expressed concern about the possibility of review of statutory 
appointment decisions.452  This is an issue that would affect most agencies.  In the case of 
statutory appointments, they are typically made when the Minister or Cabinet selects one 
applicant from a range of people who applied or nominated for the job, or simply chooses a 
person on the basis of the Minister or Cabinet’s particular preferences, and nominates that 
person to the Governor-General for approval of the appointment.  Because statutory criteria 
are usually fairly limited, and there may be many suitable candidates, the decision is highly 
discretionary, and there may be difficulties making out any grounds for review.  It is also 
difficult to see how useful judicial review remedies would be in relation to statutory 
appointments.  An order quashing a decision not to appoint a person will not necessarily 
result in his or her eventual appointment, particularly when there are other candidates in the 
field.  As such, judicial review of appointment decisions is likely to be ineffective.  Given 
government concerns about potential disruptions to the appointment process due to the 
availability of statutory judicial review, an exemption for these decisions may be appropriate. 
5.132 Examples of other statutory decisions made by the Governor-General include: 
 statutory appointment and termination decisions; 
 declarations of sites of historical prominence in Antarctica, naval waters and 
marine parks; 
 dissolution of Territory assemblies; 
 commissioning of Australian Federal Police officers; 
 proclamations of certain overseas countries for the purposes of the 
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth); 
 proclamations prohibiting entry of aircraft from particular countries; 
 declaration of an epidemic; 
 declaration of a period of emergency for the purposes of the 
Radiocommunications Act 1992; and 
 issuing Royal Commissions. 
5.133 Many of these decisions are not likely to be subject to judicial review challenges.  
Frequently statutory decisions by the Governor-General are of a highly discretionary nature, 
or of very general application.  As such, it may be difficult to successfully make out a ground 
of review in relation to the decisions.  However, there is no reason why decisions such as 
those listed above should not be subject to statutory as well as constitutional judicial review. 
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5.134 These kinds of decisions would certainly be reviewable under constitutional judicial 
review.  However, because the discretions in both cases are quite broad, the likelihood of the 
courts finding a jurisdictional error has occurred is probably less than with more closely 
defined statutory powers.  If review were available under the ADJR Act, the grounds of 
review available would be similarly limited by the broad discretion.   
5.135 Ultimately, under both constitutional review and the ADJR Act what will be relevant 
is whether the Governor-General exercised the power in terms of the statute, and whether 
proper procedures were followed.   
5.136 The Council therefore recommends that the exclusion of statutory decisions of the 
Governor-General be removed, to avoid decisions not being reviewable under the ADJR Act 
simply because of the identity of the decision maker.  The Council considers that this is an 
area where there is a clear discrepancy between constitutional and statutory judicial review, 
which is essentially a product of historical accident. 
5.137 However, the Council considers that some statutory decisions of the Governor-
General should be specifically excluded in Schedule 1, most notably the decisions identified in 
the Department of Defence’s submission to the Council, subject to ensuring transparency and 
fairness of the processes adopted.  The Council also considers that statutory appointment 
processes should be excluded from review, as judicial review remedies are likely to be 
inappropriate and ineffective in this area, and potential disruptions to appointments through 
judicial review proceedings should be avoided insofar as is possible. 
 
Recommendation 4 
With respect to the application of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) to 
decisions of the Governor-General, the Act should be amended as follows: 
(a) decisions of the Governor-General should not be excluded from the definition of 
‘decision to which this Act applies’ in s 3 of the Act;  
(b) decisions of the Governor-General relating to the administration of the Department of 
Defence and the calling out of the military forces should be listed in Schedule 1 of 
the Act as classes of decisions to which the Act does not apply; and 
(c) decisions of the Governor-General relating to statutory appointments and termination 
decisions should also be listed in Schedule 1. 
Justiciability  
5.138 In Report No 32 the Council expressed the view that common law principles of 
‘justiciability’ —meaning principles relating to what matters were suitable for judicial 
determination—would also apply to review under the ADJR Act.  The Council recommended 
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that a statement should be included in the ADJR Act that matters which were not justiciable 
at common law would not be made justiciable by operation of the ADJR Act.453   
5.139 The constitutional principles that control and limit the exercise of judicial power can 
apply to all exercises of a court’s jurisdiction.  While the concept of ‘matter’ is not expressed 
in the ADJR Act as it is in s 39B of the Judiciary Act, it is likely that similar justiciability issues 
arise under both Acts due to the separation of powers and the nature of the judicial power of 
the courts.  On this view it is unnecessary to address the issue further or differently, and it 
does not need to be expressly mentioned in the ADJR Act. 
5.140 On the other hand, the question of what is and is not appropriate for judicial 
determination is ultimately a matter for the courts to decide, and government agencies and 
ministers may want more certainty regarding particular decisions—namely, certainty that 
ADJR Act review will not ‘expand’ review of those decisions.  In these cases it may be 
preferable to have a specific exemption from review in the ADJR Act, for example in relation 
to certain defence decisions, rather than relying upon general common law principles. 
5.141 In the Consultation Paper, the Council sought views on whether a provision should 
be included in the ADJR Act along the lines recommended by the Council in Report No 32,454 
or whether guidance could be given on what decisions were justiciable—in terms of the 
subject matter of decisions—under the ADJR Act. 
5.142 The concept of justiciability in the ADJR Act was not widely discussed in 
submissions.  Some submissions argued that inserting the concept of justiciability in a general 
statutory judicial review scheme would be difficult.455  The Law Council of Australia was of 
the view that the common law test of ‘justiciability’ did not apply to ADJR Act decisions.456 
5.143 The AGD discussed whether a decision is justiciable if it has a ‘close relationship to 
national security or was made in the conduct of international relations’.457  The AGD noted 
that not all ‘national security’ decisions will be non-justiciable, for example courts have held to 
be reviewable some decisions affecting individual rights, such as security assessments 
decisions.  The AGD argued that there could be difficulties in providing a ‘broad-based 
exclusion on the basis of all national security decisions’.458  The AGD also expressed concerns 
in articulating the ‘bright line’ between what is justiciable and not in relation to national 
security decisions.459 
5.144 DIAC expressed concern with a statutory list of factors setting out the justiciability 
of a matter and argued that including the concept of justiciability in a general statutory review 
scheme is an ‘unnecessarily cumbersome control mechanism’.  DIAC noted that the clarity 
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sought to be obtained from such a list would be outweighed by the applications to the Court 
challenging the interpretation of the factors.460 
5.145 Billings and Cassimatis submitted that a more appropriate approach would be to 
include a provision stating that the ADJR Act operates without prejudice to principles of non-
justiciability that have developed or may develop at common law’.461 
5.146 The Council’s view is that there is no need to refer to the common law concept of 
justiciability in the ADJR Act, nor provide explicit limits of review that seek to reflect those 
principles.  Justiciability is not a clear or certain concept, and would introduce unnecessary 
confusion into the ADJR Act.  Rather, the Council considers that specific decisions should be 
assessed for exclusion from the ADJR Act on a case by case basis, according to the principles 
discussed in this chapter.
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6. SEPARATE STATUTORY REVIEW 
SCHEMES 
SUMMARY  
6.1 Some statutory and executive schemes for Commonwealth decision making have 
their own mechanisms for statutory appeal or review.  When large volumes of decisions are 
made under a particular scheme, or decision making under a scheme involves unique 
considerations, these mechanisms can replace the need to rely on the general avenues of 
judicial review.  Separate statutory review schemes can, however, act as yet another layer in an 
already complex review landscape.  The Consultation Paper asked whether a uniform 
statutory review mechanism could be developed to replace the multiplicity of review 
mechanisms in Commonwealth schemes. 
6.2 The Council considers that a single statutory system of judicial review could 
guarantee a cohesive approach to judicial review that does not exclude any part of 
administrative law litigation.  It could make the judicial review system a simpler and more 
understandable legal avenue for applicants.  In this chapter, the Council weighs these 
advantages against the costs and complications of a transition to any new regime.   
6.3 The Council concludes that existing schemes are, in many cases, operating well.  At 
an operational level, repealing the existing schemes that provide review of migration and 
taxation decisions would create unnecessary uncertainty and have high transaction costs.  It is 
the Council’s view that new separate statutory review schemes should only be established 
where there are compelling reasons to do so and, in such cases, that judicial review should not 
be limited.   
SHOULD THERE BE SEPARATE STATUTORY REVIEW SCHEMES? 
6.1 The Council considers that a single statutory system of judicial review provides a 
number of advantages:   
 a judicial review mechanism by which review could be sought across subject 
matter areas is typically easier for applicants and legal practitioners to 
understand;   
 the development of a centralised body of administrative law litigation could 
reduce transaction costs for users and the operating costs of the judicial 
system; and   
 the system could streamline the resolution of number of difficult and highly 
litigated concepts in particular subject matter areas.  
6.2 The Council is mindful that the advantages of a single judicial review scheme must 
be balanced against the costs that may arise during transition to a new regime.  Separate 
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statutory schemes may have particular procedural and legal advantages.  Transition to a new 
legal regime would reduce certainty of outcomes for applicants, at least in the short term, and 
potentially result in a spike in litigation, longer cases, and increased costs. 
6.3 There was some support expressed by stakeholders for the continued existence of 
separate statutory review schemes.  The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) submitted that 
a separate statutory review scheme can be tailored ‘to fit the characteristics of a particular 
agency’s responsibilities and those who seek review of its decisions’, and promote the 
development of particular expertise by reviewers.462  Likewise, the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) submitted that separate statutory schemes can be 
necessary to address the unique concerns of particular statutory and subject matter areas.463  
This is discussed in relation to the separate migration jurisdiction below. 
SHOULD THE EXISTING SEPARATE STATUTORY REVIEW SCHEMES 
REMAIN? 
6.4 While the Council considers that it is preferable for most government decisions to 
be reviewable under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act), 
existing schemes must be assessed on a different basis.  The factors relevant to the assessment 
of existing schemes are their accessibility and efficiency, and the transaction costs of reform.  
Where there is an existing scheme which is efficient and accessible, the Council does not 
consider that the desirability of a single system of review is sufficient reason alone to justify 
high transaction costs.  The Council considers the three significant existing statutory review 
schemes—taxation, migration, and statutory appeals to the Administrative Appeal Tribunal 
(AAT)—below.  
Taxation 
6.5 The ADJR Act does not apply to tax assessment decisions, and only applies to a 
limited number of other taxation decisions.  Part IVC of the Taxation 
Administration Act 1953 (Cth) provides a statutory review mechanism for certain decisions 
made under Acts administered by the Commissioner for Taxation.  Applicants can make 
‘objections’ to decisions via an internal review process, 464 and subsequently apply for review 
in the AAT.465  Appeals from the AAT on questions of law are heard in the Federal Court.  
Alternatively, direct appeals can be made to the Federal Court. 
6.6 In its Report No 32, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: the Ambit 
of the Act, a majority of the Council recommended removing the ADJR Act exemption for 
taxation decisions, considering the availability of a well-established appeals mechanism 
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insufficient reason for excluding further review.466  A minority disagreed, emphasising the 
comprehensive nature of the review system, and the possibility of applicants using review 
under the ADJR Act to ‘game’ the system.467 
6.7 Submissions to the current inquiry strongly supported the existing taxation review 
system.  The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) submitted that the system of judicial review 
of taxation decisions was ‘long established and well developed’.468  The ATO emphasised the 
unique policy aspects of challenging taxation decisions—for example, the Commissioner’s 
ability to recover amounts of taxation, despite proceedings being pending.469  The ATO 
identified that high volumes of decisions made by the Commissioner are subject to internal 
review before proceeding to external administrative or judicial review.470  
6.8 The Law Council of Australia also submitted that the taxation review system is 
working ‘perfectly well’,471 specifically after the decision of the High Court in Commissioner of 
Taxation v Futuris Corporation (Futuris).472  Currently, review under s 39B of the 
Judiciary Act 1903 of some taxation decisions is restricted by the presence of ‘no invalidity’ 
clauses, which state that a decision is not invalid because the provisions of the relevant Act 
have not been complied with.  In Futuris, 473 the High Court held that the effect of the ‘no 
invalidity’ clause in s 175 of Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) was that a breach of the 
requirements of the Act would not amount to a jurisdictional error.  Breaches of the Act 
would therefore not be subject to review under s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act or s 75(v) of the 
Australian Constitution.474  The use of ‘no invalidity’ clauses has ensured that, where 
appropriate, applicants are directed through the comprehensive merits review and appeal 
avenues in the taxation legislation. 
6.9 The Law Council cautioned against replacing Part IVC with ADJR Act review, as 
this could reduce the scope of direct appeals to the Federal Court to determine whether an 
assessment is excessive on any basis.475  The Law Council suggested that replacing Part IVC 
would expose the system to ‘gaming’ by taxpayers who may use the ADJR Act to seek pre-
emptive determinations, which could undermine the status of the AAT.476  Similarly, the ATO 
submitted that retaining the exclusion discourages applicants from instituting proceedings for 
strategic purposes, as the Court is given discretion under s 10 of the ADJR Act to refuse an 
application under that Act where other review mechanisms were available.477 
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6.10 Despite recommendations of the Council in Report No 32, the separate taxation 
review scheme has been preserved by successive governments.  The Council did not receive 
any submissions to this inquiry in support of the removal of the mechanism.  Evidence 
presented to the Council indicated that the system was operating well, providing a 
comprehensive scheme for both merits review and review by the Federal Court.478  Given the 
large volume of taxation litigation, any change to the system would have considerable impact, 
and the Council considers that such a change would impede rather than improve access to 
review.  The Council therefore considers that the exclusion for certain taxation decisions in 
the ADJR Act should be retained—retaining the separate statutory system for review of 
taxation decisions under Part IVC of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth). 
Recommendation 5 
The statutory system for the review of taxation decisions under Part IVC of the Taxation 
Administration Act 1953 (Cth) apart from the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) 
should be retained. 
Migration 
6.11 Migration decisions do not, strictly speaking, have a ‘separate’ statutory review 
scheme in the same way as taxation decisions.  Rather, constitutional review is incorporated 
into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) through the conferral on the Federal 
Magistrates Court of a parallel jurisdiction to s 75(v) of the Constitution.  Review of migration 
decisions is central to judicial review in Australia because of the sheer volume of litigation, 
and because legislative change in the jurisdiction has led to the expansion of constitutional 
judicial review.   
6.12 In 1992, in response to a significant increase in applications for review of migration 
decisions in the Federal Court, a separate judicial review scheme was enacted in Part 8 of the 
Migration Act for entry decisions and refugee claims.479  Part 8 was a restricted scheme, 
providing: mandatory merits review before judicial review could be sought; fewer grounds for 
review; and stricter time limits for applications.  As a result, a number of cases were brought 
in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, significantly increasing its workload.  Over time, 
however, the use of Part 8 was broadened by the courts through statutory interpretation. 
6.13 In 2001, the introduction of a ‘privative clause’ into the Migration Act further limited 
judicial review of migration matters.480  This attempt to limit judicial review failed, as the High 
Court subsequently allowed judicial review in relation to decisions that involve jurisdictional 
error.481  Other amendments in 2001 introduced a bar on class actions in the Federal and 
High Courts, after concerns that they were being used to encourage large numbers of people 
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to litigate to prolong their stay in Australia.482  Further amendments were made in 2002 to 
exclude the operation of common law rules of procedural fairness and to codify the 
procedure for migration decision making.483 
6.14 In 2005, Part 8 of the Migration Act was amended to enable the Federal Magistrates 
Court to deal with the majority of migration matters involving judicial review.484  Section 476 
now provides that the ‘Federal Magistrates Court has the same original jurisdiction in relation 
to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution’, with 
some exceptions.  The Federal Court still has some first instance jurisdiction over certain 
migration decisions that are specifically set out in Part 8.  Plaintiff M61, where judicial review 
was extended to non-statutory procedures carried out for the purpose of advising the Minister 
to make a decision under s 46A of the Migration Act, is an example of the broad availability of 
review for Migration Act decisions.485 
6.15 The Council considers that the experiences in the migration jurisdiction are 
instructive.  The primary lesson is that attempting to restrict or exclude judicial review entirely 
will not be successful.  ‘Streamlining’ measures, such as the taxation ‘no invalidity’ clauses 
have been more successful, because they still provide for judicial oversight of decision 
making.  In its submission to this inquiry, DIAC considered the Migration Act effective, 
because it: 
 channels first instance judicial review applications to the Federal Magistrates 
Court; 
 harmonises the jurisdictions of the Federal Magistrates Court and the High 
Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution; 
 limits the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to appeals from the Federal 
Magistrates Court; and 
 allows single judge hearings of appeals from the Federal Magistrates Court 
in the Federal Court.486 
6.16 The second lesson the Council takes from this jurisdiction is that non-legislative 
measures, focusing on litigation management and assistance for applicants, can do more to 
improve the efficiency of the review process than legislative measures.  DIAC submitted that 
the timely resolution of cases is the key to minimising of the risk that the system itself will 
encourage unmeritorious applications.487  DIAC identified as key features that contribute to 
the successful operation of review in migration decisions:  
 time limits to for the lodgement of applications; 
 limitations on standing; 
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 a prohibition against class actions; 
 court powers for summary dismissal; 
 cost orders for encouraging unmeritorious litigation; and 
 practitioners’ certificates certifying reasonable prospects of success.488 
6.17 While the Council considers that it would be possible to transpose these efficiencies 
to an ADJR Act review mechanism, their evolution is to a large part unique to the high 
volume of the migration jurisdiction.  DIAC submitted that for any statutory scheme to 
include migration decisions, it would need to be aligned with the constitutional review 
grounds, and remain limited to jurisdictional error.  If statutory review were also limited to 
jurisdictional error, the justification for migration decisions being excluded from the 
operation of the ADJR Act would be less clear.489 
6.18 On the other hand, the Migration Review Tribunal–Refugee Review Tribunal 
(MRT-RRT) emphasised that ‘given the high stakes, it is appropriate that there be a facility for 
judicial review of Tribunal decisions’.490  They submitted that the privative clause could be 
repealed and migration and refugee decision making be reviewed under the ADJR Act.491  The 
MRT-RRT said that: 
the steps taken in the attempt to restrict judicial review have had the result of 
returning judicial review to the complexity associated with the prerogative writs—
a complexity which the reforms introduced by the … ADJR Act had overcome.492 
6.19 In the longer term, the Council considers that the Government should consider 
bringing migration back into a general statutory review scheme.  The Council acknowledges 
that judicial review is an essential safety net, enabling the correction of the legal error that will 
occur from time to time in high volume merits review decision making.  Any reintegration 
would require careful consideration of procedure to ensure timely resolution of cases.   
6.20 In the short to medium term, however, the argument for bringing migration 
litigation back under the ADJR Act is less compelling.  Plaintiff M61,493 and the large numbers 
of review applications generally, suggest that the separate system has not restricted the 
availability of constitutional judicial review, which provides remedies for a number of legal 
errors. The Council also notes applicants’ relatively low success rates on appeal.  Because of 
the significant volume of litigation in this area, any change to the review system is likely to be 
accompanied by the high transaction costs of a temporary increase in litigation as applicants 
test whether the change has expanded the grounds available for challenging a decision.   
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6.21 The Council has also considered submissions on the continued utility of retaining a 
procedural code for the MRT-RRT.  The MRT-RRT submitted that the procedural codes 
enabled by s 424A of the Migration Act is the subject of significant litigation without 
enhancing the quality of decision making by the Tribunals.494  In matters remitted to the 
MRT-RRT with s 424A as the principal ground of contention, courts have found that tribunal 
action would have satisfied common law procedural fairness, but amounted to jurisdictional 
error in falling short of the requirements of a procedural code. 495  Procedural codes are 
considered further in Chapter 7, and the Council considers that DIAC may wish to consider 
the utility of the procedural code in this context.  The Council is mindful that the 
extraordinary amount of litigation and administrative work associated with the code means 
that the scale of this issue is large.  Overall, the Council notes that endeavours to achieve 
compliance with the code have not necessarily enhanced the fairness of the review process, at 
considerable cost to efficiency and increased litigation. 
Statutory appeals from the AAT 
6.22 Section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) provides 
that a party to a merits review proceeding may appeal to the Federal Court from any decision 
of the AAT, on a question of law.  A number of submissions to the Council argued that this 
appears to duplicate the statutory review rights under s 5 of the ADJR Act.  In practice, 
however, s 44 remains the primary means of seeking review of AAT decisions.  
6.23 In its 1997 Report, Appeals from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to the Federal Court 
(Report No 41), the Council acknowledged the considerable overlap between the scope of 
appeals to the Federal Court under s 44 and judicial review under the ADJR Act.  The 
Council considered arguments for removing the limited appeal right under s 44, concluding 
that s 44 appeal rights should be preserved.496 
6.24 Submissions to this inquiry presented divergent views.  The Law Council of 
Australia submitted that there were strong arguments in favour of removing the limited right 
of appeal in s 44, so that AAT decisions would be subject to judicial review under the 
ADJR Act or s 39B of the Judiciary Act.497  However, the AAT is of the view that the appeals 
mechanism in s 44 of the AAT Act has a number of benefits—most notably, the user benefits 
of a clear appeals mechanism, and procedural and cost benefits when compared to judicial 
review applications.498  The ATO also strongly supported retaining s 44, as it plays a role in 
the system for review of taxation decisions.499 
6.25 The Council considers that the risk of duplication is mitigated by the demarcated 
functions of s 44 appeals and judicial review under the ADJR Act and s 39B of the 
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Judiciary Act.  Currently, appeals under s 44 are made on ‘questions of law’, which, in practice, 
limits judicial review applications in the Federal Court under the ADJR Act and s 39B to 
‘procedural matters’.  In Report No 41, the Council noted that, rather than duplicating the 
s 44 appeals function, judicial review is of conduct that falls outside the scope of the ‘decision’ 
itself. 500  The AAT also submitted that, distinct from appeals under s 44, review applications 
under the ADJR Act and s 39B can consider interlocutory decisions of the Tribunal—that is, 
decisions other than final decisions.   
6.26 The Law Council suggested that, because AAT decisions can be reviewed under the 
ADJR Act, where review is not confined to questions of law, ‘providing a more limited right 
of appeal serves little practical purpose’.  The Law Council of Australia suggested that it is 
common practice to seek review under the ADJR Act as well as seeking leave to appeal under 
s 44, providing as an example Geographical Indications Committee v O’Connor,501 in which the 
Court found jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act, but not under s 44 of the AAT Act 
or under the ADJR Act.502   
6.27 The Council considers that the statistics available, discussed in Chapter 3, indicate 
that s 44 is used as a primary means of applying for review much more often than other 
mechanisms:  in 2010–11 there were 98 s 44 appeals, as opposed to 23 other judicial review 
applications.  Most of the other judicial review applications were related to migration matters, 
where s 44 appeals are not always available.  In addition—while there is no clear prohibition 
against applicants using both avenues and statistics do not reflect applications in the 
alternative—the Federal Court has held that s 44 should be the primary means of seeking 
review of AAT decisions.503  As submitted by the AAT, s 44 ‘serves as a clear and explicit 
statement within the AAT Act that the Tribunal is subject to judicial review’, and that this 
‘supports the principles of efficiency and openness in the administrative law system’.504 
6.28 The Council considers Geographical Indications505 an example of a review application 
properly made under s 39B, rather than an illustration of the parallel operation of the 
statutory mechanisms.  Because there was no final decision or determination by the AAT 
before the review application was made, the Federal Court had no jurisdiction to hear an 
appeal under s 44.506  This illustrates what the Council considers to be a unique benefit of the 
s 44 mechanism—the necessity of focusing appeal applications on the final AAT decision, 
and discouraging applicants involving the Federal Court in judicial review proceedings before 
the AAT makes a decision. 
6.29 In the Council’s view, the risk of duplication would also be mitigated by the ability 
of the Federal Court to refuse applications for review under s 39B and the ADJR Act where 
there is insufficient basis for review beyond appeals under s 44 of the AAT Act.  In reverse, 
                                                          
500  Administrative Review Council, Appeals from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to the Federal Court, Report 
No 41 (1997) 21. 
501  (2000) 64 ALD 325. 
502  Law Council of Australia, Submission No 23 (1 July 2011) [145]. 
503  Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2010) 84 ALJR 528 [21]. 
504  Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Submission No 12 (24 June 2011) 2. 
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the Tribunal has the ability under s 45 of the AAT Act to refer what it considers questions of 
law to the Federal Court.  This can be done of its own motion, or at the request of a party 
while a proceeding is underway. 
6.30 The Council has considered the opposing argument that removing the statutory 
appeals mechanism in s 44 would eliminate the difficulty of determining what is a ‘question of 
law’ under the AAT Act.  The Federal Court in Tuite v Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
articulated the potential breadth of the definition: 
The words ‘question of law’ in s 44 encompass matters concerning not only the 
interpretation of a Federal enactment or the enunciation of the principle of the 
common law or equity, but also the breach of any duty which the Tribunal was 
bound by law to perform and the failure of which to perform may lead to the 
setting aside of the decision.  The words ‘question of law’ encompass grounds 
enunciated in s 5 of the ADJR Act.507 
6.31 A number of submissions argued that the technical nature of a ‘question of law’ for 
the purposes of framing the jurisdiction causes confusion, particularly for self-represented 
litigants and legal practitioners inexperienced in administrative law.  The Law Council of 
Australia considered it ‘notoriously difficult’ to frame ‘questions of law’, discussing the strict 
approach of the Federal Court, requiring appeal applications to be framed as ‘pure’ questions 
of law. 508  The Law Council submitted that ‘this requirement detracts from the underlying 
question of determining the legality of the decision under review, and appears to promote 
form over substance’.509 
6.32 In consultations, the possibility was raised of replacing the statutory requirement for 
appeals on a ‘question of law’ with appeals on an ‘error of law’, but the Council considers that 
framing applications in terms of an error of law would be problematic. 510  At present, an 
appeal notice will identify a question of law which the AAT may have answered incorrectly, 
and the Federal Court hears the appeal to determine whether an error of law has been made.  
The Council considers that framing applications on questions of law has advantages—it 
draws attention to the distinction between review of the merits of a case and legal error, and 
discourages applicants from seeking to challenge findings of fact. 
6.33 Overall, the Council concludes that the procedural advantages of retaining s 44 
outweigh the arguments for its removal or revision.  The AAT submitted that s 44 provides a 
clear and explicit mechanism for the review of Tribunal decisions by the Federal Court.511  
The Council notes that s 44 appeals are improved by the ability of the Federal Court to be 
                                                          
507  40 FCR 483 at 484. 
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509  Law Council of Australia, Submission No 23 (1 July 2011) [144]. 
510  Administrative Review Council, Appeals from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to the Federal Court, Report 
No 41 (1997).  The High Court has also made clear that the scope of a right of appeal on the ground of 
error of law from a tribunal decision is a limited one that does not grant the court jurisdiction to review the 
entire matter argued in the tribunal.  The appellate jurisdiction covers only as much as is impugned for 
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constituted as the Full Court in appropriate cases,512 and the requirement that the Tribunal 
provide ‘all documents that were before the Tribunal in connexion with the proceeding’ to 
the Court within 21 days.513  Further, unlike in judicial review applications, the Tribunal is not 
required to be a party to s 44 appeals from its decisions, and this can reduce transactions costs 
for parties and for government.  Appeals without the AAT as a party also arguably preserve 
the impartiality of the Tribunal, and recognise the unique nature of the AAT as the generalist 
Commonwealth merits review tribunal.514  
6.34 The submission of the AAT noted that s 483 of the Migration Act excludes the 
operation of s 44 for most migration decisions made by the Tribunal.  This means that those 
decisions are subject to a different system of review in either the Federal Court or the Federal 
Magistrates Court.515  The AAT submitted that this can lead to confusion for appellants about 
the correct forum for lodging migration appeals.  It also means that the benefits of s 44 
appeals described above are not available for appeals from migration decisions of the 
Tribunal.  The AAT is of the view that s 44 should be the sole mechanism for review of 
Tribunal decisions.  DIAC, on the other hand, does not support any change to the existing 
arrangements.516 Given the unique considerations of Migration Act decisions, the Council does 
not propose to recommend changes at this time. 
Recommendation 6 
The avenue for appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to the Federal 
Court on a question of law under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) should 
be retained. 
SHOULD THERE BE NEW SEPARATE STATUTORY REVIEW SCHEMES? 
6.35 Where a separate statutory review system is not currently established, the 
considerations are different from those applied to existing schemes.  The Council’s view is 
that such schemes will rarely be justified.  The Council considers that there should be a 
framework for assessing future proposals for separate statutory schemes to ensure that: core 
administrative law values are maintained; there is no diminution of review avenues; and the 
reasons for establishing a separate scheme of review are compelling.  Particular issues arising 
for individual agencies or sectors may be able to be addressed by procedural modifications, 
for example to streamline general review processes, rather than by the establishment of a 
completely new system.  The Council notes that as constitutional judicial review for 
jurisdictional error cannot be excluded, establishing a separate statutory scheme of review will 
have high transaction costs while making little difference to the availability of review.   
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6.36 Where the Government proposes to establish a new separate statutory scheme to 
operate alongside or in place of review under the ADJR Act, the Council considers that there 
should be compelling reasons for the establishment of such a scheme—such as the need for a 
streamlined process involving both merits and judicial review, such as in the taxation system.  
New statutory schemes should not attempt to restrict the grounds of review or remedies 
available under the ADJR Act.  The Council notes that procedural measures can be 
implemented in relation to particular kinds of matters without establishing an entirely separate 
scheme of review.  The Council considers that further fragmentation of the judicial review 
system is undesirable, and that new separate statutory schemes will rarely be justified. 
Recommendation 7 
A new avenue for judicial review that operates alongside or in place of the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should not be established unless there are compelling reasons, and 
only after consultation with the Attorney-General and the Council. 
Australian Crime Commission 
6.37 In submissions the ACC argued for a statutory review scheme to be established 
under the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth), which would include: 
 an expedited procedure with statutory timelines subject to extension only in 
genuinely special circumstances; 
 a requirement for summary dismissal of unmeritorious cases or components 
of cases; and 
 provision for the courts to access and take account of criminal intelligence 
material that is subject to public interest immunity, or, protection under the 
statutory regime in the ACC Act, without making it available to the 
applicant.517 
6.38 The ACC acknowledged that allowing the courts to take account of publicly 
unavailable criminal intelligence material would fall short of the requirements of natural 
justice.  However the ACC submitted that this was justified by the sensitivities of its 
operations.518  The ACC noted that there already tends to be specialisation of judges of the 
Federal Court in relation to review of ACC decisions.519   
6.39 The Council considers that a new separate scheme in the case of the ACC is not 
justified.  What are purported to be special characteristics in the case—the sensitive nature of 
cases, delaying tactics and unmeritorious cases—are also present in other jurisdictions.  The 
relationship of the ACC’s administrative decisions to criminal investigations does raise issues 
of concern, however, particularly in relation to the effectiveness of prosecutions.  The 
Council considers that removing the decisions from the ambit of ADJR Act review would not 
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limit the availability of constitutional judicial review either under s 39B of the Judiciary Act or 
s 75(v) of the Constitution.  These are not circumstances in which review is appropriately 
restricted to the High Court.  The ACC’s issues may be best dealt with through non-statutory 
procedural methods, for example discussions with the court regarding the expediting of 
certain matters. 
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7. GROUNDS OF REVIEW 
Summary 
7.1 Judicial review principles set standards for the lawfulness of government decisions.  
The grounds of review define the standards for lawful decision making, but also reflect 
principles of ‘fairness’ and ‘rationality’ for administrative action.  For example, the rules of 
natural justice or procedural fairness set out certain procedures which must be followed in 
order to afford a person a fair hearing in particular cases.  Other grounds of judicial review 
require a decision maker to follow rational reasoning processes—for example, the 
requirement to consider relevant considerations and not take into account irrelevant 
considerations when making a decision.  In this way, the grounds of review align with the 
underlying principles of the administrative law system. 
7.2 The first issue with regard to grounds of review is whether they should be listed and 
codified, as in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act), or 
whether it is preferable to rely on courts to develop the grounds in the course of judicial 
review.  In the Australian context, this raises the question of whether it is appropriate to rely 
on the concept of ‘jurisdictional error’ to capture the grounds of judicial review, as is the case 
in the constitutional judicial review jurisdiction (under s 75(v) of the Australian Constitution and 
s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903). 
7.3 The Consultation Paper sought views on the best form for a codified list of grounds.  
Should it be general or specific, and accompanied or replaced by general principles?  What 
form should the ‘catch all’ grounds take—grounds designed to accommodate developments 
in the constitutional judicial review jurisdiction; and what grounds should be included? 
7.4 The Consultation Paper also considered the issue of statutory codes of procedure 
and their relationship with the general concept of procedural fairness. 
7.5 Submissions to the Council broadly supported a codified list of grounds, and only a 
few made suggestions for amendments to the grounds.  The Council concluded that the 
codified list of grounds in the ADJR Act remains a valuable guide for legal practitioners and 
government decision makers.  The Council does not recommend adding any new grounds to 
the list, but rather suggests some minor amendments to the existing grounds. 
APPROACH TO THE GROUNDS OF REVIEW 
7.6 A question the Council asked in the Consultation Paper was whether there should be 
a codified list of grounds at all, or whether it is preferable to rely on the courts’ development 
of grounds.  As Mason J observed in Kioa v West, ‘the statutory grounds of review enumerated 
in s 5(1) are not new—they are a reflection in summary form of the grounds on which 
administrative decisions are susceptible to challenge at common law’.520  However, since the 
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time the ADJR Act grounds were developed, the High Court has placed increasing emphasis 
on the fact that writs available in the original jurisdiction of the High Court (prohibition and 
mandamus) only issue where there has been a jurisdictional error.521   
7.7 Review under the ADJR Act extends beyond the requirement for a jurisdictional 
error in three respects.  First, review under the ADJR Act is available for any error of law, 
whether or not that error is jurisdictional and whether or not the error appears on the face of 
the record.522  Second, review is available where the decision maker has based the decision on 
a particular fact, and that fact did not exist—the ‘no evidence’ ground.523  This factual error 
does not have to be a jurisdictional fact or an error of law.524  Third, review is available where 
the procedures required by law were not observed.525  This ground appears not to be confined 
to jurisdictional errors,526 unlike the common law.527  Given the evolving concept of 
jurisdictional error, it is unclear to what extent these grounds go beyond the grounds for 
constitutional judicial review. 
7.8 Emeritus Professor Mark Aronson argued that repealing the codified grounds of 
review ‘would be the worst of all possible worlds’ as it would result in relying on jurisdictional 
error.  He noted that there is ‘widespread angst and confusion’ over the term, though he 
believes the ‘angst to be greatly over-wrought and the confusion to be quite unnecessary’.528  
The Council agrees that jurisdictional error is a complex concept and reliance solely on 
jurisdictional error as the basis for review of decisions may be confusing and therefore 
impede access to review.  As noted above, the grounds in the ADJR Act cover the key 
questions which need to be addressed in considering whether a jurisdictional error has been 
made, both in terms of the statutory scheme and implied limitations on the exercise of the 
statutory power.  While the concept of jurisdictional error may be well understood by expert 
legal practitioners, particularly barristers, for non-experts the list of grounds in the ADJR Act 
continues to provide a useful tool for framing judicial review applications.  Removing the 
grounds may also create more confusion for practitioners. 
7.9 The grounds of review under the ADJR Act have been criticised for a number of 
reasons.  Aronson, for example, has suggested that, while the list approach states the grounds, 
a person has always needed knowledge of the common law in order to understand them.529  
Kirby J has expressed the view that ‘to some extent the development of the common law of 
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judicial review in Australia was retarded by the enactment of the ADJR Act in 1977’.530  
Stephen Gageler SC has noted that the grounds do not have any organising principles, which 
may make development of the law more difficult.531  However, it is significant to note that 
both Aronson and Kirby J ultimately supported a codified list of grounds, with some 
modifications. 
7.10 It is also true that through the use of the concept of ‘jurisdictional error’, courts 
conducting review in the constitutional judicial review jurisdiction focus on the particular 
statutory scheme rather than general principles.  Nonetheless, grounds such as breach of 
procedural fairness, failing to take into account a relevant consideration, taking into account 
an irrelevant consideration and other more procedural grounds are almost always implied into 
the statute.  A number of ADJR Act grounds address the core concepts of a ‘jurisdictional 
error’ relating to the statutory scheme: no jurisdiction to make the decision; the decision was 
not authorised by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made; and 
improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment.  These grounds are extremely 
broad, and depend upon an interpretation of the particular statutory scheme. 
7.11 The submissions to the Council overwhelmingly supported some form of 
codification.532  Drs Billings and Cassimatis stated that codified grounds have ‘enhanced 
accessibility to review, providing both transparency and flexibility to adapt to the evolving 
administrative state’.533  The Law Council of Australia noted that the ‘clear list’ of potential 
grounds has an ‘educative effect by setting out a relatively comprehensive summary of the 
common law.’534  The Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) submitted that 
simplified and codified grounds of review could assist people to better understand the judicial 
review process and facilitate them to make better informed decisions.535  The Australian 
Crime Commission (ACC) pointed to the usefulness of a codified list of grounds for decision 
makers, noting that grounds provided ‘a structured approach to the assessment process.’536  
Should the list of grounds not be comprehensive, the ACC submitted it would be necessary 
to supplement the list with principles to guide decision makers to consider all relevant factors.  
The Council agrees that codified grounds are more transparent and accessible, and that 
grounds can play a role in explaining judicial review to legal practitioners and other applicants.   
7.12 While there may be some attraction in the idea of leaving the articulation of grounds 
to the courts—noting the important role the courts play in developing existing grounds—
relying solely on case law would almost certainly make framing an application more difficult 
for practitioners and applicants who were not familiar with administrative law.   
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7.13 The Council considers that a codified list of grounds should be retained.  The 
codified grounds do continue to play an educative role.  They have the potential to educate 
decision makers about proper decision-making practices, and applicants about their legal 
rights.  Codified grounds are more transparent and accessible than relying solely on principles 
set out in judicial decisions. 
GENERAL OR SPECIFIC LIST OF GROUNDS 
7.14 The Consultation Paper invited comment on whether a less comprehensive and 
prescriptive list of grounds may be more flexible and adaptable.  In Canada, the general power 
of federal courts to issue judicial review remedies is granted by s 18(1) of the Federal 
Courts Act, RSC 1985.   
7.15 Section 18.1(4) lists the grounds upon which the court may grant relief—if it is 
satisfied that the federal board, commission or other tribunal: 
 acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to 
exercise its jurisdiction; 
 failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other 
procedure that it was required by law to observe; 
 erred in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not the error 
appears on the face of the record; 
 based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a 
perverse or capricious manner or without regard to the material before it; 
 acted, or failed to Act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or 
 acted in any other way that was contrary to law. 
7.16 The Consultation Paper suggested that this more basic approach to codifying the 
grounds may allow room for judicial development of the grounds and address some of the 
criticisms of codification, while retaining the benefits. 
7.17 The Law Council of Australia did not support a more general list of grounds and 
argued there is no reason why the ADJR Act cannot take into consideration developments in 
the common law.537  The Law Council also argued that the general grounds proposed in the 
Consultation Paper were ‘too generic and vague’; would likely be sources of complexity and 
unpredictability; and distract from more pertinent issues with the ADJR Act.538  The Law 
Council recommended that the wording of the grounds of review in the ADJR Act could be 
simplified, noting however that there is an absence of general knowledge about the right to 
judicial review in the community, which cannot be remedied by reforming the grounds. 
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7.18 Aronson argued that adopting the Canadian approach of a generalised statement of 
grounds would be neither simple nor straightforward.539  Aronson submitted that, despite 
their drawbacks and criticisms of the grounds in the ADJR Act, it is beneficial that 
practitioners are familiar with the grounds. 
7.19 The only stakeholder to support the Canadian approach of generalised grounds was 
NSW Young Lawyers.540  They agreed with the criticisms made of the codified grounds of 
review contained in the ADJR Act, discussed in the Consultation Paper. 
7.20 The Council considers that many of the benefits that flow from having codified 
grounds flow from their specificity, to the extent that they have an educative effect and allow 
applicants to frame an application for review, and can—to some extent—be understood 
without an extensive knowledge of judicial decision making.  The Canadian list does not 
include some key grounds of review, such as the considerations grounds, and thus still 
requires an applicant to look to the common law to find key grounds of review.  It is 
therefore unclear that a more general list would retain the benefits of a codified list of 
grounds—it may simply create more confusion.  The Council therefore does not support 
replacing the specifically listed grounds in the ADJR Act with a general list of grounds. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
7.21 The Consultation Paper canvassed the case for some general principles to give 
direction for the particularised grounds.541  There are examples in other Commonwealth 
legislation of objects clauses that provide overarching principles—such as the Freedom of 
Information Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act), which has stated objects of providing public access to 
government held information through publication requirements and rights to access 
documents.542  
7.22 Including general principles to give direction for particularised grounds was not 
widely discussed in the submissions.  Billings and Cassimatis supported the inclusion of a 
‘meta-principles’ clause in a codified scheme, arguing that ‘broad statements of principle 
linking constitutional concepts ... to the role and operation of the courts would ... be 
uncontentious, serve a basic educative function and, be unlikely to hamper the development 
of administrative law’.543 
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7.23 NSW Young Lawyers also supported the use of general principles and noted it 
would be consistent with the inclusion of objects provisions in legislation.544  They argued 
such an approach is consistent with the High Court in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian 
Broadcasting Authority545 and s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). 
7.24 One of the arguments the Council considered was whether general principles of 
fairness, lawfulness and rationality, as adapted by the UK courts, could be used in Australia as 
a way of influencing the behaviour of decision makers to make the initial decision according 
to law.  By moving the focus away from specific errors in decision making, more general 
principles could assist decision makers to focus on the way they make decisions, rather than 
focusing on technical procedural requirements.  This may improve decision making and 
reduce the need for review. 
7.25 The Council considers that the problem with this approach is that general principles 
often do not assist decision makers.  A decision maker may consider that a particular 
procedure followed was ‘rational’ and ‘fair’, but a court could easily disagree with the 
interpretation of these very broad terms.  It is not clear that articulating principles would in 
fact assist decision makers with interpretation of the requirements of more specific judicial 
review grounds. 
7.26 Another argument is that if general principles were listed alongside a list of grounds 
similar to those in the ADJR Act, the principles might help the courts to develop the more 
general grounds in the ADJR Act that allow for the development of the law: ‘otherwise 
contrary to law’546 and ‘any other exercise of a power in a way that constitutes abuse of the 
power’.547  General principles may also overcome criticisms such as Kirby J’s that the 
codification of grounds is hampering the development of administrative law.   
7.27 However, it is unclear whether listed principles would make this any more likely, 
given that there is significant judicial articulation of the principles underlying judicial review.  
Aronson has suggested that objects clauses are often of little practical utility if all they do is 
list the competing factors which need to be balanced in particular cases.548  In the case of 
judicial review principles, there is an important gap between the general understanding of 
concepts like fairness, and what it means in terms of legal requirements for decision makers. 
7.28 The Law Council of Australia argued that ‘the precise legal status of such principles, 
how they would bind decision makers and whether (and in what circumstances) they would 
provide a basis for granting relief also seem to be likely sources of complexity and 
unpredictability’.549  As discussed in the Consultation Paper, complexity can be a barrier to 
accessing the legal system.  In addition, the creation of general principles could increase 
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complexity for decision makers, by adding to the issues they must consider in terms of what 
legal standards they need to meet when making decisions. 
7.29 The principles could be stated in a manner which clearly indicates they are not 
binding, and are there to assist the interpretation of the grounds.  This may assist with the 
Law Council’s concerns.  On the other hand, it may not be possible to articulate guidance on 
how a ground should be applied in a workable manner. 
7.30 Overall, the Council considers that including an overarching statement of objectives 
or principles in the ADJR Act is likely to create more uncertainty about the grounds of 
review, and that it is unlikely to have any real benefit for decision makers.  The Council 
considers that providing guidance to decision makers is important, and that the current list of 
codified grounds provides a good starting point. 
‘CATCH ALL’ GROUNDS 
7.31 The ADJR Act potentially allows for the adoption of developments in the 
constitutional judicial review jurisdiction by the inclusion of two ‘catch-all’ grounds of review, 
enabling review on the grounds that decisions are ‘otherwise contrary to law’550 or amount to 
‘an exercise of power in a way that constitutes an abuse of the power’.551  It has been 
suggested that these grounds acknowledge the capacity of new grounds of review to be 
developed as a matter of law.552  However, at the same time, the almost total lack of 
applications which have sought to use these provisions has led to the suggestion that these 
grounds of review are ‘dead letters’.553   
7.32 There are only a few cases where the ‘otherwise contrary to law’ ground has been 
considered by the courts.554  In some cases, this ground appears to have been used where 
another ground was also applicable, such as unreasonableness,555 or that the respondent’s 
decisions, conduct and actions were not authorised by the enactment in pursuance of which 
they were purported to be made.556  In the majority of cases it appears that the applicant 
merely asserted that the decision was ‘otherwise contrary to law’ and the court did not 
examine what might be encompassed by that term.557  In Re Minister of Immigration, Local 
Government and Ethnic Affairs v Veselko Kurtovic, the Federal Court considered the issue of 
whether substantive unfairness could be considered ‘otherwise contrary to law’ and found 
                                                          
550  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(j) and 6(1)(j). 
551  Ibid ss 5(2)(j) and 6(2)(j).   
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555  Manikantan v Centrelink [2008] FMCA 716 (2 June 2008) [394]. 
556  Humane Society International Inc v Minister for the Environment & Heritage (2003) 126 FCR 205, [28]. 
557  See Pharmacy Guild of Australia v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority (Unreported, Federal Court of 
Australia, Branson J, 20 November 1996). 
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that it could not.558  The implicit point of this case is that it requires a principle to be 
recognised in Australian law before it may be invoked under the ground of ‘otherwise 
contrary to law’.  In other words, the ground itself does not establish new principles or 
grounds of review but appears to allow principles of law already recognised by the courts to 
be pursued under the ADJR Act by use of this ground. 
7.33 The courts have not been willing to consider that ‘otherwise contrary to law’ 
includes breaches of private law, such as breach of confidence,559 breach of contract, estoppel, 
and misleading and deceptive conduct.560  As discussed below, there have not been many new 
grounds of constitutional judicial review, and those new grounds have only emerged in recent 
times.  It seems likely that the current provision in the ADJR Act would be sufficient to 
incorporate those new grounds.   
7.34 If the apparent purpose of these grounds is to enable the ADJR Act to 
accommodate any grounds of judicial review that may arise as a matter of law, the grounds 
could be amended more clearly to acknowledge that possibility.  The Consultation Paper 
suggested that they might instead be replaced by a single ground that enables review under the 
ADJR Act on any ground of review that may be available at common law.   
7.35 The Law Council of Australia submitted that although the grounds of ‘otherwise 
contrary to law’ and ‘abuse of power’ may not be widely used, that is not a reason to repeal 
them.561  Some stakeholders acknowledged that although codified grounds can be inflexible, 
this can be combated by including broad grounds which enable judicial review of anything 
that is available at common law.562  The Australian Network of Environmental Defenders 
Offices (ANEDO) argued that without broadening the catch-all grounds, codified grounds 
could impede the development of the law and ‘prevent incorporation of arguments from 
other jurisdictions that may not fit within the codified grounds.’563 
7.36 The Council considers that the lack of successful applications of the ‘otherwise 
contrary to law’ ground is largely due to two factors: the lack of applications made under that 
ground and the limited number of developments in constitutional judicial review that do not 
fit under one of the other grounds in ss 5 and 6.  There is therefore no evidence that the 
ground as it exists is particularly problematic and it provides an avenue through which 
developments in the common law may be incorporated or recognised in the ADJR Act. 
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ADDITIONAL GROUNDS 
7.37 The Consultation Paper considered two potential new grounds of review: 
‘proportionality’ and ‘serious administrative injustice’.  During the course of consultations, 
another potential new ground was raised: ‘serious illogicality or irrationality’. 
7.38 Proportionality is a ground currently not recognised in Australian law.  ‘Serious 
illogicality’ has been recognised by the High Court in two cases: Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs, Re Ex parte Applicant S20/2002564 and Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship v SZMDS (SZMDS).565  ‘Serious administrative injustice’ was a ground suggested by 
Kirby J,566 but it has not been adopted by the High Court. 
Serious illogicality or irrationality 
7.39 Martin Smith suggests that ‘serious illogicality or irrationality’ is now a ground 
available at common law.567  It should be noted, however, that there is some inconsistency in 
the cases in terms of precisely what the ground entails.  Four out of the five judges in SZMDS 
did consider ‘serious illogicality or irrationality’ to be a ground of review.568  However, two 
different approaches were taken by the majority judges as to the interpretation of what the 
ground required, with Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J differing from Crennan and Bell JJ on 
outcome. 
7.40 ‘Serious illogicality or irrationality’ was only recognised in SZMDS as applying to 
jurisdictional facts,569 following the conclusions of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (SLGB).570  Gummow ACJ and 
Kiefel J characterised the test for illogicality as making ‘a critical finding by inference not 
supported on logical grounds’.571  Crennan and Bell JJ, on the other hand, considered that the 
test was whether there was room for reasonable minds to differ on a particular jurisdictional 
fact—there would only be serious irrationality if there were no room to differ.572  There is also 
a question of how ‘serious illogicality or irrationality’ differs from Wednesbury 
unreasonableness, and whether it adds anything to that ground. 
7.41 If ‘serious illogicality or irrationality’ is established as a ground which demonstrates 
jurisdictional error, then the ADJR Act would most likely allow for applications to be made 
on the basis that the error meant that the decision maker did not have the jurisdiction to 
make the decision or that the decision was otherwise contrary to law.  However, one of the 
advantages of the ADJR Act grounds is their educative effect.  If there is a ground recognised 
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at common law and the ADJR Act grounds are being revised, it is in the original spirit of 
the Act to recognise new common law grounds—and to do so expressly.  While the content 
of the ground is currently uncertain, including it in the ADJR Act may assist in its 
development.  On the other hand, since the ambit of the ground is still uncertain, it may be 
preferable to leave it to develop in the constitutional judicial review jurisdiction without giving 
it clear statutory recognition at this stage, relying instead on the existing grounds in the 
ADJR Act. 
Proportionality 
7.42 Proportionality is a ground of review that originated in civil law countries in Europe, 
but has made its way into the common law of the UK.573  However, proportionality is not 
regarded as a separate ground for review in the Australian context,574 and most Australian 
courts and commentators regard it, as Michael Taggart remarked, as a ‘bridge too far’,575 
largely because of its perceived incursion into the merits of a particular case.   
7.43 In the UK, proportionality is established when executive action interferes with a 
recognised right, interest or freedom in a manner that is disproportionate to the objective to 
be achieved.576  It is a ground often applied in the UK in cases involving human rights, 
supported by the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).  Taggart has argued that it owes much of its 
‘much-admired analytic and structuring qualities’ as a methodology to an enumerated list of 
rights.577 
7.44 Australia does not have a statutory list of human rights, meaning that proportionality 
would not have the same certainty in terms of what rights, interests or freedoms would give 
rise to a consideration of the proportionality of an executive action.  The Law Council of 
Australia commented, for example, that: 
The reason for the UK ‘expansion’ of judicial review is due to peculiar factors—
UK’s geopolitical positioning in Europe; the Human Rights Act and the absence of 
a written Constitution which incorporates a strict separation of powers.  Due to 
the nature of Australia’s written Constitution it might not be desirable (or even 
possible) to create rights of review that use a principle such as proportionality.578 
7.45 The main argument in support of proportionality is that the courts currently perform 
a similar exercise using existing grounds of review, to the extent that they may apply a varying 
intensity of review where more significant rights or interests are in question—for example, 
the content of procedural fairness may alter depending on the decision-making context. 
7.46 Separate questions could arise about the meaning of proportionality.  There seems to 
be no single definition of proportionality from the jurisdictions which have engaged the 
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concept.  Adoption of this ground would require consideration of whether it should be 
defined or simply listed.  The latter would be consistent with the ADJR Act approach to other 
grounds and would enable a statutory ground of proportionality to incorporate common law 
evolution of the concept. 
Serious administrative injustice 
7.47 Kirby J suggested that the grounds of judicial review may need to develop in order 
for judicial review to correct ‘clear injustices’ or ‘serious administrative injustice’.579  His 
Honour’s mention of ‘fundamental flaws of logic and reasoning’580 indicates a focus on grave 
errors.  This suggestion echoes many English cases that have allowed relief for ‘conspicuous 
unfairness’.581  An additional ground based on serious administrative injustice is in the nature 
of a residual common law ground to be available to correct administrative error with serious 
consequences for the individual.   
7.48 The English law concept of conspicuous or substantive unfairness has not been 
adopted as a ground of review in Australia because it is seen as straying too closely to the 
exercise of merits review by the courts.582  Questions of degree—whether an injustice was 
‘serious’—are not seen as appropriate for judicial determination in Australia.  It is likely that if 
such a ground existed, the courts would frequently be called upon to determine whether a 
particular decision was ‘unjust’, and to what degree.  This kind of inquiry is likely to blur the 
distinction between executive and judicial functions, and is likely to be seen as inappropriate 
by government administrators.   
7.49 The Law Council of Australia made a general comment on the addition of new 
grounds, referring to Kirby J’s suggestion of including grounds to deal with ‘serious 
administrative injustice’ or ‘fundamental flaws of logic or reasoning’, asking: 
But should changes to the grounds be made to capture such ‘errors’?  How would 
they be worded and how would straying into merits review be avoided?  Could 
the Wednesbury unreasonableness ground be loosened?  But if so how again 
without facing criticism that the judiciary is straying into the executive field?583 
7.50 There are also other remedies and accountability mechanisms—such as claims under 
the CDDA and other discretionary compensation schemes,584 or complaints to the 
Ombudsman—which are available to people who have suffered an administrative injustice 
that cannot be remedied by the courts. 
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No need for additional ‘catch all’ grounds 
7.51 The Council considers that there is no need to add additional grounds to the current 
list in ss 5 and 6 of the ADJR Act.  The ground of ‘serious illogicality’ has not yet been fully 
defined or developed by the High Court, and the ‘catch-all’ ground in s 5(j) of the ADJR Act 
is likely to incorporate the new ground as ‘otherwise contrary to law’.  The Council considers 
that both ‘proportionality’ and ‘serious administrative injustice’ are grounds that raise issues 
about the line between merits and judicial review, and that other avenues are open to people 
who have suffered from serious maladministration to make complaints or seek compensation. 
AMENDMENT OF THE EXISTING GROUNDS OF REVIEW? 
7.52 Emeritus Professor Aronson, Greg Weeks, and Drs Billings and Cassimatis all 
suggested in submissions to the Council that some reform of the specific grounds was 
necessary.  This part considers these suggestions, considering the work of Professor Cane and 
Associate Professor McDonald, among others.  The Council agrees that it is appropriate to 
make these minor amendments in order to clarify the grounds and ensure they provide clear 
guidance to applicants and legal professionals. 
Section 5(1)(b)      that procedures that were required by law to be observed in connection with the 
making of the decision were not observed 
7.53 Aronson commented that this provision is too wide, as it could extend to immaterial 
procedural errors.585  He recommends restricting the provision to ‘procedural errors that did 
affect or might have materially affected the result’.586  The reason for altering the ground in 
this way is that it would better reflect how the ground is applied by the courts.   
7.54 The Council agrees that this provision is, on its face, extremely broad.  The potential 
breadth of the provision is an area of concern, as on one reading, the provision could imply 
that the failure to comply with any statutory step, however small, could invalidate a decision.  
However, attempting to capture the approach of the courts in a statutory provision is 
problematic.  The High Court’s approach to procedural errors in Project Blue 
Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (Project Blue Sky)587 was to look at whether the 
Parliament intended for a failure to follow the procedure to result in invalidity.  The courts 
also have discretion as to whether or not to issue an order of review, and the severity of the 
breach of procedure could be a factor taken into account. 
7.55 The Council considers that, since there is no evidence that the courts are applying 
this ground in an overly broad manner, there is not a strong case for a legislative amendment.  
The Council suggests that an explanatory note could be inserted following the ground to 
make it clear that not all breaches of a procedural requirement will necessarily result in the 
issue of an order of review.   
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Section 5(2)(a)      taking an irrelevant consideration into account 
7.56 Aronson submitted that it might be clearer to refer to an irrelevant and forbidden 
consideration, rather than to taking an irrelevant consideration into account.588  However, the 
Council was concerned that this wording might not accurately reflect the common law, and 
create confusion rather than clarify the ground.   
7.57 Aronson also suggested an alternative wording: ‘taking into account a consideration 
in breach of the enactment in pursuance of which the decision was purported to be made’.589  
This wording reflects the manner in which ‘irrelevant considerations’ are determined in 
constitutional review cases, where the relevance of a consideration is determined with 
reference to the statute.  It would therefore strengthen the relationship between the 
ADJR Act grounds and the concept of jurisdictional error.   
7.58 The Council considers that the approach to these grounds is already clear to 
practitioners, and that amending the statute might suggest that the courts should change their 
approach to the grounds.  The Council does not support an amendment to this ground. 
Section 5(2)(b)      failing to take a relevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power 
7.59 Aronson recommends that it might be clearer to refer to a relevant and mandatory 
consideration, to better reflect the common law requirement.590  The notion of ‘mandatory’ is 
also elastic and may not therefore clarify this ground.  The Council had similar issues with this 
proposal as with the proposed amendment to s 5(2)(a).  Once again, after further 
consultation, Professor Aronson suggested that s 5(2)(b) could be reworded as follows: 
‘failing to take a relevant consideration into account in breach of the enactment in pursuance 
of which the decision was purported to be made’. 591 
7.60 As with the irrelevant considerations ground, the Council considers that the 
approach to these grounds is already clear to practitioners, and that amending the statute 
might suggest that the courts should change their approach to the grounds.  The Council does 
not support an amendment to this ground. 
Section 5(2)(f)      an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without 
regard to the merits of the particular case. 
7.61 Aronson and Weeks both raised a number of interesting points in relation to this 
ground.  They both noted that it is common for high volume decision making to be 
structured by non-binding rules or policies issued by the decision-making organisation.592  
Weeks pointed out that, while there is an interest in ensuring that the merits of a particular 
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case are considered, ‘there is a competing consideration of consistency, particularly where so 
much regulation is done through the means of soft law’.593 
7.62 The importance of agency guidelines are now recognised in the FOI Act publication 
scheme, where agencies are required to publish guidelines used to make decisions.594   
7.63 Weeks stated that the increase in the use of soft law and policy to govern regulation 
has led to a recognition that: 
published soft law and policies must mean something; in other words, that those 
who use them as a regulatory tool ought not lightly to be able to apply any other 
standard.  On the other hand, soft law cannot be applied as though it were hard 
law.  The problem, in essence, is not simply regulation with soft law but the fact 
that the soft law applied asymmetrically: it operates as de facto hard law on those 
who are being regulated but is decidedly soft in its effect on the regulators.595 
7.64 Both Aronson and Weeks noted that, in the UK, the Supreme Court has recognised 
that there are situations where guidelines are needed, and that the government cannot lawfully 
depart from the terms of published guidelines.596 
7.65 Aronson and Weeks did not recommend going down the UK path.  However, they 
both considered that the need to weigh the benefits of an unfettered exercise of discretion 
against the benefits of consistency needs to be recognised, as signalled by Brennan J in 
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2).597  They both recommended a 
reformulation of s 5(2)(f) along the lines of ‘applying a rule or policy that unlawfully purports 
to narrow the breadth or content of an applicable discretionary power’. 
7.66 The Council considers that the law in this area is unclear.  However, an amendment 
dealing with rules and policies that sought to ‘unlawfully … narrow’ a discretionary power 
might be seen to imply that rules and policies that purport to widen or extend discretionary 
power are permissible.  An alternative amendment to this ground would be to address rules or 
policies that ‘narrow or expand’ or ‘unlawfully alter’ the breadth of a discretionary power.   
7.67 Overall, the Council considers that the courts are currently dealing with these issues, 
and that while an amendment to this ground might be considered in the future, at this stage 
there is not a major problem with the application of the provision by the courts. 
Sections 5(1)(h) and 5(3)—No evidence ground 
7.68 Aronson, Billings and Cassimatis recommended revision of the ‘no evidence’ ground 
in paragraph (5)(1)(h) and subsection 5(3) of the ADJR Act.598  Billings and Cassimatis 
suggested that there is conflicting authority on the operation of the provision, and that it 
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would be of benefit to clarify it—namely, to clarify when an evidential/factual error should be 
classified as a legal error.599 
7.69 Aronson suggested that the requirement that there be no material at all to justify the 
decision means that the ground as it currently stands does not add anything to ‘error of law’ 
and suggests two possible ways to reform the provision: 
 reframe the ‘no evidence’ ground, so that the conditions in s 5(3) establish 
that the ground in s 5(1)(h) is made out, leaving open the possibility that 
other conditions could also satisfy the ground; or 
 reframe the ground to focus on whether the decision that a matter of fact 
was established or existed was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision 
maker would have made it.600 
7.70 Another possible reform might be to align this ground closer to its counterpart 
under constitutional judicial review.  However, the precise boundaries of the ground as a 
ground for constitutional judicial review are unclear, and it would be difficult to draft such an 
amendment.   
7.71 In Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond, the High Court stated that ‘it has been 
accepted that the making of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence 
is an error of law’.601  However, the case law is unclear on what findings of fact the no 
evidence ground applies to.  The Full Federal Court has said that the fact must be a ‘critical 
step in [the decision maker’s] ultimate conclusion’.602  In SGLB, Gummow and Hayne JJ tied 
the constitutional judicial review no evidence ground to the concept of ‘jurisdictional fact’, 
referring to the need for a fact to be ‘a precondition to the exercise of jurisdiction’ for the no 
evidence ground to establish a jurisdictional error.603  
7.72 This link between the ‘no evidence’ ground and jurisdictional fact appears to be an 
unsatisfactory approach in the case of the ADJR Act ground.  An error in relation to a 
jurisdictional fact would be a ground of review under s 5(1)(c)—the statutory no evidence 
ground appears to go somewhat further than this. 
7.73 Cane and McDonald note that the ADJR Act formulation of the ‘no evidence’ rule 
is: 
one of the few instances where the drafters of the ADJR Act intentionally 
departed from the common law.  Unfortunately, however, the detailed description 
of the no evidence ground in s 5(3) has not resulted in a clearer understanding of 
the statutory form of the no evidence ground.604 
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7.74 It is not clear, however, whether the reason for the limited case law on this ground is 
simply because the provision is clear enough that people know that they will not be able to 
prove the ground and do not litigate.  Generally, the cases where an error of fact will amount 
to an error of law are limited, and it may simply be that such cases do not often arise.   
7.75 The question of which errors of fact amount to an error of law is addressed by 
s 5(3), though aspects of the distinction could perhaps be clearer.  The Council considers that 
s 5(3) of the ADJR Act appears to be an attempt to narrow the range of facts or matters to 
which the ground applies by specifying particular errors of fact.  Paragraph 5(3)(a) requires 
that the decision maker is required by law to only make the decision if satisfied of particular 
facts or matters.  This appears to mean that paragraph (a) is intended to cover legislative 
powers that require a fact be found or an opinion reached.  On the other hand, s 5(3)(b) 
refers only to findings of fact.  Paragraph (a) is therefore linked to legislative requirements 
that a fact be found or an opinion reached.  If that is not the case, review seems appropriate 
because it allows the terms of the statute to be scrutinised by the court.  The same is not true 
with paragraph (b) because that does not have the phrase “required by law”.  Paragraph (b) 
presumably refers to facts which may not have been expressly required by the provision, but 
the finding of which was crucial to the decision.  If this rationale was extended beyond 
findings of fact to the formation of an opinion (as seems possible under paragraph (a)) it 
would move close to merits review, which would be inappropriate. 
7.76 Cane and McDonald note that it is not clear whether the requirements of s 5(3) are 
necessary but not sufficient to establish the no evidence ground, or if s 5(3) can be taken as 
establishing the content of the no evidence ground for the purposes of the ADJR Act.605  
They also identify issues with:  
 the ‘reasonably satisfied’ standard in paragraph (a), to the extent to which is 
has not been subject to extensive discussion by the court; 
 the lack of clarity about what amounts to a ‘particular matter’ ‘required by 
law’ for the purposes of paragraph (a)—does this mean the matter must be 
a jurisdictional fact or a critical finding, or is some other standard applied; 
and 
 the strict manner is which ‘particular fact’ referred to in paragraph (b) has 
been interpreted by the court—for example, the High Court has held that 
fact will not be critical to the decision if the same decision would have been 
reached regardless.606   
7.77 In relation to the first of these matters, this appears to be a question that the Court 
will consider on a case by case basis.  The question of the standard by which a ‘particular 
matter’ or a ‘particular fact’ should be assessed could perhaps be clearer on the face of the 
provision.   
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7.78 The Council therefore supports Aronson’s suggestion that the conditions in s 5(3) 
are sufficient to establish the ‘no evidence’ ground, but are not exhaustive.  The Council also 
considers that s 5(3) should be amended in the following manner: 
 that paragraph (b) should require the decision to be based on the existence 
of facts critical to the final decision, clarifying in what manner the decision 
must be ‘based on’ the particular facts; and 
 that in the case of both paragraphs (a) and (b) it is clarified that a ‘fact’ can 
be a past, present or future fact. 
7.79 The issue of whether other facts exist which may have justified the decision is 
ultimately a remedial issue, and relevant to the court’s discretion under s 16 of the ADJR Act.  
The Council does not consider that specific direction needs to be given in the statute on this 
issue. 
 
Recommendation 8 
The Council recommends that the current list of grounds for review in ss 5 and 7 of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained in its current form, with 
one amendment to sections 5(3) and 6(3).   
The Council recommends that subsections 5(3) and 6(3), which set out the requirements which 
must be met if the ‘no evidence’ ground in paragraphs 5(1)h) or 6(1)(h) is to be made out, are 
amended so that: 
(a) it is clear that the conditions in s 5(3) are sufficient to establish the ‘no evidence’ 
ground, but are not exhaustive; 
(b) in paragraph (b) it is clear that the decision must be based on the existence of facts 
critical to the final decision; and 
(c) in the case of both paragraphs (a) and (b) it is clarified that a ‘fact’ can be a past, 
present or future fact. 
STATUTORY CODES OF PROCEDURE 
7.80 It is common for statutes to include procedural steps for decision making, mirroring 
the common law obligation to accord natural justice.  However a statutory code of procedure 
will not by itself exclude that common law obligation.607  The High Court has made clear that 
natural justice is a fundamental principle that may only be displaced by legislation with 
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‘irresistible clearness’.608  This indicates the rigorous scrutiny to which the High Court subjects 
legislative attempts to limit or exclude the requirements of natural justice. 
7.81 Procedural directions in legislation are in many ways desirable as they give a clear 
framework for decision makers.  Setting out what the legislature considers to be a fair process 
for making particular decisions can increase certainty and ensure a consistent approach to 
decision making, ensuring equity and fairness. 
7.82 Issues arise where the legislative procedures are seen as exhaustively addressing the 
requirements of procedural fairness and decision makers fail to take into account the 
circumstances of particular cases.  In these situations courts may find there has been a breach 
of procedural fairness even where procedures have been complied with.  In other 
circumstances, the courts may find that legislative procedures have not been complied with, 
but otherwise be satisfied that there has been compliance with common law procedural 
fairness requirements and overall a fair process. 
7.83 In the migration jurisdiction, a Code of Procedure was introduced in 1994 in part 7 
of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act), to codify the principles of procedural fairness, 
provide certainty and identify the procedural obligations which decision makers must meet.  
However, while such procedures can provide an indication of what might be regarded as 
procedural fairness, it would not preclude the courts’ consideration of whether procedural 
fairness has been accorded.  As the decision in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO 
indicates, a failure to comply with a statutory procedure will not automatically give rise to a 
breach of procedural fairness if there have been no adverse consequences for the individual.609   
This will depend upon whether the provision is merely designed to ‘facilitate’ a fair hearing.610 
7.84 In the Consultation Paper, the Council sought views on whether codes of procedure 
are desirable and in what circumstances, and whether policy directions could be provided to 
government on when such codes are appropriate.   
7.85 One problem identified by stakeholders was their inflexibility.  NSW Young 
Lawyers, for example, submitted that there should not be any codes of procedural fairness as 
they do not have the flexibility required to develop with the changes in society.  They argued 
that the common law and ADJR Act should apply in determining whether procedural fairness 
has been breached, and supported the inclusion of codes of procedure, but argued they 
should not constitute a code of procedural fairness.611   Billings and Cassimatis submitted that 
introducing a statutory code of procedure is ‘ill advised and highly problematic in practice’.612  
They argued that, in the migration context, the statutory code of procedure has been 
‘counterproductive and failed to assist tribunals deliver substantial justice in a timely and cost-
                                                          
608  Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252, 259 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 
609  (2009) 238 CLR 627. 
610  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO (2009) 238 CLR 627,639–40.  See also discussion of ‘practical 
injustice’ in Lam above in Chapter 3.   
611  The Law Society of New South Wales Young Lawyers, Submission No 7 (1 July 2011) 9. 
612  Peter Billings and Anthony Cassimatis, Submission No 6 (27 June 2011) 12. 
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effective manner.’613  They submitted that the common law is more flexible and importantly, 
not every procedural error will result in invalidity, as is the case in the migration context, if it 
had no substantive impact on the outcome.614 
7.86 Although the ACC submitted that a code of procedure ‘may assist in structuring the 
decision-making process’,615 they argued that it must be made clear that compliance with the 
code is not always enough and there is a ‘broader objective’ to be achieved.616  The ACC 
noted however that most decisions they make which are reviewed do not attract procedural 
fairness obligations. 
7.87 The Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) submitted that procedural fairness 
obligations will depend on the facts and circumstances in each case and it would be 
challenging to ‘capture this balancing act’ in a statutory code of procedure.617  The AGD 
expressed concern that developing statutory codes of procedure may risk creating codes that 
are not appropriate in the national security context or may in fact lessen procedural fairness 
that would have otherwise been provided. 
7.88 The code of procedure in the Migration Act was raised as a particular issue.  DIAC 
submitted that the code of procedure that applies in the migration context could not be 
removed without being replaced by some form of guidance for decision makers.  They noted 
that although there has been extensive litigation over the code, the interpretation is now ‘fairly 
settled’.618  They submitted that the code ‘was intended to eliminate the legal uncertainties that 
flow from the non-codified common law principles of natural justice while retaining fair, 
efficient and legally certain decision making procedures.’619  Conversely, the MRT-RRT 
submitted that the code of procedure in the migration context ‘leads to unexpected 
interpretation, uncertainty and extensive litigation’.620  They argued that statutory codes of 
procedure ‘cannot replicate the adaptiveness of common law procedural fairness’.621  Victoria 
Legal Aid also expressed concern with the anomalies created by the codes of procedure in the 
Migration Act as they tend ‘to create technical arguments about the interpretation of the 
code’.622 
7.89 There may be reasons why legislators wish to codify completely the natural justice 
hearing rule.  For example, where there are approval processes and where large numbers of 
submissions are received from different stakeholders, it would be difficult to assess particular 
requirements in terms of notice and hearing for each group or individual making a 
submission.  Therefore, legislation may set out a particular form of notice and time for 
                                                          
613  Peter Billings and Anthony Cassimatis, Submission No 6 (27 June 2011) 12. 
614  Ibid. 
615  Australian Crime Commission, Submission No 5 (6 July 2011) 8. 
616  Ibid. 
617  Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Submission No 21 (9 August 2011) 7. 
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619  Ibid. 
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submissions to be made.  Uncertainty about procedural fairness requirements in such cases 
could cause uncertainty about decisions which will affect a large number of groups. 
7.90 On the other hand, courts may be reluctant to accept that procedural fairness has 
been completely codified.  In addition, being too prescriptive can cause problems if fairness in 
a particular case appears to require a different process. 
7.91 The Council considers that, while setting out procedural requirements in legislation 
can assist decision makers to make valid decisions, such codes can also leave little room for 
discretion on the part of decision makers, and may sometimes result in unfairness to 
applicants.  For example, as noted in Chapter 6, the Council considers that endeavours to 
achieve compliance with the code have not necessarily enhanced the fairness of the review 
process, at considerable cost to efficiency and increased litigation.  The Council has previously 
provided some guidance on how procedural fairness requirements can be addressed in 
legislation in Report No 46, The Scope of Judicial Review.  This advice is not necessarily presented 
currently in a form which is useful for policy makers developing legislation on when and what 
kind of legislative provision for procedural fairness is appropriate, and the Council considers 
that this should be revised.   
Recommendation 9 
The Administrative Review Council should develop clear guidance for policy makers on when 
statutory codes of procedure, or procedural steps in legislation, are appropriate, and what form 
they should take. 
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8. RIGHT TO SEEK REVIEW 
SUMMARY 
8.1 ‘Standing’ refers to the right to commence legal proceedings.  In a public law 
context, ‘standing’ describes the interest regarded by the courts as sufficient to maintain 
public law proceedings.  A theme which emerged from submissions to the Council on 
standing is that the view of judicial review as a ‘public’ law proceeding—as distinct from a 
‘private’ law proceeding—gives rise to a number of questions about appropriate standing 
rules.  Standing is fundamental to access to justice, because it allows parties with an interest in 
proceedings to access the court while preventing court resources being occupied by parties 
with no real interest in the outcome of a dispute.  The rules related to standing are complex 
and still evolving.623 
8.2 Standing is not the only barrier to access to review.  Costs and other issues also play 
a role.  This chapter considers only the limited issue of standing rules.   
8.3 The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) currently gives 
standing to a person aggrieved by a decision to which the Act applies.624  The Council has 
concluded that this test does not provide sufficiently clear standing for representative 
organisations with an interest in a decision to make an application for review under the 
ADJR Act.  The Council therefore recommends that the ADJR Act be amended to align with 
the standing test in s 27 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act), in 
particular to give standing to an organisation or association of persons, whether incorporated 
or not, if the decision relates to a matter included in the objects or purposes of the 
organisation or association. 
STANDING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  
8.4 Roger Douglas’ empirical analysis of standing suggests that, while it is only at issue in 
two or three cases a year, the cases often have profound implications for sizeable sections of 
the community who have shared interests with the plaintiff.625  Furthermore, Douglas argues 
that ‘standing decisions have implications whose importance is disproportionate to their 
frequency’.626  There are also an unknown number of people and organisations that are 
dissuaded from commencing judicial review cases due to current standing principles. 
8.5 Judicial review may have implications for sections of the community or the public as 
a whole (especially where the decision relates to a broad issue of policy).  This means that 
                                                          
623  See Bateman’s Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 
247, 263, 279–80; Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd (2000) 
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624  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5–7. 
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standing rules sometimes need to balance the public’s interest in certain proceedings with the 
ability of an individual to protect his or her private interests. 
8.6 To apply for review under the ADJR Act, a person must be one ‘who is aggrieved 
by’ a decision, conduct or failure to make a decision.627  The issue is whether, given the public 
interest in government decision making, this test is too narrow. 
8.7 Representative organisations, as opposed to individuals, may have an interest in the 
proceeding, but have trouble establishing standing.  Associate Professor Matthew Groves has 
observed that, ‘although standing rules have relaxed in recent times, representative 
associations often still struggle to establish standing’.628  Groves argues that the requirement 
of the current judicial review standing rules—for a complainant to show a special interest or 
be aggrieved by a decision—does not equate with even the strong views or commitments of 
representative groups, and these restrictive elements make it difficult for representative 
groups to challenge government decisions.629  He considers this has led to uneven results in 
environmental cases.630  The problem arises because of the common law principle that the 
objects of a particular representative organisation are not alone sufficient to demonstrate an 
interest in proceedings which can give an organisation standing.631  Groves notes that cases on 
the standing of representative associations have been inconsistent,632 and at this stage the 
matter remains unresolved by the High Court. 
8.8 The Consultation Paper considered two models for expanding standing 
requirements in the ADJR Act: 
 a model based on s 27(2) of the AAT Act, which extends standing for 
representative organisations if the decision relates to a matter included in 
the objects or purposes of the organisation or association; and 
 open standing—a standing test that allows any person to commence ‘public’ 
proceedings, unless existing legislation provides otherwise or the 
commencement of an action would unreasonably interfere with a private 
interest. 
8.9 The major difference between these two models is that the first focuses on standing 
for representative organisations only, with no major changes to the standing test for 
individuals.  The second model is based on the idea that any individual has some kind of 
interest in a judicial review proceeding and should be able to make an application. 
                                                          
627  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5–7. 
628  Matthew Groves, ‘Should the Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic) be Repealed?’ (2010) 34 Melbourne University 
Law Review 451, 470. 
629  Matthew Groves, ‘Standing and related matters’ (2010) 59 Admin Review 62, 62. 
630  Ibid. 
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8.10 The rules of standing in public interest matters were the subject of detailed analysis 
by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in 1985 and 1996.633 In its 1996 report, 
the ALRC recommended broadening the rules of standing, and recommended open standing 
in cases that have a public element so as to ensure accountability and compliance to the law in 
decision making.  The ALRC argued that ‘[t]he primary function of any standing test must be 
to ensure that public law proceedings are able to be commenced when it is in the public 
interest to do so’, and the test for standing should be broader than that where private interests 
are involved (and the players’ interests are clear).634  The ALRC’s proposed standing test 
would allow any person to commence ‘public’ proceedings unless existing legislation provides 
otherwise, or the commencement of an action would unreasonably interfere with a private 
interest.  This would be regulated by a single statutory framework giving the courts a general 
power to allow intervention on terms and conditions that it specifies.   
8.11 There are two main arguments for an open standing approach in judicial review 
proceedings.  First, because all members of the public have an interest in the Government 
acting properly and according to law, any member of the public should be able to call the 
government to account for its administrative actions.  Secondly, arguments about standing in 
litigation waste time and resources, which would be better spent resolving the substantive 
issues in the case.  The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) submitted to the Council that 
changes to the standing rules are necessary to facilitate public interest litigation, which in their 
opinion ‘has the capacity to create systemic change for large groups of people without the 
need for each person to bring a separate legal claim’.635   
8.12 The Consultation Paper put forward a proposal that the test for standing for 
representative organisations in s 27(2) of the AAT Act could be adopted in judicial review 
proceedings.  Section 27(2) provides that organisations are ‘taken to have interests that are 
affected by a decision if the decision relates to a matter included in the objects or purposes of 
the organisation or association’.636   
8.13 Groves argues that the AAT Act approach has a number of advantages: 
 first, simplicity—the provision does not require applicant organisations to 
put forward evidence beyond their objectives, allowing the Tribunal to 
focus on substantive issues; 
 secondly, it aligns the approach to standing for organisations with the 
broader approach to standing taken for individuals;  
 thirdly, it would prevent different rules developing with regards to 
organisations with interests in different areas—for example, environmental 
litigation;  
                                                          
633  Australian Law Reform Commission, Standing in public interest litigation, Report No 27 (1985); Australian Law 
Reform Commission, Beyond the door-keeper: Standing to sue for public remedies, Report No 78 (1996). 
634  Australian Law Reform Commission, Beyond the door-keeper: Standing to sue for public remedies, Report No 78 
(1996) 38. 
635  Public Interest Advocacy Centre Ltd, Submission No 18 (14 July 2011) 5. 
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 fourthly, the provision focuses on the ‘substantive activities’ of the body 
rather than whether it is incorporated or not; and   
 finally, the AAT Act provision does not give standing to organisations 
whose objects were formulated after the proceeding commenced, 
preventing abuse of process.637 
8.14 There was broad support in submissions for the adoption of the AAT Act test for 
standing for representative organisations.638  Drs Peter Billings and Anthony Cassimatis 
submitted that the common law rules of standing are unnecessarily complex.  They argued 
that uncertainty in relation to standing ‘undermines the public law values that judicial review 
is intended to serve’.639  They argued the ‘person affected’ formula contained in the AAT Act 
is preferred as it is ‘broad enough to allow access to the courts for those whose rights, 
interests or legitimate expectations are impacted on by public decision making’.640  They also 
noted that the standing requirement in s 27(2) of the AAT Act appears to work well for 
environmental legislation.   
8.15 The Australian Network of Environmental Defenders Offices (ANEDO) and PIAC 
both preferred broader standing tests, but considered the AAT Act test to be a viable 
alternative.  ANEDO argued that the standing requirements for judicial review should be 
broad in order to facilitate ‘appropriate scrutiny of decisions affecting individuals and the 
wider community’.641  They expressed concern that cases such as Australian Conservation 
Foundation Inc v Commonwealth642 and North Coast Environmental Council v Minister for Resources643 
have demonstrated the courts are inconsistent in applying the current test for standing.  They 
also noted the differences in standing requirements between different pieces of legislation: the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act) contains a broad 
standing provision to apply for an injunction,644 while the National Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) does not. 
8.16 ANEDO preferred the broad standing test under s 475 of the EPBC Act.  They also 
noted the test adopted by Chesterman J in North Queensland Council Inc v Executive Director, 
Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service,645 in which the court held that a person ‘should have 
standing if it can be seen that his connection with the subject matter of the suit is such that it 
is not an abuse of process’.646  However, ANEDO expressed concern with the second limb of 
that test, which requires that standing should not be granted where it would put another 
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citizen to great cost or inconvenience, arguing it would inhibit public interest litigation.  PIAC 
submitted the liberal approach of open standing was the preferable option.  They argued that 
‘the rules of standing should be broadened to allow a wider class of people to bring civil 
proceedings’.647  They noted that should it be necessary to safeguard against open standing, 
the ADJR Act could provide the court with a discretion to refuse standing in judicial review 
where it is apparently ‘frivolous or has no basis for establishing a prima facie case’.648 
8.17 The only submissions opposed to this approach were those made by the Law 
Council of Australia and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC).  The Law 
Council submitted there would be little to gain from changing the current test in the 
ADJR Act, given that the common law ‘special’ or ‘sufficient’ interest tests and the ‘person 
aggrieved’ test in the ADJR Act are converging.649  In their submission, amending the 
ADJR Act to adopt the test in s 27(2) of the AAT Act may lead to divergence with the 
common law standing rules.650 DIAC did not support extending standing rules in relation to 
migration litigation, arguing that because it is the client’s interests that are most strongly 
affected, only the client, the client’s sponsor or the Minister should have the right to initiate 
proceedings.651 
8.18 The Council agrees that judicial review proceedings do raise broader public interest 
issues than private law matters.  This is particularly the case where a problem with one 
decision can reveal more systemic problems.  It is also true that standing requirements mean 
that the validity of a particular decision-making scheme cannot be challenged until an 
appropriate person chooses to make an application. 
8.19 However, the Council does not consider that open standing for judicial review 
proceedings is justified, particularly in the absence of the Government taking up the ALRC’s 
open standing recommendation in relation to public proceedings more generally.   
8.20 The possibility of a person challenging a decision that relates to another individual or 
company raises the issue of access to information—an applicant would find it difficult to 
access sufficient information to make an application.  Presumably the right to request reasons 
of the decision being challenged would not apply to the public at large, as this would raise 
privacy concerns and place an undue administrative burden on agencies.  Formulating an 
application would therefore be difficult.  It is unclear whether the open standing rule would 
provide much assistance in terms of successful review applications. 
8.21 The Council is of the view that having some restrictions on standing provides a 
means of managing unmeritorious applications, and that providing for open standing would 
not produce major benefits for applicants.  Ultimately, judicial review matters, unlike 
questions of the constitutional validity of legislation, are directed at the decision making in a 
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particular case.  It therefore seems appropriate that only persons with some interests in the 
decision have the ability to make an application. 
Aligning the standing rules for merits and judicial review 
8.22 The Council supports the adoption of the standing test in s 27(2) of the AAT Act 
for proceedings brought under the ADJR Act.  The Council considers that this test will 
provide greater clarity in terms of which representative organisations have an interest in a 
proceeding, and ensure consistency between different subject matter areas.   
Recommendation 10 
The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be amended to align the test for 
standing for representative organisations with that in subsection 27(2) of the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). 
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9. REASONS FOR DECISIONS 
SUMMARY 
9.1 The provision of reasons is of central importance to administrative law.  
The benefits of providing reasons to those affected by administrative decision making 
include:  
 preventing disputes from occurring and from escalating; 
 satisfying the requirements of natural justice and assisting in applications for 
review or appeal; 
 providing evidence about the reason for a decision to assist tribunals and 
courts in performing merits and judicial review; 
 improving the quality and consistency of primary decision making; and  
 promoting public confidence in the administrative process through 
transparency. 
9.2 In the 2010 decision, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS,652 the High 
Court discussed the importance of reasons in setting out the findings of the decision maker 
on any question of fact.  Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J commented that the obligation to set 
out material findings of fact ‘focuses on the thought processes of the decision maker and may 
disclose a jurisdictional error’.653  Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J further observed that ‘the 
inadequacy of the material before the decision maker may support an inference that the 
decision maker has applied the wrong test or was not “in reality” satisfied of the requisite 
matters or from the absence of reasons the court may infer the absence of any good reason’.654  
This points to the second valuable feature of reasons—their usefulness in establishing in 
judicial review proceedings whether an error has been made in the making of a decision.   
9.3 The Council also considers that the writing of reasons both assists administrative 
decision makers during the decision-making process, and results in the making of better 
quality decisions.   
9.4 Given the importance of reasons, what should be the scope of the obligation to give 
them?  Should there be a general statutory obligation to provide reasons, or is it more 
appropriate for the obligation only to have statutory backing either as an aid to seeking merits 
or judicial review, or as an explanation for a particular type of decision?  Other questions 
include the appropriate time for giving or recording reasons, the form and content of reasons, 
exemptions from the obligation to give reasons and the consequences of a failure to give 
reasons. 
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9.5 The Council has concluded that few statutory amendments are needed in this area.  
Rather, the Council wishes to encourage the recording of reasons at the same time as a 
decision is made.  It is important, however, that agencies comply with requests for reasons 
made under s 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act), and 
the Council recommends a statutory presumption that costs should be awarded in any cases 
where a person has to take the matter to court without the agency providing reasons on 
request. 
A GENERAL STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO GIVE REASONS? 
9.6 As Gibbs CJ stated in Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (Osmond): 
there is no general rule of the common law, or principle of natural justice, that 
requires reasons to be given for administrative decisions, even decisions which 
have been made in the exercise of a statutory discretion and which may adversely 
affect the interests, or defeat the legitimate or reasonable expectations, of other 
persons.655   
9.7 However, the common law may yet develop such a general obligation, and common 
law courts in other countries have been moving in this direction.  The Supreme Court of 
Canada has recognised such an obligation.656  Michael Taggart has observed that:  
although the English and New Zealand courts have yet to go as far as the 
Supreme Court of Canada in recognising a generally applicable common law duty 
to give reasons on administrative decision makers, they have recognised an 
increasing number of exceptions to the rule, and it seems only a matter of time 
before the exceptions swallow the hoary old rules that reasons need not be 
given.657  
9.8 However, as Osmond is still authority in Australia, the right to request reasons under 
the ADJR Act remains a significant statutory right.  Section 13 of the ADJR Act provides that 
where there is a right of judicial review by the Federal Court under the Act, there is also a 
right to request and obtain from a decision maker a written statement of reasons for a 
decision.  Schedule 2 sets out exclusions from this right.  The question is whether there 
should be a general obligation to give reasons in relation to any government decision, 
unfettered by the jurisdictional test in the ADJR Act. 
9.9 In addition, where an Act states that a person adversely affected by an administrative 
decision can request a statement of reasons for that decision, a statutory obligation arises.  
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (AAT Act)658 and some other legislation659 
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656  Bkaer v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 193. 
657  Michael Taggart, ‘Australian Exceptionalism in Judicial Review’ (2008) 36 Federal Law Review 1, 15.  Mark 
Elliott states that while English law requires public bodies to give reasons, the scope of the duty is 
narrower than the scope of the application of other principles of good administration, and the legal and 
remedial consequences of a breach of the duty is ambiguous: Mark Elliott, ‘Has the Common Law Duty to 
Give Reasons Come of Age Yet’ (2011) Public Law 56. 
658  Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 28. 
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provides for a right to reasons for a decision.  In other cases, reasons must automatically be 
given along with the notification of an adverse decision—for example, certain decisions of the 
Minister under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act),660 and decisions by the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission661 and Commissioner of Taxation.662  An agency 
may also be required to provide notification of a proposed decision that includes reasons, in 
order to accord procedural fairness by allowing a person to respond to any adverse 
information or inferences.663 
9.10 Professors Robin Creyke and John McMillan identify three kinds of arguments in 
support of providing reasons.  First, ‘instrumentalist arguments’ maintain that ‘the 
requirement to provide reasons for decisions … encourage[s] better and more rational 
decision-making’.664 Secondly: 
the requirement for administrative decision-makers to provide reasons for their 
decisions is thought to enhance government transparency and accountability and 
give legitimacy to a decision by showing that the decision was not made arbitrarily 
and that issues raised by interested parties have been adequately considered.665   
9.11 Thirdly, the ‘more highly contested’ group of arguments, which ‘might be called the 
procedural fairness arguments’:666  
are based on an individual-rights model of administrative decision-making and 
assert that, as a matter of fairness, there should be a duty to provide reasons for 
decisions so people affected can decide whether the decision has been lawfully 
made and why they have not succeeded; whether there are grounds for review or 
appeal; and to assess the strength of the case against them should they seek review 
or appeal.667 
9.12 There are a number of countervailing arguments as to the usefulness and importance 
of reasons.  There is no evidence that reasons actually enhance government transparency and 
accountability.  In fact, Emeritus Professor Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer and Associate 
Professor Matthew Groves point out that a requirement to provide reasons may lead to 
decision makers basing their reasons on previously accepted justifications, often in 
standardised formats.668  In relation to the procedural fairness argument, the courts have 
indicated that procedural fairness only applies to the process leading up to the decision.  In 
Osmond, Gibbs CJ stated that ‘the rules of natural justice are designed to ensure fairness in the 
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making of a decision and it is difficult to see how the fairness of an administrative decision 
can be affected by what is done after the decision had been made’.669 
9.13 Submissions to the Council acknowledged that providing reasons forms part of 
good administrative practice that contributes to transparency and accountability of 
government decision making.670  The Commonwealth Ombudsman argued that reasons reveal 
whether the decision maker has considered all relevant information, as well as providing a 
foundation for people to question and challenge decisions.  The Ombudsman’s submission 
was that reasons should be provided where a failure to do so would be a breach of natural 
justice, where there is a right of appeal, or where the decision in question is of a judicial 
nature.671  The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) submitted that 
reasons provide an affected person with the opportunity to understand the decision.672  
9.14 While there was some support for the introduction of a general statutory obligation 
to provide reasons,673 possibly subject to exemptions,674 most stakeholders did not support a 
general statutory obligation to provide reasons.  The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Forestry (DAFF) argued that ‘any further statutory right to give reasons would need to be 
flexible in order to take account of differing environments in which decisions are made’.675  
The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) referred to the Taxpayer’s Charter, which sets out the 
ATO’s policy that decisions will be explained, generally in writing.  The ATO commented 
that ‘these current practices satisfactorily result in the provision of reasons for decisions … 
[and] similar practices should be encouraged in lieu of specifically providing an obligation to 
provide reasons’.676  Other agencies provide reasons on request wherever possible.677 
9.15 Arguments against a general obligation to provide reasons were based on the nature 
of information that might need to be included.  Both the Department of Defence (Defence) 
and the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) suggested that an obligation to provide 
reasons independent of the merits review context must be subject to the need to protect 
information, the disclosure of which would be contrary to the public interest because it would 
prejudice the security, defence, law enforcement or international relations of Australia.678 
9.16 With respect to the protection of sensitive information, the courts have intimated 
that the case-by-case approach of the common law is appropriate, given the many different 
contexts (and public interest considerations) of administrative decision making.679  For 
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example, large and complex competition rulings of the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission may warrant protection from disclosure for reasons of market integrity.  
However, there is no obvious reason why procedural decisions affecting a single applicant’s 
rights should not normally be disclosed. 
9.17 Related arguments were based on workload considerations.  The Australian Crime 
Commission (ACC) submitted that, if required to provide reasons in relation to every 
summons or notice issued under the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (ACC Act), it 
would have to redact every document so as not to disclose elements of ACC intelligence that 
could assist criminal groups in counter measures.680  The ACC submitted that redacting would 
impose a significant administrative burden, and that while it would produce legally compliant 
documents, it would not assist in assessing the merits of the decision.681 
9.18 The Government makes a broad range of decisions, and it is difficult to provide a 
‘one size fits all’ approach on the obligation to give reasons.  In some cases, reasons can be 
provided on request, but they may not meet the standard of statements of reasons in 
accordance with s 13 of the ADJR Act.  For example, formal reasons are not provided for 
appointment decisions, but panels provide reports on applicants, which would be available 
under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act).  In the case of computer-assisted 
decision making, standard form reasons may be provided with the decision, but these may not 
comply with s 13 requirements.  Other examples that might be problematic include the 
decisions of Ministers that are based on recommendations of others and situations where a 
decision maker is bound to accept a decision of a third party—as with migration decisions 
which rely upon the assessment of medical officers. 
9.19  Similarly, non-statutory decisions have different considerations when it comes to 
the provision of reasons.  For example, there are a number of government grants programs 
with no formal application process where reasons will not be prepared to explain why one 
organisation was chosen rather than another.  On the other hand, usually where there is a 
formal application process, reasons will be provided to applicants. 
9.20 Many stakeholders submitted that s 13 of the ADJR Act operates well to provide 
consistency in the obligation to provide reasons, as well as allowing for exceptions.682  
Importantly it allows parties to receive a statement of reasons in an efficient manner without 
the need to commence proceedings.683  Drs Peter Billings and Anthony Cassimatis supported 
the current formula contained in the ADJR Act, specifically that reasons are restricted to final 
decisions to avoid ‘fragmentation of decision-making processes’.684 
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9.21 In the absence of a general obligation, there was also support for a requirement to 
provide reasons located within the enactment that provides authority for the decision.685  
Many statutory decision-making structures already have a specific requirement to provide 
contemporaneous reasons.  For example, reasons are required by legislation relating to social 
security, veterans’ affairs, freedom of information, passports, corporations, environmental 
protection, communications and many other areas of public administration.  As a result, many 
other agencies already provide reasons for the majority of their decisions when notice of the 
decision is provided. 
9.22 The Superannuation Complaints Tribunal submitted that their current practice is to 
provide reasons with the notification of the Tribunal’s decision.  The Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) noted that where an application for a visa has been 
refused, reasons for the decision are also provided to the applicant with the notification of the 
decision.  In some particular cases, for example as in s 236 of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), 
broader obligations might be appropriate.686 
No need for a general statutory obligation 
9.23 The Council’s view is that the existing statutory requirements to provide reasons are 
sufficient in that they are available to support applications for merits and judicial review of a 
decision.  A general obligation to provide reasons for all statutory and non-statutory decisions 
may have unintended consequences, particularly in relation to non-statutory decision making, 
as it may be difficult to assess the extent and nature of all non-statutory government 
decisions.  It would be difficult to frame a requirement that would be suitable for this wide 
range of decisions. 
9.24 Given the evidence that has been provided about current practices of agencies, the 
Council considers that it would be an undue administrative burden to introduce a statutory 
requirement for a statement of reasons to be provided for all decisions at the time the 
decision is communicated.   
9.25 Where the right to reasons is not legally available, agencies may nonetheless choose 
to provide reasons upon request.  Indeed, the Council has stated that, even if there is a 
prima facie exemption from the obligation to give reasons under an Act, it is good 
administrative practice to provide reasons unless there are good grounds for not doing so.  
Below, the Council discusses the importance of the recording of those reasons at the time the 
decision is made. 
9.26 Given the strength of support for this practice as indicated in the submissions, the 
Council supports a charter approach as an alternative to a statutory obligation.  The 
development of a Charter of Good Administration as recommended in the 2009 report of the 
Access to Justice Taskforce, A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil Justice 
System, would provide the appropriate framework for such an obligation.  That report 
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recommended a Charter of Good Administration should be developed by the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman.  The Council supports that recommendation. 
WHEN SHOULD REASONS BE RECORDED AND CONVEYED? 
9.27 The Consultation Paper considered at what stage of the decision-making process 
reasons for an administrative decision should be made available.  Under s 13 of the 
ADJR Act, there is no obligation to provide reasons until a request is made.   
9.28 If reasons are not provided at the time of the decision, it is possible that the 
statement of reasons provided in response to the request may not accurately record the basis 
for the decision.  This is more likely in cases where one or more of the following apply:  
 the actual reasons for the decision have not been recorded; 
 the statement of reasons is prepared by a legal adviser; 
 the original decision maker is no longer available; and  
 the decision maker is a Minister who has made a decision on the basis of a 
recommendation which does not clearly disclose the findings and the 
reasons for the decision.687 
Timing of the recording and giving of reasons 
9.29 The Council considers that the timing of the recording of reasons is particularly 
important, noting the important distinction between the right to be given reasons and the 
obligation to record reasons.688 The OAIC noted that it is a matter of good administrative 
practice to provide a statement of reasons at the time of the decision.689  The OAIC pointed 
out that, where a decision maker is not required to provide reasons at the time the decision is 
made, an accurate record of the reasons for the decision should be kept to assist in preparing 
a statement of reasons at a later date.690 
9.30 NSW Young Lawyers argued that the implementation of an obligation on decision 
makers to provide a statement of reasons at the time of the decision ‘would assist decision 
makers to deliberate carefully in their decision making and may also help administrative 
agencies to formulate rules and standards for application in future decision making’.691 
9.31 In guidance material published by the Council on the preparation of statements of 
reasons, the Council has recommended that a record of the assessment of evidence, findings 
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of fact and reasons for the decision be produced at the time the decision is made.692  The 
Council still strongly supports this view. 
The evidential status of reasons 
9.32 The issue of contemporaneous recording of reasons has also arisen in the courts.  
There is a line of authorities that calls into question the admissibility of a statement of reasons 
that was not prepared at the time of the decision. 
9.33 For example, in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Taveli,693 Davies and Hill JJ 
(French J disagreeing on this issue) held that the tender of a statement of reasons prepared 
more than a month after the decision was made had been correctly rejected by the trial judge 
(on the ground that the tender of an unverified statement of reasons prepared after the event 
would only be admissible if a ground of admissibility could be established—such a ground 
had not been made out in this case).  The court’s reasoning was that reasons prepared after 
the fact should reflect the actual reasons for the decision, and should not include evidence 
which only came to light after the decision was made, even if that further evidence tended to 
support the decision. 
9.34 An aspect of the Taveli decision, which may be of particular importance to 
administrators, is the view expressed by Davies and Hill JJ that, if the statement of reasons 
were to accompany the decision concerned, it would be admissible as part of the res gestae.694  
This suggests that, particularly on occasions when the decision maker considered that a 
challenge to the decision in the Federal Court was likely, there would be a distinct advantage 
for the decision maker in providing the statement of reasons contemporaneously with 
notification of the decision.  Provision by decision makers of a statement of reasons at this 
point, rather than ex post facto, would ensure that they would not be liable to be required to 
attend for cross-examination.  While this might not be the approach to be taken for all 
decisions, it might be worthwhile for cases where there is a likelihood of judicial review. 
9.35 There are also other methods of proof, such as an affidavit, which can be used to 
provide evidence of the reasons for the decision if the decision maker is not available.695 The 
decision in George v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, 696 on the other 
hand, demonstrates the difficulties where there is no contemporaneous record of the 
decision.  In that case, the Court did not permit an affidavit to be tendered by a person who 
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was not the original decision maker, stating that it would be ‘unprincipled’ and noting ‘the 
dangers and difficulties relating to statements of reasons prepared after the event’.697 
9.36 In the 2008 decision in Phosphate Resources Ltd v Minister for Environment, Heritage and the 
Arts,698 Buchanan J rejected the detailed statement of reasons prepared for the Minister in 
relation to a decision under the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) as a statement of his real reasons for the decision.  Among other 
matters raised, Buchanan J held that the presumption of regularity ‘does not give evidentiary 
priority to an explanation brought into existence after the power is exercised’.699  His Honour 
also rejected a submission that the Minister had adopted the statement of reasons prepared by 
departmental officers as his own, considering (among other matters) that it had been prepared 
some six weeks after the decision had been made.700 
9.37 In Report No 33, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: Statements of 
Reasons for Decisions, the Council made a recommendation in relation to the admissibility and 
evidentiary value of statements of reasons.  Recommendation 4 suggested that: 
The ADJR Act ought to be amended along the following lines: 
 when a copy of a statement furnished under section 13 in relation to a 
decision is tendered by the decision maker in proceedings under the Act for 
an order of review in respect of the decision, the copy is admissible as 
evidence of the reasons for the decision if: 
(a) the decision maker has given the applicant prior notice of intention 
to tender the statement as evidence of those reasons; and 
(b) the applicant does not object to the tender; 
 if the applicant objects to the tender, the Federal Court may, at its discretion, 
give leave to admit the statement into evidence without attendance by the 
decision maker for examination; 
 in exercising its discretion, the Federal Court must take into account: 
(a) the nature of the grounds of review upon which the applicant 
relies; and 
(b) the desirability, in all the circumstances of the case, of the decision 
maker verifying by affidavit the reasons for the decision; 
 if the Federal Court refuses to give leave but the decision maker still wishes to 
tender the statement, the decision maker must verify the statement by 
affidavit and must be available for cross examination on the statement; 
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 the weight to be accorded to a statement of reasons tendered by the decision 
maker is a matter for the Federal Court. 
9.38 It may be that an amendment to the ADJR Act to the effect that a statement of 
reasons would be prima facie evidence of the reasons for the decision, if it can be proved that 
the reasons were produced at the time of the decision, or that the reasons were based on a 
record made at the time of the decision, would provide some incentive to decision makers to 
record reasons at the time of the decision.   
Encouraging contemporaneous recording of reasons 
9.39 The Council is concerned that an amendment to the ADJR Act along the lines 
discussed above may appear to suggest that decisions other than those prepared at the time of 
the decision are not the real reasons for those decisions.  There may be valid reasons for 
delaying the production of reasons for a decision.  Putting such a provision into the 
ADJR Act also risks increasing disputes around the validity of non-contemporaneous reasons.  
A provision of this nature might be counterproductive because, on the one hand it would be 
intended to encourage decision making and giving reasons to occur at the same time (with the 
goal of improving decision making).  On the other hand, a failure to observe the requirements 
of the provision could be interpreted to render a decision invalid (which would not enhance 
decision making). 
9.40 The Council considers that the contemporaneous recording of reasons by decision 
makers has a number of significant advantages.  First, reasons recorded at the time of making 
are more likely to reflect a decision maker’s actual reasons.  Secondly, contemporaneous 
reasons can be provided at the time notice of the decision is given, improving overall 
communication.  Thirdly, the process of writing reasons materially assists decision-makers 
during the process—facilitating the detailed consideration of all necessary issues.  The process 
of providing for reasons disciplines a decision maker’s thinking.   
9.41 The Council’s view is that the contemporaneous recording of reasons is a principle 
of good administration, which should be reflected in agency best practice and in any 
Charters of Good Administration. 
Recommendation 11 
All Australian Government agencies should endeavour to record reasons at the time of making 
decisions. 
Statement of reasons not prepared by the decision maker 
9.42 Statements of reasons that are not prepared by the decision maker raise more 
significant issues than reasons prepared by the decision maker at a later time.  
Stephen Lloyd SC and Donald Mitchell have noted the issue of legal practitioners ‘settling’ 
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draft reasons to remove legal errors.701  There are risks associated with this practice.  While it 
removes the error from the record, the decision may still be affected by the legal error.  Lloyd 
and Mitchell also point out that such advice would be protected by legal professional privilege 
and not subject to scrutiny by the courts.702  They suggested that the Council could provide 
directions to Government officials on the kind of advice that should and should not be 
sought from legal practitioners about reasons.703 
9.43 The absence of the original decision maker is a particular instance where not 
providing contemporaneous reasons or records of a decision is problematic.  Lloyd and 
Mitchell suggest that when this is the case, the person currently responsible for the area 
should give their own reasons for the decision, and remake the decision if they consider it is 
incorrect.704  This would ensure that the reasons are the actual reasons for the decision.   
9.44 Evidentiary problems have arisen in relation to Ministerial decisions where the only 
reasons available are either a submission to the Minister from an agency recommending a 
particular approach, or ex post facto reasons prepared by the agency.  As a matter of practice, 
Lloyd and Mitchell suggest that, where appropriate, agencies could provide a statement of 
reasons with a submission for the Minister to sign, which he/she can alter as necessary.705 
9.45 There is already some guidance from the Council on the preparation of statements 
of reasons,706 which includes reference to when the original decision maker is not available707 
and the preparation of draft statements of reasons.708  In preparing updated versions of this 
material, the Council will consider the need for material about reliance upon advice from legal 
practitioners in the preparation of statements of reasons and the preparation of reasons for 
decisions made by Ministers. 
 
Recommendation 12 
The Administrative Review Council should update its guidance material on the preparation of 
statements of reasons, especially with respect to: 
(a) the kind of advice that should and should not be obtained from legal practitioners in 
relation to the preparation of statements of reasons; and 
(b) to deal with situations where the original decision maker is no longer available to 
prepare a statement of reasons or where Ministers are decision makers. 
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FORM AND CONTENT OF REASONS 
9.46 When reasons are sought under a specific statute, they usually have to include certain 
information.  The statement generally must:709 
 set out the decision; 
 list the findings on material facts (those facts on which the decision turns); 
 refer to the evidence for the findings; and 
 give the reasons for the decision (including any legal principles relied on). 
9.47 The Council also recommends (in guidance material it has published), that 
statements of reasons set out the appeal rights available to the applicant.710  Some statutory 
schemes also require this.711 The joint submission of the Migration Review Tribunal–Refugee 
Review Tribunal argued that the requirement to set out reasons containing this information 
promotes ‘public confidence in the integrity of the administrative process’ and has a 
‘normative effect on primary decision making’.712  
9.48 In Avon Downs Pty Ltd v FCT,713 Dixon J said that where a decision maker is not 
required to give reasons for not being satisfied about a matter, a full consideration of what 
was before them may show that the decision reached is capable of explanation only on the 
ground of the jurisdictional error.  Dixon J explained that it is ‘not necessary that you should 
be sure of the precise particular in which [the decision maker] has gone wrong.  It is enough 
that you can see that in some way he must have failed in the discharge of his exact function 
according to law’.714 
9.49 The appropriateness or adequacy of reasons that are given for a decision will depend 
upon whether it is a formal statement of reasons in accordance with s 13 of the ADJR Act or 
whether reasons are being provided at the time of the decision when there is no formal 
obligation to do.  The Commonwealth Ombudsman noted that: 
a common cause of complaints is the adequacy of reasons provided by agencies.  
It is the Ombudsman’s experience that providing a clear explanation of the 
reasons for a decision can reduce a person’s concerns, even if the decision cannot 
be altered.715   
9.50 The Ombudsman submitted that a statement of reasons should be in writing (a letter 
is normally sufficient) and must contain in ‘plain English, the relevant facts and material 
considerations which the decision maker relied on in making the final decision’.716  The 
Ombudsman acknowledged that less formal methods of providing reasons may be 
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appropriate, given the burden that a general statutory requirement to provide reasons may 
place on agencies.   
9.51 Some stakeholders proposed ways in which s 13 of the ADJR Act could be 
improved.  The Ombudsman, the OAIC and NSW Young Lawyers submitted that the 
reasons should contain information about the rights of review.717  While the Council considers 
that this is a good practice in relation to statements of reasons,718 it does need to be a formal 
requirement for the purposes of s 13 of the ADJR Act. 
9.52 The ACC argued that there should be an express provision to provide an indication 
that ‘the decision maker is satisfied that any legal preconditions for the exercise of the power 
have been satisfied’.719  The Council considers that this is implicit in any decision made that 
purports to be validly made, rather than a key element of a statement of reasons.  Such a 
phrase may, in fact, create unnecessary confusion for the recipients of reasons. 
9.53 The Law Council of Australia argued that there is no evidence that the requirements 
in s 13 of the ADJR Act are too legalistic and the ‘content of the requirement to give reasons 
could arguably be enhanced’.720  The Law Council of Australia submitted that there should be 
an additional requirement that reasons ‘address the critical arguments, issues, and evidence 
raised by a party directly affected by the decision’ or contain other information which aids a 
party to understand how their evidence was dealt with.721  The Council considers that this 
formulation does not add to the current formulation in the ADJR Act, requiring a statement 
to list the findings on material facts and refer to evidence of the findings. 
9.54 The Australian Network of Environmental Defenders Offices (ANEDO) proposed 
that there should be a ‘standard setting that identifies the applicable legislation, the findings of 
fact, the decision, and the reasoning behind the decision’. 722  They also suggested that 
decision makers be required to attach documents that contributed to the decision to their 
statements, arguing that this ‘would greatly increase transparency in the decision making 
process’.723  In particular, they suggested this would assist public interest litigants in obtaining 
‘the full picture’.724  The Council considers that, while providing attachments may be useful in 
particular contexts, it could make the process of producing reasons overly cumbersome, and 
detract from the communication value of reasons by confusing and overwhelming recipients. 
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9.55 The OAIC suggested that the form of reasons should be comparable to that 
required by s 26 of the FOI Act.725  They submit that reasons should include:  
 the decision; 
 findings on material questions of fact; 
 evidence on which those findings are based; 
 reasons for decision; 
 name and designation of person giving the decision; and  
 the applicant’s review and complaint rights.   
The Council does not consider that these requirements differ markedly from the current 
requirements in the ADJR Act. 
9.56 A number of submissions stressed the importance of reasons reflecting the basis on 
which the decision is made and the material taken into account, as required by the 
ADJR Act.726  The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) argued that the critical 
requirements for the content of reasons remain the same despite the differing contexts in 
which decisions are made.  The critical requirements include the ‘evidence on which each 
material finding of fact is based, and the actual reasons relied upon by the decision maker at 
the time of making the decision’.727   
9.57 The AGD argued that best practice principles should outline the content of reasons 
to avoid rigid requirements that might render statements unhelpful.  The AGD also submitted 
that agencies should be able to produce classified and unclassified statements of reasons in 
order to balance the confidential nature of sensitive information with procedural fairness.728 
Maintaining the current statutory requirements 
9.58 The Council does not consider that any of the proposed changes to the ADJR Act 
requirements in s 13 as to the form of reasons are necessary, because the key features 
identified in submissions are already reflected in s 13.  Having too many requirements risks 
making reasons less accessible, and too focused on potential judicial review applications 
rather than communication of the basis of the decision.  The Council’s view is that reasons 
should clearly communicate the actual reasons for a decision in a simple, understandable way. 
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CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE TO GIVE REASONS 
9.59 Section 13(3) of the ADJR Act provides that: 
Where a person to whom a request is made under subsection (1) is of the opinion 
that the person who made the request was not entitled to make the request, the 
first-mentioned person may, within 28 days after receiving the request: 
(a) give to the second-mentioned person notice in writing of his or her opinion; 
or 
(b) apply to the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court under 
subsection (4A) for an order declaring that the person who made the request 
was not entitled to make the request. 
9.60 Section 13(4A) allows the person to whom a request is made or a person given 
notice under s 13(3) to apply to the court for ‘an order declaring that the person who made 
the request concerned was, or was not, entitled to make the request’.  If the person to whom 
the request was made does not provide notice under s 13(3), however, the ADJR Act does not 
provide a mechanism for compelling the production of reasons. 
9.61 If a decision maker fails to supply a statement of reasons when requested to do so, 
an applicant could seek a writ of mandamus to command the furnishing of reasons by the 
decision maker.  In Clanwilliam Pty Ltd v Bartlett, Fitzgerald J explained that: 
there are doubts attendant upon whether or not an order may be made under the 
[ADJR Act] for the provision of [a s 13 statement], at least prior to the 
commencement of the proceedings for the review of the decision in respect of 
which the statement is requested.729   
9.62 Providing for judicial review of a failure to provide reasons contradicts a central 
purpose of the right to reasons: providing an opportunity to determine whether there is any 
basis for commencing an action.  In Clanwilliam Pty Ltd v Bartlett the applicant commenced 
proceedings under s 39B of the Judiciary Act for an order of mandamus compelling the 
production of reasons.  Fitzwilliam J noted that: 
in the cases to which s 13 of the Act applies, there is a clear statutory obligation 
upon decision-makers, although officers of the Commonwealth, to supply 
statements, and there is no doubt, in my opinion, that that duty can be enforced 
by an order of the court.730 
Here, the Department of Health had informed the applicant that reasons were close to 
finalisation, and that the application for mandamus was therefore a waste of time and costs.731 
9.63 Even if there is no formal requirement to give reasons, in certain circumstances the 
courts may infer that a decision maker who has not given reasons had no proper basis for that 
                                                          
729  Clanwilliam Pty Ltd v Bartlett (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Fitzgerald J, 8 May 1984).  Quoted in 
(1984) 6 Administrative Law Notes 61.   
730  Ibid. 
731  Ibid. 
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decision732 and thus the decision is reviewable as an error of law or on other grounds, such as 
the failure to take into account relevant considerations.733  This does not necessarily justify the 
setting aside of a decision.  However, the court may order the provision of a statement of 
reasons or amended reasons in such a case. 
9.64 Reasons may be held to be inadequate if they are insufficient to assist the person 
affected to decide whether to challenge the decision or to assist the process of review of the 
decision.734  If the reasons for the decision are inaccurate, wrong, need other reasons or 
evidence, or have to be supplemented, the original decision may be found to be unlawful by a 
court or tribunal.735  The applicant may also be eligible for discretionary compensation under 
the scheme for Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration (CDDA).736 
9.65 In Report No 33, the Council recommended giving the Federal Court power to 
order the furnishing of a statement of reasons under the section.737  In making this 
recommendation, the Council noted that it would be expensive to activate the judicial review 
procedure in the ADJR Act or under s 39B of the Judiciary Act for the purpose of obtaining a 
statement of reasons.  Furthermore, it would seem to be contrary to one of the major reasons 
for imposing the reasons requirement if a person were to be required to commence judicial 
review proceedings for the purpose of determining whether there are grounds for 
commencing separate proceedings.  The Council concluded that a simpler means of obtaining 
the production of a statement of reasons would seem to be required.  This recommendation 
has not been implemented to date. 
9.66 Billings and Cassimatis submitted that the current system of being able judicially to 
enforce the right to reasons, where reasons have been refused or are inadequate, should 
continue.  They noted the development of the constitutional judicial review grounds ‘such 
that a failure to provide adequate reasons may also undermine the legality of the particular 
decision’.738  The Law Council of Australia noted that ‘a powerful incentive for providing 
comprehensive reasons for decision is (or at least ought to be) that the failure to refer to 
particular evidence or issues can justify an inference that the decision maker did not consider 
that material relevant’.739 
9.67 It is arguable that an incentive to give reasons is provided in the fact that an absence 
or inadequacy of reasons may undermine the legality of a decision.  In practice, it is more 
likely that this fact will delay the provision of reasons.  If delay is excessive and unexplained, 
applicants can seek assistance from the Ombudsman in the first instance, although time may 
                                                          
732  Public Service Board v Osmond (1986) 59 CLR 656, 663–66 (Gibbs CJ). 
733  Administrative Review Council, Commentary on the Practical Guidelines for preparing statements of reasons (2002) 8. 
734  Ibid 41. 
735  Ibid. 
736  Department of Finance and Deregulation, Discretionary Compensation and Waiver of Debt Mechanisms, Finance 
Circular 2009/09. 
737  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: Statements of reasons 
for decisions, Report No 33 (1991) rec 3. 
738  Peter Billings and Anthony Cassimatis, Submission No 6 (27 June 2011) 16. 
739  Law Council of Australia, Submission No 23 (1 July 2011) [93]. 
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not allow this course of action if they wish to make an application for judicial review under 
the ADJR Act, which has a 28 day time limit. 
9.68 A number of submissions argued that the consequences of a failure to provide 
reasons should depend on the context.740  The Law Council of Australia said the consequence 
should be left to the courts ‘to determine as the nature of the case requires’.741  DIAC and the 
ACC both stressed that a failure to provide reasons should not automatically invalidate a 
decision.742  
9.69 The ACC suggested that there should be a ‘rebuttable presumption that a decision 
maker who failed to provide reasons when required to do so by law had no sufficient reasons 
for the decision made’.743  The ACC identified that ‘if the decision is challenged, but ultimately 
upheld, the failure to provide reasons could be a reason for nevertheless awarding costs 
against the decision maker’.744  PIAC and Billings and Cassimatis both submitted that there 
should be provisions relating to cost protections, similar to s 50 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 
(Qld), for applicants who request reasons.745 
9.70 NSW Young Lawyers submitted that the present statutory scheme does not 
sufficiently provide for the situation for a failure to respond to a request for reasons.  They 
argued that a failure to provide reasons should give rise to an automatic finding of procedural 
unfairness in favour of the affected party, in line with the court’s approach in 
Collins v Repatriation Commission.746  The Council refers to the discussion above regarding 
Osmond, in which the High Court held that, in most cases, a failure to give reasons will not 
result in a finding of procedural unfairness.  As discussed above, procedural fairness 
ultimately relates to the process of making a decision.  Reasons, while important, relate to the 
communication of a decision and should not invalidate a properly made decision. 
9.71 The OAIC submitted that, in response to a failure to provide adequate reasons, ‘the 
decision maker could be required within a specified period to provide adequate or better 
reasons for their decision’.747  The OAIC noted that s 55E of the FOI Act and s 28(5) of the 
AAT Act provide a similar power. 
Agency to pay costs where an application is made to the court 
9.72 The Council does not see any practical benefit from the inclusion of an additional 
power for the Federal Court to make an order requiring a statement of reasons as 
recommended by the Council in Report No 33.  The Council considers that this would create 
                                                          
740  Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Submission No 21 (9 August 2011) 11; Law Council of Australia, 
Submission No 23 (1 July 2011) [92]. 
741  Law Council of Australia, Submission No 23 (1 July 2011) [92]. 
742  Australian Crime Commission, Submission No 5 (6 July 2011) 11; Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship, Submission No 11 (1 July 2011) 8. 
743  Australian Crime Commission, Submission No 5 (6 July 2011) 11. 
744  Ibid. 
745  Public Interest Advocacy Centre Ltd, Submission No 18 (14 July 2011) 8; Peter Billings and Anthony 
Cassimatis, Submission No 6 (27 June 2011) 15. 
746  The Law Society of New South Wales Young Lawyers, Submission No 7 (1 July 2011) 13. 
747  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission No 17 (5 July 2011) 7. 
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another level of litigation focusing on the form of the reasons rather than the substance of the 
decision.  The Council considers that government agencies should be complying with the 
legal requirements in the ADJR Act as a matter of course, and that an additional provision 
implies that agencies might refuse a request for reasons arbitrarily. 
9.73 However, the failure of an agency to provide a statement of reasons that complies 
with the requirements of s 13 is relevant to the question of costs in proceedings to seek an 
order that reasons are required under s 13(4A).  The failure to provide adequate reasons is 
also potentially relevant to questions of costs in subsequent ADJR Act proceedings, if the 
applicant is put in a position where they need to make an application under the ADJR Act in 
the absence of an adequate statement of reasons.  Therefore, the failure to comply with the 
duty to provide reasons on request should be a factor for a court determining costs at the 
conclusion of any proceedings under the ADJR Act.  This approach is consistent with the 
High Court’s decision in Oshlack v Richmond River Council,748 where the High Court held that 
the public interest character of litigation is a relevant factor in a costs order.  If necessary, this 
principle should be given effect by an amendment to the ADJR Act, the Federal 
Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) or the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).   
9.74 There are already a number of Acts which contain special costs rules for 
administrative law litigation.  For example, Section 66 of the FOI Act, s 66 provides that 
where a person applies to the AAT for review of a decision of the Information Commissioner 
and is successful or substantially successful in the application, ‘the Tribunal may, in its 
discretion, recommend to the responsible Minister that the costs of the applicant in relation 
to the proceedings be paid by the Commonwealth.’  Section 67 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) provides that the AAT can order that: 
 a responsible authority pays the applicant’s costs if its decision is varied or 
remade in a manner more favourable to the claimant;749 
 Comcare pays costs where the Commonwealth institutes proceedings and a 
decision is varied or remade in a manner favourable to the claimant;750 and 
 the Commonwealth pays costs where the Commonwealth institutes 
proceedings ‘in any other case’.751 
Recommendation 13 
The failure of an agency to provide a statement of reasons that complies with the requirements 
of s 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be a factor that is 
taken into account by a court in making a costs order at the conclusion of proceedings under 
the Act. 
                                                          
748  (1998) 193 CLR 72. 
749  Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 67(8). 
750  Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 67(8A)(a). 
751  Ibid s 67(8A)(b). 
170     
Federal Judicial Review in Australia 
170 
EXEMPTIONS FROM THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE REASONS 
Summary 
9.75 Schedules 1 and 2 were inserted into the ADJR Act by the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Amendment Act 1980.  The Schedules set up a dichotomy between the ambit of 
review under the Act and the ambit of the reasons requirement.  In Report No 33 (1991), the 
Council considered exemptions from the right to request reasons, but was not formally 
consulted in the drafting of Schedule 2.752   
9.76 In this chapter, the Council considers if there should be exemptions from a general 
obligation to provide reasons.  In this context, the Council considers recommendations made 
in Report No 33 about ss 13(11) and 13A of the ADJR Act.  The Council also outlines some 
of the general principles for exemptions from the obligation to provide reasons in s 13 of the 
ADJR Act and considers each of the current exemptions in Schedule 2 with reference to 
those principles in Appendix C. 
Exemption from a general obligation to provide reasons 
9.77 The Consultation Paper asked whether there should be any exemptions from a 
general obligation to provide reasons, including the obligation in s 13 of the ADJR Act.  This 
could be an exemption from the obligation to provide a statement of reasons or a general 
exemption from providing certain information in a statement of reasons, as in the current 
s 13A.   
9.78 Section 13(11) provides that s 13 does not apply to the following decisions: 
(a) a decision in relation to which section 28 of the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal Act 1975 applies; 
(b) a decision that includes, or is accompanied by a statement setting out, findings 
of facts, a reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings 
were based and the reasons for the decision; or 
(c) a decision included in any of the classes of decision set out in Schedule 2. 
9.79 The rationale behind paragraphs (a) and (b) is that reasons have already been 
provided in these cases—s 28 of the AAT Act also provides for a right to request reasons.  
Schedule 2 contains a list of Acts and provisions which are, by operation of paragraph (c), 
exempt from s 13. 
                                                          
752  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The Ambit of the Act, 
Report No 32 (1989); Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
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9.80 Section 13A currently provides that statements of reasons need not include: 
information that: 
(a) relates to the personal affairs or business affairs of a person, other than the 
person making the request; and 
(b) is information: 
(i) that was supplied in confidence; 
(ii) the publication of which would reveal a trade secret; 
(iii) that was furnished in compliance with a duty imposed by an 
enactment; or  
(iv) the furnishing of which in accordance with the request would be in 
contravention of an enactment, being an enactment that expressly 
imposes on the person to whom the request is made a duty not to 
divulge or communicate to any person, or to any person other than a 
person included in a prescribed class of persons, or except in 
prescribed circumstances, information of that kind.   
9.81 If not providing the information would make the statement of reasons misleading, a 
statement does not have to be furnished. 
9.82 Decisions not captured by the general exemptions may be exempt through the 
operation of a public interest certificate issued by the Attorney-General.  Section 14 of the 
ADJR Act provides that information does not have to be disclosed in reasons: 
if the Attorney‑General certifies, by writing signed by him or her, that the 
disclosure of information concerning a specified matter would be contrary to the 
public interest: 
(a) by reason that it would prejudice the security, defence or international 
relations of Australia; 
(b) by reason that it would involve the disclosure of deliberations or decisions of 
the Cabinet or of a Committee of the Cabinet; or 
(c) for any other reason specified in the certificate that could form the basis for a 
claim in a judicial proceeding that the information should not be disclosed. 
9.83 In Report No 33, the Council considered that the administration of the statements 
of reasons should be as clear as possible on the face of the legislation.  At that time, the 
Council disapproved of the dichotomy the schedules to the ADJR Act created between the 
ambit of judicial review under the Act and the scope of the obligation to provide reasons 
under s 13. 
9.84 In Report No 33, the Council recommended repealing—with certain safeguards—
the Schedule 2 exceptions to the obligation to provide a statement of reasons, as ‘the 
requirements of justice can be met only by ensuring that in every case where judicial review 
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under the ADJR Act is available there is also an entitlement to reasons’.753  This is primarily 
because the availability of a statement of reasons is a de facto precondition to accessing 
judicial review—without it, the applicant is unlikely to be able to understand whether the 
decision was made lawfully.754  The Council considered that, to the extent that reasons for or 
information relating to certain decisions should be protected from disclosure, the exemptions 
in ss 13A and 14 provide adequate protection.755 
9.85 In making its recommendation for repeal of Schedule 2, the Council also conducted 
a review of the decisions listed in the schedule and made a number of recommendations for 
amendments to ss 13 and 13A.  The effect of the recommendations would have been either 
to exclude certain broad categories of decisions from s 13 or to expand the categories of 
information that need not be disclosed as part of a s 13 statement of reasons.   
9.86 Many submissions to this inquiry considered that it was necessary for certain types 
of decisions to be exempt from the requirement to provide reasons, and supported the 
ongoing use of Schedule 2 exemptions in the ADJR Act.756  For example, the Ombudsman 
acknowledged that providing reasons in certain circumstances is problematic:   
This includes circumstances where, for example, the provision of reasons might 
disclose information which could compromise confidentiality, or have adverse 
consequences for the protection of national security, law enforcements, public 
safety or commercially valuable administration.757   
9.87 Only the ANEDO submitted that there should be no exemptions from the 
obligation to provide reasons, ‘in the interests of accountability, transparency and robust 
decision making’.758 
9.88 Stakeholders, for example the Law Council of Australia and NSW Young Lawyers, 
agreed that the Schedule 2 exemptions could be safely repealed.  However, both organisations 
submitted that some decisions should be exempt from the requirement to provide reasons.759  
NSW Young Lawyers argued that the safeguards in ss 13A and 14 of the ADJR Act are 
adequate.760 
9.89 The ACC submitted that an Attorney-General’s certificate could be ‘well adapted to 
discouraging ill-considered withholding of reasons on asserted public interest grounds in a 
context where such grounds will not commonly exist’.761  However, the ACC noted that 
                                                          
753  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: Statements of reasons 
for decisions, Report No 33 (1991) 47. 
754  Ibid 48. 
755  Ibid. 
756  Fair Work Ombudsman, Submission No 22 (1 July 2011) 1; Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), 
Submission No 21 (9 August 2011) 10; Australian Crime Commission, Submission No 5 (6 July 2011) 12; 
Department of Defence, Submission No 4 (24 June 2011) 6; Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 
No 15 (8 July 2011) 7; Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Submission No 11 (1 July 2011) 8. 
757  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission No 15 (8 July 2011) 7. 
758  Australian Network of Environmental Defenders Offices, Submission No 9 (1 July 2011) 8 
759  Law Council of Australia, Submission No 23 (1 July 2011) 15. 
760  The Law Society of New South Wales Young Lawyers, Submission No 7 (1 July 2011) 12. 
761  Australian Crime Commission, Submission No 5 (6 July 2011) 10. 
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where a large proportion of an agency’s decisions would need to rely on a certificate, it would 
be more appropriate to develop procedures similar to what is contained in the FOI Act to 
determine what material should be disclosed.762 
Exemptions for information 
9.90 The Council considers that there is justification for both the exemption of particular 
decisions from the requirement to provide reasons on request and for general exemptions for 
particular types of information.   
9.91 With regards to the exemption of particular classes of information, the Council 
considers that amending s 13A of the ADJR Act would not be without difficulty.  
Amendments to s 13A could potentially broaden exemptions from the right to request 
reasons. 
9.92 In Report No 33, the Council recommended that s 13A should be amended to 
provide that the section applies in relation to any information to which a request under 
subsection 13(1) relates, being information which ‘is personal information within the meaning 
of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and which that Act prevents the person to whom the request was 
made from disclosing,’ and that which ‘would, or could reasonably be expected to’: 763 
 prejudice the conduct of an investigation of a breach, or possible breach, of 
the law, or a failure, or possible failure, to comply with a law relating to 
taxation or prejudice the enforcement or proper administration of the law in 
a particular instance; 
 disclose, or enable a person to ascertain, the existence or identity of a 
confidential source of information in relation to the enforcement or 
administration of the law; 
 endanger the life or physical safety of any person; 
 prejudice the fair trial of a person or the impartial adjudication of a 
particular case; 
 disclose lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, 
investigating or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of 
the law the disclosure of which would, or would be reasonably likely to, 
prejudice the effectiveness of those methods or procedures;  
 prejudice the maintenance or enforcement of lawful methods for the 
protection of public safety; or 
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763  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: Statements of reasons 
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 adversely affect an authority of the Commonwealth in respect of its 
competitive commercial activities.764 
9.93 Another option was put forward in the OAIC’s submission to the Council.  The 
OAIC pointed to the exemptions to provide reasons in the FOI Act,765 noting that: 
Section 25(1) of the FOI Act restricts the general right to reasons by emphasising 
that the Act does not require disclosure of information relating to the existence or 
non-existence of a document if the inclusion of that information would make a 
document an exempt document under s 33 (documents affecting national security, 
defence or international relations) or s 37(1) (documents affecting law 
enforcement and protection of public safety).766  
9.94 This approach would better align the information protection requirements in the 
FOI Act and the ADJR Act.  Section 13A was enacted before the FOI Act, and this may 
explain the inconsistency between the two regimes for the protection of information.   
9.95 The Council in Report No 33 also recommended that: 
Subsection 13(11) ought to be amended to exclude from the definition of decision 
to which section 13 applies a decision the terms of which are required by an 
enactment to be laid before each House of the Parliament and a decision the 
terms of which are laid before each House of the Parliament pursuant to a power 
conferred by an enactment.767 
This issue is now addressed in the FOI Act, which provides that access to a document can be 
deferred if the document is to be presented before Parliament.768 
9.96 The categories of information the Council recommended in Report No 33 should 
not be required to be included in a statement of reasons provided on request under the 
ADJR Act are not consistent with the current regime in the FOI Act.  The Council considers 
that consistency between that the two systems for release of information is desirable. 
 
                                                          
764  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: Statements of reasons 
for decisions, Report No 33 (1991) Recommendation 10. 
765  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission No 17 (5 July 2011) 6. 
766  Ibid. 
767  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: Statements of reasons 
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Recommendation 14 
The categories of information that are not required to be included in a statement of reasons 
under sections 13A(1) and 14(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) 
should be deleted and replaced by a provision stating that a statement of reasons is not 
required to contain: 
(a) any matter that is of such a nature that its inclusion in a document would cause that 
document to be an exempt document under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth); 
or 
(b) the notice of or statement of reasons for a decision that is required by an enactment 
to be laid before either House of the Parliament, prior to the date on which that 
notice or statement of reasons is laid before a House of the Parliament. 
Principles justifying the exclusion of the ADJR Act obligation to provide a 
statement of reasons for decisions under particular Acts or provisions 
9.97 The Council considers that the list of specific exemptions in Schedule 2 should be 
retained, and has undertaken a review of Schedule 2 in consultation with relevant agencies.  
The comments provided have assisted the Council in developing a list of principles for 
consideration in determining whether a particular decision should be included in Schedule 2 
and therefore exempt from the requirement to provide reasons.   
9.98 The Council considers that decisions should be exempt from the obligation to 
provide a statement of reasons in the following circumstances: 
 Where an alternative scheme for providing reasons for decisions exists 
which is as accessible and effective as the ADJR Act obligation.  This would 
include decisions of Tribunals, where there is a statutory obligation to 
provide reasons for decisions or where reasons are made public by virtue of 
tabling.  It would also include employment and appointment decisions. 
 Where providing reasons for a decision has the potential to fragment or 
frustrate another legal process which is already underway.  In the context of 
the requirement to give reasons, there are concerns about revealing 
information which might disclose sensitive operational information that 
could ‘tip off’ others or alert persons to a confidential source of 
information.  There are other mechanisms to examine and test the legality 
of such decisions, such as through the court process. 
 Where disclosure of any information would, or could reasonably be 
expected to, prejudice the ability of the Commonwealth Government or 
another body exercising power under a Commonwealth enactment to 
manage the Australian economy. 
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 An example would be decisions of the Reserve Bank in connection with its 
banking operations (including individual open market operations and 
foreign exchange dealings). 
 Where the requirement to provide reasons may involve significant workload 
implications. 
 This consideration is raised in the context of the thousands of decisions 
related to employment in the public sector for which reasons would be 
available in most instances if requested.  The concern about applying s 13 of 
the ADJR Act relates to the level of formality and detail required for 
statements of reasons for all such decisions.  In addition, it is 
Commonwealth policy that the Australian Public Service should, as far as is 
possible, be covered by the same arrangements that apply in the workforce 
generally. 
9.99 Specific exemptions are discussed in detail in Appendix C.  The Council makes 
recommendations to amend Schedule 2, including to remove: 
 exemptions for decisions under Acts that no longer exist; 
 exemptions for decisions that should be exempt from the ADJR Act as a 
whole and included in Schedule 1; and 
 exemptions that would otherwise be available under the non-disclosure 
provisions of s 13A. 
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10. REMEDIES 
Summary 
10.1 As discussed in Chapter 3, the remedies available under the Australian Constitution 
and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (Judiciary Act) in relation to constitutional judicial 
review are similar in nature to those available under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) for statutory judicial review.  The primary difference is the 
need to show a ‘jurisdictional error’ to demonstrate an entitlement to the constitutional 
remedies. 
10.2 The Consultation Paper only raised a few issues regarding remedies in judicial review 
proceedings.  The first was whether it was appropriate for remedies only to issue where there 
was a jurisdictional error.  The Consultation Paper also canvassed a recommendation by the 
Law Commission of England and Wales that damages should be available in judicial review 
proceedings.  The Council has concluded that remedies should issue in relation to certain 
non-jurisdictional errors, and this is reflected in the Council’s model for review discussed in 
Chapter 4.  The Council has not made a recommendation with respect to damages. 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES 
10.3 The question of whether remedies should only issue where a jurisdictional error has 
been shown is central to the consideration of the ambit and model for review discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5.  The submissions to the Council on remedies did not focus on the question 
of whether remedies should only issue where there is a jurisdictional error.  Rather, 
submissions addressed more broadly the question of statutory remedies versus constitutional 
writs. 
10.4 Submissions broadly supported the current remedies in the ADJR Act, and their 
expression.769  The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) argued that the ADJR Act 
‘simplifies the issue of remedies and removes the unhelpful common law distinction between 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error’.770  The Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship (DIAC) submitted that a statutory remedial scheme would assist clients by helping 
them to understand the remedies that are available in judicial review.771  The Law Council of 
Australia stated that the discretion given to the Court in s 16 to refuse to grant a remedy is 
‘workable and desirable’.772   
10.5 Drs Peter Billings and Anthony Cassimatis suggested that there should be some 
amendments to remedies.  They supported ‘codification of the discretionary grounds for 
                                                          
769  Law Council of Australia, Submission No 23 (1 July 2011) [116]; Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship, Submission No 11 (1 July 2011) 8; Australian Crime Commission, Submission No 5 
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denial [of] relief  in judicial review proceedings’, for example judicial review should only be 
exercised as a remedy of last resort, after merits review options have been exhausted.773   
10.6 Billings and Cassimatis argued that it was important for the Council to consider 
introducing a statutory duty on courts conducting judicial review ‘to consider alternative 
judicial review remedies (with attendant powers to issue those remedies where appropriate) 
before dismissing a judicial review application on jurisdictional grounds’.774  They noted that  
one significant mischief of the traditional judicial review remedies identified by 
the Kerr and Ellicott Committees was the situation where an applicant’s choice of 
one remedy led to dismissal of the claim on technical grounds that might have 
been avoided had a different remedy have been sought.775 
10.7 They argued that ‘this mischief has not disappeared and more could be done to 
avoid its occurrence’.776  They point to rule 569 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Qld), 
which applies in cases where an application has been made for statutory judicial review and 
the court finds it has no jurisdiction to hear the matter under the Judicial Review Act 1991 
(Qld), but could have heard the matter if an application had been made for judicial review in 
the Supreme Court’s inherent jurisdiction.  Rule 569 allows the court to ‘order the proceeding 
to continue as if it had been started as an application for review’.  Billings and Cassimatis 
noted that this rule could have been relied on in Griffith University v Tang,777 but was not, and as 
such argued that ‘it may be appropriate to formulate an equivalent rule in mandatory terms’.778 
10.8 The Council considers that the ADJR Act did address the issues raised by the 
Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee (Kerr Committee) and the Committee of 
Review of Prerogative Writ Procedures (Ellicott Committee) in terms of the flexibility of 
remedies, but notes the problem raised by Billings and Cassimatis when alternative review 
jurisdictions are available.  The Council considers that its preferred recommendation would 
address this issue, without the need for a provision similar to rule 569 of the Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules (Qld).  The Council also supports the maintenance of clear remedies expressed 
in plain language, which are not restricted to jurisdictional error. 
DAMAGES 
10.9 The 2008 consultation paper released by the Law Commission of England and 
Wales (the Law Commission), Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen,779 proposed the 
creation of a damages remedy as an ancillary remedy to be claimed alongside the prerogative 
writs available at common law, or for private law claims against public bodies.  The Law 
Commission considered that such a remedy would fill a gap in the current law, as damages 
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778  Peter Billings and Anthony Cassimatis, Submission No 6 (27 June 2011) 16. 
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can only be claimed against a public body where there is a private law right to damages, where 
there has been a breach of a European Union law or under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
10.10 The Law Commission proposed, in relation to judicial review, that courts could 
grant a claimant damages if the claimant could show that: 
 the legal regime in which the public body acted was intended to confer a 
benefit on individuals and the harm suffered by the individual was of a 
similar nature to the benefit that the regime conferred;780 
 the public body had committed a ‘serious fault’—it fell far below the 
standard expected in the circumstances;781 and 
 the defendant’s conduct did in fact result in the damage complained of and 
the damage is not, in law, too remote a consequence of the defendant’s 
wrongdoing.782 
10.11 The Law Commission suggested a number of factors that might indicate there had 
been a serious fault, such as: 
 the risk or likelihood of harm involved in the conduct of the public body; 
 the seriousness of the harm caused; 
 the knowledge of the public body, at the time that the harm occurred that 
its conduct could cause harm, and whether it knew or should have known 
about vulnerable potential victims; 
 the cost and practicability of avoiding the harm; 
 the social utility of the activity in which the public body was engaged when 
it caused the harm—this would include factors such as preventing an undue 
administrative burden on the public body; 
 the extent and duration of departures from well-established good practice; 
and 
 the extent to which senior administrators had made possible, or facilitated, 
the failure or failures in question.783 
10.12 The Law Commission also asked for views on whether the discretionary nature of 
the prerogative writs should be retained for the damages remedy.  Some responses to the Law 
Commission’s consultation paper supported this position. 
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10.13 However, there was substantial opposition, particularly from government bodies, to 
both the public law and private law aspects of the proposal to allow damages for serious 
fault.784  The main criticisms of the proposal were that:  
 monetary remedies were inconsistent with the nature of public law;785  
 there was a risk of increased delays to judicial review proceedings;786 and  
 providing for damages would place an increased financial burden on public 
authorities.787 
10.14 In its final report, the Law Commission noted that there was a lack of available data 
on the compensation liability of public bodies to enable assessment of potential benefits from 
the proposed reforms.  The Law Commission considered that there was no evidence available 
to support or refute criticisms of the proposal.  Therefore, while the Law Commission 
considered that the proposals had merit, it decided not to pursue them any further. 
10.15 The Law Commission argued that in some cases damages were necessary to avoid 
injustice to individuals, for example where a licence had been revoked invalidly and a person 
had lost earnings as a result.788  The Law Commission considered that sometimes damages 
were appropriate in the interests of justice in individual cases, and to improve government 
service delivery.789 
10.16 Damages in Australia, as in the United Kingdom, are available in a private law action 
based on contractual relationships or tort action for negligence, breach of statutory duty or 
misfeasance in public office.790  In Australia, the injustices which the Law Commission sought 
to address may be compensated through other schemes that are not dependent upon a 
finding of legal error in a decision making process.  The Government has the discretion to 
make compensation payments, either in the form of payments under the Compensation for 
Detriment caused by Defective Administration scheme (CDDA) or ‘act of grace’ payments, 
to people adversely affected by government administration.791  These discretionary 
compensation schemes are available where there may have been defective administration or 
where government administration has inequitable consequences for a particular individual.  
Compensation under these schemes is often granted where no other remedies are available.  
As a result, discretionary compensation will not usually be available in conjunction with 
judicial review remedies.  The Law Commission’s proposal sought to have damages available 
as an ancillary remedy in judicial review proceedings. 
10.17 A major concern with providing for the courts to grant damages as a judicial review 
remedy allied to a finding of unlawful administrative action would be that the court either 
                                                          
784  Law Commission, Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen, Report No 332 (2010) 2. 
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788  Ibid 15. 
789  Ibid 22. 
790  See Chapter 2. 
791  See Chapter 2. 
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was, or would appear to be, deciding the correctness of the decision on the merits.  In 
Australian judicial review proceedings, a court can decide whether a decision maker has made 
an error of law, but not what the correct decision should have been.  The Law Commission’s 
criteria require assessments of the seriousness of harm caused to individuals and the causal 
relationship between the decision of the government body and that harm.  An assessment of 
that kind could embrace an assessment of the merits of particular administrative action. 
10.18 The Law Council of Australia discussed the issue of damages in judicial review at 
length.  They argued that s 16(d) of the ADJR Act is broad enough to allow courts to grant an 
award of damages; however they noted the High Court in Park Oh Ho v Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs792 has not interpreted it in that way.  They submitted that s 16 of the 
ADJR Act should be amended to include the following: 
If a decision, conduct, act or omission breaches one of the grounds of review in 
this Act, and results from negligent performance or non-performance, and a 
person suffers loss or damage as a direct result, then the Court may award 
damages for any economic loss so caused.793 
10.19 The Law Council argued, however, against an ‘overarching’ remedy for damages: 
It would be contrary to the development of orthodox principles to create an 
overarching damages remedy which does not take account of the particular 
statutory intention and, importantly, broader public policy reasons which tend 
against imposing a general liability to damages where administrative action may be 
taken in error (but not where there is a duty of care in negligence).794 
10.20 The Law Council noted that Australian courts have consistently rejected the notion 
of an administrative tort.795  In their submission, the Australian cases demonstrate that there is 
appropriate relief from negligent administrative action when a duty of care can be made 
out.796 
10.21 The Law Council of Australia submitted that schemes, such as CDDA, ex gratia and 
act of grace payments make, in effect, awards of damages in cases of defective administrative 
decision making.  Because of this, the Law Council argued that the schemes should be subject 
to judicial review to avoid inconsistent application of discretionary principles flowing from 
terms such as ‘defective’ and ‘detriment’, although they expressed concern at the justiciability 
of the CDDA ‘given that it has its basis in moral rather than legal obligation.’797 
10.22 The Council notes that this proposal raises issues going beyond this report which 
would require specific attention, and which may be appropriate for further consideration in 
the future. 
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11. COURT PROCEDURES 
SUMMARY 
11.1 Any reform of judicial review requires consideration of the courts and the processes 
that apply to judicial review applications.  While judicial review focuses on addressing an 
individual grievance, court procedures and other non-legal mechanisms can be utilised to 
ensure that grievances are being resolved in the most effective and appropriate manner. 
11.2 The Consultation Paper considered the streamlining procedures that apply in 
relation to judicial review applications under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act), 
however the wider roles played by the Federal Court and Federal Magistrates Court in judicial 
review applications were not considered.  In this Chapter, the Council considers measures the 
courts can take to ensure the processes for considering judicial review applications are 
efficient.  The Council conducted further consultations with the Federal Court and Federal 
Magistrates Court following the publication of the Consultation Paper, focusing on the 
courts’ existing powers to manage cases.  The Council does not consider that any 
recommendations to change court procedures specifically in relation to judicial review 
applications are warranted given the courts’ existing powers to manage cases.   
11.3 In this chapter, the Council also considers the appropriateness of adopting 
streamlining measures used in the migration jurisdiction, public interest and costs in judicial 
review litigation, and the issues raised by the principle established in R v Australian Broadcasting 
Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman798 (the ‘Hardiman principle’)—that decision-making tribunals 
should not contest applications for review of their decisions.   
11.4 Stakeholders generally did not support adopting procedures used in the migration 
jurisdiction to apply to judicial review applications.  Few stakeholders made a submission 
about costs in judicial review proceedings.  As noted above, the Council considers the federal 
courts already have extensive powers to deal with cases effectively, including sufficient 
discretion to make orders as to costs, and does not consider that any improvements could be 
made to current court procedures. 
ROLE OF FEDERAL COURT AND FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT 
11.5 Both the Federal Court and the Federal Magistrates Court have an interest in 
ensuring that applications for judicial review are made appropriately and that the processes 
for hearing matters are efficient.  The measures that the federal courts can take include:  
 ensuring that matters are heard by judges with relevant expertise; 
 making information about judicial review available on websites and in 
forms; 
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 developing accessible court forms; and 
 streamlined procedures. 
11.6 Streamlined procedures aim to minimise delays in the litigation process and reduce 
time spent dealing with unmeritorious litigation.  The Consultation Paper discussed 
streamlining procedures specifically and these are discussed separately below. 
Expertise of judges 
11.7 The Federal Magistrates Court has two main divisions: 
 General Division—covering administrative law, admiralty law, bankruptcy, 
copyright, human rights, industrial law, migration, privacy and trade 
practices, family law and child support; and 
 Fair Work Division—as established by the Fair Work (Transitional Provisions 
and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009 (Cth).   
11.8 The Federal Magistrates Court has established specialist panels, including an 
administrative law panel.  The establishment of panels in its specialist jurisdictions are an 
important development of the Court.  The Court believes that the panel system best enables it 
to use its judicial resources effectively according to its jurisdictions.799 
11.9 The administrative law panel includes: 
 all appeals transferred from the Federal Court to the Federal Magistrates 
Court from non-presidential members of the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (AAT) and all applications under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act); and  
 most first instance judicial reviews of visa-related decisions under the 
Migration Act. 
11.10 The Court submitted that the panels provide an opportunity for members to 
develop and maintain expertise in the jurisdictional areas allotted.  The Court advised that the 
panels have been established in order to ensure that work is handled by Federal Magistrates 
with expertise in the area and with a commitment to allocating appropriate priority to the 
cases assigned to them.  The Court also advised that diary rules are intended to ensure that 
cases in these jurisdictions will be dealt with generally within a target time frame of six 
months after filing. 
11.11 The Federal Court uses an Individual Docket System to allocate and manage cases.  
Under this system, a matter will usually stay with the same judge from commencement until 
disposition.  This means a judge has greater familiarity with each case and leads to the more 
efficient management of the proceeding.800  The New South Wales, Victorian and Queensland 
                                                          
799  Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, Annual Report 2010–11 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) 28. 
800  Federal Court of Australia, Annual Report 2010–11 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) 25. 
184     
Federal Judicial Review in Australia 
184 
registries of the Federal Court also have established subject matter panels.  A proceeding 
involving a panel matter will be allocated to a judge who is a member of the relevant panel.  
Administrative law does not have a specific subject matter panel. 
Information about judicial review 
11.12 In general, both the Federal Court and the Federal Magistrates Court have detailed 
information on their websites about making an application for judicial review.  The 
information provided by the Federal Magistrates Court on administrative law refers to the 
Court’s jurisdiction under the ADJR Act, including a list of grounds for applying.  The Court 
also refers to appeals from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under s 44 of the ADJR Act 
on questions of law which have been remitted from the Federal Court.  There is a detailed 
fact sheet on review of decisions under the Migration Act, including the basis on which judicial 
review can be sought (limited to occasions when there has been a jurisdictional error). 
Court forms 
11.13 One way that the federal courts can ensure that applications for judicial review are 
made appropriately is through the design of forms.  The Federal Court altered its forms in 
August 2011, which has raised new issues in relation to applications under the ADJR Act.  
For judicial review matters, the Federal Court and Federal Magistrates Court both use Form 
66 under Rule 31.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011.  The form itself is described as an 
‘originating application for judicial review’, but does not specifically mention the ADJR Act.  
For example, where the form asks for grounds of review, it does not state that the grounds 
are listed in s 5 of the ADJR Act. 
11.14 Form 69 is used for originating applications for relief under s 39B of the 
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (Judiciary Act) in the Federal Court.  It provides for a statement of the 
relief sought, but the grounds of review are contained in accompanying documents such as 
the statement of claim or affidavit.  The Judiciary Act does not confer jurisdiction on the 
Federal Magistrates Court in relation to judicial review, therefore this form is not relevant for 
judicial review applications filed in the Federal Magistrates Court. 
11.15 A different form is used for judicial review of migration decisions.  The relevant 
form provides information about seeking review of migration decisions and contains a 
description of the available remedies and information about how to describe the grounds for 
the application. 
11.16 In consultations with the Council, the Federal Court submitted that the new forms, 
implemented under the new Federal Court Rules 2011 from 1 August 2011, are cross-referenced 
to the particular Court Rules relevant to the form and contain instructions to assist the user 
when completing the form.  It is intended that the Court Rules will be read in conjunction 
with the forms.  The Court submitted that Form 66 can be used in two ways, either to start a 
proceeding for judicial review under the ADJR Act, or for an application under the ADJR Act 
which is joined with an application for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act that arises out of 
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or relates to, or is connected with, the same subject matter.  For this reason, the Court 
indicated that a specific reference in the form to the ADJR Act could confuse users intending 
to use the form to claim relief under both legislative bases.  It was also felt that any user 
reading Rule 31.01 in conjunction with the form would not be aided by a further reference to 
the legislation on the form. 
11.17 The Court indicated that the forms should not be changed until sufficient time has 
elapsed to enable users to become familiar with the new Federal Court Rules 2011 and the 
approved forms. 
Adequate direction to users of the courts 
11.18 The panel system established in the Federal Magistrates Court provides a twofold 
benefit in specialist jurisdictions in allowing for Magistrates with relevant expertise to hear 
matters as well as ensuring that timeframes are managed.  The Individual Docket System in 
the Federal Court also ensures that judges are familiar with their cases. 
11.19 The information on the Federal Magistrates Court’s website about judicial review is 
very detailed in relation to migration matters.  The information on applications under the 
ADJR Act is also sufficiently detailed considering the number of non-migration administrative 
law matters filed in the Federal Magistrates Court is very low (according to the Annual Report 
of the Federal Magistrates Court, 15 administrative law matters were filed compared with 959 
migration matters).801 
11.20 Although the court forms used in judicial review applications do not specifically 
mention the enumerated grounds in s 5 of the ADJR Act, the Council considers that the 
forms, when read in conjunction with the Federal Court Rules 2011, give adequate directions to 
users. 
STREAMLINED PROCEDURES 
11.21 The Consultation Paper asked if it would be beneficial to extend the streamlining 
measures used in the migration jurisdiction to all avenues of judicial review.   
11.22 Appeals from the Federal Magistrates Court can already be heard by a single judge of 
the Federal Court.  Procedures in the Migration Act that are also intended to streamline the 
migration jurisdiction include: 
 an obligation not to encourage litigation proceedings where there are no 
reasonable prospects of success;802 
 the ability for the court to make a personal costs order against a person who 
encourages unmeritorious litigation;803 
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 a requirement that any lawyer filing a document to commence migration 
litigation certify that there are reasonable prospects of success;804 and  
 a requirement for applicants to disclose any previous applications for 
judicial review of the same migration decision.805 
11.23 Other procedural reforms raised in the Consultation Paper included strengthening 
the Court’s discretion to dismiss proceedings, introducing a ‘leave to proceed requirement’ 
and time limits. 
Streamlined proceedings 
11.24 Stakeholders generally did not support adopting procedures used in the migration 
context to streamline judicial review matters.806  Drs Billings and Cassimatis submitted that 
the migration reforms to court procedures were based upon ‘a false premise’: ‘that rising 
numbers of judicial review applicants indicated that they (and their lawyers) were 
inappropriately using the judicial process to extend the applicant’s time in Australia’.807  They 
argued that any reforms to streamlining measures should be evidence-based and focused on 
the ‘possible structural causes, (such as the adequacy of legal aid funding) rather than simply 
the effects’, as ‘part of an overall strategy’.808 
11.25 NSW Young Lawyers gave qualified support to the proposal to extend the 
requirement for compulsory disclosure of previous judicial review applications.809  The 
Australian Tax Office (ATO) supported improvements to case management, particularly 
encouraging early identification of facts and issues in dispute.810  The ATO noted the Federal 
Court’s Practice Note811 about tax and the Fast Track process in the Federal Court as 
examples of ‘efficient case management’, encouraging issues in dispute to be discussed at an 
early stage of the litigation.812 
11.26 Overall, the Council considers that there is no need to extend the streamlining 
measures in the migration jurisdiction to other judicial review proceedings.  There are small 
numbers of judicial review applications, and there is therefore no evidence that such measures 
would be beneficial for the courts, and they may be disadvantageous for applicants. 
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Courts’ discretion to dismiss proceedings 
11.27 There have been attempts to strengthen the discretion of the Federal Court not to 
hear judicial review applications at an early stage where alternatives to judicial review exist.  
The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Amendment Bill 1986 (Cth) sought to amend the 
ADJR Act to restrict the right to seek the review of administrative decisions by: 
 altering the statutory provisions enabling the Federal Court to dismiss an 
application for review where alternative remedies are available; and  
 requiring the Federal Court to consider whether it should exercise its 
discretion to dismiss applications at the earliest opportunity. 
11.28 The Bill would have provided for the near automatic refusal of relief under the 
ADJR Act where there were either alternate means of review, or where the proceeding 
challenged was not complete, unless the applicant satisfied the court that the interests of 
justice required otherwise.   
11.29 The Explanatory Memorandum suggested that the aim was to reduce delay and 
increase administrative efficiency, as proceedings were increasingly fragmented by 
interlocutory ADJR Act applications.  In its report on the Bill, the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee noted the problems caused by significant amounts of 
litigation relating to the decision regarding allocation of television licenses in Perth.813 
11.30 In considering the Bill, the Senate Committee recognised that applicants should be 
encouraged to use merits review before judicial review.  However, it did not wish to 
recommend restricting judicial review for all applicants because of a few unmeritorious or 
vexatious cases.  The Senate Committee recommended that the Bill not be enacted and it was 
ultimately not passed by the Parliament. 
11.31 Under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the Court can give 
summary judgment if it considers that a party has no reasonable prospect of successfully 
prosecuting or defending a proceeding. 
11.32 Stakeholders did not consider that strengthening the discretion of the Federal Court 
and the Federal Magistrates Court to dismiss proceedings would be an effective streamlining 
measure of judicial review proceedings.814 However, Billings and Cassimatis supported ‘efforts 
to codify the discretionary grounds for dismissing judicial review proceedings, particularly in 
the light of existing merits review options’.815  The Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship (DIAC) submitted that, in their experience, requiring Courts to exercise their 
discretion to dismiss applications at the earliest opportunity may not result in large number of 
applications dismissed.  DIAC submitted that the Court has wide powers in the migration 
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context to give orders and directions at the first court date to proceed to an immediate ‘show 
cause hearing’ under Rule 44.12 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules.816  DIAC noted the Court 
has rarely utilised show cause hearings. 
11.33 The Council considers that the experience in the migration jurisdiction demonstrates 
that strengthening the courts’ power to dismiss proceedings is unlikely to be effective.  The 
Council also considers that codifying the discretionary grounds for dismissing judicial review 
proceedings are unlikely to alter the courts’ approach to these matters, and may unnecessarily 
fetter the courts’ discretion. 
Leave to proceed 
11.34 In the United Kingdom, a person needs ‘permission’ to apply for judicial review.817  
Judicial review is considered a remedy of last resort, and the permission stage is designed to 
filter out those claims that have no prospect of success.  Parties are expected to have 
exhausted all other remedies before commencing a claim—including alternative remedies 
such as statutory appeals and appeals to relevant tribunals.  A judge in the Administrative 
Court will consider the claim on the papers.818  If permission is granted, the matter will go to a 
full hearing.  There is also a pre-action protocol, designed to allow parties to avoid litigation. 
11.35 While federal courts in Australia currently have a wide discretion to dismiss 
applications in judicial review proceedings, a further obligation could be placed on the courts 
requiring them to consider whether an application should be dismissed without an application 
from the parties involved. 
11.36 Given the significance of the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction in judicial review 
matters, leave requirements are unlikely to have much of an effect.  Leave requirements could 
raise natural justice considerations if someone could have an application dismissed without a 
hearing to specifically address this issue.  The alternate options could be: 
 to give a hearing on the leave to proceed issue, which would defeat its 
purpose of saving time and resources; or 
 to accept that unhappy applicants would frequently appeal dismissals, which 
might simply create more appeal work. 
11.37 Experience in the migration jurisdiction tends to suggest that judges are likely to give 
leave to proceed even if no error is demonstrated in the original application, in case a real 
issue emerges at a later time.  This is also borne out in the English experience of a leave to 
                                                          
816  Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Submission No 11 (1 July 2011) 9. 
817  United Kingdom procedure which governs making a claim for judicial review is set out in the Civil Procedure 
Rules (UK) part 54. 
818  If the judge refuses permission, the claimant is entitled to seek (within seven days) that the matter be 
reconsidered at an oral hearing, see Civil Procedure Rules (UK) r 54.12.  If at the oral hearing the judge again 
refuses permission, the claimant will have a right to apply for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal 
against that refusal pursuant to Rule 52.15. 
          189
Chapter 11: Court Procedures 
189 
proceed requirement as examined by Andrew Le Sueur and Maurice Sunkin.819  Although the 
authors’ research is almost 20 years old, the article made some useful findings.  One was that 
37% of applications were refused permission.  But of those that were re-filed, 40% obtained 
permission. 
11.38 The authors thought these statistics suggested a high degree of error in decisions not 
to grant permission.  They also found that there was a range of reasons for refusal of 
permission (such as delay, no standing, no arguable case, or where judicial review was found 
not to be the correct remedy).  The article also found that many cases were dismissed because 
they were thought unarguable.  However, there was no clear definition of ‘unarguable’ and 
many cases found to be unarguable were later pursued, and won. 
11.39 The English example is complicated by Civil Procedure Rule 54.4, which does not 
specify the criteria to grant permission (and, by implication, the criteria to refuse permission).   
If a requirement for permission does not have clear criteria, its value, above more general 
existing powers to dismiss claims that lack merit, is somewhat unclear. 
11.40 DIAC noted that a requirement to seek ‘permission’ to apply for judicial review 
could assist the courts to vet unmeritorious judicial review applications.  However, DIAC 
expressed concern that if a requirement to seek permission was introduced, it may add an 
additional procedural layer to litigation with no benefits or increased efficiencies.820 
11.41 NSW Young Lawyers submitted that it is untenable in the Australian context to 
require applicants to obtain permission to seek judicial review.  They argued that: 
any attempt to require permissions for review applications under the ADJR Act or 
common law would simply prompt unsuccessful applicants to make applications 
under s 75(v) of the Constitution following the High Court’s decision in 
Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [228 CLR 651].821 
11.42 Given the small number of judicial review applications and the availability of 
alternative paths of review under constitutional judicial review, the Council considers that 
there is no merit in requiring leave to proceed under the ADJR Act. 
Time limits 
11.43 Time limits encourage litigation to proceed in a timely way, and discourage repeat 
litigation.  Current time limits under the ADJR Act are more flexible than those under the 
Migration Act, because the court has more discretion as to when it may entertain an application 
for extension of time. 
11.44 An aggrieved person has 28 days from receipt of the decision to commence Federal 
Court proceedings under s 11 of the ADJR Act.  The Federal Court may extend this time limit 
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in appropriate cases.  The principles governing time limits under the ADJR Act have also 
been fairly well settled through a long line of cases on the point.822  
11.45 The use of time limits as a specific streamlining measure was not widely discussed by 
stakeholders.  NSW Young Lawyers and the Australian Network of Environmental 
Defenders Offices (ANEDO) did not support the use of time limits.823  The ANEDO 
expressed concerns at the existing time limits currently required under s 11 of the ADJR Act 
and submitted that the complexities involved in environmental litigation meant 28 days is 
often not sufficient.824  The ANEDO would therefore support an extension of the prescribed 
period for applications for an order of review in cases of public interest litigation. 
11.46 The Council considers that the 28 day limit encourages prompt applications for 
review, and that there are other methods for dealing with complex matters once a proceeding 
has commenced.   
Pre-trial consideration on the papers 
11.47 Only NSW Young Lawyers suggested that a pre-trial consideration of an application 
on the papers warrants further consideration.825  The Council considers it is not a measure 
which should apply only in relation to judicial review proceedings, separate to other 
proceedings commenced in the federal courts.   
PUBLIC INTEREST AND COSTS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 
11.48 In Chapter 8, the Council considered public interest in judicial review in relation to 
the requirements of standing.  The Council made a recommendation to facilitate public 
interest groups making judicial review applications.  However, the public interest advocacy 
groups Public Interest Advocacy Centre Ltd (PIAC) and the ANEDO raised the issue of 
costs in judicial review litigation. 
11.49 The accessibility of judicial review in public interest matters may be compromised by 
the potential for adverse costs orders against applicants when they are unsuccessful.  
Rule 40.51 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 provides that the Court may, by order made at a 
directions hearing, specify the maximum costs that can be recovered on a party and party 
basis. 
11.50 PIAC and the ANEDO both submitted that adverse costs orders can potentially 
inhibit public interest litigation.826 
                                                          
822  The rules governing time limits under the ADJR Act are explained in Enid Campbell and Matthew Groves, 
‘Time Limitations in Applications for Judicial Review’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 29. 
823  The Law Society of New South Wales Young Lawyers, Submission No 7 (1 July 2011) 14; Australian 
Network of Environmental Defenders Offices, Submission No 9 (1 July 2011) 9. 
824  Australian Network of Environmental Defenders Offices, Submission No 9 (1 July 2011) 9. 
825  The Law Society of New South Wales Young Lawyers, Submission No 7 (1 July 2011) 14. 
826  Australian Network of Environmental Defenders Offices, Submission No 9 (1 July 2011) 7; Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre Ltd, Submission No 18 (14 July 2011) 6. 
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11.51 In its submission, PIAC raised the following two suggestions about costs: 
 the ADJR Act should include a provision that specifically allows the federal 
courts to make orders that protect litigants bringing an action in the public 
interest from an adverse costs order;827 or 
 the application of Order 62A of the superseded Federal Court Rules (now 
Rule 40.51 under the Federal Court Rules 2011) should be strengthened so 
that there is a presumption in favour of limiting costs in ‘public interest’ 
matters, where ‘public interest’ is defined broadly to include all cases that 
could benefit a class of disadvantaged people, even though they may benefit 
the applicant as well.828 
11.52 The ANEDO submitted that federal courts should be given the discretion to grant 
‘no costs’ orders to public litigants.829  They submitted an alternative would be the adoption of 
s 49 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), which provides for ‘own costs’ orders, where parties 
only bear their own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings.830 
11.53 The courts’ existing discretion to cap costs in accordance with Rule 40.51 would 
only be exercised where the order is sought by the applicant and where the court decides to 
exercise its discretion to make a capping order.  Effectively, the ANEDO and PIAC were 
seeking that capping of costs should be presumed to apply in all cases that could benefit a 
class of disadvantaged people (presumably test cases).   
11.54 The Council notes the concerns expressed by the ANEDO, that ‘the threat of 
adverse costs orders is one of the greatest deterrents to litigants seeking to bring public 
interest proceedings’.831  While some argue that the use of presumptions of costs to protect 
public interest litigants could operate to fetter courts’ existing discretion, the Council agrees 
that judicial review requires particular protection for public interest litigants.  The Council 
also considers that a presumption that parties bear their own costs reflects an approach now 
routinely applied in the administrative law context, including in tribunal decision making. 
  Recommendation 15 
The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should provide that, unless the court 
orders otherwise, parties to a judicial review proceeding should bear their own costs.  
THE HARDIMAN PRINCIPLE 
11.55 The Hardiman principle was not considered in the Consultation Paper, but was raised 
during consultations subsequently conducted by the Council.  The Council has considered the 
                                                          
827  Public Interest Advocacy Centre Ltd, Submission No 18 (14 July 2011) 6. 
828  Ibid 7. 
829  Australian Network of Environmental Defenders Offices, Submission No 9 (1 July 2011) 7. 
830  Ibid. 
831  Ibid, 8. 
192     
Federal Judicial Review in Australia 
192 
principle as part of this Report.  The effect of the principle is that, in certain circumstances, a 
decision maker cannot appear as a contradictor in proceedings challenging its own decision.   
11.56 In the case of R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (Hardiman),832 the 
High Court held that, in general, decision-making tribunals should not contest applications 
for review of their decisions.  In some cases tribunals might make submissions limited to the 
powers and procedures of the tribunal.   
11.57 Concerns were expressed during consultations that the Hardiman principle has 
expanded in recent times, and that the scope of its application has become unclear.  It was 
noted that a matter of public law can be litigated between two private parties who may not 
necessarily have the public interest as their main concern.  Section 18 of the ADJR Act, which 
allows the Attorney-General to intervene in the public interest, is rarely used, which means 
the public interest may not be represented in important public law matters.  The courts have 
not given the Commonwealth clear guidance on the issue.   
The role of agencies in judicial review proceedings 
11.58 The lack of clarity about the application of Hardiman is in relation to two issues:  
 which decision makers are subject to the rule; and  
 to what proceedings does the rule apply. 
11.59 The High Court in Hardiman indicated that the rule only applied to tribunals in the 
nature of court substitutes, exercising adjudicatory functions inter partes. 833  There was a 
particular concern in these cases that tribunals maintain the appearance of impartiality, 
particularly if a decision was to be remitted.  However, there have been a number of recent 
cases extending the rule in Hardiman to tribunals exercising regulatory functions and to 
administrative decision makers.834 
11.60 On the other hand, there are many cases in which administrative decision makers do 
act as contradictors—migration and tax matters are two examples.  In two recent cases, the 
Federal Court has suggested that the Hardiman principle could apply to administrative 
decision makers in matters before the AAT.835  However, a recent Victorian Court of Appeal 
case criticised an administrative decision maker for not appearing as a contradictor in 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal proceedings, on the basis that the decision maker 
was the only party governed exclusively by the aims and objectives of the statutory scheme, 
rather than self interest.836 
                                                          
832  (1980) 144 CLR 13. 
833  Ibid. 
834  TXU Electricity Ltd v Office of the Regulator-General (2001) 3 VR 93; Community Television Sydney Ltd v Australian 
Broadcasting Authority (No 2) (2004) 136 FCR 338.   
835  Geographical Indications Committee v O’Connor (2002) 64 ALD 325; Capricornia Credit Union Ltd v Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) [2007] FCAFC 112. 
836  Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Romsey Hotel Pty Ltd (2008) 19 VR 422. 
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11.61 Associate Professor Matthew Groves has suggested that five areas of exception to 
the Hardiman principle can be regarded as reasonably well settled: 
 where there is no active contradictor; 
 no real possibility of remittal; 
 questions arise on the powers and procedures of tribunals; 
 in relation to investigative bodies; and 
 where the rule has been abrogated by statute.837 
11.62 Groves argues that the Hardiman principle is one of wide application, yet at the same 
time, subject to a great number of exceptions that have developed on an ad hoc basis.  
Unfortunately, the increasing number of exceptions has not been accompanied by a logical 
reconsideration of the wider implications of the rule and whether it should be retained.838 
11.63  In a 2012 article, Nicholas Gouliaditis suggests that two areas of Hardiman could be 
subject to reform: 
First, it could be made clear that the Hardiman principle does not apply to 
proceedings before merits review tribunals (or to primary decision-makers in 
subsequent judicial review applications), especially the AAT ...  Secondly, there 
would be significant benefits if the Hardiman principle were modified to permit 
decision-makers to present ‘neutral’ submissions on jurisdiction in all instances 
(rather than simply in ‘exception cases), without necessarily displacing the 
convention that the tribunal not be subject to a costs order regardless of the 
outcome.  This appears to be how Hardiman is (incorrectly) presently applied in 
many cases without harm.  The benefits of such participation have long been 
recognised and the risk of an appearance of bias in such circumstances must be 
low.839 
11.64 Gouliaditis goes on to suggest that the overall justification for the Hardiman principle 
should be revisited: 
Although explained as a rule designed to prevent decision-makers from 
compromising their partiality in judicial review proceedings, it may be more 
satisfactory if the Hardiman principle was viewed as one based on the perception 
of what is appropriate—that is, on the basis that it is unseemly for some bodies to 
become actively involved in defending their decisions having regard to their 
status.840 
11.65 On this basis, Gouliaditis suggests that ‘the principle would largely be confined to 
tribunals in the nature of court substitutes’ and would not apply to other administrative 
                                                          
837  Mathew Groves, ‘The Hardiman Rule’ (2012) 33(2) Adelaide Law Review (forthcoming). 
838  Ibid. 
839  Nicholas Gouliaditis, ‘The Hardiman Principle: Revisited’ (2012) 19 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 
152, 166. 
840  Ibid. 
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decision makers, who have mandates beyond appearing impartial, relating to the 
implementation of their statutory framework.841 
11.66 Simon Daley and Nick Gouliadatis have questioned whether the Hardiman principle 
is appropriate.842  For example, it is incongruous that in judicial review applications, where 
questions of public law are raised, that the only parties who are allowed to take an active role 
in the proceedings are those more concerned with narrow commercial or personal interests, 
not the broader public interest.  Forming part of the basis of the Hardiman principle is the 
assumption that tribunals should not assume an active role in proceedings where there is a 
‘contradictor of substance’.843  An option to consider is whether the Attorney-General could 
be notified of proceedings brought under the ADJR Act and s 39B of the Judiciary Act, in a 
similar manner to notifications provided under s 78B of the Judiciary Act, and act as a 
‘contradictor’. 
11.67 It would be difficult to identify a particular criterion for the need to give notice, as a 
‘public interest’ test is much broader than the constitutional issues test in s 78B, which 
involves ‘a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation’.  However, if 
notice was provided for all applications, the Attorney-General (and the Council) could better 
monitor the use of different judicial review mechanisms, and it would be easier for the 
Attorney-General to intervene where appropriate in judicial review matters.  The need to 
report to the Attorney-General on significant issues that arise in litigation under clause 3 of 
the Legal Service Directions 2005 (Cth)844 may already serve this purpose. 
11.68 On the other hand, intervention by the Attorney-General may be unlikely, given the 
Attorney-General’s status as a member of Cabinet and the political nature of the role, as well 
as the fact that such litigation would need to be funded from the Attorney-General’s 
portfolio.  Such a requirement may also be considered unduly burdensome, and there is a 
question of to whom the obligation would apply. 
11.69 The Hardiman principle is increasingly complicated by its broad application and the 
development of ad hoc exceptions to the rule.  While the Council acknowledges these as 
issues, they are questions worthy of broader consideration—they are beyond the scope of an 
examination of the federal system of judicial review. 
                                                          
841  Nicholas Gouliaditis, ‘The Hardiman Principle: Revisited’ (2012) 19 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 
152, 166. 
842  Simon Daley and Nick Gouliaditis, ‘The Hardiman Principle’ (2010) 59 Admin Review 83, 86. 
843  Mathew Groves, ‘The Hardiman Rule’ (2012) 33(2) Adelaide Law Review (forthcoming). 
844  The Legal Service Directions 2005 are issued under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 55ZF and can be downloaded 
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APPENDIX A: JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS 
MODEL—DIRECTIONS TO DECISION 
MAKERS 
This Appendix sets out the views of Mr Roger Wilkins AO in favour of repealing the 
ADJR Act and replacing it with a list of jurisdictional limits on decision makers.  
Mr Wilkins, an appointed member of the Council, considers this model of review, briefly 
discussed in Chapter 4, to be preferable to the Council’s recommended model.   
A.1 The option of repealing the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) 
(ADJR Act) and relying solely on constitutional judicial review, with Parliament setting general 
jurisdictional limits on decision makers, has been suggested as a possibility by the 
Commonwealth Solicitor-General, Stephen Gageler SC.845  Gageler has raised the idea of 
Parliament ‘spelling out’ the jurisdictional limits of administrative decision makers, ‘perhaps in 
some code or charter of administrative rights and responsibilities or at least in some new part 
of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)’.846   
A.2 This approach would fundamentally change the nature of judicial review in Australia.  
Rather than a list of grounds focusing on the review powers of the courts, as in the 
ADJR Act, a list of jurisdictional limits would focus on decision makers and the extent of 
their powers.  Parliament could state, in general terms, the limits of the power of executive 
officers to make decisions under legislation, emphasising the standards that contribute to 
good decision making.  Particular pieces of legislation could retain more specific limits as 
appropriate.  This approach could also create a unified general system of federal judicial 
review, as opposed to the bifurcated system which currently exists. 
Bifurcation—the basic problem 
A.3 The ADJR Act has played an important role in the administrative review system.  It 
simplifies and clarifies judicial review procedures, provides for the right to request reasons, 
and allows for more flexible and understandable remedies.  However, the increasing 
significance of constitutional judicial review contributes to the declining significance of the 
ADJR Act.  The constitutional writs are now the subject of a large amount of case law, and 
their availability is much clearer. 
A.4 In this Report, the existence of dual streams of general judicial review in the Federal 
Court—under the ADJR Act and under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (Judiciary Act)—
has been identified by the Council as an issue with the current system of judicial review.  
Constitutional judicial review cannot be excluded, and to achieve a fully unified general 
system of review, I consider it necessary to repeal the ADJR Act.  Currently, the scope of 
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constitutional judicial review encompasses and exceeds the scope of judicial review under the 
ADJR Act.  The main exceptions to this rule are review of decisions for non-jurisdictional 
errors of law and review of decisions made under an enactment by persons who are not 
officers of the Commonwealth.  However, the common-law development of these concepts 
continues to limit the scope and relevance of these exemptions.847   
A.5 A unified system of judicial review would improve access to justice by eliminating 
technicalities and confusion created by dual, slightly divergent, systems of judicial review.  
Given the need for the Federal Court to have a judicial review jurisdiction which mirrors 
s 75(v) of the Australian Constitution, the only means of achieving this is to repeal the 
ADJR Act. 
A.6 A further advantage of the reform would be that there would no longer be any need 
for a separate system for judicial review of migration decisions.  Particular procedural 
differences, such as appeals to a single Federal Court judge, could remain in the 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), but the scope and grounds of review would be the same for general 
judicial review and review of migration decisions.  Since migration decisions make up the bulk 
of applications for judicial review, this would allow for the coherent development of case law 
in relation to all Australian Government decision making. 
Assisting decision makers 
A.7 The ADJR Act plays a significant role in refining the possible grounds of review and 
communicating them via statute.  This list is considered to provide guidance to applicants on 
the kinds of errors that may ground an application for an order of review under the 
ADJR Act, and to some extent provide guidance to decision makers on what errors might 
make their decisions subject to judicial review orders.  However, the grounds are directed to 
review by the court rather than to decision makers, and do not necessarily apply in relation to 
all administrative decision making.  I consider the guidance role of the grounds to be limited. 
A.8 The concept of ‘jurisdictional error’ defines the grounds available in the 
constitutional judicial review jurisdiction.  It is not always clear, however, which errors by the 
decision maker amount to a jurisdictional error.  Setting out the jurisdictional limits on 
decision makers would clarify which errors could ground an application for the constitutional 
writs. 
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A.9 Gageler has described the task of constitutional judicial review as ‘the policing of 
jurisdictional error’,848 saying that it ‘amounts to nothing more or less than keeping 
administrative decision makers within the express or implied limits of the jurisdiction 
conferred on them by statute’.849  However, Gageler notes that: 
keeping administrative decision-makers within the express limits of the lawful 
authority given to them by statute is as uncontroversial as it is mechanical.  
Keeping administrative decision makers within the limits that are implied into the 
terms by which lawful authority is given to them by statute is more problematic.850   
A.10 A list of jurisdictional limits could be designed to make explicit the limits on 
decision-making power which are currently implied by the courts into particular statutory 
schemes.  These general limits would interact with particular limits in legislation.  Compared 
to the current list of grounds in the ADJR Act, a list of jurisdictional limits would differ in 
two significant ways:  
 they could be directed to decision makers rather than the courts; and 
 they could be clearly stated rather than implied from the statute. 
Instructions to decision makers 
A.11 Following this model, decision makers could refer to general jurisdictional limits and 
the statutes that enable their decisions to determine the correct processes.  Rather than 
statutory interpretation and a general list of grounds in the ADJR Act, decision makers would 
have a clear statutory scheme to refer to.  This could emphasise the role of judicial review in 
improving and enforcing decision-making standards. 
A.12 I consider that it is appropriate that decision-making standards are set by Parliament, 
implemented by the executive and enforced by the courts.  For example, under the ADJR Act, 
an application can be made for an order of review if a decision maker exercises ‘a personal 
discretionary power at the direction or behest of another person’.  Under a jurisdictional 
limits model, a provision would state that a decision maker must not exercise a personal 
discretionary power at the direction or behest of another person. 
A.13 Jurisdictional limits would also clarify the application of procedural fairness 
standards.  Rather than stating that an application can be made for an order of review on the 
occurrence of a breach, a jurisdictional limits model would provide that a decision maker 
must comply with the rules of procedural fairness by providing persons affected with a fair 
hearing, and make the decision without bias or the appearance of bias. 
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Clear limits 
A.14 If an applicant can show that one of the grounds listed in ss 5 and 6 of the 
ADJR Act have been breached in a particular case then the court may make an order of 
review under s 16.  However, the applicant must also show that a particular requirement, such 
as procedural fairness, applies in that case.  Mason J in Kioa v West stated that: 
The statutory grounds of review enumerated in s 5(1) are not new—they are a 
reflection in summary form of the grounds on which administrative decisions are 
susceptible to challenge at common law. The section is therefore to be read in the 
light of the common law and it should not be understood as working a challenge 
to common law grounds of review … Viewed in this light, paragraph (a) does not 
impose an obligation to apply the rules of natural justice where, apart from s 5, 
there is no obligation on a person making a decision to comply with those rules or 
any of them. When the paragraph prescribes a breach of the rules as a ground of 
review it makes no assumption that the rules apply to every decision to which the 
sub-section relates. Under the general law it is always a question whether the rules 
apply and, if so, what rule or rules apply to the making of the particular 
decision.851 
A.15 The precise boundaries of the decision maker’s power are therefore still largely a 
matter of the interpretation of the statute conferring the power and the express or implied 
limits in the statute.  As such, they do not provide a definitive statement of what is required 
when making decisions to which the ADJR Act applies, or a definitive statement of what 
errors will ground an order of review under s 16 of the Act. 
A.16 An example of what this conclusion means in practice is Botany Bay City 
Council v Minister for Transport and Regional Development (Botany Bay).852  Botany Bay concerned a 
decision by the Commonwealth Minister for Transport and Regional Development to exempt 
from the requirements of administrative procedures established under s 6 of the Environment 
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth) certain directions by the relevant NSW minister 
relating to the use of runways at Sydney Airport.  A Sydney resident living near the airport 
made an application for an order of review under s 5 of the ADJR Act.  One of the grounds 
pleaded was paragraph 5(a) of the ADJR Act—that the Minister had breached the 
requirements of natural justice by not providing for a hearing on the exemption decision.  
Lehane J said: 
if [the decision] affects the interests of the public, or a section of the public, at 
large rather than the interests of particular individuals it will, usually at least, be a 
decision in relation to which no particular individual or body can claim an 
entitlement to procedural fairness; particularly, an entitlement to be heard, in 
relation to a proposed decision, before it is made. 
A.17 It is clear that listing breaches of natural justice as grounds for judicial review does 
not impose a requirement to afford natural justice in making all decisions to which the 
ADJR Act applies.  A general list of jurisdictional limits would make clear the limits that did 
apply, and statutes could specifically exclude particular limits.  Applicants would have greater 
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certainty about the power of decision makers, referring to clearly listed limitations in a statute 
rather than arguing that particular limits are implied.  
Reasons 
A.18 If the ADJR Act were repealed, the location and extent of the requirement to give 
reasons would need to be considered.  The simplest method would be retaining the current 
right to request reasons for statutory decisions and updating the current exemptions along the 
lines recommended in Chapter 9 of in this Report.  The right to request reasons is a 
fundamental element of the administrative law system independent of the ADJR Act. 
Remedies 
A.19 One of the advantages of the ADJR Act is the clear list of remedies in s 16 of 
the Act.  The remedies in the ADJR Act are based on the prerogative writs and do not differ 
in substance from the remedies which the court may issue in the constitutional judicial review 
jurisdiction once an applicant has established their entitlement.  The ADJR Act remedies are, 
however, stated in plain language and are easier for applicants to understand.  A jurisdictional 
limits model could incorporate these plain language remedies through a provision stating that 
if a court has jurisdiction under s 39B(1), then the court could make: 
 a quashing order; 
 an order directing either of the parties to do something or refrain from 
doing something; 
 an order declaring the rights of the parties; or 
 an order referring the matter for further consideration, subject to directions 
as the court thinks fit. 
Implementation of the model 
A.20 There are a number of ways the proposed model could be implemented.  The Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) could appropriately house the jurisdictional limits which are to be 
implied into all statutes, as suggested by Gageler.853  It would clearly connect the jurisdictional 
limits with exercises of statutory power. 
A.21 To define the Federal Courts’ review power, s 39B(1) could be moved from the 
Judiciary Act into a general Judicial Review Act, which could include s 39B(1), a list of plain 
language remedies and a provision setting out the scope of the right to request reasons.  
Alternatively, s 39B(1) could remain in the Judiciary Act and the right to request reasons could 
be included in another Act, such as the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). 
                                                          
853 Stephen Gageler, ‘Impact of migration law on the development of Australian administrative law’ (2010) 17 
Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92, 105. 
200     
Federal Judicial Review in Australia 
200 
Conclusion 
A.22 The jurisdictional limits model would require a fundamental shift in thinking about 
judicial review from government officials, legal practitioners and academics.  The model has 
at its core the constitutional writs, but moves beyond the remedial focus of the writs to give 
clear directions to decision makers about the exercise of statutory power.  Issues relating to 
the judicial review of non-statutory power would remain for the courts to resolve, possibly 
influenced by Parliament’s express limits on statutory power.  
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APPENDIX B: SCHEDULE 1 EXEMPTIONS 
B.1 There are currently a large number of exemptions in Schedule 1 of the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act).  The Council considers many of these 
exemptions are justified by reference to the principles discussed in Chapter 5.  A number of 
exemptions should clearly be removed.854 
Obsolete and unnecessary exemptions 
B.2 The following exemptions are obsolete or unnecessary and should be removed: 
 the Coal Industry Act 1946 (Cth) is no longer in force and the exemption in 
paragraph (c) of Schedule 1 should be removed;   
 the Telephonic Communications (Interception) Act 1960 (Cth) is no longer in force 
and the exemption in paragraph (d) of Schedule 1 should be removed; and 
 the National Workplace Relations Consultative Council does not make any 
decisions under statute and the exemption in paragraph (l) of Schedule 1 
should be removed. 
Recommendation B1 
Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be amended to 
remove the following exemptions: 
 the exemption of decisions under the Coal Industry Act 1946 (Cth) in 
paragraph (c); 
 the exemption of decisions under the Telephonic Communications 
(Interception) Act 1960 (Cth) in paragraph (d); and 
 the exemption of decisions of the National Workplace Relations 
Consultative Council in paragraph (l). 
Workplace relations decisions 
B.3 There are a number of exempt Acts and decisions in Schedule 1 relating to 
workplace relations.  The Council separately contacted the Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations, Fair Work Australia (FWA) and the Australian 
Building and Construction Commission (ABCC) to seek their comments on these 
exemptions.  The Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) made a submission to the Council during 
the consultation period. 
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B.4 A version of this exemption has been in the ADJR Act since it came into force.  At 
the time of the Council’s 1989 report, the exemption related to decisions of the Industrial 
Relations Court.  Overall in 1989 the Council considered that because, at the time, decisions 
of the Industrial Relations Commission were not subject to review under s 39B of the Judiciary 
Act 1903 (Cth) (Judiciary Act), it was also appropriate for them to be excluded from the 
ADJR Act.   
B.5 This consideration no longer applies.  The Federal Court was given the IRC 
jurisdiction in 1996 and the exemption in s 39B was removed.  It was not reinstated by the 
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Fair Work Act).  As a result, all FWA, FWO and ABCC decisions 
are excluded from the ADJR Act but not from s 39B review.  The Council’s previous views 
therefore need to be re-evaluated on a principled basis. 
Decisions by Fair Work Australia (paragraph (a)) 
B.6 In Report No 32 the Council stated that: 
The Commission is not an ordinary adjudicative tribunal.  Effectively, it is a 
legislative tribunal, the major decisions of which have an important impact on the 
Australian economy.  The parties to Commission proceedings are private 
individuals: employers on the one hand, employees on the other.855 
B.7 These considerations still apply to FWA.  FWA undertakes a variety of functions 
including: 
 setting the terms for ‘Modern Awards’; 
 making orders with respect to enterprise bargaining disputes; 
 setting the minimum wage; and 
 dealing with unfair dismissal matters. 
B.8 There is a legislative framework setting out criteria and relevant considerations for 
most of the decisions by FWA.  Award decisions determine future rights and conduct 
between employers and employees and are of general application.  They are therefore not 
purely administrative in character.  Bargaining decisions focus on parties reaching agreements 
and are analogous to private arbitration between parties. 
B.9 Section 563 of the Fair Work Act gives the Federal Court jurisdiction in any matter 
where  a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought in the Federal Court 
against a person holding office under the Act.  However, there have also been several 
applications for writs under s 39B of the Judiciary Act with respect to FWA decisions, some of 
which have been successful.856  The Federal Court has also held that s 562 of the Fair 
                                                          
855  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The Ambit of the Act, 
Report No 32 (1989) 58. 
856  Australian Postal Corporation v Gorman (2011)196 FCR 126; Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v 
Deputy President Hamberger (2011) 195 FCR 74; Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler (2011) 192 FCR 
78. 
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Work Act gives the Federal Court jurisdiction to grant mandamus.857  Other cases have 
involved the Federal Court’s jurisdiction under s 39B(1A)(c).858   
B.10 Similar considerations apply to decisions under the Fair Work (Registered 
Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth), which gives FWA the jurisdiction to grant the constitutional 
writs in s 339A, as well as the Fair Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential 
Amendments) Act 2009 (Cth), and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). 
B.11 The Council’s view is that the exemption for decisions of FWA is justified, due to 
the special nature of industrial relations decisions.  These decisions affect the national 
economy (for example, minimum wage decisions) and determine general rights and 
obligations into the future (in the case of Award decisions).  The Council also notes the 
arbitration functions of FWA in some matters.  The Council considers that the Fair Work Act 
provides a comprehensive system of review for FWA decisions.   
Recommendation B2 
The exemption of Fair Work Australia decisions in paragraph (a) of Schedule 1 of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
Fair Work Ombudsman decisions (paragraph (a)) 
B.12 The FWO has a variety of powers and functions including the power to investigate 
premises, issue compliance notices and apply to the Federal Court for civil penalty orders.  
These powers are similar to the powers of many regulatory bodies, which are not generally 
exempt from the ADJR Act.  Unlike FWA, the FWO does not function like a tribunal.  
Rather, its functions and powers are more those of an administrative decision maker. 
B.13 The FWO made a submission to the inquiry, and did not raise an objection to the 
general exemption in Schedule 1 being removed.  The FWO was more concerned about the 
possible removal of the exemption from the right to request reasons in Schedule 2(f) if the 
Schedule 1 exemption was repealed.859 
B.14 The Council does not propose that the exemption in Schedule 2(f) be removed.  The 
main argument for retaining the exemption for the FWO is that judicial review proceedings 
have the potential to fragment enforcement proceedings.  No other enforcement agencies 
have a general exemption on this basis.  Applications could currently be made under s 39B of 
the Judiciary Act. 
B.15 Overall, therefore, there is little justification for retaining the exemption for the 
FWO in Schedule 1.  The primary argument in support would simply be that the FWO is 
established by the Fair Work Act, and it makes sense to treat the FWO and FWA consistently.   
                                                          
857  Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Deputy President Hamberger (2011) 195 FCR 74. 
858  Alcoa of Australia Limited (ACN 004 879 298) v The Australian Workers’ Union (No 2) [2010] FCA 610. 
859  Fair Work Ombudsman, Submission No 22 (1 July 2011) 1. 
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B.16 However, the Council considers that the justifications relating to the special role of 
FWA do not apply to the FWO, and the exemption should be altered to distinguish decisions 
by the two bodies, making the FWO subject to the ADJR Act. 
Recommendation B3 
The exemption of Fair Work Ombudsman decisions in paragraph (a) of Schedule 1 of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed. 
Decisions under the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) 
(paragraph (a)) 
B.17 In his report on the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) 
(Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act), Justice Wilcox considered that ABCC 
decisions should for the most part be subject to review under the ADJR Act.860    
B.18 The Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act does not contain an appeals 
process within the legislation for application for judicial review writs.  The only judicial review 
available is under s 39B of the Judiciary Act.  In addition, the Building and Construction Industry 
Improvement Act contains occupational health and safety provisions which give the Federal 
Safety Commission accreditation powers.  These are regulatory-type powers which would 
ordinarily be subject to ADJR Act review. 
B.19 The ABCC submitted to the Council that the Commissioner agreed with the FWO’s 
submission—that the ADJR Act exemption for the Building and Construction Industry 
Improvement Act be removed, but the Schedule 2(f) exemptions be retained.861 
B.20 The Council considers that the exemption for the ABCC should be removed.  
However, with the passing of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Amendment 
(Transition to Fair Work) Act 2012 (Cth), the ABCC’s functions will now be undertaken by a 
Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate.  The Act also establishes the Fair Work Building 
Industry Inspectorate Advisory Board.  The Advisory Board’s role is to make 
recommendations to the Director on the policies and priorities of the Building Inspectorate.  
The Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act is renamed the Fair Work (Building 
Industry) Act 2012 (Cth).    
B.21 The Council considers, however, that as with the FWO, the functions carried out by 
the new Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate are regulatory in nature, and not subject to 
the same considerations as FWA’s adjudicative and conciliation functions. 
                                                          
860  Wilcox J, Transition to Fair Work Australia for the Building and Construction Industry (Commonwealth 
Government, 2009) 66 and 89. 
861  Office of the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner, comments provided to the 
Administrative Review Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (4 November 2011). 
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Recommendation B4 
The exemption of Australian Building and Construction Commission decisions in paragraph (a) 
of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed. 
National security decisions 
Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) (paragraph (d)) 
B.22 The Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) (Intelligence Services Act) sets out the functions of: 
the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation, 
and the Defence Signals Directorate.  These organisations obtain intelligence and conduct 
counter intelligence activities primarily in relation to persons or organisations outside 
Australia.   
B.23 These organisations are subject to a number of accountability mechanisms, 
including: 
 review by the Inspector General of Intelligence Security (IGIS); 
 oversight by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security 
(PJCIS); and  
 oversight by the Australian National Audit Office. 
B.24 The Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) submitted that the availability of 
judicial review could inhibit the proper functions of Intelligence Services Act agencies, both due 
to the risk of public exposure of intelligence information that is, by its very nature, secret, and 
due to the probable increase in the number of applications for review of decisions.  The 
AGD noted the existence of accountability mechanisms in the Act, including the requirement 
for ministerial authorisation of any activities additional to the express statutory functions of 
the agencies.  The AGD also pointed out that these agencies focus on persons and 
organisations outside Australia, and Ministerial authorisation is required where agencies 
perform incidental functions in respect of Australian persons or organisations.862   
B.25 The Council considers that the external focus of the Intelligence Services Act makes this 
an appropriate exemption. 
Recommendation B5 
The exemption of decisions under the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) in paragraph (d)of 
Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)  should be retained. 
                                                          
862  National Security Law and Policy Division, Attorney-General’s Department, comments provided to the 
Administrative Review Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (8 November 2011). 
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Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (paragraph (d)) 
B.26 The AGD pointed to the following accountability mechanisms which apply to ASIO 
in addition to review under s 39B of the Judiciary Act: review by the IGIS, and oversight by the 
PJCIS.863  There are also Ministerial accountability mechanisms, including Ministerial approval 
of warrant powers under Division 2 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (ASIO Act) require and requirements that the Director-General 
report to the Minister on the extent to which each warrant issued has assisted the organisation 
in carrying out its statutory functions.  Only s 39B review provides for review of the legality 
of decisions by a court, however.   
B.27 The AGD argues more specifically that powers which are part of a process of 
intelligence gathering provided for in the ASIO Act—such as the power to issue search 
warrants and the authorisation of the use of listening devices—raise issues parallel to those in 
relation to criminal investigations.  The AGD submitted that ‘even the knowledge of such 
warrants being issued will often be inimical to the purpose to be achieved—as with criminal 
investigations—and hence call into question the suitability of the application of the 
ADJR Act’.864   
B.28 The considerations discussed above regarding the need to protect sensitive security 
information justify the exemption of (at least some) decisions under the ASIO Act.  With 
regard to the analogy drawn by the AGD between intelligence gathering and criminal 
investigations, the Council notes that criminal investigations prior to prosecution are subject 
to the ADJR Act but exempt from the obligation to provide reasons865 and thus applicants 
would not have knowledge of warrants at the intelligence gathering stage. 
Recommendation B6 
The exemption from the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) of all decisions 
under the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) in paragraph (d) of Schedule 1 
of the ADJR Act should be reviewed. 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) (paragraph (d)) 
B.29 The IGIS is an accountability body for security and intelligence organisations.  The 
IGIS can receive complaints and can be directed by the government to conduct inquiries, and 
investigate the actions of intelligence agencies.  The IGIS produces reports and can make 
recommendations to government.  Judicial review of the IGIS’ decisions is likely to be of 
limited utility, given the non-binding nature of most IGIS decisions.866  The AGD submitted 
that concerns relating to the production of classified information in judicial review 
                                                          
863  National Security Law and Policy Division, Attorney-General’s Department, comments provided to the 
Administrative Review Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (8 November 2011). 
864  Ibid. 
865  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) sch 2 paragraph (e). 
866  While IGIS decisions on how to conduct an inquiry (for example, decisions to exercise its statutory 
information-gathering powers) are binding and supported by coercive powers, the findings and 
recommendations of an IGIS inquiry are merely advisory.   
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proceedings also apply to IGIS decisions.867  However, since the IGIS is an accountability 
body rather than an intelligence gathering body, the Council does not consider that the 
exemption from the ADJR Act should be retained. 
Recommendation B7 
The exemption of decisions under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) in 
paragraph (d) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should 
be removed. 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (paragraph (d)) 
B.30 The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act  1979 (Cth) (Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act) provides a regime for access to covert interception powers to assist 
with the investigation of certain offences, accessed by both Commonwealth and State and 
Territory interception agencies.  Government agencies in different jurisdictions oversee the 
operation of the regime and compliance with the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act.  
Queensland and Victoria have introduced Public Interest Monitors—independent bodies 
which represent the public interest in relation to applications for covert warrants. 
B.31 However, none of these mechanisms ensures legal accountability for decisions made 
under the Act, and are not consistent throughout jurisdictions.  Agencies monitoring the 
regime do not provide independent accountability to the same level as judicial review. 
B.32 Under the Act, Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) members nominated by the 
Attorney-General can, in a personal capacity, issue warrants.  The AGD submitted that 
warrants are appropriately reviewed during criminal justice proceedings, and that ADJR Act 
review would risk fragmenting those proceedings.868 
B.33 Generally, the AGD was concerned that capabilities and methodologies for covert 
techniques are protected, noting the potential for the release of small amounts of information 
through the judicial review process to build a picture which allowed offenders to modify their 
mode of operation.869 
B.34 Decisions to issue warrants under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act are 
sometimes reviewable under section 39B of the Judiciary Act.  However, because AAT 
members issuing warrants do so in a personal capacity, the court has no jurisdiction to grant a 
writ of mandamus or prohibition against a member who issued a warrant.870  Nevertheless, in 
Carmody v MacKellar,871 Merkel J held that the Court could grant remedies in relation to the 
continued operation of the warrant, for example preventing AFP officers from relying upon 
                                                          
867  National Security Law and Policy Division, Attorney-General’s Department, comments provided to the 
Administrative Review Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (8 November 2011). 
868  Ibid.  
869  Ibid. 
870  Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348. 
871  (1996) 68 FCR 265. 
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the warrants.872  Because no information is given to a person about the issue of a warrant a 
challenge to the validity of the warrant will almost always occur.   
B.35 The Council considers that the concerns about warrants are not a major issue.  If a 
person is not aware of the issue of a warrant, they cannot apply for review of the decision.  
There is no requirement to provide reasons or notice of such decisions because of the 
operation of paragraph (e) of Schedule 2 of the ADJR Act.  This means such decisions are 
extremely unlikely to be challenged.  Section 9A of the ADJR Act prevents these decisions 
from being subject to review once a prosecution is commenced.   
B.36 The Council therefore considers that there is no particular need for the specific 
inclusion of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act in Schedule 1, as the decisions of 
concern are either already excluded from Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 under more general 
headings.   
Recommendation B8 
The exemption of decisions under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) in 
paragraph (d) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should 
be reviewed in light of other exemptions in Schedules 1 and 2. 
Decisions under the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) (paragraph (daa)) 
B.37 Decisions made by the Attorney-General under s 58A of the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) to withdraw a telecommunications carrier licence on security 
grounds are exempt from review under the ADJR Act.  Directions made on security grounds 
under s 581(3) to a carriage provider to stop supplying services to a particular person are also 
exempt from review. 
B.38 Similar considerations apply to these decisions as to those discussed above about the 
dissemination of security information.   
Recommendation B9 
The exemption of decisions of the Attorney-General under s 58A or s 581(3) of the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) in paragraph (daa) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained.  
Certain Criminal Code decisions (paragraphs (dab) and (dac)) 
B.39 The AGD submitted to the Council that decisions of the Attorney-General under 
s 104.2 (to consent to the making of a request for an interim control order) and Division 105 
(relating to preventative detention orders) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code) 
are appropriately excluded from ADJR Act review because of their security nature.873 
                                                          
872  Carmody v MacKellar (1996) 68 FCR 265. 
873  Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Submission No 21 (9 August 2011) 6. 
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B.40 The justification for the exemption of decisions of the Attorney-General under 
s 104.2 seems to be related to these decisions being part of a ‘process’.  S 104.2 requires a 
senior member of the AFP to obtain the Attorney-General’s written consent prior to applying 
to a court for an interim control order.  If the Attorney-General consents, the AFP may apply 
to a court for the order.  The order, which may be made by a court under s 104.4,  is an 
interim order rather than a final order, issued for security reasons.  These interim orders are 
issued to prevent security threats materialising before criminal charges can be brought874 or a 
final order can be made by the court.  Section 104.4 requires the court to be satisfied on the 
balance of probabilities: 
 that making the order would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act; 
or 
 that the person has provided training to, or received training from, a listed 
terrorist organisation; and 
 that each of the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed on 
the person by the order is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate 
and adapted, for the purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist act. 
B.41 The interim control order must set a date (as soon as possible, but at least 72 hours 
after the interim control order is made) for the person to attend court for the court to 
confirm, vary or revoke the interim order, or declare the order void.  Given that this process 
involves a court making a substantive decision on the application made by the AFP officer 
with the consent of the Attorney-General, allowing for ADJR Act review of the 
Attorney-General’s decision is unnecessary, as it would interfere with another court process.  
The AGD also noted that there are appropriate judicial appeal mechanisms for the person 
subject to an order to challenge it once it is issued by the court.875   
Recommendation B10 
The exemption of decisions of the Attorney-General  under section 104.2 of the Criminal Code in 
paragraph (dab) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should 
be retained. 
B.42 Division 105 relates to preventative detention orders.  An initial preventative 
detention order can be issued under s 105.8 by a senior AFP officer for up to 24 hours, if 
there are reasonable grounds to suspect the person: 
 will engage in a terrorist act; 
 possesses a thing which is connected with the preparation for a 
terrorist Act; or 
                                                          
874  Criminal charges may not be brought against the person, as control orders are not necessarily related to 
later prosecutions.  Rather, they are protective in nature. 
875  National Security Law and Policy Division, Attorney-General’s Department, comments provided to the 
Administrative Review Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (8 November 2011). 
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 has done a thing in preparation for a terrorist Act.876 
B.43 The AFP officer must be satisfied that making the order would substantially assist in 
preventing a terrorist act occurring and that detaining the person for the relevant period 
under the order is reasonably necessary this purpose.877 
B.44 The ‘terrorist act’ must be imminent and likely to occur in the next 14 days.878  
Section 105.4 also allows an order to be issued if the AFP officer is satisfied that a terrorist 
act has occurred within the last 28 days and it is reasonably necessary to detain the person to 
preserve the evidence. 
B.45  The Commonwealth Ombudsman must be notified when an order has been made 
and when a person has been taken into custody under an order.  The order can be extended, 
but only up to 24 hours after the person was taken into custody under the initial order.  An 
application can also be made for a continued preventative detention order to certain issuing 
authorities.879  Continued preventative detention orders cannot be issued for longer than 48 
hours after the person was initially detained under the initial preventative detention order.  If 
the person is not taken into custody within 48 hours after an initial preventative detention 
order is made, the order ceases to have effect. 
B.46 The AGD notes that alternative mechanisms of review are available, including merits 
review of the decision to issue a control order by the Security Appeals Division of the 
AAT.880  Remedies available under this review include a determination that the 
Commonwealth should compensate the person who was detained if the Tribunal declares the 
decision to be void.  However, an application may not be made to a court or to the AAT 
while the control order is in force. 
B.47 Unlike s 104.2, there is no court involvement in this process.  It is related to an 
investigative process, but not one where criminal justice proceedings are already on foot.  
Section 39B review would be available.  As such there seems to be limited utility in excluding 
ADJR Act review.  However, given the short timeframes, judicial review proceedings may not 
be particularly useful in relation to these decisions.  As a general principle, administrative 
decisions made in relation to criminal investigation processes where proceedings have not yet 
commenced are not excluded from review.  The Council suggests that this exemption is 
achieving little, and could be removed, but notes that an application could be made in relation 
to a detention decision under s 39B of the Judiciary Act or using the merits review process in 
s 105.51 of the Criminal Code. 
                                                          
876  Criminal Code s 105.4(4). 
877  Ibid s 105.4(4). 
878  Ibid s 104.4(5). 
879  Certain judges, Federal Magistrates, AAT members and retired judges are issuing authorities for continued 
preventative detention orders. 
880  National Security Law and Policy Division, Attorney-General’s Department, comments provided to the 
Administrative Review Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (8 November 2011); see also 
Criminal Code s 105.51. 
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Recommendation B11 
The exemption of decisions under Division 105 of the Criminal Code in paragraph (dac) of 
Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed. 
Decisions regarding transfer of prisoners (paragraphs (xb) and (xc)) 
B.48 These exemptions appear to be based on the other ‘security’ exemptions.  As noted 
above, ‘security’ related decisions are not intrinsically unsuitable for review, but certain 
considerations with regard to the protection of information about national security agency 
operations may justify exemptions from ADJR Act review.  The problem with this exemption 
is that only one of the grounds needs to relate to national security for the exemption to apply 
to the entire decision.   
B.49 The Council’s view is that this exemption is not justified, and that provisions 
designed to protect any security information would be more appropriate for these decisions, 
rather than a Schedule 1 exemption. 
Recommendation B12 
The exemption of decisions regarding transfer of prisoners in paragraphs (xb) and (xc) of 
Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed.  
Security Appeals Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (paragraph (y)) 
B.50 There is a mechanism for review of security assessment decisions through a merits 
review process in the Security Appeals Division of the AAT.  The AGD submits that this 
merits review process has been specifically designed to balance security interests and 
individual rights.  The AGD supports maintaining this exemption, for reasons discussed 
above relating to the security of information.881 
B.51 Review of the AAT’s decision in the Federal Court is available via appeal under s 44 
of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act).  As discussed in Chapter 6, 
s 44 is an accessible and appropriate means of seeking review of AAT decisions.   
B.52 The Council therefore considers that, given the concern about protection of national 
security information (which is subject to particular controls in the Security Appeals Division), 
and the fact that review is available via s 44 and s 39B, this exemption should be maintained. 
Recommendation B13 
The exemption of decisions of the Security Appeals Division of the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal in paragraph (y) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 
(Cth) should be retained. 
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Financial regulation decisions 
Decisions under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) (paragraph (h)) 
B.53 Under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) (Foreign Acquisitions and 
Takeovers Act) foreign individuals and businesses can propose to invest in Australia.  The 
Treasurer is empowered to:  
 issue a statement of no objections;  
 issue a statement of no objections subject to conditions;  
 extend the initial 30 day time period for considering a proposal by a further 
90 days; or  
 prohibit the proposal.   
The Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act allows conditions to be imposed only where, 
but for the conditions, the proposal would be contrary to the national interest.  
Similarly, proposals are only prohibited where they are contrary to the national 
interest (and, by implication, these concerns cannot be resolved through conditions). 
B.54 Judicial review applications can be made in relation foreign to investment decisions 
under s 39B of the Judiciary Act.  There are two main groups that would have standing to 
apply for review: 
 a party to the transaction, seeking review of a decision to prohibit an 
investment or apply conditions; and 
 individuals or organisations not party to the transaction, whose interests are 
directly affected by a decision not to object to or prohibit a proposal. 
B.55 The extent to which the courts are able to review determinations by the Treasurer 
under s 39B of the Judiciary Act was considered in Canwest Global Communications 
Corporation v the Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia.882  Hill J stated that: 
A court would be loath to interfere with a discretion vested in the Treasurer on a 
matter such as national interest.  … Parliament has entrusted decisions on matters 
of national interest to the Treasurer; not to the courts.  … If it can be shown that 
the Treasurer has not fulfilled a condition precedent to making an order under 
s 18 (for example, because the Treasurer erred in law in coming to the conclusion 
that a person was a foreign corporation) the Court can intervene to set aside the 
decision.  So too, if the Treasurer in forming a view about the national interest 
takes into account a matter which is clearly irrelevant to the national interest, the 
Court can intervene.  So too, if the Treasurer has made a decision which no 
reasonable person acting in accordance with his authority could have made, the 
Court can intervene.  But the area in which judicial challenge can succeed is 
                                                          
882  (1997) 147 ALR 509. 
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clearly circumscribed by the breadth of the consideration of national interest 
entrusted to the Treasurer.883 
B.56 In its Report No 1, Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Regulations, the Council 
mentioned that the reason put forward by the Department of the Treasury for exemption of 
these decisions was that classified or commercially confidential material may have to be 
revealed in proceedings or statements of reasons.   
B.57 In Report No 32 the Council did not agree, and was of the view that the exemption 
should be removed, for a number of reasons.  First, the Council was of the view that other 
legal principles would operate to protect sensitive information in an ADJR Act matter as well 
as in a s 39B matter.  The Council considered that the question of exemption from the 
requirement to provide a statement of reasons on request was a separate matter.  Secondly, 
the Council considered that the fact that the national interest was one of the criteria to be 
taken into account did not justify the exclusion of judicial review.  Thirdly, the Council 
considered that the enforceability of the Treasurer’s orders in State and Territory Supreme 
Courts indicated that they should be subject to review. 
B.58 A minority of the Council disagreed with this position and considered that the 
national interest considerations justified continued exemption from the operation of the 
ADJR Act.  This dissenting view is possibly less compelling now, as there are many decisions 
in legislation, most subject to ADJR Act review, which require a Minister to consider the 
‘national interest’.  Examples include the decision not to grant or to cancel an international 
broadcasting licence under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth), the making of exemption 
orders under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), a number of decisions in the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) and in the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth).  The Council has not considered this to be a general 
principle justifying exemption. 
B.59 In relation to this inquiry, the Council notes several concerns about removing the 
exemption, including: 
 the potential for an increase in applications under the ADJR Act due to the 
more liberal standing rules, increasing the costs of administering the Act; 
 an indirect cost in the form of applicants being more reluctant to share 
information with the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), due to an 
actual or perceived likelihood of information being disclosed in ADJR Act 
proceedings which may have the ancillary impact of impairing the quality of 
advice provided by the FIRB Secretariat on foreign investment proposals; 
and 
 broader economic impacts from increased complexity of processing 
applications. 
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B.60 While the Council acknowledges the disadvantage of a potential increase in the cost 
of administering the Act, it does not regard it as a principled reason for exemption.  The most 
compelling reason for an exemption, in the Council’s view, is the potential broad impacts on 
the national economy if applicants become less willing to share information due to a 
perceived likelihood of information being disclosed in ADJR Act proceedings.  The Council 
does not consider that more information would actually be disclosed in ADJR Act 
proceedings. 
B.61 The Council considers that the exemption should, on balance, be retained.  Review 
under s 39B of the Judiciary Act is fairly limited, and applying a new review scheme could 
potentially have serious consequences for the national economy. 
Recommendation B14 
The exemption of decisions under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) in 
paragraph (h) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should 
be retained. 
Decisions of the Minister under Division 1 of Part 7.4 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
(paragraph (ha)) 
B.62 This provision relates to limits on share ownership in certain types of companies.  
The Minister makes decisions under the provision taking into account the ‘national interest’.  
Presumably this is the reason why the exemption was originally inserted.  However, many 
decisions with a similar criterion are reviewable under the ADJR Act, and the decision does 
not seem to be one of particular national significance (for example,  there seems to be less of 
an argument here than for the foreign takeovers legislation, which involves relations with 
other countries).   
B.63 The Council has been made aware that, as a number of other review mechanisms 
already exist—by way of an application under s 1337B of the Corporations Act 2001(Cth) 
(Corporations Act) and under s 39B of the Judiciary Act—the exemption is of little utility.  
Moreover, even an exemption from the obligation to give reasons would be of little utility 
given the availability of discovery in litigation. 
Recommendation B15 
The exemption of decisions of the Minister under under Division 1 of Part 7.4 of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in paragraph (ha) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed. 
Decisions of the SEGC under Part 7.5 of the Corporations Act (paragraph (hb)) 
B.64 The Security Exchanges Guarantee Corporation (SEGC) is a company limited by 
guarantee which was incorporated in 1987 to be the trustee of the National Guarantee Fund 
(NGF).  The sole member of SEGC is ASX Limited.  Part 7.5 confers on the SEGC powers 
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to make various other decisions relating to the management of the NGF including decisions 
about borrowing money, giving security, determining the size of the fund, the imposition of 
levies on market operators and participants and making operating rules about the Fund. 
B.65 A claimant who is dissatisfied with a decision of the SEGC may bring proceedings 
under s 888H of the Corporations Act to establish their claim.  The courts’ powers in these 
cases are broader than on a judicial review application, and allow the court to consider the 
merits of the decision. 
B.66 It has been suggested that the commercial nature of many of these decisions is a 
possible justification for maintaining the existing exemption of ADJR Act review.  The 
Council was made aware that there are a number of other safeguards available, such as 
ministerial disallowance of decisions. 
B.67 The Council’s view is that ministerial disallowance and scrutiny is not an appropriate 
substitute for judicial review.  The commercial nature of the decisions is not a principle which 
the Council considers justifies the exemption of ADJR Act review, where the decisions are 
made under an enactment and would otherwise be subject to review.  The SEGC is still 
fulfilling a regulatory function rather than operating in a competitive commercial 
environment.  Review would be available under s 39B of the Judiciary Act, and does not appear 
to be utilised by applicants, probably due to the availability of proceedings under s 888H, 
which allow an assessment of the merits of the case.   
B.68 As such, the best justification for maintaining the exemption is that a review 
mechanism currently exists which is as efficient and effective as ADJR Act review.  The 
Council considers that the s 888H provides such a scheme, and the exemption should be 
retained. 
Recommendation B16 
The exemption of decisions of the Security Exchanges Guarantee Corporation under Part 7.5 of 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in paragraph (hb) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
Decisions by APRA relating to certain insolvency matters (paragraphs (hc) and (hd)) 
B.69 This provision relates to payments made by the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) to account holders with protected accounts with an Authorised Deposit-
taking Institution, or to policyholders with a General Insurer, which APRA has sought to be 
wound up for insolvency.  The decisions which are exempt from the ADJR Act are: 
 the dollar amounts of individual entitlements of depositors under the 
Financial Claims Scheme (FCS); and  
 decisions as to whether a person has a valid claim against an insurer under 
the FCS as it relates to insurance. 
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B.70 The Explanatory Memorandum justified the exemption as ensuring:  
that the scheme can be administered in a seamless and timely way.  If depositors 
were able to challenge the decision of APRA about individual entitlements and 
amounts received, there is the potential to delay finalisation of payments to all 
depositors which could significantly complicate the management of the failure. 
Similarly, the FCS is designed to ensure that eligible insurance claims are paid in a 
normal timeframe, rather than in the liquidation stage which is considerably more 
drawn out.  As such, any mechanism which reviews APRA’s decision to pay 
claims in a normal timeframe would seem to undermine the point of the FCS.884 
B.71 Policyholders can still pursue outstanding amounts that they believe they are owed 
through the liquidation process. 
B.72 APRA has informed the Council that ADJR Act review, because it is more accessible 
(than the alternative route under s39B of the Judiciary Act), would increase the likelihood of 
challenges to APRA’s decisions and compromise APRA’s ability to fulfil its responsibilities.885 
B.73 The Council agrees with the reasoning in the explanatory memorandum, and with 
APRA’s position.   
Recommendation B17 
The exemptions of decisions by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority relating to 
certain insolvency matters in paragraphs (hc) and (hd) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
Decisions giving effect to the foreign investment policy of the Commonwealth Government under the 
Banking (Foreign Exchange) Regulations 1959 (Cth) (paragraph (j)) 
B.74 The Council stated in 1989 that it was appropriate that decisions made with regard 
to high level policy should still be able to be tested for legality, and that this exemption was 
therefore not justified.886  The Council considered that the broad scope of the decision was 
likely to limit review.887 
B.75 The main issue with this exemption is that the decisions or classes of decisions 
which are exempt from the ADJR Act are extremely unclear.  The Banking (Foreign Exchange) 
Regulations 1959 (Cth) governs the ability of the Reserve Bank to regulate foreign currency 
exchanges, transfer of money outside Australia, proceeds of exports and a number of other 
matters relating to foreign exchanges. 
                                                          
884  Explanatory Memorandum, Financial System Legislation Amendment (Financial Claims Scheme and Other 
Measures) Bill 2008 (Cth) 54 [3.39]–[3.40]. 
885  The Treasury, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on existing exemptions from the 
ADJR Act (19 December 2011). 
886  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The Ambit of the Act, 
Report No 32 (1989) 69. 
887  Ibid. 
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B.76 There does not seem to be much justification for this exemption on the face of the 
provision given that: 
 these decisions would be subject to review under s 39B of the Judiciary Act; 
 the lack of transparency about which decisions are excluded from 
ADJR Act review; and 
 the fact that the legality of a decision, not the policy behind it, is subject to 
review.   
Recommendation B18 
The exemption of decisions giving effect to the foreign investment policy of the Commonwealth 
Government under the Banking (Foreign Exchange) Regulations 1959 (Cth) in paragraph (j) of 
Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed. 
Customs decisions 
Decision to require and take securities in respect of duty that may be payable under the Customs 
Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act 1975 (Cth) (paragraph (p)) 
B.77 Paragraph (p) was inserted in Schedule 1 by the Customs Securities (Anti-Dumping) 
Amendment Act 1982 (Cth), which also introduced s 42(1B) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) 
(Customs Act) which provided an express power to take such securities.  These amendments 
followed litigation under the ADJR Act which challenged decisions to impose securities.888  
B.78 Section 42 allows securities to be taken from importers in relation to certain goods.  
Applications for the imposition of trade measures are made to the CEO, and investigated by 
the CEO, leading up to a report to the Minister, within 155 days of initiation.889  The Minister 
can only impose measures if satisfied that there has been dumping (sale of goods for export 
to Australia at less than the price in the country of export) or a subsidy is provided by the 
exporting country, and that has caused material injury to an Australian industry producing like 
goods.890 
B.79 Not later than 60 days after the initiation of such an investigation, the CEO may 
make a Preliminary Affirmative Determination under s 269TD, that there appear to be 
sufficient grounds for the publication of a dumping duty or countervailing duty notice, which 
must be publicly notified.  It is once that Determination has been made that most securities 
are taken under s 42 for duty which may become payable under the Customs Tariff 
(Anti-Dumping) Act 1975 (Cth). 
B.80 The securities that are taken at that stage are usually only in the form of an 
undertaking, and at the level calculated at the time of the s 269TD decision as the likely 
                                                          
888  See Tasman Timber Ltd v Minister for Industry and Commerce (1982) 46 ALR 149; Feltex Reidrubber Ltd v Minister 
for Industry and Commerce (1982) 46 ALR 171. 
889  Customs Securities (Anti-Dumping) Amendment Act 1982 (Cth) ss 269TB–TEB.   
890  Ibid ss 269TG–TJA. 
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amount of the anti-dumping or countervailing duty that will be imposed.  If the Minister 
ultimately decides to impose duty upon receipt of the report of the CEO on the investigation, 
the duty cannot be imposed retrospectively unless there has been a s 269TD preliminary 
affirmative decision and securities have been taken, and the amount of retrospective duty 
then collected must not exceed the amount of the securities taken.891 If the Minister decides 
not to impose measures, then the securities are cancelled, and no retrospective duty is 
imposed.  The securities expire within six months.892 
B.81 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) submitted that these 
provisions and practice are designed to be consistent with the relevant World Trade 
Organisation International Agreements.  The taking of securities is part of the system of 
imposing provisional measures to protect Australian industry pending completion of an 
investigation that is recognised both under the Customs Act and the relevant International 
Agreements.  Those international agreements require member nations to provide for judicial 
or administrative review of final determination decisions, but do not require any review to be 
provided of the imposition of provisional measures.  Consistent with those requirements, the 
final decisions by the Minister are subject to administrative review, as provided in Division 9 
of Part XVB of the Customs Act .  Final decisions of the Minister are also subject to judicial 
review, both under s39B of the Judiciary Act and under the ADJR Act.893 
B.82 The Council commented in Report No 32 that the exemption had not achieved a 
great deal, as a number of applications for review had been made under s 39B.894 
B.83 In response to the Council’s inquiries in relation to this inquiry, however, the 
ACBPS submitted that the exemption should be retained.  The ACBPS noted that the taking 
of these securities: 
 are  taken as a preliminary and precautionary decision, subject to a final 
determination at a later stage; 
 are usually taken only in the form of an undertaking; 
 are taken as part of a system for imposing provisional measures of trade 
measures for the interim protection of Australian industry that is recognised 
in International Law, and 
 the final decision is usually made within a few months of the initial taking of 
securities, and the securities expire anyway within 6 months.895 
B.84 The ACBPS noted that while the taking of these securities is not exempt from s 39B 
of the Judiciary Act, it perhaps it should be.  The ACBPS submitted that these decisions may 
                                                          
891  Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 269TN; Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act 1975 (Cth) s 12. 
892  Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act 1975 (Cth) s 42(3). 
893  Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, comments provided to the Administrative Review 
Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (28 October 2011). 
894  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The Ambit of the Act, 
Report No 32 (1989) 73. 
895  Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, comments provided to the Administrative Review 
Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (28 October 2011). 
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not be final and operative consistent with the High Court’s decision in the Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond,896 and that the exemption therefore would preclude applications, 
and possibly signal public policy reasons in s 39B cases why the taking of securities may not 
be appropriate for judicial review.897 
B.85 The Council is of the view that the arguments for retaining the exemption do not 
correspond with any of the principles for excluding ADJR Act review.  The ACBPS makes 
the point that the decisions may not be final and operative, and therefore not within the 
ADJR Act jurisdiction.898  It is appropriate that this question is answered by the Court.  There 
is no legal basis for arguing that an ADJR Act exemption signals that a matter is not 
appropriate for constitutional review, and this has not been the case with migration decisions 
or any other decisions listed in Schedule 1.  Section 39B review remains appropriate, as these 
decisions are not ones which should be litigated in the High Court in the first instance.   
Recommendation B19 
The exemption of decisions to require and take securities in respect of duty that may be payable 
under the Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act 1975 (Cth) in paragraph (p) of Schedule 1 of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed. 
Decisions making, or forming part of the process of making, or leading up to the making of, 
assessments or calculations of tax, charge or duty, or decisions disallowing objections to assessments 
or calculations of tax, charge or duty, or decisions amending, or refusing to amend, assessments or 
calculations of tax, charge or duty, under the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) and Customs 
Tariff Act 1995 (Cth) (paragraph (e)) 
B.86  These exemptions are included in the list of taxation-type decisions in paragraph (e).  
The system for applying for review of the imposition of customs duties is similar to the 
system in the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (Taxation Administration Act).  The ACBPS 
submitted to the Council that ‘the AAT is the major jurisdiction for independent review of 
decisions regarding ordinary customs duty (ie that imposed by the Customs Tariff Act 1995 )’.899 
B.87 Section 273GA(1)(haaa) of the Customs Act states that a decision to refuse a refund 
of duty under s 163 of the Customs Act is directly reviewable by the AAT.  The ACBPS noted 
that: 
a decision demanding the payment of customs duty can also be challenged by: 
 paying the duty demanded under protest under s 167 of [the] Customs 
Act; 
 and then, within six months, either 
                                                          
896  (1990) 170 CLR 321. 
897  Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, comments provided to the Administrative Review 
Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (28 October 2011). 
898  Ibid. 
899  Ibid. 
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o instituting a Court action to recover the money as provided in 
s 167(4); or 
o applying to the AAT for review as provided in s 273GA(2), for 
review of the demand, or any decision forming part of the 
process of making, or leading up to the making of, that 
demand.900 
B.88 The ACBPS also stated that they were not aware of any s 167(4) Court actions since 
the AAT alternative was introduced.  The ACBPS argued that ‘this indicates that importers 
are generally much happier to dispute duty via the AAT, which enables full merits 
review, rather than via the Courts’.901 
B.89 Finally, the ACBPS noted that: 
where a demand for duty is made as a result of audit activity, on goods that have 
already entered home consumption, the importer may simply refuse to pay the 
duty, and can dispute liability for the duty in a debt recovery action:  Malika 
Holdings Pty Ltd v Stretton (2001) 204 CLR 290.  Customs would then have to 
establish that the duty was due, to the satisfaction of the Court.  That would 
usually enable the Court to in effect review both the legality and the merits of 
each aspect of Customs decision to demand duty.  This has occurred in some 
cases.902 
B.90  In this case, the Council agrees that there is an existing, comprehensive system of 
judicial review, analogous to the system of review of taxation decisions in Part IVC of the 
Taxation Administration Act, which provides for both merits review and review by the courts. 
Recommendation B20 
The exemption of decisions relating to assessments or calculations of tax, charge or duty under 
the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) and Customs Tariff Act 1995 (Cth) in paragraph (e) of Schedule 1 of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
Miscellaneous decisions 
Decisions under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) (paragraph (o)) 
B.91 The Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) provides for its own code of appeals and 
review relating to discipline in the Defence Force.  The Department of Defence in its 
submission to the current inquiry supported maintaining this exemption: 
The armed forces are disciplined forces which are hierarchically organised.  
Military discipline is, and always has been, an essential aspect of command of the 
Defence Force.  The offences contained in the Defence Force Discipline Act 
                                                          
900  Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, comments provided to the Administrative Review 
Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (28 October 2011). 
901  Ibid. 
902  Ibid. 
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exist only to facilitate discipline within the Defence Force and do not have 
broader application outside of the military environment.903  
B.92 Defence made a similar argument in 1989.  The Council, however, did not consider 
this to be sufficient reason to justify an exemption, on the basis that s 10 of the ADJR Act 
provided room for the court to refuse to grant an application for review on the basis that a 
more adequate remedy is available.904 
B.93 However, there does seem to be more merit to Defence’s argument than the Council 
gave credit to in 1989.  Different considerations apply to decisions made by the military about 
individuals within the organisation than in relation to most administrative decisions.  The 
nature of the military, the currently voluntary nature of military service and the importance of 
hierarchy are all factors which distinguish military discipline decisions from other 
administrative decisions.  Constitutional judicial review remains available, clearly, but it is 
possible that in the case of the military, constitutional review is sufficient.  The Council is also 
mindful that further reforms to military justice have been announced by the Government as a 
consequence of the decision of the High Court that declared the Australian Military Court to 
be unconstitutional.905 
Recommendation B21 
The exemption of decisions under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) in paragraph (o) of 
Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
Decisions under subsection 25(1) or Part IIIA of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) 
(paragraph q) 
B.94 Section 25(1) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) (Commonwealth Electoral 
Act) involves the Governor-General’s power to terminate the appointment of an ‘electoral 
officer by reason of misbehaviour or physical or mental incapacity’.  The Australian Electoral 
Commission (AEC) submitted that this power is not an AEC power but one exercisable by 
the Governor-General and therefore does not impact on the AEC’s administration. 
B.95 Part IIIA of the Commonwealth Electoral Act no longer exists.  Before 1983, this part 
dealt with redistributions.  Those provisions are now contained in Part IV of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act.  Part IV now also contains s 77 which states that ‘notwithstanding 
anything contained in any other law’, decisions of the AEC and the Augmented Electoral 
Commission are final on redistribution matters.  Part IIIA in paragraph (q) of Schedule 1 of 
the ADJR Act is therefore not required in order to exclude these decisions from review under 
the Act. 
B.96 Part IV relates to electoral re-distributions.  Section 48(1) requires the Electoral 
Commissioner, after he has ascertained the numbers of the people in the Commonwealth and 
                                                          
903  Department of Defence, Department of Defence, Submission No 4 (24 June 2011) 4–5. 
904  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The Ambit of the Act, 
Report No 32 (1989) 73. 
905  Lane v Morrison (2010) 239 CLR 230. 
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the several States to determine the number of members of the House of Representatives to be 
chosen in the several States at a general election.  Section 48(3) provides that a decision by the 
Electoral Commissioner is final and conclusive, subject to the Australian Constitution and to 
s 39B of the Judiciary Act. 
B.97 Section 77 of Part IV of the Electoral Act likewise provides that decisions made 
under the Part by the Electoral Commissioner, the Electoral Commission, a redistribution 
committee, an augmented Electoral Commission, or the redistribution commissioners for a 
State are final and conclusive.  They remain, however, subject to review under the Constitution 
and to s 39B of the Judiciary Act.   
B.98 In 1989, the Council took the view that the availability of review under s 39B meant 
that decisions under Part IV should not be excluded from the operation of the Act.906  The 
Electoral Commissioner, on the other hand, ‘argued strongly for the maintenance of the 
present exclusion’, submitting that ‘opportunities to disrupt the redrawing of boundaries open 
to persons with a vexatious or partisan purpose ought to be minimised to the greatest extent 
possible.’907  The Commissioner also raised concerns about the risk of delay in completing a 
redistribution which the possibility of review under the ADJR Act would bring.908 
B.99 This Council considers that decisions relating to election boundaries are of a special 
nature, and that it is appropriate to continue deal with these matters in the constitutional 
review jurisdiction.  The AEC notes that other accountability mechanisms in Part IV of 
the Act apply to re-distribution decisions, including the requirement to publish statements of 
reasons, issue draft re-distribution proposals and to hold public hearings.909 
B.100 More broadly, the Council notes that most decisions under the Electoral Act can be 
reviewed under the ADJR Act, depending on the timing of applications for review, and the 
nature of relief sought.  The notable exception is challenges to the results of an election, 
where the Court of Disputed Returns has exclusive review jurisdiction,910 and only where a 
petition is lodged within 40 days after the declaration of the poll.  This exception recognises 
the public benefit in the quick resolution of elections. 
Recommendation B22 
The exemption of decisions under subsection 25(1) or Part IIIA of the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) in paragraph (q) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
                                                          
906  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The Ambit of the Act, 
Report No 32 (1989) 74–75. 
907  Ibid 74. 
908  Ibid. 
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Decisions under section 176 or 248 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (paragraph qa) 
B.101 Section 176 is a decision to apply for a civil penalty order taken by the CEO of the 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC).  As discussed above, 
applications for civil penalty orders are appropriately not subject to judicial review under the 
ADJR Act.  If covered by a more general exemption as recommended, this exemption could 
be removed. 
Recommendation B23 
The exemption of decisions under section 176 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing Act 2006 (Cth) in paragraph (qa) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) should be removed if a new general exemption for application 
for civil penalty orders is included in the ADJR Act. 
B.102 Section 248 gives the AUSTRAC CEO the power to declare that the Act does not 
apply to a particular person.  The AGD and AUSTRAC submitted that these decisions were 
appropriately subject to review on the basis that: 
 they are similar to a legislative decision under s 247 of the Act (s 247 
provides that the Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism Financing 
Rules (AML/CTF Rules) may provide that a specified provision of this Act 
does not apply to a designated service that is of a kind specified in the 
AML/CTF Rules); 
 decisions require consideration of the broader impact on the financial 
sector, not merely the individual concerned; 
 ADJR Act review would risk exposing information about people who 
supplied information to AUSTRAC; and 
 the availability of review could increase costs for AUSTRAC. 
B.103 While the decision may be similar to the decision under s 247, the decision under 
s 248 is appropriately subject to judicial review because it is not legislative in nature—ie it 
applies to a particular person rather than to a class of individuals.  It is also unlikely that 
ADJR Act review would significantly increase the number of applications, and therefore costs.  
Regardless, costs are not a justification for excluding ADJR Act review, as the same argument 
could be made with respect to any decision.  The concern about exposing information could 
be appropriately dealt with by a Schedule 2 exemption.  The remaining reason—the need to 
consider broader financial impacts not just the individual—is likely to affect the grounds of 
review available, and may make successful review applications less likely.  Many decisions 
currently reviewable under the ADJR Act require assessments of this kind. 
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Recommendation B24 
The exemption of decisions under section 248 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing Act 2006 (Cth) in paragraph (qa) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed.  
Decisions under the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) (paragraph (r)) 
B.104 In 1989, the majority of the Council was of the view that this exemption should be 
removed, given the availability of review under s 39B.911 However, a minority of the Council 
expressed the view that the statutory review mechanisms in the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) 
(Extradition Act) should remain the primary means of seeking review of such decisions, in line 
with the expectations of foreign governments.912 
B.105 The AGD in its submission to the current inquiry supported retaining this 
exemption because is facilitates the expeditious resolution of extradition cases, and because 
judicial review is already available under s 39B of the Judiciary Act and through the appeals 
mechanisms in the Extradition Act.913 
B.106 In relation to extradition two principles therefore justify the retention of the 
exemption: 
 the fact that there are no issues with access to suitable review in relation to 
extradition decisions (given that review is almost always sought at various 
stages of the process and applicants are clearly able to exercise their review 
rights under both the Extradition Act and s 39B), and that there is an 
appeals process in the Act, indicates that this exemption is not limiting the 
accessibility or effectiveness of review; and 
 as observed in the Council’s Report No 47, The Scope of Judicial Review, 
the availability of ADJR Act review could interfere with other legal 
processes. 
Recommendation B25 
The exemption of decisions under the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) in paragraph (r) of Schedule 1 
of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained.  
                                                          
911  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The Ambit of the Act, 
Report No 32 (1989) 75–77. 
912  Ibid 82. 
913  The Australian Government has proposed a number of amendments to the Extradition Act 1988, but not to 
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Determinations made by the Child Support Registrar under Part 6A of the Child Support 
(Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) (paragraph (s)) 
B.107 Part 6A of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) relates to decisions by the 
Child Support Registrar to determine that the Act can be departed from in relation to an 
administrative assessment of child support.  Individuals can apply for such a determination to 
be made, or the Registrar can make the determination on his or her own initiative.  Under 
s 80 of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) (Child Support (Registration and 
Collection) Act), either the carer entitled to child support or the liable parent may lodge an 
objection to the decision.  The Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act sets out a number of 
detailed notice requirements which the Registrar must comply with. 
B.108 The Registrar’s decision in relation to the objection, including decisions as to 
extensions of time, are subject to review by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT), and 
following that are subject to appeals on a question of law from the SSAT.  The Child Support 
(Registration and Collection) Act also sets out detailed provision for proceedings in the SSAT. 
B.109 These decisions are subject to a well-established existing review scheme, which 
provides for both merits review and review by the court on a question of law.   
Recommendation B26 
The exemption of determinations made by the Child Support Registrar under Part 6A of the 
Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) in paragraph (s) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
Decisions by private companies (paragraphs (t), (u), (v), (va), (za) and (zb)) 
B.110 The decisions of the following private companies and their subsidiaries are excluded 
from the ADJR Act: 
 Qantas Airways Limited; 
 Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation Limited; 
 CSL Limited; 
 Telstra Corporation Limited; and 
 Snowy Hydro Limited. 
B.111 Decisions made under Part VIIIB of the Judiciary Act, which relates to the 
establishment of the Australian Government Solicitor, are also excluded. 
B.112 These provisions are all directed to ensuring that decisions of privatised companies 
are not subject to judicial review of decisions, given that they are established or privatised by 
statute.  Given that none of those acts contain actual decision-making powers, these 
exemptions are probably unnecessary to achieve this purpose.  It is unlikely that any decisions 
taken by the companies would be made ‘under’ the relevant enactment.  The Department of 
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Finance and Deregulation submitted that decisions of Snowy Hydro should be exempted 
because of the commercial nature of its operations.914   
B.113 The Council considers that these exemptions are unnecessary, given that these 
bodies, while established by statute, do not make decisions ‘under’ enactments.   
Recommendation B27 
The exemptions of decisions by private companies and of decisions made under Part VIIIB of 
the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in paragraphs (t), (u), (v), (va), (za) and (zb) of Schedule 1 of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed. 
Witness protection program (paragraphs (w) and (x)) 
B.114 The Witness Protection Act 1994 (Cth) (Witness Protection Act) provides for the 
protection of participants in the National Witness Protection Program (NWPP). 
B.115 The AGD submitted that disclosure that a person is a participant in the NWPP can 
compromise the safety of the participant or that of their family and that disclosure of the 
workings of the NWPP can compromise the safety of police officers assigned to the 
program.915  Disclosure of NWPP information is an offence under the Witness Protection Act.  
The NWPP is also subject to various complaints mechanisms, including oversight by the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman and internal complaints processes.  Some decisions in the Act 
are also subject to internal review. 
B.116 The Council considers that given the importance of protecting the safety of 
participants in the NWPP, and the fact that the decisions made under the Act largely relate to 
consensual agreements between a witness and the Commissioner and as such are not ordinary 
administrative decisions, it is not appropriate to have these decisions subject to ADJR Act 
review. 
Recommendation B28 
The exemption of decisions relating to the National Witness Protection Program in 
paragraphs (w) and (x) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) 
should be retained. 
Decisions under section 34B or 34D of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) 
(paragraph (wa)) 
B.117 Section 34B of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) relates to applications 
by an examiner for contempt order from a court.  Section 34D gives the examiner the power 
to order the detention of person in respect of whom the contempt order request has been 
made. 
                                                          
914  Department of Finance and Deregulation, Submission No 19 (18 July 2011) 6. 
915  Attorney-General’s Department, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on existing 
exemptions from the ADJR Act (31 October 2011).  
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B.118 These exemptions appear to be in place because the power of the examiner in 
respect of these decisions is more ‘court-like’ in nature.  The ACC did not comment on these 
current exemptions in its submissions.  A decision to detain is a serious decision.  However, a 
decision to apply for a contempt order is appropriately reviewed as part of the Court’s 
consideration of the application.  Since the detention is linked to the request, it seems logical 
to also exempt the detention decision.  Both decisions would only have effect until the court 
made a final decision as to the contempt order, making judicial review of the decision an 
unnecessary delay.   
Recommendation B29 
The exemption of decisions under section 34B or 34D of the Australian Crime 
Commission Act 2002 (Cth) in paragraph (wa) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
Decisions to prosecute persons for any offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a 
Territory (paragraph (xa)) 
B.119 This general exemption is justified by the potential disruptive effect on criminal 
proceedings.  However, the exemption was not recommended by the Council in its 1989 
report.  The Council's view  was that the court had sufficient discretion to avoid interference 
with the criminal prosecution process, and only exceptional circumstances would justify 
interference.916  The Council was of the view that the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions (CDPP) should be accountable for the legality of prosecution decisions, and as 
such should be subject to ADJR Act review.   
B.120 This provision was inserted in 2000 by the Jurisdiction of Courts Legislation 
Amendment Act 2000 (Cth) (Jurisdiction of Courts Act).  The Minister in his second reading 
speech stated that the purpose of the amendment was ‘to avoid the use of unmeritorious 
delaying tactics in the criminal justice process’.917  The Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee 
expressed concerns that the provision would also prevent meritorious applications for review, 
in its Alert Digest No  3 of 2000. 
B.121 In response to the Committee, the Attorney-General gave the following reasons for 
the provision: 
 The cross-vesting of jurisdiction in Federal, State and Territory courts 
meant that federal criminal prosecutions could occur in State and Territory 
courts, and that those courts had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the matter 
where the prosecution was commenced in those courts 
 By making an ADJR Act application in the Federal Court (noting that 
ADJR Act applications must be made in the Federal Court), a person could 
                                                          
916  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The Ambit of the Act, 
Report No 32 (1989) 86–67. 
917  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 March 2000, 14,111 
(Daryl Williams MP, Attorney-General). 
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remove the action from the State or Territory court, thus losing priority for 
the criminal matter.  This increases the duration and costs of the criminal 
prosecution, as well as the consequence of loss of recall on the part of 
witnesses, and the possible unavailability of documentary evidence for 
investigators. 
 The Jurisdiction of Courts Act also conferred s 39B writ jurisdiction on State 
and Territory Courts, in matters where the State or Territory court had 
exclusive jurisdiction (see s 39B(1B) of the Judiciary Act).918 
B.122 As a result, a decision to prosecute could be challenged in a State or Territory court 
as part of the criminal proceedings, and the State or Territory court could issue constitutional 
writs in such a case. 
B.123 The situation now is quite different to that in 1989.  There are good reasons relating 
to court jurisdiction and the desirability of not allowing delays in criminal proceedings for 
exempting these decisions from the ADJR Act, noting that judicial review writs are otherwise 
available through the operation of the Judiciary Act. 
Recommendation B30 
The exemption of decisions to prosecute persons for any offence against a law of the 
Commonwealth, a State or a Territory in paragraph (xa) of Schedule 1 of the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
CDPP or examiner decisions in relation to proceeds of crime (paragraphs (ya), (yb) and (yc)) 
B.124 This Part relates to examinations conducted by an approved examiner in relation to 
orders made by a court (eg restraining order, compensation order, confiscation order) on 
application by the CDPP. 
B.125 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) (Proceeds of Crime Act) proceedings are closely tied with 
criminal proceedings and are akin to proceedings for civil penalties (to the extent that they 
involve an application to the court for orders).  Furthermore, as for criminal proceedings, 
questions relating to a decision to prosecute under the Proceeds of Crime Act can be addressed 
by the court in the course of those proceedings.  This would avoid the fragmentation of 
proceedings that separate review by a different court, under the ADJR Act, would entail.   
Recommendation B31 
The exemption of decisions in relation to proceeds of crime in paragraphs (ya), (yb) and (yc) of 
Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
                                                          
918  See Jurisdiction of Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2000 (Cth) s 56. 
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Decisions of justices of federal courts (paragraphs (zd), (ze) and (zf)) 
B.126 Provisions relating to decisions regarding the management of court business are not 
reviewable under s 39B of the Judiciary Act either.  The Council considers that the exemption 
is appropriate. 
Recommendation B32 
The exemptions of decisions of justices of federal courts in paragraphs (zd), (ze) and (zf) of 
Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
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APPENDIX C: SCHEDULE 2 EXEMPTIONS 
C.1 Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) 
contains a large number of exemptions from the obligation to provide reasons in s 13.  The 
Council considers many of these can be justified by reference to the principles discussed 
above.  The Council also considers that certain exemptions can be removed from Schedule 2 
in conjunction with the Council’s recommended amendments to s 13A 
(Recommendation 14), or alternatively, be moved to Schedule 1, if they are justified by the 
principles discussed in Chapter 5 to have an exemption from the ADJR Act as a whole. 
Obsolete and unnecessary exemptions 
Obsolete Tribunals 
C.2 The Academic Salaries Tribunal and Federal Police Arbitral Tribunal do not exist 
and reference to these Tribunals in paragraph (j) of Schedule 2, exempting the decisions of 
those Tribunals from the requirement to provide a statement of reasons, should be removed. 
C.3 The Council has recommended that the exemption in paragraph (j) be removed in 
its entirety (see Recommendation C17). 
National Director of the Commonwealth Employment Service 
C.4 The National Director of the Commonwealth Employment Service was established 
by the Commonwealth Employment Service Act 1978 (Cth) (Commonwealth Employment Service Act), 
and continued to exist under the Employment Services Act 1994 (Cth).  The Commonwealth 
Employment Service Act was removed in 2006 and the National Director of Commonwealth 
Employment Service no longer exists.  Further, the Department of Employment Education 
and Workplace Relations does not consider the exemption necessary.919   
Recommendation C1 
The exemption of decisions of the National Director of the Commonwealth Employment 
Service in paragraph (o) of Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed. 
Decisions relating to Defence Force personnel matters 
C.5 Schedule 2 contains two exemptions in relation to defence force personnel matters.  
Paragraph (a) exempts decisions in connection with redress of grievances or wrongs with 
respect to members of the Defence Force.  Paragraph (b) exempts decisions in connection 
with personnel management with respect to the Defence Force, including decisions relating to 
particular persons. 
                                                          
919  Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, comments provided to the 
Administrative Review Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (15 November 2011) 2. 
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C.6 In Report No 33, the Council noted that excluding Defence force personnel 
matters was consistent with the High Court decision in Coutts v Commonwealth920 where the 
Court held that the dismissal of an officer of the Defence Force was not open to judicial 
review on the grounds of breach of natural justice.  On that basis, the Council recommended 
moving paragraphs (a) and (b) to Schedule 1. 
C.7 The Council endorses its previous recommendation with respect to 
paragraphs (a) and (b) and considers that these exemptions in Schedule1 can be justified on 
the basis that the decisions relate to the discipline of defence force members and there 
is already a well-established alternative scheme which is as accessible and effective 
as ADJR Act review. 
Recommendation C2 
The exemptions of decisions relating to Defence Force personnel matters in paragraphs (a) 
and (b) should be moved from Schedule 2 to Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth). 
Decisions relating to consular and diplomatic privileges and immunities 
C.8 Paragraph (c) exempts decisions under the Consular Privileges and 
Immunities Act 1972 (Cth), the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1967 (Cth) and the 
International Organisations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1963 (Cth) from the obligation to 
provide reasons.  DFAT were consulted in relation to these exemptions.  They agreed with 
the Council’s recommendation in Report No 33 that the Acts listed above should be exempt 
from the ADJR Act as a whole.921 
C.9 The Acts listed in paragraph (c) contain very few administrative discretionary 
decisions.  An example of an administrative discretion in all three Acts is where the Minister 
may withdraw privileges and immunities of specified individuals under certain circumstances.  
The Council previously commented that any dispute arising out of this discretion could be 
resolved by traditional diplomatic methods.  DFAT submitted to the Council in 1991922 that 
the administrative law package was clearly not introduced into Parliament for the benefit of 
the diplomatic and consular community. 
C.10 The Council considers that decisions made under the Acts listed in paragraph (c) 
should be exempt from the ADJR Act as a whole.  It is the Council’s view this can be justified 
on the principle that the decisions relate to representatives of the diplomatic or consular 
community. 
                                                          
920  (1985) 157 CLR 91. 
921  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on 
existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (19 December 2011). 
922  Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: Statements of 
Reasons for Decisions, 1991. 
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Recommendation C3 
The exemption of decisions relating to consular and diplomatic privileges and immunities in 
paragraph (c) should be moved from Schedule 2 to Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). 
Decisions by the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 
C.11 Paragraph (zb) exempts decisions made under Part 4 or 5 of the Export Finance and 
Insurance Corporation Act 1991 (Cth) (Export Finance Act) from the obligation to provide 
reasons.  The Export Finance Act provides for the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 
(EFIC) to enter into transactions on both the Commercial Account (under Part 4 of the 
Export Finance Act) and the National Interest Account (under Part 5). 
C.12 The EFIC were consulted in relation to the exemption in paragraph (zb).  The EFIC 
submitted the exemption in paragraph (zb) should be maintained as the information that 
is considered when making a decision under part 4 or 5 of the Export Finance Act is complex, 
commercially sensitive, and occasionally provided in-confidence.  Occasionally 
decisions made under Part 5 are based on Cabinet deliberations and are therefore highly 
sensitive.  The secrecy provision in s 87 of the Export Finance Act and the standing exemption 
in s 7(2) and part 2 of Schedule 2 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 govern how the EFIC 
deals with confidential information provided to it.923 
C.13 The EFIC submitted in order to produce a meaningful statement of reasons, it 
would invariably need to refer to confidential information which would be excluded by the 
terms of s 13A of the ADJR Act.924 
C.14 The Council considers that decisions relating to the activities of the EFIC under 
Part 4 or 5 of the Export Finance Act should continue to be exempt from the obligation to 
provide reasons.  This can be justified on the basis that the obligation to provide 
reasons would, or could reasonably be expected to, prejudice the ability of the 
Australian Government or another body exercising power under a Commonwealth enactment 
to manage the Australian economy. 
Recommendation C4 
The exemption of decisions relating to the activities of the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation in paragraph (zb) of Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
                                                          
923  Export Finance and Insurance Corporation, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on 
existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (16 November 2011). 
924  Ibid. 
          233
Appendix C: Schedule 2 Exemptions 
233 
Migration decisions 
C.15 Paragraph (d) exempts decisions under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) 
from the obligation to provide reasons.   
C.16 In Report No 33, the Council recommended that s 13 of the ADJR Act be amended 
to provide that, in spite of any other provision of the ADJR Act, reasons are not available for 
decisions made under s 34 of the Migration Act or a decision concerning the issue or 
cancellation of a visa.  To make a request for reasons in these cases, persons aggrieved by the 
decision would have to show that they were, at the time of the decision: 
 the holder of a valid visa; or 
 an Australian citizen or an Australian permanent resident (as defined in the 
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)). 
C.17 It is possible that the framing of the amendment previously recommended by the 
Council in the terms of ‘unless the person is aggrieved’ is potentially so broad it would 
capture nearly all decisions made under the Migration Act.  This could be problematic given 
the large volumes of administrative decisions made by the Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship under the Migration Act.  In any event, it is unclear what additional benefit a 
statement of reasons would have given to persons aggrieved, in addition to the existing 
obligations under the Migration Act to provide notification of decisions. 
C.18 In light of these reasons, the Council considers the current exemption can be 
justified on the basis that an alternative scheme for providing reasons for 
decisions exists which is as accessible and effective as the ADJR Act obligation.  The 
mandatory notification requirements under Migration Act would likely be compliant with the 
statement of reasons requirements in the ADJR Act. 
Recommendation C5 
The exemption of decisions under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in paragraph (d) of Schedule 2 of 
the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
Decisions relating to national security 
C.19 The decisions described in paragraphs (da) and (db) relate to controlling what 
information can be disclosed in federal criminal or civil court proceedings.  The object of the 
National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) is to prevent the 
disclosure of information in federal criminal and civil proceedings where the disclosure 
is likely to prejudice national security, except to the extent that preventing the disclosure 
would seriously interfere with the administration of justice.925  The National Security Law and 
Policy Division of the Attorney-General’s Department (NSLPD) were consulted about these 
exemptions. 
                                                          
925  National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s 3. 
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C.20 NSLPD submitted that decisions made in the national security context would often 
have to balance the need to protect sensitive information with procedural fairness obligations.  
Therefore, NSLPD considered there should be scope to have classified and unclassified 
statements of reasons in relation to national security decisions, as well as the possibility that in 
some cases it may not be appropriate to provide even a summary of reasons without 
prejudicing national security.  NSLPD submitted there is a possibility that providing 
reasons for decision might disclose sensitive operational information that could alert 
persons to a confidential source of information.  NSLPD also noted the availability of other 
mechanisms to test the legality of these decisions, in particular the court process that 
follows after the Attorney-General has issued a certificate to prevent disclosure of 
information in court proceedings.926 
C.21 The Council considers that exemptions in paragraphs (da) and (db) can be justified 
as providing reasons in this context has the potential to fragment or frustrate another legal 
process which is already underway. 
Recommendation C6 
The exemptions of decisions relating to national security in paragraphs (da) and (db) of 
Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
Decisions relating to law enforcement integrity 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement 
C.22 Paragraph (dc) exempts decisions made under ss 8(4) and 9(4) of the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Act 2010 (Cth) (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law 
Enforcement Act) from the obligation to provide reasons. 
C.23 Sections 8 and 9 of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Act create an 
obligation on the Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) and 
Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) respectively, to comply with a request 
from the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement for information in relation to 
an ACC or AFP investigation.  If the Chief Executive Officer or Commissioner do not 
comply with the request to disclose due to the sensitivity of the information, the Committee 
may then apply to the Minister to determine if the information is sensitive and if its disclosure 
is warranted in the public interest. 
C.24 The AFP consider this exemption should be retained as it is directed at protecting 
sensitive information.  The AFP submitted that the exemption in paragraph (dc) is consistent 
with the legislative scheme for the disclosure of sensitive information contained in s 9 of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Act.  The AFP expressed concern about 
protecting confidential information, however they did not consider the operation of s 13A in 
                                                          
926  Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Submission No 21 (9 August 2011) 10. 
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this regard.  The AFP also did not consider using redacted reasons, which the Council 
has discussed on previous occasions.927 
C.25 The Council considers that the exemption in paragraph (dc) is justified on the 
basis that providing reasons for a decision under ss 8(4) and 9(4) of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Law Enforcement Act has the potential to fragment or frustrate another legal 
process which is already underway by revealing sensitive information of an investigation. 
Recommendation C7 
The exemption of decisions under s 8(4) or 9(4) of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law 
Enforcement Act 2010 (Cth) in paragraph (dc) of Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) 
C.26 Paragraph (eaa) exempts decisions under the Law Enforcement Integrity 
Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) (LEIC Act) in connection with a corruption investigation or 
public inquiry from the obligation to provide reasons.  The Australian Commission for Law 
Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) were consulted about this exemption. 
C.27 The decisions under the LEIC Act relate to procedural decisions, such as issuing a 
notice to produce documents, holding a hearing, or prohibiting disclosure of any information 
relating to a hearing.  The LEIC Act also sets out the nature of the information to be included 
in the report of an investigation, including: 
 the Commissioner’s findings on the issue of corruption; 
 the evidence and other material on which those findings are based; 
 any action that the Commissioner has taken, or proposes to take under; 
Part 10 of the Act in relation to the investigation; and 
 any recommendations that the Integrity Commissioner thinks fit to make 
and, if recommendations are made, the reasons for those recommendations. 
C.28 ACLEI considered there is a continuing need for the exemptions.  The LEIC Act 
contains a framework for providing detailed information and investigation reports to parties, 
and for balancing the rights of those concerned with relevant criminal justice and security 
concerns.  ACLEI submitted that the legislative framework, read together with the exemption 
in paragraph (eaa) is more apposite to the policy aims of ensuring the integrity of the 
Commonwealth’s law enforcement and anti-corruption framework than a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach in the ADJR Act.928   
                                                          
927  Australian Federal Police, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on existing 
exemptions from the ADJR Act (21 November 2011) 5–6. 
928  Australian Law Enforcement Integrity Commission, comments provided to the Administrative Review 
Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (15 November 2011) 2. 
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C.29 The Council considers the exemption in paragraph (eaa) can be justified as providing 
reasons for a decision has the potential to fragment or frustrate another legal process which 
is already underway. 
Recommendation C8 
The exemption of decisions under the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) in 
paragraph (eaa) of Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should 
be retained. 
Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) 
C.30 Paragraph (ea) exempts decisions under the Australian Crime 
Commission Act 2002 (Cth) in connection with intelligence operations or decisions in 
connection with investigations of State offences that have a federal aspect from the obligation 
to provide reasons.  The ACC was consulted about this exemption. 
C.31 The ACC submitted there are clear reasons for retaining this exemption.  Disclosure 
of information connected with an investigation would, in many cases, risk compromising 
ongoing ACC inquiries by disclosing elements of ACC intelligence about the relevant criminal 
activity.  Disclosure may assist the group concerned to take counter measures.  To avoid 
this from happening, a statement of reasons would need to be redacted resulting in a 
statement that would shed little light on the merits of the decision.929 
C.32 The Council considers the current exemption in paragraph (ea) can be justified on 
the basis that providing reasons could interfere with the running of an investigation or inquiry 
and has the potential to fragment or frustrate another legal process which is already under 
way. 
Recommendation C9 
The exemption of decisions under the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) in 
paragraph (ea) of Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should 
be retained. 
Decisions relating to the administration of criminal justice 
C.33 Paragraph (e) exempts decisions relating to the administration of criminal justice 
from the obligation to provide reasons.  In Report No 33 the Council recommended that 
s 13A should be expanded to protect from disclosure in a statement of reasons information 
concerning enforcement of the law or protection of public safety.  In the current report, the 
Council recommends that a statement of reasons is not required to contain any matter that 
is of such a nature that its inclusion in a document would cause that document to be an 
exempt document under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act) 
(Recommendation 14). 
                                                          
929  Australian Crime Commission, Submission No 5 (6 July 2011) 9. 
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C.34 The Criminal Justice Division of the Attorney-General’s Department considered that 
the exemption in paragraph (e) is necessary.  They submitted that the policy rationale for the 
exemption is that reasons for decisions relating to the administration of criminal justice often 
contain information that might prejudice law enforcement activities or might endanger the life 
or physical safety of persons.  They noted that information affecting the enforcement of law 
and protection of public safety is specifically excluded from disclosure under s 37 of the 
FOI Act.  In their opinion, the fair and efficient administration of criminal justice is premised 
upon the avoidance of delay.  Requests under s 13 of the ADJR Act could frustrate 
this process.930 
C.35 The Criminal Justice Division considered that the Council’s previous proposed 
amendment to s 13A was not sufficient to protect information.931  The Council now 
proposes to align s 13A with the exemption under the FOI Act.   
C.36 Section 37 of the FOI Act provides that documents affecting the enforcement of law 
and protection of public safety are exempt from disclosure.  Section 27 provides that: 
(1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act 
would, or could reasonably be expected to: 
(a) prejudice the conduct of an investigation of a breach, or possible 
breach, of the law, or a failure, or possible failure, to comply with a 
law relating to taxation or prejudice the enforcement or proper 
administration of the law in a particular instance; 
(b) disclose, or enable a person to ascertain, the existence or identity of 
a confidential source of information, or the non-existence of a 
confidential source of information, in relation to the enforcement 
or administration of the law; or 
(c) endanger the life or physical safety of any person. 
(2) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act 
would, or could reasonably be expected to: 
(a) prejudice the fair trial of a person or the impartial adjudication of a 
particular case; 
(b) disclose lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, 
investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or 
evasions of the law the disclosure of which would, or would be 
reasonably likely to, prejudice the effectiveness of those methods or 
procedures; or 
(c) prejudice the maintenance or enforcement of lawful methods for 
the protection of public safety. 
                                                          
930  Criminal Justice Division, Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), comments provided to the 
Administrative Review Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (14 December 2011). 
931  Ibid. 
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(2A) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), a person is taken to be a confidential source of 
information in relation to the enforcement or administration of the law if the person 
is receiving, or has received, protection under a program conducted under the 
auspices of the Australian Federal Police, or the police force of a State or Territory, for 
the protection of: 
(d) witnesses; or 
(e) people who, because of their relationship to, or association with, a 
witness need, or may need, such protection; or 
(f) any other people who, for any other reason, need or may need, 
such protection. 
(3) In this section, law means law of the Commonwealth or of a State or 
Territory. 
C.37 The Council considers that these protections for information in the FOI Act, which 
the Council recommends be incorporated into the ADJR Act through an amendment to 
s 13A, would provide sufficient protection of information of concern. 
C.38 The Criminal Justice Division are concerned about procedural delays of requiring 
the AFP to compile statements of reasons and assess them for redaction when required.932  
The Council notes that s 13A(2)(b) provides that a statement of reasons does not have to be 
provided at all if the statement would be false or misleading were the information not 
included.  Decisions relating to the administration of criminal justice which result in a 
prosecution will ultimately be tested by a court in the course of a criminal trial.  Requiring the 
AFP to produce reasons in relation to these decisions, even where information could be 
protected, would place a burden on the resources of the AFP, where other means are 
available of testing those decisions.   
C.39 The Criminal Justice Division and the AFP are also concerned that the ability to 
request a statement of reasons would be used by some persons to frustrate the criminal justice 
process in matters not yet before the criminal courts.  The disclosure of police 
activities before the resolution of an investigation, such as the arrest of a person, could 
undermine ongoing operations and compromise police methodology.  Further, external 
oversight of operational activity is already available, including by independent issuing 
authority (in relation to warrants), and by the Ombudsman and ACLEI.  Again, requiring the 
AFP to produce reasons for these decisions, even where the information could be protected, 
duplicates review processes and could place a burden on the resources of the AFP.933   
C.40 The Council agrees that the production of reasons could unduly delay criminal 
justice processes. 
                                                          
932  Criminal Justice Division, Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), comments provided to the 
Administrative Review Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (14 December 2011). 
933  Criminal Justice Division, Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), additional comments provided to the 
Administrative Review Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act  (7 June 2012). 
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Recommendation C10 
The exemption of decisions relating to the administration of criminal justice in paragraph (e) of 
Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed (in 
conjunction with the Council’s recommended amendments to s 13A in Recommendation 14). 
Decisions in connection with the institution or conduct of proceedings in a 
civil court 
C.41 Paragraph (f) exempts from the obligation to provide reasons decisions relating in 
connection with the institution or conduct of proceedings in a civil court.   
C.42 The Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) submitted that the current exemptions in 
paragraph (f) of Schedule 2 of the ADJR Act are appropriate and should not be repealed.934  
They argued that, in certain circumstances, a statement of reasons may prejudice future 
investigations and operate as a means of unnecessary delay to an investigation.  The FWO 
noted that the requirements in relation to the court procedures of pleadings, filing of evidence 
and discovery should not be replicated by requiring a statement of reasons to be produced.935  
They also noted that because of the exemption in Schedule 1 of the ADJR Act, the FWO 
has never relied on Schedule 2. The submission was made in the event that the ADJR Act 
would apply to the decisions made by the FWO.936 
Recommendation C11 
The exemption of decisions in connection with the institution or conduct of proceedings in a 
civil court in paragraph (f) of Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed (in conjunction with the Council’s recommended 
amendments to s 13A in Recommendation 14). 
Financial decisions 
C.43 Schedule 2 of the ADJR Act contains a number of financial decisions that are 
exempt from the obligation to provide reasons. 
Consolidated Revenue Fund 
C.44 The Consolidated Revenue Fund is established under s 81 of the Australian 
Constitution.  Paragraph (g) exempts decisions of the Finance Minister to issue money out of 
the Consolidated Revenue Fund.  The Commonwealth views the Fund as ‘self-executing’, that 
is, all revenues or moneys form part of the Fund upon receipt, and there is no statutory 
basis for the Fund separate to the Constitution. 
                                                          
934  Fair Work Ombudsman, Submission No 22 (1 July 2011) 1. 
935  Ibid 4. 
936  Ibid 1. 
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C.45 In Report No 33, the Council recommended that the exemption in paragraph (g) be 
moved to Schedule 1 of the ADJR Act.  In recent consultations, the Department of Finance 
and Deregulation agreed with this recommendation.937 
C.46 The Council considers that excluding decisions in paragraph (g) from the whole of 
the ADJR Act is justified on the basis that the decisions relate to the management of the 
national economy, do not directly affect the interests of individuals, and are likely to be most 
appropriately resolved in the High Court.  In the 1991 report, the Council considered whether 
a decision of the Finance Minister to issue funds out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund 
would be justiciable, given that budget allocations are determined in an exhaustive process of 
consideration by Cabinet.  In any event, the Council does not consider decisions in 
paragraph (g) should be subject to judicial review under the ADJR Act. 
Recommendation C12 
The exemption of decisions of the Finance Minister to issue money out of the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund in paragraph (g) should be moved from Schedule 2 to Schedule 1 of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). 
Financial Management and Accountability Act 
C.47 Section 27 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) (FMA Act) 
provides that the Minister may issue a drawing right to an official authorising them to make a 
payment of public money, request the debiting of an amount against an appropriation, or 
debit an amount against an appropriation.  Paragraph (h) of Schedule 2 
exempts decisions made under s 27 of the FMA Act from the obligation to provide reasons. 
C.48 The Council recommended in Report No 33 that paragraph (h), as it then read,938 
should be moved to Schedule 1.  In recent consultations, the Department of Finance and 
Deregulation agreed with this recommendation. 
C.49 For similar reasons to the Consolidation Revenue Fund exemption discussed above, 
the Council considers that excluding decisions in paragraph (h) from the whole of the 
ADJR Act is justified on the basis that the decisions relate to the management of the national 
economy, do not directly affect the interests of individuals, and are likely to be most 
appropriately resolved in the High Court.  Furthermore, it is unclear who would have 
standing to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Minister under s 27 of the FMA Act. 
                                                          
937  Department of Finance and Deregulation, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on 
existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (22 November 2011) 1. 
938  At the time Report No 33 was published in 1991, paragraph (h) read ‘decisions under section 32 or 36A of 
the Audit Act 1901’.  The Audit Act 1901 was repealed in 1997 and replaced with the Financial Management 
and Accountability Act 1997. 
          241
Appendix C: Schedule 2 Exemptions 
241 
Recommendation C13 
The exemption of decisions under s 27 of the Financial Management and 
Accountability Act 1997 (Cth)  in paragraph (h) should be moved from Schedule 2 to Schedule 1 of 
the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). 
Commonwealth Grants Commission  
C.50 The Commonwealth Grants Commission recommends to the Treasurer how the 
revenues raised from the Goods and Services Tax should be distributed to the States and 
Territories to achieve ‘horizontal fiscal equalisation’.  Paragraph (i) of Schedule 2 
exempts decisions of the Commonwealth Grants Commission relating to the allocation of 
funds from the obligation to provide reasons. 
C.51 In Report No 33 the Council recommended to amend s 13(11) of the ADJR Act to 
exclude from the definition of decision, a decision the terms of which are required by an 
enactment to be laid before each House of Parliament.  The Commission’s rationale 
is outlined in reports that are required to be tabled in Parliament.  If s 13(11) were amended 
as expressed above, then the Commonwealth Grants Commission would be exempt from the 
obligation to provide reasons by operation of that section. 
C.52 The Treasury supported the previous recommendation of the Council, that s 13(11) 
should be amended and paragraph (i) of Schedule 2 can be repealed.  They noted that under 
the current administrative arrangements, the Commonwealth Grants Commission does not 
make decisions, but rather makes recommendations to the Treasurer who then decides as to 
the allocation of funds.939 
C.53 In the current report, the Council recommends that a statement of reasons is not 
required to contain the notice of or a statement of reasons for a decision that is required by 
an enactment to be laid before either House of the Parliament, prior to the date on which that 
notice or statement of reasons is laid before a House of Parliament.  This recommendation 
aligns with the Freedom of Information Act (Recommendation 14). 
C.54 The Council’s recommended amendment would still allow an application to be made 
for a statement of reasons, but after the report was tabled in Parliament.  The Council 
considers that it is appropriate for the requirements in the ADJR Act and the Freedom of 
Information Act to align in this particular case.   
Recommendation C14 
The exemption of decisions of the Commonwealth Grants Commission relating to the allocation 
of funds in paragraph (i) of Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed (in conjunction with the Council’s recommended 
amendments to s 13A in Recommendation 14). 
                                                          
939  The Treasury, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on existing exemptions from the 
ADJR Act (16 December 2011). 
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Reserve Bank of Australia 
C.55 Paragraph (l) exempts decisions of the Reserve Bank in connection with its banking 
operations, including individual open market operations and foreign exchange dealings, from 
the obligation to provide reasons. 
C.56 The Council previously recommended that s 13A of the ADJR Act be amended to 
provide that the section applies in relation to any information to which s 13(1) relates, being 
information which would, or could reasonably be expected to, prejudice the ability of the 
Commonwealth Government to manage the Australian economy. 
C.57 The Reserve Bank does not support the previous recommendation of the Council.  
They argued that amending s 13A would not cover the same field as the exemption in 
Schedule 2.  The Reserve Bank submitted that the banking operations of their Banking 
Department are arguably not necessary to enable the Commonwealth Government to manage 
the Australian economy.  Furthermore, they are carried out by the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
and not the Commonwealth Government.  The open market and foreign exchange 
operations are also functions carried out and managed by the Reserve Bank of Australia and 
not the Commonwealth Government.940 
C.58 The Reserve Bank of Australia submitted that a similar exemption to paragraph (l) in 
Schedule 2 is found in the Freedom of Information Act.  This is in addition to a general 
exemption that a document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure would, or could 
reasonably be expected to, have a substantial adverse effect on the Australian economy.941  
The Reserve Bank also argued that in the conduct of its commercial activities, for privacy law 
purposes, the Bank is treated as if it were a private sector organisation.  For example, the 
Bank must comply with the National Privacy Principles and not the Information Privacy 
Principles which apply to the Commonwealth public sector.942 
C.59 Contrary to the recommendation in Report No 33, the Council considers that the 
exemption in paragraph (l) is justified on the basis that disclosure of any information that 
would, or could reasonably be expected to, prejudice the ability of the Reserve Bank to 
manage the Australian economy or interfere with their commercial activities. 
Recommendation C15 
The exemption of decisions of the Reserve Bank of Australia in connection with its banking 
operations in paragraph (l) of Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
                                                          
940  Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission on proposal to remove Schedule 2 exemption under the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act (23 February 2012) 2. 
941  Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 47J. 
942  Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission on proposal to remove Schedule 2 exemption under the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act (23 February 2012) 5–6. 
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Recovery of moneys by the Commonwealth 
C.60 Paragraph (m) exempts from the obligation to provide reasons decisions in 
connection with the enforcement of judgments or orders for the recovery of moneys by the 
Commonwealth or by an officer of the Commonwealth. 
C.61 The Council previously recommended in Report No 33 that s 13A be amended to 
provide that the section applies in relation to any information to which a request under 
s 13(1) relates, being information which would, or could reasonably be expected to, adversely 
affect an authority of the Commonwealth in respect of its competitive commercial activities. 
C.62 The Department of Finance submitted that they support the amendment to s 13A of 
the ADJR Act and consequential removal of paragraph (m).943 
C.63 The Council has, however, chosen to recommend that a statement of reasons is not 
required to contain any matter that is of such a nature that its inclusion in a document would 
cause that document to be an exempt document under the FOI Act (Recommendation 14).  
Section 47 of the FOI Act protects commercially valuable information from disclosure, and 
s 47D provides that ‘a document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure … would have a 
substantial adverse effect on the financial or property interests of the Commonwealth’—
meaning access should be given unless it would be contrary to the public interest.  The 
Council considers that these exemptions are considered sufficient protection for 
Commonwealth commercial activities in the FOI Act context, and are therefore sufficient in 
the ADJR Act context.   
C.64 The Department of Finance and Deregulation expressed concern about the scope of 
the Council’s proposed Recommendation 14, particularly as it compares with the 
decisions captured by the exemptions in paragraphs (k) and (m) of Schedule 2, and therefore 
requested consultation in relation to the drafting of any amendments to s 13A.944 
Recommendation C16 
The exemption of decisions in connection with the enforcement of judgments or orders for the 
recovery of moneys by the Commonwealth or by an officer of the Commonwealth in 
paragraph (m) of Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should 
be removed (in conjunction with the Council’s recommended amendments to s 13A in 
Recommendation 14).  
                                                          
943  Department of Finance and Deregulation, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on 
existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (22 November 2011) 1. 
944  Department of Finance and Deregulation, additional comments provided to the Administrative Review 
Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (8 June 2012). 
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Decisions of Tribunals or Authorities 
Obsolete Tribunals 
C.65 Paragraph (j) exempts decisions of certain Tribunals from the obligation to provide 
reasons for decisions.  As discussed above, the Academic Salaries Tribunal and Federal Police 
Arbitral Tribunal no longer exist. 
C.66 The Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal was established in 1984 to inquire into 
and determine pay and pay related allowances for the Regular and Reserve members of the 
Australian Defence Force.  Its functions are set out in ss 58F–58Y of the Defence 
Force Act 1903 (Cth). 
C.67 The Remuneration Tribunal is established under the Remuneration 
Tribunal Act 1973 (Cth).  The Tribunal is the independent statutory body that handles the 
remuneration of key Commonwealth offices. 
C.68 The Council previously recommended that the Acts establishing the 
Tribunals should be amended to require the decisions of those Tribunals to be accompanied 
by a statement of reasons.  In this case, s 13 would not apply given the operation of s 13(11). 
C.69 The Council does not consider that the exemption in paragraph (j) is justified. 
Recommendation C17 
The exemption of decisions of certain Tribunals in paragraph (j) of Schedule 2 of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed. 
Decisions of Authorities 
C.70 Paragraph (k) exempts decisions of numerous boards or corporations from the 
obligation to provide reasons.  In Report No 33, the Council recommended that s 13A of the 
ADJR Act be amended to provide that the section applies in relation to any information to 
which a request under s 13(1) relates, being information which would, or could reasonably be 
expected to, adversely affect an authority of the Commonwealth in respect of its competitive 
commercial actives. 
C.71 The Department of Finance and Deregulation supported the Council’s 
recommendation to amend s 13A.  The Department supported extending the scope of s 13A 
and consequently repealing paragraph (k).945 
C.72 The Council has, however, chosen to recommend that a statement of reasons is not 
required to contain any matter that is of such a nature that its inclusion in a document would 
cause that document to be an exempt document under the FOI Act (Recommendation 14).  
Section 47 of the FOI Act protects commercially valuable information form disclosure, and 
                                                          
945  Department of Finance and Deregulation, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on 
existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (22 November 2011) 1. 
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s 47D provides that ‘a document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure … would have a 
substantial adverse effect on the financial or property interests of the Commonwealth’—
meaning access should be given unless it would be contrary to the public interest.  The 
Council considers that these exemptions are sufficient protection for Commonwealth 
commercial activities in the FOI Act context, and are therefore sufficient in the ADJR Act 
context. 
C.73 The Department of Finance and Deregulation expressed concern about the scope of 
the Council’s proposed Recommendation 14, particularly as it compares with the 
decisions captured by the exemptions in paragraphs (k) and (m) of Schedule 2, and therefore 
requested consultation in relation to the drafting of any amendments to s 13A.946 
Recommendation C18 
The exemption of decisions of certain authorities in paragraph (k) of Schedule 2 of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed (in conjunction with the 
Council’s recommended amendments to s 13A in Recommendation 14). 
Decisions relating to Employment 
Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (Cth) 
C.74 Decisions relating to engagement or termination of employment of staff or 
consultants under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (Cth) (Members of Parliament 
(Staff) Act) are exempt from the obligation to provide reasons.  The Act provides for 
automatic termination of employment of staff and consultants in the event the 
Parliamentarian ceases to hold office.  The Act also provides for termination of employment 
by the Parliamentarian at any time. 
C.75 The Council previously recommended in Report No 33 that paragraph (y) should be 
moved to Schedule 1 of the ADJR Act given the personal nature of the employment and the 
provision in the Act for termination at will.  In recent consultations, the Department of 
Finance and Deregulation agreed with this recommendation.947   
C.76 The Council considers that decisions relating to engagement or termination of staff 
or consultants under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act should be exempt from the ADJR Act 
as a whole.   
                                                          
946  Department of Finance and Deregulation, additional comments provided to the Administrative Review 
Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (8 June 2012). 
947  Department of Finance and Deregulation, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on 
existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (22 November 2011) 2. 
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Recommendation C19 
The exemption of decisions relating to engagement or termination of employment of staff or 
consultants under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (Cth) in paragraph (y) should be 
moved from Schedule 2 to Schedule 1of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth). 
Australian Public Service Employment 
C.77 Paragraphs (q), (r), (t), (u) and (w) exempt various decisions relating to employment 
in the Australian Public Service (APS) from the obligation to provide reasons.  The Australian 
Public Service Commission (APSC) argued that it is Commonwealth policy that the APS, as a 
workforce, should be covered by the same arrangements as apply in the workforce generally.  
Therefore, the APSC considered that all the exemptions relating to APS employment, 
apart from paragraph (w), should be maintained.948 
C.78 Paragraph (q) exempts decisions relating to personnel management of the APS, 
other than decisions relating to the particular characteristics or circumstances of a person, 
from review under the ADJR Act.  Decisions that fall within the ambit of paragraph (q) relate 
to high level management decisions, particularly personnel policy decisions.  Often, such 
decisions would not ordinarily be subject to review under the ADJR Act, as they are not made 
under an enactment. 
C.79 In Report No 33, the Council recommended paragraph (q) should be repealed.  The 
Council noted that for strategic staffing decisions that did not relate to a particular person, it 
would be difficult to establish the necessary standing to seek a statement of reasons.  
Otherwise, the Council considered that statements of reasons should be available to those 
affect. 
C.80 The APSC did not support the previous recommendation by the Council.  In their 
opinion, decisions to which paragraph (q) is directed are made without regard to the 
circumstances of a particular persons as they are policy decisions for the APS as a whole.  
Nevertheless, the decisions could cause an applicant or incumbent to feel ‘aggrieved’.  In 
this instance, the APSC submitted that it is helpful to refer to an explicit exemption 
demonstrating that the individual does not have a right to a statement of reasons.949 
C.81 Contrary to the recommendation made in Report No 33, the Council considers that 
paragraph (q) is justified on the basis that it is Commonwealth policy that APS employment 
is subject to the same arrangements as the wider workforce. 
                                                          
948  Australian Public Service Commission, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on 
existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (16 November 2011). 
949  Ibid. 
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Recommendation C20 
The exemption of decisions relating to personnel management of the Australian Public Service, 
other than decisions relating to the particular characteristics or circumstances of a person, in 
paragraph (q) of Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should 
be retained. 
C.82 Paragraphs (r) and (t) exempt decisions relating to promotions, transfers, temporary 
performance of duties or appeals of such decisions (paragraph (r)) and decisions relating to 
the making of appointments or the engagement of employees in the public sector 
(paragraph (t)). 
C.83 In Report No 33 the Council recommended paragraphs (r) and (t) should be 
repealed.  The Council did not consider the arguments in relation to generating a significant 
workload should paragraph (r) exemption be removed to be valid.  In relation to 
paragraph (t), the Council considered that because appointment and engagement decisions do 
not normally attract the principles of natural justice, this is not sufficient reason to exclude 
them from the obligation to provide reasons. 
C.84 The APSC submitted that the exemptions in paragraphs (r) and (t) should continue.  
They argued that removing these exemptions would generate a significant workload, 
particularly with machinery of government changes.  For example, machinery of government 
changes affected approximately 12,000 employees after the 2007 federal election.  
Furthermore, when Centrelink and Medicare merged with the Department of Human 
Services, approximately 34,000 employees were affected.950 
C.85 The APSC noted that agencies are encouraged to provide feedback to unsuccessful 
applicants.  Internal and external review is available of some of the decisions under the Public 
Service Act 1999 (Cth) (Public Service Act) and in some circumstances, applicants are able to get 
access to personal material through requests under the FOI Act.  The APSC argued these 
other avenues were sufficient for unsuccessful applications to be provided with reasons for 
the decision.951 
C.86 Contrary to the recommendations made in Report No 33, the Council consider the 
exemptions in paragraphs (r) and (t) are justified on the basis that subjecting the decisions in 
these exemptions to the obligation to provide reasons would involve significant workload 
implications.  This is particularly acute in times of machinery of government changes.  
Furthermore, the Council considers that paragraph (r) can be justified on the basis that 
providing a statement of reasons for the decisions in this exemption could potentially allow 
the ADJR Act to frustrate structural changes in the APS.  This would be contrary to purpose 
of the ADJR Act. 
                                                          
950  Australian Public Service Commission, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on 
existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (16 November 2011). 
951  Ibid. 
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Recommendation C21 
The exemptions of decisions relating to promotions, transfers, temporary performance of 
duties or appeals of such decisions and decisions relating to the making of appointments or the 
engagement of employees in the public sector in paragraphs (r) and (t) of Schedule 2 of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
C.87 Paragraph (u) exempts decisions in connection with APS industrial matters.  The 
Council previously recommend in Report No 33 that this exemption be removed, on the 
basis that where a decision deals with the rights or interests of a particular employee, a 
statement of reasons ought to be available.  The Council also argued that paragraph (u) 
appears to be unnecessary in light of paragraph (a) of Schedule 1 (as it then read), exempting 
industrial relation disputes of the APS from the entire ADJR Act. 
C.88 The APSC submitted that the exemption should continue.  They noted that 
paragraph (a) of Schedule 1 relates only to decisions under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), 
while paragraph (u) refers more broadly to decisions in connection with industrial matters.  
The APSC argued that this exemption should be maintained in order to have comparable 
circumstances with the general workforce.952 
Recommendation C22 
The exemption of decisions in connection with Australian Public Service industrial matters in 
paragraph (u) of Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should 
be retained. 
C.89 Paragraph (w) exempts decisions relating to the making or terminating of 
appointments of Secretaries under the Public Service Act from the obligation to provide a 
statement of reasons.  The Council previously recommended that paragraph (w) be moved to 
Schedule 1 of the ADJR Act. 
C.90 The APSC supported the Council’s previous recommendation.  The APSC noted 
that proposed amendments to the Public Service Act would make decisions relating to the 
appointment and terminations of Secretaries decisions of the Governor-General.953  
This would automatically exempt these decisions from the operation of the ADJR Act by 
virtue of Schedule 1.  The Council considers moving the exemption in paragraph (w) to 
Schedule 1 is justified. 
Recommendation C23 
The exemption of decisions relating to the making or terminating of appointments of 
Secretaries under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) in paragraph (w) should be moved from 
Schedule 2 to Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). 
                                                          
952  Australian Public Service Commission, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on 
existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (16 November 2011). 
953  Ibid. 
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Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) 
C.91 Paragraph (z) exempts decision under ss 28, 40F and 40H of the 
Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) from the obligation to provide reasons.  Section 28 
is the Commissioner of the AFP’s power to terminate employment.  Section 40F allows the 
Commissioner to make arrangements for the secondment of AFP employees to other 
bodies and s 40H allows the Commissioner to determine duties of an AFP officer. 
C.92 The Council recommended in Report No 33 that paragraph (z) be repealed, 
consistent with its recommendations to repeal paragraph (r), discussed briefly above.  The 
AFP submitted that the exemption should continue.  The AFP stated that decisions under 
ss 40F and 40H relate to the Commissioner’s general employment powers and unique 
command powers as the head of a disciplined police force.  They argued that the current 
legislative arrangements recognise the distinctive nature of the AFP as a policing agency, 
where the Commissioner has unique command and employment powers.  This puts the AFP 
on a different footing to other public sector agencies.  The command powers are made within 
the unique backdrop of operation and administrative necessity, sometimes based on 
operationally sensitive information.  Similar to deployments of the Australian Defence Force, 
the AFP submitted that deployments are necessary to meet law enforcement 
operational needs.954 
C.93 The AFP submitted that decisions made under s 28 incorporate comprehensive 
administrative processes, including procedural fairness, despite being exempt from the 
obligation to provide reasons in Schedule 2 of the ADJR Act.955 
C.94 Contrary to the previous recommendation, the Council considers the exemption in 
paragraph (z) is justified on the basis that there is an alternative scheme available which 
is as accessible as the ADJR Act.  Furthermore, these cases are ordinarily extremely complex, 
and are best dealt with by the processes established by the AFP. 
Recommendation C24 
The exemption of decisions under ss 28, 40F and 40H of the Australian Federal 
Police Act 1979 (Cth) in paragraph (z) of Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be retained. 
Decisions under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) 
C.95 Paragraph (e) exempts from the obligation to provide reasons decisions under the 
Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) that relate to aircraft design, construction or maintenance of 
aircraft or otherwise related to aviation safety that was based on material either applied 
supplied on confidence or publication of which would reveal a trade secret. 
                                                          
954  Australian Federal Police, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on existing 
exemptions from the ADJR Act (21 November 2011) 2–4. 
955  Ibid 5. 
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C.96 In Report No 33, the Council considered that s 13A of the ADJR Act was sufficient 
to deal with the material that the exemption in paragraph (p) is directed at.  In the current 
report, the Council recommends that a statement of reasons is not required to contain any 
matter that is of such a nature that its inclusion in a document would cause that document to 
be an exempt document under the FOI Act (Recommendation 14).  Section 45 of the 
FOI Act exempts from disclosure documents containing material obtained in confidence, and 
s 47 of the FOI Act exempts from disclosure documents disclosing trade secrets or 
commercially valuable information 
C.97 The Civil Aviation Safety Authority did not object to repealing paragraph (p) if 
s 13A allowed for the protection of trade secrets.956 
Recommendation C25 
The exemption of decisions under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) in paragraph (p) of 
Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed (in 
conjunction with the Council’s recommended amendments to s 13A in Recommendation 14). 
Decisions under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) 
C.98 Paragraph (zc) exempts decisions of the Minister for Foreign Affairs under Part 8B 
of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) from the obligation to provide reasons. 
C.99 Part 8B of the Act is concerned with International Broadcasting licenses.  Among 
other discretionary powers in Part 8B, the Minister has the power to object to allocating an 
international broadcasting license to an international broadcasting service if the objection 
would be in Australia’s national interest. 
C.100 The Department of Broadband Communications and the Digital Economy 
submitted the exemption in paragraph (zc) could be repealed.  They argued that an 
Attorney-General’s certificate under s 14 of the ADJR Act  could provide a reasonable 
alternate mechanism for ensuring that sensitive information about Australia’s international 
relations is not disclosed in a statement of reasons.957 
C.101 The Council does not consider that the exemption in paragraph (zc) is justified, 
particularly given the operation of Attorney-General’s certificates to protect information that 
would prejudice Australia’s international relations. 
 
                                                          
956  Civil Aviation Safety Authority, comments provided to the Administrative Review Council on existing 
exemptions from the ADJR Act (19 December 2011).  
957  Department of Broadband Communications and the Digital Economy, comments provided to the 
Administrative Review Council on existing exemptions from the ADJR Act (16 November 2011). 
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Recommendation C26 
The exemption of decisions of the Minister for Foreign Affairs under Part 8B of the Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992 (Cth) in paragraph (zc) of Schedule 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) should be removed. 
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APPENDIX D: DECISIONS EXEMPT 
UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
DECISIONS (JUDICIAL REVIEW) 
REGULATIONS 1985 
Decisions relating to the Builders Labourers’ Federation 
(paragraphs (a)-(d)) 
D.1 The exemptions relating to decisions made under industrial relations laws about the 
Builders Labourers Federation are no longer necessary. The Builders Labourers Federation is 
a union which has been permanently deregistered and no longer exists.  Paragraph (a) refers 
to decisions by the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission—a defunct body 
whose functions are now carried out by Fair Work Australia.  The Builders Labourers’ Federation 
(Cancellation of Registration—Consequential Provisions) Act 1986 (Cth) (paragraph (b)) contains no 
decision-making powers.  The Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) (paragraphs (c) 
and (d)) has been repealed. 
Recommendation D1 
The exemptions of decisions made under industrial relations laws about the Builders Labourers 
Federation in paragraphs (a)–(d) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) 
Regulations 1985 (Cth) should be removed. 
Decisions under the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry Act 1986 (Cth) 
(paragraph (e)) 
D.2 The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry Act 1986 (Cth) has been repealed and is no 
longer necessary. 
Recommendation D2 
The exemption of decisions under the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry Act 1986 (Cth) in 
paragraph (e) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Regulations 1985 (Cth) should be 
removed. 
Decisions under certain Australian Capital Territory Ordinances 
(paragraph (f)) 
D.3 These exemptions are not necessary due to the operation of s 3A of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act), which states that ACT 
enactments are not enactments for the purpose of the ADJR Act. 
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Recommendation D3 
The exemption of decisions under certain Australian Capital Territory Ordinances in 
paragraph (f) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Regulations 1985 (Cth) should be 
removed. 
Decisions under provisions of the law of Western Australia as in force in 
external Territories (paragraph (g)) 
D.4 Paragraph (g) provides exemptions for decisions under provisions of the law of 
Western Australia as in force in:  
 
 the Territory of Christmas Island under section 8A of the Christmas 
Island Act 1958 (Cth) (Christmas Island Act); and  
 the Territory of Cocos (Keeling) Islands under section 8A of the Cocos 
(Keeling) Islands Act 1955 (Cth) (Cocos (Keeling) Islands Act);  
except for in relation to decisions of certain bodies or persons.   
D.5 Bodies or persons whose decisions will be subject to the ADJR Act are largely 
bodies or persons employed by the Commonwealth, or appointed or established under 
Commonwealth statutes.  The provision therefore operates to ensure that the sections of the 
Christmas Island Act and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands Act which apply Western Australian law in 
the Territories do not expand the scope of ADJR Act review to bodies or persons not 
associated with the Commonwealth making decisions under non-Commonwealth law. 
Recommendation D4 
The exemption of decisions under provisions of the law of Western Australia as in force in 
external Territories in paragraph (g) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) 
Regulations 1985 (Cth) should be retained, but moved to Schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review)  Act 1977 (Cth). 
Quarantine decisions (paragraphs (h) and (i)) 
D.6 These decisions relate to epidemics caused by, or in danger of being caused by, 
diseases or pests.  The Governor-General can proclaim an epidemic under s 2B(1) and the 
Minister can then make declarations or take actions ‘as he or she thinks necessary to control 
and eradicate the epidemic, or to remove the danger of the epidemic, by quarantine measures 
or measures incidental to quarantine’ under s 2B(2).  Paragraph (h) exempts any actions taken 
or directions given from review under the ADJR Act. 
D.7 Section 3 gives the Minister the power to give directions to authorise persons who 
are the executive heads of national response agencies to take actions and give directions to 
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control and eradicate the epidemic.  Paragraph (i) makes those decisions or directions of 
authorised persons exempt from review under the ADJR Act. 
D.8 Given that an epidemic situation is a situation of national emergency, review is 
appropriately limited to a constitutional minimum because: 
 there is a risk posed to public safety, and 
 given the national significance of the decisions, the matter is appropriately 
dealt with by the High Court. 
Recommendation D5 
The exemptions of quarantine decisions in paragraphs (h) and (i) of the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Regulations 1985 (Cth) should be retained, but moved to Schedule 1 of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review)  Act 1977 (Cth). 
          255
 
255 
APPENDIX E: SUBMISSIONS 
The Council received submissions from the individuals and organisations: 
1. Mark Aronson 
2. Superannuation Complaints Tribunal  
3. Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
4. Department of Defence 
5. Australian Crime Commission  
6. Dr Peter Billings and Dr Anthony E Cassimatis 
7. NSW Young Lawyers 
8. Greg Weeks 
9. Australian Network of National Environmental Defenders Offices 
10. Migration Review Tribunal–Refugee Review Tribunal 
11. Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
12. Administrative Appeals Tribunal  
13. Australian Taxation Office  
14. Victorian Legal Aid 
15. Commonwealth Ombudsman  
16. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
17. Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 
18. Public Interest Advocacy Centre 
19. Department of Finance and Deregulation 
20. Dr Paul Latimer 
21. Attorney-General’s Department 
22. Fair Work Ombudsman 
23. Law Council of Australia 
Copies of submissions are available from the Council’s website at www.arc.ag.gov.au or by 
contacting the Secretariat: 
The Executive Director 
Administrative Review Council 
Robert Garran Offices 
National Circuit 
Barton ACT 2600 
Telephone: 02 6141 4180 
Facsimile: 02 6141 3248 
Email: arc.can@ag.gov.au 
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APPENDIX F: CONSULTATIONS 
The following individuals and organisations were consulted in the preparation of this report: 
Organisation Name  Location 
Clayton Utz Ms S Sheppard, Partner Melbourne 
Law Institute of Victoria Mr E Rodan OAM and Ms K Miller Melbourne 
Social Security Appeals Tribunal Ms J McDonnell, Principal Member Melbourne 
Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal 
Mr P Kellow, Registrar Sydney 
Mr C Matthies, A/g Registrar, 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
Sydney 
Mr J Cabarus, A/g Manager, Research 
and Policy, Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal 
Sydney 
Sparke Helmore Lawyers Ms B Rayment and Mr M Alderton Sydney 
Ms M Brennan Canberra 
Victorian Bar Ms D Mortimer SC Melbourne  
Mr R Niall SC Melbourne 
Mr S Donaghue SC Melbourne 
Rule of Law Institute Mr R Gilbert Sydney 
New South Wales Bar Mr G Kennett SC Sydney 
Mr S Lloyd SC Sydney 
Dr K Stern Sydney 
Mr Neil Williams SC Sydney 
Public Interest Advocacy 
Centre 
Mr E Santow and Ms J Namey Sydney 
University of New South Wales 
(UNSW) 
Emeritus Professor Mark Aronson  Sydney 
Gilbert & Tobin Centre of 
Public Law UNSW 
Mr Greg Weeks Sydney 
DLA Piper Australia Mr M Will Canberra 
Solicitor-General for Australia Mr S Gageler SC Canberra 
Minter Ellison Lawyers Ms S Tongue Canberra 
 Sir A Mason Sydney 
High Court of Australia  Canberra 
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The following government departments and agencies were consulted: 
1. Attorney-General’s Department 
2. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) 
3. Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 
4. Australian Crime Commission 
5. Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
6. Australian Electoral Commission 
7. Australian Federal Police 
8. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
9. Australian Public Service Commission 
10. Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
11. Australian Taxation Office 
12. Centrelink 
13. Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
14. Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy 
15. Department of Defence 
16. Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
17. Department of Families and Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 
18. Department of Finance and Deregulation 
19. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
20. Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
21. Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 
22. Fair Work Australia 
23. Office of the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner 
24. Reserve Bank of Australia 
25. The Treasury 
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APPENDIX G: KEY ADJR ACT 
PROVISIONS 
3  Interpretation 
 (1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears: 
… 
decision to which this Act applies means a decision of an administrative character 
made, proposed to be made, or required to be made (whether in the exercise of a 
discretion or not and whether before or after the commencement of this definition): 
 (a) under an enactment referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) of the definition 
of enactment; or 
 (b) by a Commonwealth authority or an officer of the Commonwealth under an 
enactment referred to in paragraph (ca) or (cb) of the definition of enactment; 
other than: 
 (c) a decision by the Governor-General; or 
 (d) a decision included in any of the classes of decisions set out in Schedule 1. 
Note: Regulations for the purposes of section 19 can declare that decisions that 
are covered by this definition are not subject to judicial review under this 
Act. 
duty includes a duty imposed on a person in his or her capacity as a servant of the 
Crown. 
enactment means: 
 (a) an Act, other than: 
 (i) the Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970; or 
 (ii) the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978; or 
 (iii) an Act or part of an Act that is not an enactment because of section 3A 
(certain legislation relating to the ACT); or 
 (b) an Ordinance of a Territory other than the Australian Capital Territory or the 
Northern Territory; or 
 (c) an instrument (including rules, regulations or by-laws) made under such an Act 
or under such an Ordinance, other than any such instrument that is not an 
enactment because of section 3A; or 
 (ca) an Act of a State, the Australian Capital Territory or the Northern Territory, or 
a part of such an Act, described in Schedule 3; or 
 (cb) an instrument (including rules, regulations or by-laws) made under an Act or 
part of an Act covered by paragraph (ca); or 
 (d) any other law, or a part of a law, of the Northern Territory declared by the 
regulations, in accordance with section 19A, to be an enactment for the 
purposes of this Act; 
and, for the purposes of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (ca) or (cb), includes a part of an 
enactment. 
Note: Regulations for the purposes of section 19B can amend Schedule 3 (see 
section 19B). 
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failure, in relation to the making of a decision, includes a refusal to make the 
decision. 
… 
order of review, in relation to a decision, in relation to conduct engaged in for the 
purpose of making a decision or in relation to a failure to make a decision, means an 
order on an application made under section 5, 6 or 7 in respect of the decision, 
conduct or failure. 
… 
 (2) In this Act, a reference to the making of a decision includes a reference to: 
 (a) making, suspending, revoking or refusing to make an order, award or 
determination; 
 (b) giving, suspending, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, 
approval, consent or permission; 
 (c) issuing, suspending, revoking or refusing to issue a licence, authority or other 
instrument; 
 (d) imposing a condition or restriction; 
 (e) making a declaration, demand or requirement; 
 (f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article; or 
 (g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing; 
and a reference to a failure to make a decision shall be construed accordingly. 
 (3) Where provision is made by an enactment for the making of a report or 
recommendation before a decision is made in the exercise of a power under that 
enactment or under another law, the making of such a report or recommendation 
shall itself be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be the making of a decision. 
 (4) In this Act: 
 (a) a reference to a person aggrieved by a decision includes a reference: 
 (i) to a person whose interests are adversely affected by the decision; or 
 (ii) in the case of a decision by way of the making of a report or 
recommendation—to a person whose interests would be adversely 
affected if a decision were, or were not, made in accordance with the 
report or recommendation; and 
 (b) a reference to a person aggrieved by conduct that has been, is being, or is 
proposed to be, engaged in for the purpose of making a decision or by a failure 
to make a decision includes a reference to a person whose interests are or 
would be adversely affected by the conduct or failure. 
 (5) A reference in this Act to conduct engaged in for the purpose of making a decision 
includes a reference to the doing of any act or thing preparatory to the making of the 
decision, including the taking of evidence or the holding of an inquiry or 
investigation. 
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5  Applications for review of decisions 
 (1) A person who is aggrieved by a decision to which this Act applies that is made after 
the commencement of this Act may apply to the Federal Court or the Federal 
Magistrates Court for an order of review in respect of the decision on any one or 
more of the following grounds: 
 (a) that a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the 
making of the decision; 
 (b) that procedures that were required by law to be observed in connection with 
the making of the decision were not observed; 
 (c) that the person who purported to make the decision did not have jurisdiction 
to make the decision; 
 (d) that the decision was not authorized by the enactment in pursuance of which it 
was purported to be made; 
 (e) that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power 
conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be 
made; 
 (f) that the decision involved an error of law, whether or not the error appears on 
the record of the decision; 
 (g) that the decision was induced or affected by fraud; 
 (h) that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the 
decision; 
 (j) that the decision was otherwise contrary to law. 
 (2) The reference in paragraph (1)(e) to an improper exercise of a power shall be 
construed as including a reference to: 
 (a) taking an irrelevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power; 
 (b) failing to take a relevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power; 
 (c) an exercise of a power for a purpose other than a purpose for which the power 
is conferred; 
 (d) an exercise of a discretionary power in bad faith; 
 (e) an exercise of a personal discretionary power at the direction or behest of 
another person; 
 (f) an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without 
regard to the merits of the particular case; 
 (g) an exercise of a power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could 
have so exercised the power; 
 (h) an exercise of a power in such a way that the result of the exercise of the power 
is uncertain; and 
 (j) any other exercise of a power in a way that constitutes abuse of the power. 
 (3) The ground specified in paragraph (1)(h) shall not be taken to be made out unless: 
 (a) the person who made the decision was required by law to reach that decision 
only if a particular matter was established, and there was no evidence or other 
material (including facts of which he or she was entitled to take notice) from 
which he or she could reasonably be satisfied that the matter was established; 
or 
 (b) the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a 
particular fact, and that fact did not exist. 
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6  Applications for review of conduct related to making of decisions 
 (1) Where a person has engaged, is engaging, or proposes to engage, in conduct for the 
purpose of making a decision to which this Act applies, a person who is aggrieved by 
the conduct may apply to the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court for an 
order of review in respect of the conduct on any one or more of the following 
grounds: 
 (a) that a breach of the rules of natural justice has occurred, is occurring, or is 
likely to occur, in connection with the conduct; 
 (b) that procedures that are required by law to be observed in respect of the 
conduct have not been, are not being, or are likely not to be, observed; 
 (c) that the person who has engaged, is engaging, or proposes to engage, in the 
conduct does not have jurisdiction to make the proposed decision; 
 (d) that the enactment in pursuance of which the decision is proposed to be made 
does not authorize the making of the proposed decision; 
 (e) that the making of the proposed decision would be an improper exercise of the 
power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which the decision is 
proposed to be made; 
 (f) that an error of law had been, is being, or is likely to be, committed in the 
course of the conduct or is likely to be committed in the making of the 
proposed decision; 
 (g) that fraud has taken place, is taking place, or is likely to take place, in the 
course of the conduct; 
 (h) that there is no evidence or other material to justify the making of the 
proposed decision; 
 (j) that the making of the proposed decision would be otherwise contrary to law. 
 (2) The reference in paragraph (1)(e) to an improper exercise of a power shall be 
construed as including a reference to: 
 (a) taking an irrelevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power; 
 (b) failing to take a relevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power; 
 (c) an exercise of a power for a purpose other than a purpose for which the power 
is conferred; 
 (d) an exercise of a discretionary power in bad faith; 
 (e) an exercise of a personal discretionary power at the direction or behest of 
another person; 
 (f) an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without 
regard to the merits of the particular case; 
 (g) an exercise of a power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could 
have so exercised the power; 
 (h) an exercise of a power in such a way that the result of the exercise of the power 
is uncertain; and 
 (j) any other exercise of a power in a way that constitutes abuse of the power. 
 (3) The ground specified in paragraph (1)(h) shall not be taken to be made out unless: 
 (a) the person who proposes to make the decision is required by law to reach that 
decision only if a particular matter is established, and there is no evidence or 
other material (including facts of which he or she is entitled to take notice) 
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from which he or she can reasonably be satisfied that the matter is established; 
or 
 (b) the person proposes to make the decision on the basis of the existence of a 
particular fact, and that fact does not exist. 
7  Applications in respect of failures to make decisions 
 (1) Where: 
 (a) a person has a duty to make a decision to which this Act applies; 
 (b) there is no law that prescribes a period within which the person is required to 
make that decision; and 
 (c) the person has failed to make that decision; 
a person who is aggrieved by the failure of the first-mentioned person to make the 
decision may apply to the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court for an 
order of review in respect of the failure to make the decision on the ground that 
there has been unreasonable delay in making the decision. 
 (2) Where: 
 (a) a person has a duty to make a decision to which this Act applies; 
 (b) a law prescribes a period within which the person is required to make that 
decision; and 
 (c) the person failed to make that decision before the expiration of that period; 
a person who is aggrieved by the failure of the first-mentioned person to make the 
decision within that period may apply to the Federal Court or the Federal 
Magistrates Court for an order of review in respect of the failure to make the 
decision within that period on the ground that the first-mentioned person has a duty 
to make the decision notwithstanding the expiration of that period. 
10  Rights conferred by this Act to be additional to other rights 
 (1) The rights conferred by sections 5, 6 and 7 on a person to make an application to 
the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court in respect of a decision, in 
respect of conduct engaged in for the purpose of making a decision or in respect of 
a failure to make a decision: 
 (a) are in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other rights that the person has 
to seek a review, whether by the court, by another court, or by another 
tribunal, authority or person, of that decision, conduct or failure; and 
 (b) shall be disregarded for the purposes of the application of subsection 6(3) of 
the Ombudsman Act 1976 and section 40TF of the Australian Federal Police Act 
1979. 
 (2) Notwithstanding subsection (1): 
 (a) the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court, or any other court, may, in 
a proceeding instituted otherwise than under this Act, in its discretion, refuse 
to grant an application for a review of a decision, conduct engaged in for the 
purpose of making a decision, or a failure to make a decision, for the reason 
that an application has been made to the Federal Court or the Federal 
Magistrates Court under section 5, 6 or 7 in respect of that decision, conduct 
or failure; and 
 (b) the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court may, in its discretion, refuse 
to grant an application under section 5, 6 or 7 that was made to the court in 
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respect of a decision, in respect of conduct engaged in for the purpose of 
making a decision, or in respect of a failure to make a decision, for the reason: 
 (i) that the applicant has sought a review by the court, or by another court, of 
that decision, conduct or failure otherwise than under this Act; or 
 (ii) that adequate provision is made by any law other than this Act under 
which the applicant is entitled to seek a review by the court, by another 
court, or by another tribunal, authority or person, of that decision, 
conduct or failure. 
 (3) In this section, review includes a review by way of reconsideration, re-hearing, 
appeal, the grant of an injunction or of a prerogative or statutory writ or the making 
of a declaratory or other order. 
13  Reasons for decision may be obtained 
 (1) Where a person makes a decision to which this section applies, any person who is 
entitled to make an application to the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court 
under section 5 in relation to the decision may, by notice in writing given to the 
person who made the decision, request him or her to furnish a statement in writing 
setting out the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or 
other material on which those findings were based and giving the reasons for the 
decision. 
 (2) Where such a request is made, the person who made the decision shall, subject to 
this section, as soon as practicable, and in any event within 28 days, after receiving 
the request, prepare the statement and furnish it to the person who made the 
request. 
 (3) Where a person to whom a request is made under subsection (1) is of the opinion 
that the person who made the request was not entitled to make the request, the 
first-mentioned person may, within 28 days after receiving the request: 
 (a) give to the second-mentioned person notice in writing of his or her opinion; or 
 (b) apply to the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court under 
subsection (4A) for an order declaring that the person who made the request 
was not entitled to make the request. 
 (4) Where a person gives a notice under subsection (3), or applies to the Federal Court 
or the Federal Magistrates Court under subsection (4A), with respect to a request, 
the person is not required to comply with the request unless: 
 (a) the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court, on an application under 
subsection (4A), declares that the person who made the request was entitled to 
make the request; or 
 (b) the person who gave the notice under subsection (3) has applied to the Federal 
Court or the Federal Magistrates Court under subsection (4A) for an order 
declaring that the person who made the request was not entitled to make the 
request and the court refuses that application; 
and, in either of those cases, the person who gave the notice shall prepare the 
statement to which the request relates and furnish it to the person who made the 
request within 28 days after the decision of the court. 
 (4A) The Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court may, on the application of: 
 (a) a person to whom a request is made under subsection (1); or 
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 (b) a person who has received a notice under subsection (3); 
make an order declaring that the person who made the request concerned was, or 
was not, entitled to make the request. 
 (5) A person to whom a request for a statement in relation to a decision is made under 
subsection (1) may refuse to prepare and furnish the statement if: 
 (a) in the case of a decision the terms of which were recorded in writing and set 
out in a document that was furnished to the person who made the request—
the request was not made on or before the twenty-eighth day after the day on 
which that document was so furnished; or 
 (b) in any other case—the request was not made within a reasonable time after the 
decision was made; 
and in any such case the person to whom the request was made shall give to the 
person who made the request, within 14 days after receiving the request, notice in 
writing stating that the statement will not be furnished to him or her and giving the 
reason why the statement will not be so furnished. 
 (6) For the purposes of paragraph (5)(b), a request for a statement in relation to a 
decision shall be deemed to have been made within a reasonable time after the 
decision was made if the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court, on 
application by the person who made the request, declares that the request was made 
within a reasonable time after the decision was made. 
 (7) If the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court, upon application for an order 
under this subsection made to it by a person to whom a statement has been 
furnished in pursuance of a request under subsection (1), considers that the 
statement does not contain adequate particulars of findings on material questions of 
fact, an adequate reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings 
were based or adequate particulars of the reasons for the decision, the court may 
order the person who furnished the statement to furnish to the person who made 
the request for the statement, within such time as is specified in the order, an 
additional statement or additional statements containing further and better 
particulars in relation to matters specified in the order with respect to those findings, 
that evidence or other material or those reasons. 
 (8) The regulations may declare a class or classes of decisions to be decisions that are 
not decisions to which this section applies. 
 (9) Regulations made under subsection (8) may specify a class of decisions in any way, 
whether by reference to the nature or subject matter of the decisions, by reference to 
the enactment or provision of an enactment under which they are made, by 
reference to the holder of the office by whom they are made, or otherwise. 
 (10) A regulation made under subsection (8) applies only in relation to decisions made 
after the regulation takes effect. 
 (11) In this section, decision to which this section applies means a decision that is a 
decision to which this Act applies, but does not include: 
 (a) a decision in relation to which section 28 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
Act 1975 applies; 
 (b) a decision that includes, or is accompanied by a statement setting out, findings 
of facts, a reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings 
were based and the reasons for the decision; or 
          265
Appendix G: Key ADJR Act Provisions 
265 
 (c) a decision included in any of the classes of decision set out in Schedule 2. 
13A  Certain information not required to be disclosed 
 (1) This section applies in relation to any information to which a request made to a 
person under subsection 13(1) relates, being information that: 
 (a) relates to the personal affairs or business affairs of a person, other than the 
person making the request; and 
 (b) is information: 
 (i) that was supplied in confidence; 
 (ii) the publication of which would reveal a trade secret; 
 (iii) that was furnished in compliance with a duty imposed by an enactment; or 
 (iv) the furnishing of which in accordance with the request would be in 
contravention of an enactment, being an enactment that expressly 
imposes on the person to whom the request is made a duty not to divulge 
or communicate to any person, or to any person other than a person 
included in a prescribed class of persons, or except in prescribed 
circumstances, information of that kind. 
 (2) Where a person has been requested in accordance with subsection 13(1) to furnish a 
statement to a person: 
 (a) the first-mentioned person is not required to include in the statement any 
information in relation to which this section applies; and 
 (b) where the statement would be false or misleading if it did not include such 
information—the first-mentioned person is not required by section 13 to 
furnish the statement. 
 (3) Where, by reason of subsection (2), information is not included in a statement 
furnished by a person or a statement is not furnished by a person, the person shall 
give notice in writing to the person who requested the statement: 
 (a) in a case where information is not included in a statement—stating that the 
information is not so included and giving the reason for not including the 
information; or 
 (b) in a case where a statement is not furnished—stating that the statement will 
not be furnished and giving the reason for not furnishing the statement. 
 (4) Nothing in this section affects the power of the Federal Court or the Federal 
Magistrates Court to make an order for the discovery of documents or to require the 
giving of evidence or the production of documents to the court. 
14  Certification by Attorney-General concerning the disclosure of information 
 (1) If the Attorney-General certifies, by writing signed by him or her, that the disclosure 
of information concerning a specified matter would be contrary to the public 
interest: 
 (a) by reason that it would prejudice the security, defence or international relations 
of Australia; 
 (b) by reason that it would involve the disclosure of deliberations or decisions of 
the Cabinet or of a Committee of the Cabinet; or 
 (c) for any other reason specified in the certificate that could form the basis for a 
claim in a judicial proceeding that the information should not be disclosed; 
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the following provisions of this section have effect. 
 (2) Where a person has been requested in accordance with section 13 to furnish a 
statement to a person: 
 (a) the first-mentioned person is not required to include in the statement any 
information in respect of which the Attorney-General has certified in 
accordance with subsection (1) of this section; and 
 (b) where the statement would be false or misleading if it did not include such 
information—the first-mentioned person is not required by that section to 
furnish the statement. 
 (3) Where, by reason of subsection (2), information is not included in a statement 
furnished by a person or a statement is not furnished by a person, the person shall 
give notice in writing to the person who requested the statement: 
 (a) in a case where information is not included in a statement—stating that the 
information is not so included and giving the reason for not including the 
information; or 
 (b) in a case where a statement is not furnished—stating that the statement will 
not be furnished and giving the reason for not furnishing the statement. 
 (4) Nothing in this section affects the power of the Federal Court or the Federal 
Magistrates Court to make an order for the discovery of documents or to require the 
giving of evidence or the production of documents to the court. 
16  Powers of the Federal Court and the Federal Magistrates Court in respect of 
applications for order of review 
 (1) On an application for an order of review in respect of a decision, the Federal Court 
or the Federal Magistrates Court may, in its discretion, make all or any of the 
following orders: 
 (a) an order quashing or setting aside the decision, or a part of the decision, with 
effect from the date of the order or from such earlier or later date as the court 
specifies; 
 (b) an order referring the matter to which the decision relates to the person who 
made the decision for further consideration, subject to such directions as the 
court thinks fit; 
 (c) an order declaring the rights of the parties in respect of any matter to which 
the decision relates; 
 (d) an order directing any of the parties to do, or to refrain from doing, any act or 
thing the doing, or the refraining from the doing, of which the court considers 
necessary to do justice between the parties. 
 (2) On an application for an order of review in respect of conduct that has been, is 
being, or is proposed to be, engaged in for the purpose of the making of a decision, 
the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court may, in its discretion, make either 
or both of the following orders: 
 (a) an order declaring the rights of the parties in respect of any matter to which 
the conduct relates; 
 (b) an order directing any of the parties to do, or to refrain from doing, any act or 
thing the doing, or the refraining from the doing, of which the court considers 
necessary to do justice between the parties. 
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 (3) On an application for an order of review in respect of a failure to make a decision, 
or in respect of a failure to make a decision within the period within which the 
decision was required to be made, the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates 
Court may, in its discretion, make all or any of the following orders: 
 (a) an order directing the making of the decision; 
 (b) an order declaring the rights of the parties in relation to the making of the 
decision; 
 (c) an order directing any of the parties to do, or to refrain from doing, any act or 
thing the doing, or the refraining from the doing, of which the court considers 
necessary to do justice between the parties. 
 (4) The Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court may at any time, of its own 
motion or on the application of any party, revoke, vary, or suspend the operation of, 
any order made by it under this section.
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 (a) decisions under the Fair Work Act 2009, the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 
2009, the Fair Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009, the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 or the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 
2005; 
 (c) decisions under the Coal Industry Act 1946, other than decisions of the Joint Coal 
Board; 
 (d) decisions under any of the following Acts: 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1956 
Intelligence Services Act 2001 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
Telephonic Communications (Interception) Act 1960; 
 (daa) decisions of the Attorney-General under section 58A, or subsection 581(3), of the 
Telecommunications Act 1997; 
 (dab) decisions of the Attorney-General under section 104.2 of the Criminal Code; 
 (dac) decisions under Division 105 of the Criminal Code; 
 (da) a privative clause decision within the meaning of subsection 474(2) of the Migration 
Act 1958;  
 (db) a purported privative clause decision within the meaning of section 5E of the 
Migration Act 1958; 
 (e) decisions making, or forming part of the process of making, or leading up to the 
making of, assessments or calculations of tax, charge or duty, or decisions 
disallowing objections to assessments or calculations of tax, charge or duty, or 
decisions amending, or refusing to amend, assessments or calculations of tax, charge 
or duty, under any of the following Acts: 
A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 
A New Tax System (Luxury Car Tax) Act 1999 
A New Tax System (Wine Equalisation Tax) Act 1999 
Customs Act 1901 
Customs Tariff Act 1995 
Excise Act 1901 
Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 
Fuel Tax Act 2006 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Assessment Act 1987 
Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 
Taxation Administration Act 1953, but only so far as the decisions are made under 
Part 3-10 in Schedule 1 to that Act 
Training Guarantee (Administration) Act 1990 
Trust Recoupment Tax Assessment Act 1985; 
 (ga) decisions under section 14ZY of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 disallowing 
objections to assessments or calculations of tax, charge or duty; 
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 (gaa) decisions of the Commissioner of Taxation under Subdivision 268-B or 
section 268-35 in Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953; 
Note: Subdivision 268-B and section 268-35 empower the Commissioner to 
make, reduce and revoke estimates of certain liabilities. 
 (gb) decisions making, or forming part of the process of making, or leading up to the 
making of, assessments under Division 2 of Part 5 of the Renewable Energy (Electricity) 
Act 2000 or decisions disallowing objections to such assessments or decisions 
amending or refusing to amend such assessments; 
 (h) decisions under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975; 
 (ha) decisions of the Minister under Division 1 of Part 7.4 of the Corporations Act 2001; 
 (hb) decisions of the SEGC under Part 7.5 of the Corporations Act 2001; 
 (hc) decisions under Division 3 of Part VC of the Insurance Act 1973, except so far as they 
relate to either of the following matters: 
 (i) whether persons are covered by determinations under section 62ZZ of that 
Act; 
 (ii) determinations under subsection 62ZZJ(2) of that Act; 
 (hd) decisions under Subdivision C of Division 2AA of Part II of the Banking Act 1959, 
except so far as they relate to whether account-holders have protected accounts with 
ADIs; 
 (j) decisions, or decisions included in a class of decisions, under the Banking (Foreign 
Exchange) Regulations in respect of which the Treasurer has certified, by instrument 
in writing, that the decision or any decision included in the class, as the case may be, 
is a decision giving effect to the foreign investment policy of the Commonwealth 
Government; 
 (l) decisions of the National Workplace Relations Consultative Council; 
 (o) decisions under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982; 
 (p) decisions under section 42 of the Customs Act 1901 to require and take securities in 
respect of duty that may be payable under the Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act 1975; 
 (q) decisions under subsection 25(1) or Part IIIA of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918; 
 (qa) decisions under section 176 or 248 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing Act 2006; 
 (r) decisions under the Extradition Act 1988; 
 (s) determinations made by the Child Support Registrar under Part 6A of the Child 
Support (Assessment) Act 1989; 
 (t) decisions under an enactment of Qantas Airways Limited or a company that is a 
subsidiary of that company; 
 (u) decisions of Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation Limited or a body 
corporate that is a subsidiary of that body corporate; 
 (v) decisions of CSL Limited or a company that is a subsidiary of that company; 
 (va) decisions of Telstra Corporation Limited or a company that is a subsidiary of that 
company; 
 (w) decisions under the Witness Protection Act 1994; 
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 (wa) decisions under section 34B or 34D of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002; 
 (x) decisions under subsection 60A(2B) of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979; 
 (xa) decisions to prosecute persons for any offence against a law of the Commonwealth, 
a State or a Territory; 
Note: An application under this Act in relation to other criminal justice process 
decisions cannot be heard or determined in certain circumstances: see 
section 9A. 
 (xb) decisions of the Attorney-General under Part II or III of the Transfer of Prisoners Act 
1983 refusing applications or requests, or refusing to give consent, on the ground 
that, or on grounds that include the ground that, refusal is necessary in the interests 
of security (within the meaning of that Act); 
 (xc) decisions of the Attorney-General under Part IV of the Transfer of Prisoners Act 1983; 
 (y) decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (other than decisions made on 
review of decisions of the Australian Archives) made on a review that is required by 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to be conducted by the Security Appeals 
Division of that Tribunal; 
 (ya) decisions of a proceeds of crime authority or an approved examiner under Part 3-1 
of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; 
 (yb) decisions of a proceeds of crime authority to apply for an order under the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002; 
 (yc) decisions of a proceeds of crime authority to transfer to another proceeds of crime 
authority responsibility for an application for a principal order, or a principal order, 
under section 315B of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; 
 (za) decisions under Part VIIIB of the Judiciary Act 1903 (which relates to the Australian 
Government Solicitor); 
 (zb) decisions of Snowy Hydro Limited or a body corporate that is a subsidiary of Snowy 
Hydro Limited;  
 (zd) the following decisions under the Family Law Act 1975: 
 (i) decisions of the Chief Judge or the Deputy Chief Judge in the exercise of, or in 
assisting in the exercise of, the functions or powers mentioned in subsection 
21B(1A) of that Act; 
 (ii) decisions of the Chief Judge or the Attorney-General whether to consent as 
mentioned in paragraph 22(2AAA)(a) of that Act; 
 (ze) the following decisions under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976: 
 (i) decisions of the Chief Justice in the exercise of the functions or powers 
mentioned in subsection 15(1AA) of that Act; 
 (ii) decisions of the Chief Justice or the Attorney-General whether to consent as 
mentioned in paragraph 6(3)(a) of that Act; 
 (zf) decisions of the Chief Federal Magistrate in the exercise of the functions or powers 
mentioned in subsection 12(3) or (4) of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999.
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 (a) decisions in connection with, or made in the course of, redress of grievances, or 
redress of wrongs, with respect to members of the Defence Force; 
 (b) decisions in connection with personnel management (including recruitment, training, 
promotion and organization) with respect to the Defence Force, including decisions 
relating to particular persons; 
 (c) decisions under any of the following Acts: 
Consular Privileges and Immunities Act 1972 
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1967 
International Organisations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1963; 
 (d) decisions under the Migration Act 1958, being: 
 (i) decisions under section 11Q, other than: 
 (A) a decision relating to a person who, at the time of the decision, was, 
within the meaning of that Act, the holder of a valid visa; or 
 (B) a decision relating to a person who, having entered Australia within the 
meaning of that Act, was in Australia at the time of the decision; 
 (ii) decisions in connection with the issue or cancellation of visas; 
 (iii) decisions whether a person is a person referred to in paragraph (b) of the 
definition of exempt non-citizen in subsection 5(1) of that Act; or 
 (iv) decisions relating to a person who, having entered Australia as a diplomatic or 
consular representative of another country, a member of the staff of such a 
representative or the spouse, de facto partner or a dependent relative of such a 
representative, was in Australia at the time of the decision (for the purposes of 
this subparagraph, enter Australia, spouse, de facto partner and relative 
have the same meanings as in that Act); 
 (da) decisions of the Attorney-General to give: 
 (i) notice under section 6A of the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil 
Proceedings) Act 2004; or 
 (ii) a certificate under section 26, 28, 38F or 38H of that Act; 
 (db) decisions of the Minister appointed by the Attorney-General under section 6A of the 
National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 to give: 
 (i) notice under section 6A of that Act; or 
 (ii) a certificate under section 38F or 38H of that Act; 
 (dc) decisions under subsection 8(4) or 9(4) of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law 
Enforcement Act 2010; 
 (e) decisions relating to the administration of criminal justice, and, in particular: 
 (i) decisions in connection with the investigation, committal for trial or 
prosecution of persons for any offences against a law of the Commonwealth or 
of a Territory; 
 (ii) decisions in connection with the appointment of investigators or inspectors for 
the purposes of such investigations; 
 (iii) decisions in connection with the issue of warrants, including search warrants 
and seizure warrants, under a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory; 
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 (iv) decisions under a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory requiring the 
production of documents, the giving of information or the summoning of 
persons as witnesses; 
 (v) decisions in connection with an appeal (including an application for a new trial 
or a proceeding to review or call in question the proceedings, decision or 
jurisdiction of a court or judge) arising out of the prosecution of persons for 
any offences against a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory; 
 (eaa) decisions under the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 being: 
 (i) decisions in connection with a corruption investigation (within the meaning of 
that Act); or 
 (ii) decisions in connection with a public inquiry (within the meaning of that Act); 
 (ea) decisions under the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 being: 
 (i) decisions in connection with intelligence operations; or 
 (ii) decisions in connection with investigations of State offences that have a federal 
aspect; 
 (f) decisions in connection with the institution or conduct of proceedings in a civil 
court, including decisions that relate to, or may result in, the bringing of such 
proceedings for the recovery of pecuniary penalties arising from contraventions of 
enactments, and, in particular: 
 (i) decisions in connection with the investigation of persons for such 
contraventions; 
 (ii) decisions in connection with the appointment of investigators or inspectors for 
the purposes of such investigations; 
 (iii) decisions in connection with the issue of search warrants or seizure warrants 
issued under Division 1 of Part XII of the Customs Act 1901 under enactments; 
and 
 (iv) decisions under enactments requiring the production of documents, the giving 
of information or the summoning of persons as witnesses; 
 (g) decisions of the Finance Minister to issue sums out of the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund under an Act to appropriate moneys out of that Fund for the service of, or for 
expenditure in respect of, any year; 
 (h) decisions under section 27 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997; 
 (i) decisions of the Commonwealth Grants Commission relating to the allocation of 
funds; 
 (j) decisions of any of the following Tribunals: 
Academic Salaries Tribunal 
Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal 
Federal Police Arbitral Tribunal 
Remuneration Tribunal; 
 (k) decisions of any of the following authorities in respect of their commercial activities: 
Australian Honey Board 
Australian Meat and Live-stock Corporation 
Australian Wheat Board 
Australian Wool Corporation 
Canberra Commercial Development Authority 
Christmas Island Phosphate Commission 
Indigenous Business Australia; 
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 (l) decisions of the Reserve Bank in connection with its banking operations (including 
individual open market operations and foreign exchange dealings); 
 (m) decisions in connection with the enforcement of judgments or orders for the 
recovery of moneys by the Commonwealth or by an officer of the Commonwealth; 
 (o) decisions of the National Director of the Commonwealth Employment Service 
made on behalf of that Service to refer, or not to refer, particular clients to particular 
employers; 
 (p) decisions under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 that: 
 (i) relate to aircraft design, the construction or maintenance of aircraft or the safe 
operation of aircraft or otherwise relate to aviation safety; and 
 (ii) arise out of findings on material questions of fact based on evidence, or other 
material: 
 (A) that was supplied in confidence; or 
 (B) the publication of which would reveal information that is a trade secret; 
 (q) decisions in connection with personnel management (including recruitment, training, 
promotion and organization) with respect to the Australian Public Service or any 
other Service established by an enactment or the staff of a Commonwealth authority, 
other than a decision relating to, and having regard to the particular characteristics 
of, or other circumstances relating to, a particular person; 
 (r) decisions relating to assignment of duties, voluntary moves between Agencies, 
compulsory moves between Agencies, promotions or decisions of Promotion 
Review Committees, of or by individual APS employees; 
 (t) decisions relating to: 
 (i) the making of appointments in the Australian Public Service or any other 
Service established by an enactment or to the staff of a Commonwealth 
authority; 
 (ii) the engagement of persons as employees under the Public Service Act 1999 or 
under any other enactment that establishes a Service or by a Commonwealth 
authority; or 
 (iii) the making of appointments under an enactment or to an office established by, 
or under, an enactment; 
 (u) decisions in connection with industrial matters, in respect of the Australian Public 
Service or any other Service established by an enactment or the staff of a 
Commonwealth authority; 
 (w) decisions relating to the making or terminating of appointments of Secretaries under 
the Public Service Act 1999; 
 (y) decisions relating to: 
 (i) engaging, or terminating engagements of, consultants; or 
 (ii) employing, or terminating the employment of, staff; 
under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984; 
 (z) decisions under section 28, 40F or 40H of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979; 
 (zb) decisions relating to the activities of the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 
under Part 4 or 5 of the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991; 
 (zc) decisions of the Minister for Foreign Affairs under Part 8B of the Broadcasting Services 
Act 1992 (for this purpose, Minister for Foreign Affairs has the same meaning as 
in that Act).
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Part 8—Judicial review 
Division 1—Privative clause 
474  Decisions under Act are final 
 (1) A privative clause decision: 
 (a) is final and conclusive; and 
 (b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in 
question in any court; and 
 (c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in 
any court on any account. 
 (2) In this section: 
privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, 
proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or 
under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise 
of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5). 
 (3) A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following: 
 (a) granting, making, varying, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to make 
an order or determination;  
 (b) granting, giving, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to give a 
certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission (including a visa); 
 (c) granting, issuing, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to issue an 
authority or other instrument; 
 (d) imposing, or refusing to remove, a condition or restriction; 
 (e) making or revoking, or refusing to make or revoke, a declaration, demand or 
requirement; 
 (f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article; 
 (g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing; 
 (h) conduct preparatory to the making of a decision, including the taking of 
evidence or the holding of an inquiry or investigation; 
 (i) a decision on review of a decision, irrespective of whether the decision on 
review is taken under this Act or a regulation or other instrument under this 
Act, or under another Act;  
 (j) a failure or refusal to make a decision. 
 (4) For the purposes of subsection (2), a decision under a provision, or under a 
regulation or other instrument made under a provision, set out in the following table 
is not a privative clause decision:  
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Decisions that are not privative clause decisions 
Item Provision Subject matter of provision 
1 section 213 Liability for the costs of removal or 
deportation 
2 section 217 Conveyance of removees 
3 section 218 Conveyance of deportees etc. 
4 section 222 Orders restraining non-citizens from 
disposing of property 
5 section 223 Valuables of detained non-citizens 
6 section 224 Dealing with seized valuables 
7 section 252 Searches of persons 
8 section 259 Detention of vessels for search 
9 section 260 Detention of vessels/dealing with 
detained vessels 
10 section 261 Disposal of certain vessels 
11 Division 14 of 
Part 2 
Recovery of costs 
12 section 269 Taking of securities 
13 section 272 Migrant centres 
14 section 273 Detention centres 
15 Part 3 Migration agents registration scheme 
16 Part 4 Court orders about reparation 
17 section 353A Directions by Principal Member 
18 section 354 Constitution of Migration Review 
Tribunal 
19 section 355 Reconstitution of Migration Review 
Tribunal 
20 section 355A Reconstitution of Migration Review 
Tribunal for efficient conduct of 
review 
21 section 356 Exercise of powers of Migration 
Review Tribunal 
22 section 357 Presiding member 
23 Division 7 of 
Part 5 
Offences 
24 Part 6 Establishment and membership of 
Migration Review Tribunal 
25 section 421 Constitution of Refugee Review 
Tribunal 
26 section 422 Reconstitution of Refugee Review 
Tribunal 
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Decisions that are not privative clause decisions 
Item Provision Subject matter of provision 
27 section 422A Reconstitution of Refugee Review 
Tribunal for efficient conduct of 
review 
28 Division 6 of 
Part 7 
Offences 
29 Division 9 of 
Part 7 
Establishment and membership of 
Refugee Review Tribunal 
30 Division 10 of 
Part 7 
Registry and officers 
31 regulation 5.35 Medical treatment of persons in 
detention 
 (5) The regulations may specify that a decision, or a decision included in a class of 
decisions, under this Act, or under regulations or another instrument under this Act, 
is not a privative clause decision. 
 (6) A decision mentioned in subsection 474(4), or specified (whether by reference to a 
particular decision or a class of decisions) in regulations made under subsection 
474(5), is a non-privative clause decision. 
 (7) To avoid doubt, the following decisions are privative clause decisions within the 
meaning of subsection 474(2): 
 (a) a decision of the Minister not to exercise, or not to consider the exercise, of the 
Minister’s power under subsection 37A(2) or (3), section 48B, paragraph 
72(1)(c), section 91F, 91L, 91Q, 195A, 197AB, 197AD, 351, 391, 417 or 454 or 
subsection 503A(3); 
 (b) a decision of the Principal Member of the Migration Review Tribunal or of the 
Principal Member of the Refugee Review Tribunal to refer a matter to the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal; 
 (c) a decision of the President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to accept, 
or not to accept, the referral of a decision under section 382 or 444; 
 (d) a decision of the Minister under Division 13A of Part 2 to order that a thing is 
not to be condemned as forfeited. 
 
Division 2—Jurisdiction and procedure of courts 
475  This Division not to limit section 474 
  This Division is not to be taken to limit the scope or operation of section 474. 
476  Jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrates Court 
 (1) Subject to this section, the Federal Magistrates Court has the same original 
jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 
75(v) of the Constitution. 
 (2) The Federal Magistrates Court has no jurisdiction in relation to the following 
decisions: 
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 (a) a primary decision; 
 (b) a privative clause decision, or purported privative clause decision, of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal on review under section 500; 
 (c) a privative clause decision, or purported privative clause decision, made 
personally by the Minister under section 501, 501A, 501B or 501C; 
 (d) a privative clause decision or purported privative clause decision mentioned in 
subsection 474(7). 
 (3) Nothing in this section affects any jurisdiction the Federal Magistrates Court may 
have in relation to non-privative clause decisions under section 8 of the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 or section 44AA of the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal Act 1975. 
 (4) In this section: 
primary decision means a privative clause decision or purported privative clause 
decision: 
 (a) that is reviewable under Part 5 or 7 or section 500 (whether or not it has been 
reviewed); or 
 (b) that would have been so reviewable if an application for such review had been 
made within a specified period. 
476A  Limited jurisdiction of the Federal Court 
 (1) Despite any other law, including section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 and section 8 
of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, the Federal Court has original 
jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision if, and only if: 
 (a) the Federal Magistrates Court transfers a proceeding pending in that court in 
relation to the decision to the Federal Court under section 39 of the Federal 
Magistrates Act 1999; or 
 (b) the decision is a privative clause decision, or a purported privative clause 
decision, of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on review under section 500; 
or 
 (c) the decision is a privative clause decision, or purported privative clause 
decision, made personally by the Minister under section 501, 501A, 501B or 
501C; or 
 (d) the Federal Court has jurisdiction in relation to the decision under subsection 
44(3) or 45(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. 
Note: Only non-privative clause decisions can be taken to the Federal Court 
under subsection 44(3) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (see 
section 483). 
 (2) Where the Federal Court has jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision under 
paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c), that jurisdiction is the same as the jurisdiction of the 
High Court under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution. 
 (3) Despite section 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, an appeal may not be 
brought to the Federal Court from: 
 (a) a judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court that makes an order or refuses to 
make an order under subsection 477(2); or 
 (b) a judgment of the Federal Court that makes an order or refuses to make an 
order under subsection 477A(2). 
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 (4) Despite section 33 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, an appeal may not be 
brought to the High Court from a judgment of the Federal Court that makes an 
order or refuses to make an order under subsection 477A(2). 
 (5) In this section: 
judgment has the same meaning as in the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. 
476B  Remittal by the High Court 
 (1) Subject to subsection (3), the High Court must not remit a matter, or any part of a 
matter, that relates to a migration decision to any court other than the Federal 
Magistrates Court. 
 (2) The High Court must not remit a matter, or any part of a matter, that relates to a 
migration decision to the Federal Magistrates Court unless that court has jurisdiction 
in relation to the matter, or that part of the matter, under section 476. 
 (3) The High Court may remit a matter, or part of a matter, that relates to a migration 
decision in relation to which the Federal Court has jurisdiction under paragraph 
476A(1)(b) or (c) to that court. 
 (4) Subsection (1) has effect despite section 44 of the Judiciary Act 1903. 
477  Time limits on applications to the Federal Magistrates Court 
 (1) An application to the Federal Magistrates Court for a remedy to be granted in 
exercise of the court’s original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a 
migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the 
migration decision. 
 (2) The Federal Magistrates Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the 
Federal Magistrates Court considers appropriate if: 
 (a) an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal 
Magistrates Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in 
the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and 
 (b) the Federal Magistrates Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of 
the administration of justice to make the order. 
 (3) In this section: 
date of the migration decision means: 
 (a) in the case of a migration decision made under subsection 43(1) of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975—the date of the written decision under 
that subsection; or 
 (b) in the case of a written migration decision made by the Migration Review 
Tribunal or the Refugee Review Tribunal—the date of the written statement 
under subsection 368(1) or 430(1); or 
 (c) in the case of an oral migration decision made by the Migration Review 
Tribunal or the Refugee Review Tribunal—the date of the oral decision; or 
 (d) in any other case—the date of the written notice of the decision or, if no such 
notice exists, the date that the Court considers appropriate. 
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 (4) For the purposes of subsection (1), the 35 day period begins to run despite a failure 
to comply with the requirements of any of the provisions mentioned in the 
definition of date of the migration decision in subsection (3). 
 (5) To avoid doubt, for the purposes of subsection (1), the 35 day period begins to run 
irrespective of the validity of the migration decision. 
477A  Time limits on applications to the Federal Court 
 (1) An application to the Federal Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the 
court’s original jurisdiction under paragraph 476A(1)(b) or (c) in relation to a 
migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the 
migration decision. 
 (2) The Federal Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Court 
considers appropriate if: 
 (a) an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Court 
specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the 
administration of justice to make the order; and 
 (b) the Federal Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the 
administration of justice to make the order. 
 (3) In this section: 
date of the migration decision has the meaning given by subsection 477(3). 
 (4) For the purposes of subsection (1), the 35 day period begins to run despite a failure 
to comply with the requirements of any of the provisions mentioned in the 
definition of date of the migration decision in subsection 477(3). 
 (5) To avoid doubt, for the purposes of subsection (1), the 35 day period begins to run 
irrespective of the validity of the migration decision. 
478  Persons who may make application 
  An application referred to in section 477 or 477A may only be made by the Minister, 
or where appropriate the Secretary, and: 
 (a) if the migration decision concerned is made on review under Part 5 or 7 or 
section 500—the applicant in the review by the relevant Tribunal; or 
 (b) in any other case—the person who is the subject of the decision; or 
 (c) in any case—a person prescribed by the regulations. 
479  Parties to review 
  The parties to a review of a migration decision resulting from an application referred 
to in section 477 or 477A are the Minister, or where appropriate the Secretary, and: 
 (a) if the migration decision concerned is made on review under Part 5 or 7 or 
section 500—the applicant in the review by the relevant Tribunal; or 
 (b) in any other case—the person who is the subject of the migration decision; or 
 (c) in any case—a person prescribed by the regulations. 
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480  Intervention by Attorney-General 
 (1) The Attorney-General may, on behalf of the Commonwealth, intervene in a 
proceeding resulting from an application referred to in section 477 or 477A. 
 (2) If the Attorney-General intervenes in such a proceeding, the Federal Magistrates 
Court or Federal Court (as the case requires) may make such orders as to costs 
against the Commonwealth as the court thinks fit. 
 (3) If the Attorney-General intervenes in such a proceeding, he or she is taken to be a 
party to the proceeding. 
481  Operation etc. of decision 
  The making of an application referred to in section 477 or 477A does not: 
 (a) affect the operation of the decision; or 
 (b) prevent the taking of action to implement the decision; or 
 (c) prevent the taking of action in reliance on the making of the decision. 
482  Changing person holding, or performing the duties of, an office 
  If: 
 (a) a person has, in the performance of the duties of an office, made a migration 
decision; and 
 (b) the person no longer holds, or, for whatever reason, is not performing the 
duties of, that office; 
this Part has effect as if the decision had been made by: 
 (c) the person for the time being holding or performing the duties of that office; 
or 
 (d) if there is no person for the time being holding or performing the duties of that 
office or that office no longer exists—such person as the Minister specifies. 
483  Section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 
  Section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 does not apply to privative 
clause decisions or purported privative clause decisions. 
484  Exclusive jurisdiction of High Court, Federal Court and Federal Magistrates Court 
 (1) Only the High Court, the Federal Court and the Federal Magistrates Court have 
jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions. 
 (2) To avoid doubt, subsection (1) is not intended to confer jurisdiction on the High 
Court, the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court, but to exclude other 
courts from jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions. 
 (3) To avoid doubt, despite section 67C of the Judiciary Act 1903, the Supreme Court of 
the Northern Territory does not have jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions. 
 (4) To avoid doubt, jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions is not conferred on 
any court under the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987.
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44  Appeals to Federal Court of Australia from decisions of the Tribunal 
Appeal on question of law 
 (1) A party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may appeal to the Federal Court of 
Australia, on a question of law, from any decision of the Tribunal in that proceeding. 
Appeal about standing 
 (2) Where a person has applied to the Tribunal for a review of a decision, or has applied 
to be made a party to a proceeding before the Tribunal for a review of a decision, 
and the Tribunal decides that the interests of the person are not affected by the 
decision, the person may appeal to the Federal Court of Australia from the decision 
of the Tribunal. 
When and how appeal instituted 
 (2A) An appeal by a person under subsection (1) or (2) shall be instituted: 
 (a) not later than the twenty-eighth day after the day on which a document setting 
out the terms of the decision of the Tribunal is given to the person or within 
such further time as the Federal Court of Australia (whether before or after the 
expiration of that day) allows; and 
 (b) in such manner as is prescribed by rules of court made under the Federal Court 
of Australia Act 1976. 
 (2B) In the interest of justice, the grounds on which the Federal Court of Australia may 
allow further time under paragraph (2A)(a) include, but are not limited to, the 
following grounds: 
 (a) if the Tribunal made an oral statement as to the reasons for the decision and 
afterwards gave a written statement of reasons for the decision—the written 
statement contains reasons that were not mentioned in the oral statement; 
 (b) the text of the decision or a statement of reasons for the decision has been 
altered under section 43AA. 
Jurisdiction 
 (3) The Federal Court of Australia has jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals 
instituted in that Court in accordance with subsections (1) and (2) and that 
jurisdiction: 
 (a) may be exercised by that Court constituted as a Full Court; 
 (b) shall be so exercised if: 
 (i) the Tribunal’s decision was given by the Tribunal constituted by a 
member who was, or by members at least one of whom was, a presidential 
member; and 
 (ii) after consulting the President, the Chief Justice of that Court considers 
that it is appropriate for the appeal from the decision to be heard and 
determined by that Court constituted as a Full Court; and 
 (c) shall be so exercised if the Tribunal’s decision was given by the Tribunal 
constituted by a member who was, or by members at least one of whom was, a 
Judge. 
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Powers of Federal Court 
 (4) The Federal Court of Australia shall hear and determine the appeal and may make 
such order as it thinks appropriate by reason of its decision. 
 (5) Without limiting by implication the generality of subsection (4), the orders that may 
be made by the Federal Court of Australia on an appeal include an order affirming 
or setting aside the decision of the Tribunal and an order remitting the case to be 
heard and decided again, either with or without the hearing of further evidence, by 
the Tribunal in accordance with the directions of the Court. 
Constitution of Tribunal if Federal Court remits case etc. 
 (6) If the Federal Court of Australia makes an order remitting a case to be heard and 
decided again by the Tribunal: 
 (a) the Tribunal need not be constituted for the hearing by the person or persons 
who made the decision to which the appeal relates; and 
 (b) whether or not the Tribunal is reconstituted for the hearing—the Tribunal 
may, for the purposes of the proceeding, have regard to any record of the 
proceeding before the Tribunal prior to the appeal (including a record of any 
evidence taken in the proceeding), so long as doing so is not inconsistent with 
the directions of the Court. 
Federal Court may make findings of fact 
 (7) If a party to a proceeding before the Tribunal appeals to the Federal Court of 
Australia under subsection (1), the Court may make findings of fact if: 
 (a) the findings of fact are not inconsistent with findings of fact made by the 
Tribunal (other than findings made by the Tribunal as the result of an error of 
law); and 
 (b) it appears to the Court that it is convenient for the Court to make the findings 
of fact, having regard to: 
 (i) the extent (if any) to which it is necessary for facts to be found; and 
 (ii) the means by which those facts might be established; and 
 (iii) the expeditious and efficient resolution of the whole of the matter to 
which the proceeding before the Tribunal relates; and 
 (iv) the relative expense to the parties of the Court, rather than the Tribunal, 
making the findings of fact; and 
 (v) the relative delay to the parties of the Court, rather than the Tribunal, 
making the findings of fact; and 
 (vi) whether any of the parties considers that it is appropriate for the Court, 
rather than the Tribunal, to make the findings of fact; and 
 (vii) such other matters (if any) as the Court considers relevant. 
 (8) For the purposes of making findings of fact under subsection (7), the Federal Court 
of Australia may: 
 (a) have regard to the evidence given in the proceeding before the Tribunal; and 
 (b) receive further evidence. 
 (9) Subsection (7) does not limit the Federal Court of Australia’s power under 
subsection (5) to make an order remitting the case to be heard and decided again by 
the Tribunal. 
 (10) The jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia under subsection (3) includes 
jurisdiction to make findings of fact under subsection (7).
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APPENDIX L: TAXATION 
ADMINISTRATION ACT PART IVC 
Part IVC—Taxation objections, reviews and appeals 
Division 1—Introduction 
14ZL  Part applies to taxation objections 
 (1) This Part applies if a provision of an Act or of regulations (including the provision 
as applied by another Act) provides that a person who is dissatisfied with an 
assessment, determination, notice or decision, or with a failure to make a private 
ruling, may object against it in the manner set out in this Part. 
 (2) Such an objection is in this Part called a taxation objection. 
14ZM  Division 2—Interpretive 
  Division 2 contains interpretive provisions necessary for this Part. 
14ZN  Division 3—Taxation objections 
  Division 3 describes how taxation objections are to be made and how they are to be 
dealt with by the Commissioner. 
14ZO  Division 4—Tribunal review  
  Division 4 contains provisions about applications to the Tribunal for review of 
decisions by the Commissioner in relation to certain taxation objections and requests 
for extension of time. 
14ZP  Division 5—Federal Court appeals 
  Division 5 contains provisions about appeals to the Federal Court against decisions 
by the Commissioner in relation to certain taxation objections. 
Division 2—Interpretive provisions 
14ZQ  General interpretation provisions 
  In this Part: 
AAT means the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
AAT Act means the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. 
AAT extension application means an application under subsection 29(7) of the 
AAT Act that relates to a review of a reviewable objection decision or an extension 
of time refusal decision. 
delayed administration (beneficiary) objection means a taxation objection made 
under: 
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 (b) subsection 220(3) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (including that 
subsection as applied by any other Act); or 
 (g) subsection 260-145(5) in Schedule 1 (because of paragraph (a) of that 
subsection). 
delayed administration (trustee) objection means a taxation objection made 
under: 
 (a) subsection 220(7) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (including that 
subsection as applied by any other Act); or 
 (b) subsection 260-145(5) in Schedule 1 (because of paragraph (b) of that 
subsection). 
extension of time refusal decision means a decision of the Commissioner under 
subsection 14ZX(1) to refuse a request by a person. 
Family Court means the Family Court of Australia. 
Family Court Judge means a Judge of the Family Court (including the Chief Judge, 
the Deputy Chief Judge, a Judge Administrator or a Senior Judge). 
Federal Court means the Federal Court of Australia. 
franking assessment has the same meaning as in the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1997. 
objection decision has the meaning given by subsection 14ZY(2). 
reviewable objection decision means an objection decision that is not an ineligible 
income tax remission decision. 
taxation decision means the assessment, determination, notice or decision against 
which a taxation objection may be, or has been, made. 
taxation objection has the meaning given by section 14ZL. 
14ZR  Taxation decisions covered by single notice to be treated as single decision 
 (1) If: 
 (a) a provision of an Act (including a provision as applied by another Act) 
provides that a person who is dissatisfied with a taxation decision may object 
against it in the manner set out in this Part; and 
 (b) a notice incorporates notice of 2 or more such taxation decisions; 
then, for the purposes of the provision and of this Part, the taxation decisions are 
taken to be one taxation decision. 
 (2) If: 
 (a) under subsection (1), 2 or more taxation decisions are taken to be a single 
taxation decision (in this subsection called the deemed single taxation 
decision); and 
 (b) the Commissioner makes an objection decision in relation to the deemed single 
taxation decision; and 
 (c) the objection decision is to any extent an ineligible income tax remission 
decision; 
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then, this Part has effect, in relation to any review or appeal, as if so much of the 
objection decision as consists of one or more ineligible income tax remission 
decisions were taken to be a separate objection decision. 
14ZS  Ineligible income tax remission decisions 
 (1) An objection decision is an ineligible income tax remission decision if it relates 
to the remission of additional tax payable by a taxpayer under the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (other than Division 11 of former Part IIIAA), except where the 
additional tax is payable under former section 163B, 224, 225, 226, 226G, 226H, 
226J, 226K, 226L or 226M of that Act, whatever its amount, or is payable under a 
provision of former Part VII of that Act other than any of the preceding sections 
and its amount, after the decision is made, exceeds: 
 (a) in the case of additional tax payable under former section 222 of that Act 
because of the refusal or failure to furnish a return, or any information, relating 
to a year of income—the amount calculated, in respect of the period 
commencing on the last day allowed for furnishing the return or information 
and ending on: 
 (i) the day on which the return or information is furnished; or 
 (ii) the day on which the assessment of the additional tax is made; 
  whichever first happens, at the rate of 20% per year of the tax properly payable 
by the taxpayer in respect of the year of income; or 
 (d) if the amount calculated in accordance with paragraph (a) is less than $20—
$20. 
 (2) A reference in this section to a provision of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
includes a reference to that provision as applied by any other Act. 
Division 3—Taxation objections 
14ZU  How taxation objections are to be made 
  A person making a taxation objection must: 
 (a) make it in the approved form; and 
 (b) lodge it with the Commissioner within the period set out in section 14ZW; and 
 (c) state in it, fully and in detail, the grounds that the person relies on. 
Note: A person who objects against the Commissioner’s failure to make a private 
ruling must lodge a draft private ruling with the objection: see subsection 
359-50(4). 
14ZV  Limited objection rights in the case of certain amended taxation decisions 
  If the taxation objection is made against a taxation decision, being an assessment or 
determination that has been amended in any particular, then a person’s right to 
object against the amended assessment or amended determination is limited to a 
right to object against alterations or additions in respect of, or matters relating to, 
that particular. 
14ZVA  Limited objection rights because of objection against private ruling 
  If there has been a taxation objection against a private ruling, then the right of 
objection under this Part against an assessment, or against a decision made under an 
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indirect tax law or an excise law, relating to the matter ruled is limited to a right to 
object on grounds that neither were, nor could have been, grounds for the taxation 
objection against the ruling. 
14ZW  When taxation objections are to be made 
 (1) Subject to this section, the person must lodge the taxation objection with the 
Commissioner within: 
 (aa) if the taxation objection is made under section 175A of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936: 
 (i) if item 1, 2 or 3 of the table in subsection 170(1) of that Act applies to the 
assessment concerned—2 years after notice of the assessment is given to 
the person; or 
 (ii) otherwise—4 years after notice of the assessment concerned is given to 
the person; or 
 (aaa) if the taxation objection is made under section 78A of the Fringe Benefits Tax 
Assessment Act 1986 or former section 160AL of the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1936—4 years after notice of the taxation decision to which it relates has been 
given to the person; or 
 (aab) if the taxation objection is made under section 292-245 of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1997—4 years after notice of the assessment concerned is given 
to the person; or 
 (ab) if the taxation objection is a delayed administration (beneficiary) objection 
made under subsection 260-145(5) in Schedule 1 (because of paragraph (a) of 
that subsection) or subsection 220(3) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (not 
including that subsection as applied by any other Act)—4 years after notice of 
the taxation decision to which it relates has been first published; or 
 (ac) if the taxation objection is a delayed administration (trustee) objection made 
under subsection 260-145(5) in Schedule 1 (because of paragraph (b) of that 
subsection) or subsection 220(7) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (not 
including that subsection as applied by any other Act)—4 years after probate of 
the will, or letters of administration of the estate, of the deceased person 
concerned has been granted; or 
 (a) if the taxation objection is a delayed administration (beneficiary) objection to 
which paragraph (ab) does not apply—60 days after notice of the taxation 
decision to which it relates has been first published; or 
 (b) if the taxation objection is a delayed administration (trustee) objection to which 
paragraph (ac) does not apply—60 days after probate of the will, or letters of 
administration of the estate, of the deceased person concerned has been 
granted; or 
 (ba) if the taxation objection is an objection under subsection 359-50(3) in 
Schedule 1 against the Commissioner’s failure to make a private ruling—60 
days after the end of the period of 30 days referred to in that subsection; or 
 (bb) if the taxation objection is made under section 66 of the Petroleum Resource Rent 
Tax Assessment Act 1987 to an assessment under that Act—4 years after notice 
of the assessment is given to the person; or 
 (bd) if the taxation objection is made under section 20P of the Superannuation 
(Unclaimed Money and Lost Members) Act 1999 against a notice given to a 
superannuation provider under section 20C of that Act and the person is not 
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the superannuation provider—2 years after the notice was given to the 
superannuation provider; or 
 (be) if the taxation objection is made under section 20P of the Superannuation 
(Unclaimed Money and Lost Members) Act 1999 against a decision under Division 4 
or 5 of Part 3A of that Act and the person is not a superannuation provider (as 
defined in that Act)—2 years after the person was given notice of the decision; 
or 
 (c) in any other case—60 days after notice of the taxation decision to which it 
relates has been served on the person. 
 (1AAA) The person must lodge the taxation objection against a reviewable indirect tax 
decision (within the meaning of section 105-40 in Schedule 1) before the end of 
whichever of the following ends last: 
 (a) the 60 days after notice of the decision was served on the person; 
 (b) the 4 years after the end of the tax period, or after the importation of goods, to 
which the decision relates. 
 (1AAB) The person cannot lodge a taxation objection against a private indirect tax ruling 
after the end of whichever of the following ends last: 
 (a) 60 days after the ruling was made; 
 (b) 4 years after the end of the tax period, or after the importation of goods, to 
which the ruling relates. 
 (1A) The person cannot lodge a taxation objection against a private ruling (other than a 
private indirect tax ruling, or a ruling that relates to an excise law) that relates to a 
year of income after the end of whichever of the following ends last: 
 (a) 60 days after the ruling was made; 
 (b) whichever of the following is applicable: 
 (i) if item 1, 2 or 3 of the table in subsection 170(1) of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 applies to the person’s assessment for that income 
year—2 years after the last day allowed to the person for lodging a return 
in relation to the person’s income for that year of income; 
 (ii) otherwise—4 years after that day. 
 (1AA) The person cannot lodge a taxation objection against a private ruling that relates to a 
year of tax and a petroleum project under the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Assessment 
Act 1987 after the end of whichever of the following ends last: 
 (a) the 60 days after the ruling was made; 
 (b) the 4 years after the last day allowed to the person for lodging a return in 
relation to the year of tax and the project. 
 (1B) If: 
 (a) section 14ZV applies to a taxation objection; and 
 (b) apart from this subsection, subparagraph (1)(aa)(ii) or paragraph (1)(aaa), (aab), 
(ab), (ac) or (bb) would apply to the taxation objection;  
the person must lodge the taxation objection before the end of whichever of the 
following ends last: 
 (c) the 4 years after notice of the assessment or determination that has been 
amended by the amended assessment or amended determination to which the 
taxation objection relates has been served on the person; 
288     
Federal Judicial Review in Australia 
288 
 (d) the 60 days after the notice of the amended assessment or amended 
determination to which the taxation objection relates has been served on the 
person.  
 (1BA) If: 
 (a) section 14ZV applies to a taxation objection; and 
 (b) apart from this subsection, subparagraph (1)(aa)(i) would apply to the taxation 
objection; 
the person must lodge the taxation objection before the end of whichever of the 
following ends last: 
 (c) 2 years after notice of the assessment or determination that has been amended 
by the amended assessment or amended determination to which the taxation 
objection relates has been served on the person; 
 (d) 60 days after the notice of the amended assessment to which the taxation 
objection relates has been served on the person. 
 (1BB) If: 
 (a) the taxation objection is against an assessment by the Commissioner of the 
amount of an administrative penalty under Division 284; and 
 (b) that penalty relates to an assessment of the person; and 
 (c) the person has longer than 60 days to lodge a taxation objection against the 
assessment referred to in paragraph (b); 
the person must lodge the taxation objection within that longer period. 
 (1C) For the purposes of paragraph (1B)(c), if an assessment or determination has been 
amended more than once, the notice is the notice of the first assessment or 
determination in relation to the year of income, franking year or year of tax, as the 
case requires. 
 (2) If the period within which an objection by a person is required to be lodged has 
passed, the person may nevertheless lodge the objection with the Commissioner 
together with a written request asking the Commissioner to deal with the objection 
as if it had been lodged within that period. 
 (3) The request must state fully and in detail the circumstances concerning, and the 
reasons for, the person’s failure to lodge the objection with the Commissioner 
within the required period. 
14ZX  Commissioner to consider applications for extension of time  
 (1) After considering the request, the Commissioner must decide whether to agree to it 
or refuse it. 
 (2) The Commissioner must give the person written notice of the Commissioner’s 
decision. 
 (3) If the Commissioner decides to agree to the request, then, for the purposes of this 
Part, the objection is taken to have been lodged with the Commissioner within the 
required period. 
 (4) If the Commissioner decides to refuse the request, the person may apply to the 
Tribunal for review of the decision. 
          289
Appendix L: Taxation Administration Act Part IVC 
289 
14ZY  Commissioner to decide taxation objections 
 (1) Subject to subsection (1A), if the taxation objection has been lodged with the 
Commissioner within the required period, the Commissioner must decide whether 
to: 
 (a) allow it, wholly or in part; or 
 (b) disallow it. 
 (1A) If the taxation objection is an objection under subsection 359-50(3) in Schedule 1 
against the Commissioner’s failure to make a private ruling, the Commissioner must: 
 (a) make a private ruling in the same terms as the draft ruling lodged with the 
objection; or 
 (b) make a different private ruling. 
 (2) Such a decision is in this Part called an objection decision. 
 (3) The Commissioner must cause to be served on the person written notice of the 
Commissioner’s objection decision. 
14ZYA  Person may require Commissioner to make an objection decision 
 (1) This section applies if the taxation objection (other than one under subsection 
359-50(3) in Schedule 1) has been lodged with the Commissioner within the required 
period and the Commissioner has not made an objection decision by whichever is 
the later of the following times: 
 (a) the end of the period (in this section called the original 60-day period) of 60 
days after whichever is the later of the following days: 
 (i) the day on which the taxation objection is lodged with the Commissioner; 
 (ii) if the Commissioner decides under section 14ZX to agree to a request in 
relation to the taxation objection—the day on which the decision is made; 
 (b) if the Commissioner, by written notice served on the person within the original 
60-day period, requires the person to give information relating to the taxation 
objection—the end of the period of 60 days after the Commissioner receives 
that information. 
 (2) The person may give the Commissioner a written notice requiring the Commissioner 
to make an objection decision. 
 (3) If the Commissioner has not made an objection decision by the end of the period of 
60 days after being given the notice, then, at the end of that period, the 
Commissioner is taken to have made a decision under subsection 14ZY(1) to 
disallow the taxation objection. 
14ZYB  Requiring Commissioner to make a private ruling 
 (1) This section applies if the taxation objection is an objection under subsection 
359-50(3) in Schedule 1 against the Commissioner’s failure to make a private ruling 
and the Commissioner has not made an objection decision by the end of 60 days 
after the later of these days: 
 (a) the day on which the taxation objection was lodged with the Commissioner; 
 (b) if the Commissioner decides under section 14ZX to agree to a request in 
relation to the taxation objection—the day on which the decision was made. 
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 (2) The Commissioner is taken, at the end of that 60 day period, to have disallowed the 
objection. 
14ZZ  Person may seek review of, or appeal against, Commissioner’s decision  
  If the person is dissatisfied with the Commissioner’s objection decision (including a 
decision under paragraph 14ZY(1A)(b) to make a different private ruling), the 
person may: 
 (a) if the decision is a reviewable objection decision—either: 
 (i) apply to the Tribunal for review of the decision; or 
 (ii) appeal to the Federal Court against the decision; or 
 (b) otherwise—appeal to the Federal Court against the decision. 
Division 4—AAT review of objection decisions and extension of time refusal decisions 
14ZZA  Modified AAT Act to apply 
  The AAT Act applies in relation to: 
 (a) the review of reviewable objection decisions; and 
 (b) the review of extension of time refusal decisions; and 
 (c) AAT extension applications; 
subject to the modifications set out in this Division. 
14ZZB  Sections 27, 28, 41 and 44A of the AAT Act not to apply to certain decisions 
 (1) Sections 27 and 41 of the AAT Act do not apply in relation to: 
 (a) a reviewable objection decision; or 
 (b) an extension of time refusal decision. 
 (2) Sections 28 and 44A of the AAT Act do not apply in relation to a reviewable 
objection decision. 
14ZZC  Modification of section 29 of the AAT Act 
  Section 29 of the AAT Act applies in relation to a reviewable objection decision as if 
subsections (1) to (6) (inclusive) of that section were omitted and the following 
subsection were substituted: 
 “(1) An application to the Tribunal for a review of a decision: 
 (a) must be in writing; and 
 (b) may be made in accordance with the prescribed form; and 
 (c) must set out a statement of the reasons for the application; and 
 (d) must be lodged with the Tribunal within 60 days after the person making the 
application is served with notice of the decision.”. 
14ZZD  Modification of section 30 of the AAT Act 
  Section 30 of the AAT Act applies in relation to a reviewable objection decision or 
an extension of time refusal decision as if subsection (1A) of that section were 
omitted and the following subsection were substituted: 
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 “(1A) If an application has been made by a person to the Tribunal for the review of a 
reviewable objection decision or an extension of time refusal decision: 
 (a) any other person whose interests are affected by the decision may apply, in 
writing, to the Tribunal to be made a party to the proceeding; and 
 (b) the Tribunal may, in its discretion, by order, if it is satisfied that the person 
making the application consents to the order, make that person a party to the 
proceeding.”. 
14ZZE  Hearings before Tribunal other than Small Taxation Claims Tribunal to be held 
in private if applicant so requests 
  Despite section 35 of the AAT Act, the hearing of a proceeding before the Tribunal, 
other than the Small Taxation Claims Tribunal, for: 
 (a) a review of a reviewable objection decision; or 
 (b) a review of an extension of time refusal decision; or 
 (c) an AAT extension application; 
is to be in private if the party who made the application requests that it be in private. 
14ZZF  Modification of section 37 of the AAT Act 
 (1) Section 37 of the AAT Act applies in relation to an application for review of a 
reviewable objection decision as if: 
 (a) the requirement in subsection (1) of that section to lodge with the Tribunal 
such numbers of copies as is prescribed of statements or other documents 
were instead a requirement to lodge with the Tribunal such numbers of copies 
as is prescribed of: 
 (i) a statement giving the reasons for the decision; and 
 (ii) the notice of the taxation decision concerned; and 
 (iii) the taxation objection concerned; and 
 (iv) the notice of the objection decision; and 
 (v) every other document that is in the Commissioner’s possession or under 
the Commissioner’s control and is considered by the Commissioner to be 
necessary to the review of the objection decision concerned; and 
 (vi) a list of the documents (if any) being lodged under subparagraph (v); and 
 (b) the power of the Tribunal under subsection (2) of that section to cause a notice 
to be served containing a statement and imposing a requirement on a person 
were instead: 
 (i) a power to make such a statement and impose such a requirement orally at 
a conference held in accordance with subsection 34(1) of the AAT Act; 
and 
 (ii) a power, by such a notice, to make such a statement and impose a 
requirement that the person lodge with the Tribunal, within the time 
specified in the notice, the prescribed number of copies of each of those 
other documents that is in the person’s possession or under the person’s 
control; and 
 (iii) a power, by such a notice, to make such a statement and impose a 
requirement that the person lodge with the Tribunal, within the time 
specified in the notice, the prescribed number of copies of a list of the 
documents in the person’s possession or under the person’s control 
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considered by the person to be relevant to the review of the objection 
decision concerned. 
 (2) Paragraph (1)(b) does not affect any powers that the Tribunal has apart from that 
paragraph. 
 (3) The imposition of a requirement covered by subparagraph (1)(b)(iii) does not 
prevent the subsequent imposition of a requirement covered by 
subparagraph (1)(b)(ii). 
14ZZG  Modification of section 38 of the AAT Act 
  Section 38 of the AAT Act applies in relation to an application for a review of a 
reviewable objection decision as if the reference to paragraph 37(1)(a) of that Act 
were instead a reference to subparagraph 14ZZF(1)(a)(i) of this Act. 
14ZZJ  Modification of section 43 of the AAT Act 
  Section 43 of the AAT Act applies in relation to: 
 (a) a review of a reviewable objection decision; and 
 (b) a review of an extension of time refusal decision; and 
 (c) an AAT extension application; 
as if the following subsections were inserted after subsection (2B): 
 “(2C) If a hearing of a proceeding for the review of a decision or an AAT extension 
application is not conducted in public, that fact does not prevent the Tribunal from 
publishing its reasons for the decision. 
 “(2D) If: 
 (a) a hearing of a proceeding for the review of a decision or an AAT extension 
application is not conducted in public; and 
 (b)  a notice of appeal has not been lodged with the Federal Court; 
the Tribunal must ensure, as far as practicable, that its reasons for the decision are 
framed so as not to be likely to enable the identification of the person who applied 
for the review. 
 “(2E) In subsections (2C) and (2D): 
reasons for decision includes findings on material questions of fact and references 
to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.”. 
14ZZK  Grounds of objection and burden of proof  
  On an application for review of a reviewable objection decision: 
 (a) the applicant is, unless the Tribunal orders otherwise, limited to the grounds 
stated in the taxation objection to which the decision relates; and 
 (b) the applicant has the burden of proving that: 
 (i) if the taxation decision concerned is an assessment (other than a franking 
assessment)—the assessment is excessive; or 
 (ii) if the taxation decision concerned is a franking assessment—the 
assessment is incorrect; or 
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 (iii) in any other case—the taxation decision concerned should not have been 
made or should have been made differently. 
14ZZL  Implementation of Tribunal decisions  
 (1) When the decision of the Tribunal on the review of a reviewable objection decision 
or an extension of time refusal decision becomes final, the Commissioner must, 
within 60 days, take such action, including amending any assessment or 
determination concerned, as is necessary to give effect to the decision. 
 (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), if no appeal is lodged against the Tribunal’s 
decision within the period for lodging an appeal, the decision becomes final at the 
end of the period. 
14ZZM  Pending review not to affect implementation of taxation decisions 
  The fact that a review is pending in relation to a taxation decision does not in the 
meantime interfere with, or affect, the decision and any tax, additional tax or other 
amount may be recovered as if no review were pending. 
Division 5—Federal Court appeals against objection decisions 
14ZZN  Time limit for appeals 
  An appeal to the Federal Court against an objection decision must be lodged with 
the Court within 60 days after the person appealing is served with notice of the 
decision. 
14ZZO  Grounds of objection and burden of proof 
  In proceedings on an appeal under section 14ZZ to the Federal Court against an 
objection decision: 
 (a) the appellant is, unless the Court orders otherwise, limited to the grounds 
stated in the taxation objection to which the decision relates; and 
 (b) the appellant has the burden of proving that: 
 (i) if the taxation decision concerned is an assessment (other than a franking 
assessment)—the assessment is excessive; or 
 (ii) if the taxation decision concerned is a franking assessment—the 
assessment is incorrect; or 
 (iii) in any other case—the taxation decision should not have been made or 
should have been made differently. 
14ZZP  Order of Federal Court on objection decision 
  Where the Federal Court hears an appeal against an objection decision under 
section 14ZZ, the Court may make such order in relation to the decision as it thinks 
fit, including an order confirming or varying the decision. 
14ZZQ  Implementation of Federal Court order in respect of objection decision 
 (1) When the order of the Federal Court in relation to the decision becomes final, the 
Commissioner must, within 60 days, take such action, including amending any 
assessment or determination concerned, as is necessary to give effect to the decision. 
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 (2) For the purposes of subsection (1): 
 (a) if the order is made by the Federal Court constituted by a single Judge and no 
appeal is lodged against the order within the period for lodging an appeal—the 
order becomes final at the end of the period; and 
 (b) if the order is made by the Full Court of the Federal Court and no application 
for special leave to appeal to the High Court against the order is made within 
the period of 30 days after the order is made—the order becomes final at the 
end of the period. 
14ZZR  Pending appeal not to affect implementation of taxation decisions 
  The fact that an appeal is pending in relation to a taxation decision does not in the 
meantime interfere with, or affect, the decision and any tax, additional tax or other 
amount may be recovered as if no appeal were pending. 
14ZZS  Transfer of certain proceedings to Family Court 
 (1) If: 
 (a) a proceeding is pending in the Federal Court on an appeal under section 14ZZ 
in relation to an objection decision; and 
 (b) the taxation decision to which the objection decision relates was made under 
the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936; 
the Federal Court may, on the application of a party to the proceeding or on its own 
initiative, transfer the proceeding to the Family Court. 
 (2) Subject to subsection (3), if the proceeding is transferred to the Family Court: 
 (a) the Family Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the proceeding; and 
 (b) the Family Court also has jurisdiction to hear and determine matters not 
otherwise within its jurisdiction (whether because of paragraph (a) or 
otherwise): 
 (i) that are associated with matters arising in the proceeding; or 
 (ii) that, apart from subsection 32(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, 
the Federal Court would have had jurisdiction to hear and determine in 
the proceeding; and 
 (c) the Family Court may, in and in relation to the proceeding: 
 (i) grant such remedies; and 
 (ii) make orders of such kinds; and 
 (iii) issue, and direct the issue of, writs of such kinds; 
  as the Federal Court could have granted, made, issued or directed the issue of, 
as the case may be, in and in relation to the proceeding; and 
 (d) remedies, orders and writs granted, made or issued by the Family Court in and 
in relation to the proceeding have effect, and may be enforced by the Family 
Court, as if they had been granted, made or issued by the Federal Court; and 
 (e) appeals lie from judgments of the Family Court given in and in relation to the 
proceeding as if the judgments were judgments of the Federal Court 
constituted by a single Judge of that Court, and do not otherwise lie; and 
 (f) subject to paragraphs (a) to (e) (inclusive), this Act, the regulations, the Federal 
Court of Australia Act 1976, the Rules of the Court made under that Act, and 
other laws of the Commonwealth, apply in and in relation to the proceeding as 
if: 
          295
Appendix L: Taxation Administration Act Part IVC 
295 
 (i) a reference to the Federal Court (other than in the expression “the Court 
or a Judge”) included a reference to the Family Court; and 
 (ii) a reference to a Judge of the Federal Court (other than in the expression 
“the Court or a Judge”) included a reference to a Family Court Judge; and 
 (iii) a reference to the expression “the Court or a Judge” when used in relation 
to the Federal Court included a reference to a Family Court Judge sitting 
in Chambers; and 
 (iv) a reference to a Registrar of the Federal Court included a reference to a 
Registrar of the Family Court; and 
 (v) any other necessary changes were made. 
 (3) If any difficulty arises in the application of paragraphs (2)(c), (d) and (f) in or in 
relation to a particular proceeding, the Family Court may, on the application of a 
party to the proceeding or on its own initiative, give such directions, and make such 
orders, as it considers appropriate to resolve the difficulty. 
 (4) An appeal does not lie from a decision of the Federal Court in relation to the 
transfer of a proceeding under this Part to the Family Court.
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REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW COUNCIL 
1. Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 - Exclusions under Section 19, 1978 
2. Repatriation Appeals, 1979 
3. Review of Import Control and Customs By-Law Decisions, 1979 
4. Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 - Amendments, 1979 
5. Defence Force Ombudsman, 1979 
6. Entry to Cocos (Keeling) Islands and Christmas Island, 1979 
7. Citizenship Review and Appeals System, 1980 
8. Social Security Appeals, 1980 
9. Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Amendment Bill 1980, 1980 
10. Shipping Registration Bill, 1980 
11. Student Assistance Review Tribunals, 1981 
12. Australian Broadcasting Tribunal Procedures, 1981 
13. Commonwealth Employees’ Compensation Tribunal, 1981 
14. Land Use in the ACT, 1981 
15. Australian Federal Police Act 1979: Sections 38 & 39, 1982 
16. Decisions under the Broadcasting and Television Act 1942, 1982 
17. Review of Taxation Decisions by Boards of Review, 1983 
18. Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 - Amendments, 1983 
19. Rights of Review under the Migration Act 1958 and Related Legislation: Interim Report on 
the Constitution of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 1983 
20. Review of Pension Decisions under Repatriation Legislation, 1983 
21. The Structure and Form of Social Security Appeals, 1984 
22. The Relationship Between the Ombudsman and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 1985 
23. Review of Customs and Excise Decisions: Stage Two, 1985 
24. Review of Customs and Excise Decisions: Stage 4: Censorship, 1985 
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25. Review of Migration Decisions, 1985 
26. Review of Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977: Stage 1, 1986 
27. Access to Administrative Review: Stage One Notification of Decisions and Rights of Review, 
1986 
28. Review of Customs and Excise Decisions: Stage Three Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duty Decisions, 1987 
29. Constitution of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 1987 
30. Access to Administrative Review: Provision of Legal and Financial Assistance in 
Administrative Law Matters, 1988 
31. Review of Decisions under Industry Research and Development Legislation, 1988 
32. Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: the Ambit of the Act, 1989 
33. Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: Statements of Reasons for 
Decisions, 1991 
34. Access to Administrative Review by Members of Australia’s Ethnic Communities, 1991 
35. Rule Making by Commonwealth Agencies, 1992 
36. Environmental Decisions and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 1994 
37. Administrative Review and Funding Decisions (A Case Study of Community Services 
Programs), 1994 
38. Government Business Enterprises and Commonwealth Administrative Law, 1995 
39. Better Decisions: review of Commonwealth Merits Review Tribunals, 1995 
40. Open Government: a review of the federal Freedom of Information Act 1982, 1995 
41. Appeals from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to the Federal Court, 1997 
42. The Contracting Out of Government Services, 1998 
43. Administrative Review of Patents Decisions, 1998 
44. Internal Review of Agency Decision Making, 2000 
45. Report on the Council of Australasian Tribunals, 2002 
46. Automated Assistance in Administrative Decision, 2004 
47. The Scope of Judicial Review, 2006 
48. The Coercive Information-Gathering Powers of Government Agencies, 2008 
49. Administrative Accountability in Business Areas Subject to Complex And Specific 
Regulation, 2008 



